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ABSTRACT
Since independence, the economy of Peninsular Malaysia has undergone
drastic changes as a result of uneven development of the structure of pro-
duction in the rural hinterlands and in the urban sectors. How these chan-
ges in the structure of production organization have affected the structure
of employment in different sectors, and how the labor being displaced from
some sectors is re-absorbed in other sectors are the subjects of study in
this dissertation. Specifically, it is argued that there has been an increase
in wage-labor operation in the traditional peasant sectors (fishing, padi
farming and rubber smallholding operation) and that this has contributed to
increasing displacement of labor from these traditional peasant sectors.
Moreover, the expansion of the private plantation and public land develop-
ment sectors have provided insufficient absorption of the labor dislocated
from the traditional peasant sectors; in fact, the plantation sector has
actually displaced large numbers of non-Malay laborers in the post-colonial
period. In spite of increasing landlessness and land-poverty among the land-
based peasantry, rural-urban migration has not been significant up to 1970
as other resoponses - rural land squatting, absorption in the military (for
the rural Malays) and transient contract-labor work (for the rural Chinese) -
were resorted to.
Within the urban sectors, it is found that an increasing concentration
of production in large private corporate enterprises as well as in the public
sector (both the administrative bureaucracy and the public corporation com-
ponents) has occurred, and that this has led to a polarized pattern of urban
labor absorption - increasing share of labor absorbed in the corporate sec-
tor and in the small petty-enterprise/self-employment sector relative to the
small capitalist sector. This relative expansion of the corporate and the
public sectors has resulted in an expansion of a "white-collar" salariat
stratum as well as an industrial wage-working class. A significant differential
in earnings separates the two, with access to the former strongly determined
by educational attainment. Within the latter the commonly alleged existence
of a blue-collar "aristocracy" that enjoys high earnings and job secu-
rity due to significant governmental and union protection is found to
have little empirical support. Instead the concept of a "white-collar
aristocracy" is found to be more appropriate. Finally, a substantial
decline in ethnic segmentation vertically along the occupational hier-
archy is found to have occurred in the post-colonial period although
this was achieved through relative concentration of Malay labor absorp-
tion in the public sector and in large enterprises.
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1CHAPTER ONE INTRODUCTION
In any society, a large segment of its population must be produc-
tively absorbed within a system of labor activities to generate the wealth
that sustains that society. How this labor absorption pattern is determined
- that is, how the social division of labor is structured, and how people
get absorbed and allocated within it - would profoundly affect the socio-
economic wellbeing of the individuals involved as well as their social
relationships with each other. Moreover, in the course of economic deve-
lopment, the pattern of labor absorption is constantly being transformed,
and this process of change often results in large-scale dislocation of people
from their occupations and communities. The process whereby these displaced
laborers are re-absorbed and re-integrated within the economic system
needs neither be smooth norself-equilibrating; indeed, the phenomena of
increasing displacement of peasant labor in the course of rural modernization
and of widening urban social stratification in the face of increasing
spatial mobility of labor are both manifestations of the unevenness of this
labor absorption process
This dissertation attempts to study the dynamics of this labor
absorption process in one developing society, Peninsular Malaysia, in the
course of its post-colonial economic development. More specifically, this
study attempts to analyze empirically how changes in the structure of
production organization transform the pattern of labor absorption in the
rural as well as urban sectors. It also attempts to analyze the impact
of these changes on the pattern of employment segmentation by ethnic groups
that was previously maintained under colonial rule.
21.1 Background on Peninsular Malaysia
Peninsular Malaysia, or Malaya for short, is a multi-ethnic
society consisting of the three major ethnic groups: Malay (53%),
Chinese (35%) and Indian (11%). As a territorial unit it was colonized
by Britain in progressive stages from the late 18th century, and did not
become politically independent until 1957. The historical forces that
shaped the development of the structure of the colonial economy were
complex (see, e.g., Li Dun Jen (1955), Stockwell (1976), and Jomo (1977));
but it suffices to note here that, as a consequence of colonial rule, the
economy of Peninsular Malaysia at the eve of independence was characterized
by a productive structure heavily geared towards primary export commodity
production (mainly rubber and tin) and largely dominated by British
colonial capital. Built largely to service these export industries,
a network of commercial and financial activities was spawned. These
raw-material extraction and associated commercial activities, together
with the development of the colonial administrative bureaucracy and
consumption servicing activities, had given rise to a whole hierarchy of
towns superimposed upon a rural hinterland consisting of enclaves of
plantations/mines and a more dispersed agricultural peasantry. Few
industrial activities developed in these urban towns, however, due to
active colonial policy to foster dependence on imports of consumer goods
from the colonial industrial center itself.
Within such a colonial economic structure, different systems
of labor utilization had evolved: e.g., resident wage-labor in plantations,
indentured or transient hired labor in the mines, wage employment in the
public bureaucracy and large colonial corporate firms, family labor
3operations in various urban consumption services, and a variety of peasant
labor operations in rural agriculture. However, these different forms of
employment had been distributed very unevenly among the different ethnic
groups; for the same historical forces that shaped this colonial economic
structure had also determined the process of labor absorption and allocation
within it. The historical process of Indian, Chinese and Indonesian labor
immigration to Malaya and their subsequent pattern of absorption and
distribution within the Malayan colonial economy has been widely studied
(e.g., Parmer (1960), Jackson (1961), Simoniya (1961), Saudhu (1969),
Shamsul Bahrin (1965), et al.); we shall only note here that a significant
consequence of this historical labor absorption process has been the
segmentation of labor activities along ethnic and even subethnic group
lines. Thus, the majority of Malay (including immigrant Indonesian) labor
was in rural peasant agricultural production, except for a small upper
aristocratic stratum that was absorbed into the colonial bureaucracy, and
a small number that was engaged in the institutions of the military, police
and teaching; the Indians were mainly confined to wage labor in estates
or in the public infrastructure and service sectors, while mining, urban
commercial, and industrial activities involved mainly Chinese labor. As a
result, not only was there significant spatial segregation of the labor
force along ethnic lines (both in terms of place of work and community of
residence), but even when in the same location, segmentation by production
activity and occupational specialization tended to occur. On the one hand,
this condition of ethnic segmentation constrained the amount of social
interaction and intercultural integration between the members of the
different ethnic groups; on the other hand, it led to the development of
certain economic relationships that were potentially conflicting along
4ethnic lines (e.g., Chinese middleman vs. Malay peasant producer,
Indian Chettian moneylender vs. Malay peasant producer).
In the two decades or so since Independence, a drastic pace of
transformation of the colonial economy has occurred. In the rural
hinterland front, a massive two-pronged rural development program has been
pursued. One prong consists of the large-scale introduction of productivity-
raising technological transformation in the traditional rural peasant
production sectors (double-cropping and 'Green Revolution' development in
major padi farming areas, replanting with high-yielding material in rubber
smallholdings, and mechanization of gear and boats in fishing), while the
other prong involves a large-scale public land development and settlement
program that seeks to expand the land resources under production. At the
same time, in the urban non-agricultural front, a rapid program of
industrialization and commercialization has been pushed. This program is
based on the encouragement of foreign investment and active Government
promotional activities (tariff protection, investment incentives, transport
infrastructure development for regional submarket integration, and other
social overhead capital formation and services). The pace of urban
industrial, commercial and financial development has been further hastened
since 1970 with the formulation of the New Economic Policy (NEP) to promote
the growth of a modern industrial-commercial Malay elite. This has led to
a great expansion of direct public-sector participation in ownership and
control over all spheres of economic activity.
How have all these post-colonial developments transformed the
colonial pattern of labor absorption? Has it led to an increased labor
employment capacity in the rural hinterland sectors relative to rural labor
force growth, or has it contributed to displacing rural labor from the
5hinterland? And has it led to a rise in wage-labor relations in the rural
peasant sectors? Has the urban industrial-commercial development led to
an increase in the group of independent family producers or has it led to
their gradual replacement by wage employment in increasingly large corporate
firms? And has there been an increase in occupational mobility in the
urban areas? How have these changes affected the pattern of social
stratification previously maintained under colonial rule? Has the colonial
pattern of ethnic segmentationof the labor force been broken dow-n, or has
it been replaced by new forms of segmentation? These are some of the
questions that we hope to address through a concrete empirical case study.
Before we attempt to formulate our framework of approach more
systematically and precisely, a brief review of the main existing
theoretical approaches is in order.
1.2 Review of existing theoretical frameworks of approach
At the most general level, the process of labor absorption can be
viewed as the interaction of three interrelated sets of factors:
a) the supply characteristics of the labor force and its growth
over time;
b) the structure of production that generates the employment
opportunities; and
c) the conditions of access and mechanisms of distribution of
labor into the employment positions generated by the structure of production.
The interaction of these factors is illustrated schematically in
Figure 1.1. In the course of economic development, each of these factors
can change autonomously as well as in feedback response adjustment to each
other. Moreover, the resultant pattern of employment distribution would have
6General schematic of labor absorption processFigure 1.1
7significant impact on the pattern of social stratification.
Any attempt at.understanding the dynamics of this labor absorption
process must begin with appropriate concepts for characterizing each of
these interrelated sets of factors and how they interact. Different conceptual
assumptions as to which aspects of these factors are of relevance may lead
to a different understanding. In particular, the process of economic
development involves three interrelated aspects of change in the structure
of production which may affect the employment structure:
i) changes in the output product mix to be produced: e.g., the
shift from agricultural production to non-agricultural goods production,
or the shift within the latter from light consumer goods production to
heavy capital goods production. Corresponding to such changes in the
output mix are changes in the production activity pattern (including
changes in the input-output linkage structure).
ii) changes in the technology of production within a particular
production activity or industrial sector, e.g., the shift from one type of
gear to another in fishing, or the introduction of tractors in place of
draught animals for land prepartion in padi production. Corresponding to
such changes in the technology of production are changes in the intensities
of factor input utilization as well as changes in the productivity of labor.
iii) changes in the structure of production organization, i.e.,
changes in how a particular production activity is distributed among
different production units, and how these individual production units are
internall-y organized in terms of the structure of ownership of the factors of
production and the structure of control and utilization of labor. The
structure of production organization largely determines the mode of
employment (family labor, wage labor, etc.) as well as the conditions of
access to employment.
8How one conceptualizes the relevance of these different aspects
of production structure as factors determining employment distribution
would affect one's understanding of the overall labor absorption process.
Moreover, to a large e xtent, one's choice of which social stratification
consequences of the labor absorption process to focus on is largely
determined by one's overall view of the objective of economic development
(maximizing growth, realizing social equality, etc.).
At the risk of oversimplification, the mainstream approaches to
the study of employment can be classified into two groups which we will call
the 'old orthodox' view and the 'new orthodox' view.
Basically, the 'old orthodox' view sees economic development
solely from the perspective of maximizing production growth, and thus its
concern with the structure of production is confined primarily to the
first and second aspects (the production activity pattern aspect and the
production technology aspect), with the third aspect (production organization
structure) either abstracted away or implicitly assumed as irrelevant.
Employment is thus viewed only from its productivity aspect, and employment
changes are assumed to follow from the production growth rates and
output-labor productivity ratios of different sectors (which in turn are
assumed to follow either planned targets or projections of technological
development). Access to employment is seen as determined by a more or less
perfectly competitive labor market, with the employment structure being
interpreted as the competitive equilibrium between labor supply and demand.
The social stratification effect is generally ignored, it being assumed that
maximizing aggregate output and productivity growth would maximize welfare
for all--more or less.
9This 'old orthodox' conceptual view is most evident in many
official LDC macro-manpower planning/projection studies (see Mehmet (1972)
and literature cited therein), although it is also implicit in much of the
economic development literature in the fifties and sixties (e.g., the
technological dualism model of Ranis and Fei (1965)). While useful as a
rough guide to aggregate changes in the magnitude of employment relative to
supply, this 'macro-manpower projection' approach has been increasingly
criticized recently for its relative inability to make useful predictions
as well as its inability to enhance one's understanding of the actual
processes of change involved (see critique by Mehmet (1972)).' While we
share very much with this critique, we are more concerned with the fact
that such an approach, by abstracting away the production organizational
aspect of change, ends up totally ignoring or obscuring the social
differentiation consequences that are largely due to changes in production
organization structure. Thus, this approach fails to inform us as to
whether independent owner-producers are being reduced to wage labor for
others in the process of economic development (and if so, why); whether
(and how) labor is losing control over the production process, or is being
dislocated by technological innovations; whether the labor force has become
increasingly segmented into unequal economic functional roles or has become
increasingly socially mobile as a result of changes in how production is
organized.
The inadequacy of this 'old orthodox' approach becomes more glaring
in the early seventies with the increasing realization of the failure of
economic development in most LDCs to alleviate problems of poverty or to
provide adequate employment (Turnham (1971), ILO (1970), Bairoch (1975)).
This disillusion with the !old orthodox' view has led to the emergence of a
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fnew orthodoxy,' whereby 'employment' creation becomes an important concern
in addition to growth in production. Moreover, one aspect of the social
stratification consequences of the labor absorption process--that of income
distribution in general and 'poverty groups' in particular--is now given
attention.
Nevertheless, the focus of analysis and policy prescription
concerning the impact of production structure on employment is still
largely confined to the first and second aspects (production activity pattern
and production technology aspects). This is because what is central to this
new approach is the view that poverty is due solely to either inadequate
employment (unemployment or underemployment) or low productivity employment,
and that a strategy of growth with poverty alleviation would :still consist of
raising labor productivity through technological innovation and sectoral
shift from 'low productivity' sectors to 'high productivity' sectors. In
contrast to the 'old orthodox' view, this second approach acknowledges that
maximization of aggregate growth may not provide adequate employment to all
or help improve the position of 'poverty groups' in some low productivity
sectors, and thus a proper 'trade-off' between aggregate growth and
employment has to be promoted by the public sector (through subsidizing
technological change in the 'low productivity' sectors and providing
incentives for the expansion of employment in the 'high productivity' sectors
if necessary).
Implicit in this (as well as in the 'old orthodox') approach is
the assumption that the choice of technology or the relative growth of
labor productivities in different sectors of activities can be addressed
independently of the structure of production organization. Similarly, the
icnome return to labor is assumed to depend only on the labor productivity
of the sector it is in, and is independent of the structure of ownership
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and control or of the mode of employment. Both of these assumptions are
false.
Moreover, while this second view improves on the first one by
recognizing that the labor market may be 'imperfect' due to 'distortion'
by 'institutional' factors (and hence the employment structure may not
be assumed to automatically reflect desirable labor allocation or income
distribution), its basic approach remains faulty with its inadequate
attention to how these "institutional distortions" themselves are
determined. The major focus of concerns tends to be on the individual
laborer and his response to exogenously given or assumed labor market
structural conditions, rather than on how the organization of production
units actually shapes these structural conditions. Consequently, many of
the assumptions concerning the nature of labor markets that go into
studies adopting this apporach are often either overly simplistic or
wrong. As we shall argue in the course of this dissertation's empirical
documentation, many of the assumptions implicit in the widely popularized
'formal' vs. 'informal' sector dualization model of the urban employment
structure were often unproven or wrong, even though a whole edifice of LDC
urban employment studies and rural-urban migrational analyses (e.g., the
'Todao' school ) has been built on these assumptions. Indeed, a growing
body of critical literature, mainly by anthropologists whose fieldworks
have brought them to confront these assumptions directly (e.g., Peattie (1975),
Moser (1977), Lubeck (1977) and Breman (1976)), is beginning to emerge,
calling into question much of the implicit assumptions in such approaches.
In summary, our critique of the two mainstream approaches is that
they fail to take into account the impact of production organization structure
on employment; and, as a result, they tend no.t only to provide an inadequate
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understanding of the dynamics of the labor absorption process, but also
to leave out of consideration those aspects of this process that are most
crucial for understanding the social stratification of the labor force.
This dissertation attempts to adopt a conceptual view different
from the two mainstream approaches. Rather than abstracting away the effect
of production organization structure on the labor absorption process,
we choose to put primary focus on this relationship.
The starting point of our alternative approach is the view that
labor activities take place within specific units of production organization,
and that different systems of organizing production give rise to different
conditions of employment access and labor utilization strategies as well as
different social stratification consequences. From this viewpoint, therefore,
it is the structure of production organization--i.e., how a particular
economic activity is being distributed among different types of production
units, and how these different types of units are internally organized--that
largely determines where and how labor is being absorbed and utilized. Rather
than view the process whereby labor is absorbed into employment from the
perspective of the individual laborers confronting an undifferentiated
perfectly competitive labor market demand (or one largely so except for
certain 'institutional' distortions), this approach focuses on how the
conditions of access to different employment positions are actually shaped
by the production units that generate such employment. An understanding of
how the production organization structure itself is determined, and how it
changes in the course of economic development, thus becomes central for
explaining the dynamics of labor absorption over time. Thus, the effects of
technological changes on labor absorption are to be analyzed through their
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impact on the structure of production organization; similarly, the impacts
of shifts in the sectoral pattern of economic activities on employment are
to be interpreted through the changes in production organization structure
associated with such shifts. Finally, the impacts of public policies are
to be assessed not just from the macro view of their effect on overall
productivities and employment creation capacities alone, but from t heir
likely differential impacts on different production units, and how these
uneven impacts may also affect the labor force unevenly. Figure 1.2
summarizes this alternative view adopted in this dissertation.
Given the central importance we have thus attached to the concept
of production organization structure in analyzing the labor absorption
process, we shall attempt to develop and elaborate more systematically on
this concept in the next section (Section 1.3) before turning to discuss its
application in our case study of Peninsular Malaysia in Section 1.4.
Sectoral pattern of Technology of
production activities production in
each activity
Production organization
structure of each
Conditions of activity
Labor force employment distribution of
acces labo for) Employment Structureaccess labor force
Social stratification
pattern
View adopted in this dissertationFigure 1. 2
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1.3 Production organization and its impact on employment: conceptual
formulation
1.3.1 The concept of a production unit
Every economic activity involving a labor process consists of
two elements:
i) the laborer's productive power
ii) the non-labor factors of production, consisting of the objects being
processed and transformed by labor (raw materials) and the instruments
with which this processing is carried out (machinery, tools, energy
sources, and technology (both physically embodied and disembodied)).
These two sets of factors of production have to be brought together
and organized within a specific production unit by an organizer who has
overall control over the production process. Different systems of production
organization can be distinguished according to:
(1) the relationship among (i) the organizer of the production unit;
(ii) the owner of the non-labor factors of production; and (iii) the
direct laborer. (The term 'organizer,' towner,' and 'laborer' for the
purpose of our discussion here shall denote either individuals or groups
of individuals (e.g., a family); where there is a need to be more specific,
appropriate qualifying adjectives will be added.)
(2) the orientation of the production unit.
As we shall elaborate below, the two considerations are interrelated.
At the most general level, two 'pure types' of production unit can
be identified, those of the own-labor unit or the hired-labor unit, depending
on whether the organizer is also the laborer. Starting from this basic
distinction, we can introduce further distinctions progressively by taking into
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consideration relationships with the owner of the non-labor production factors
as well as the type of hired-labor system; Figure 1.3 illustrates one way
that this can be done in the case of agricultural production units. Before
we pursue this question of further differentiation more systematically,
however, it is useful to note first the interrelationship between the basic
characterization of production units and their orientation of production,
and to identify their differing labor utilization and- employment access
characteristics.
Orientations of production unit
At the risk of oversimplification, we can say that there are three
different primary orientations that an organizer of a production unit can have:
i) to produce a direct consumption good for subsistence or home use by the
laborer himself, or for sale in the market to generate an income return
to the laborer;
ii) to realize a profit return to capital investment by the organizer;
iii) to provide a social service to the general public (or particular socio-
economic groups) who are not involved in the production unit themselves.
For convenience we shall refer to production units operating under
these different orientations as labor-oriented units, commercial (or 'capitalist')
units, and public service units, respectively.
The last case pertains only to public sector organized units, whose
peculiar characteristics require a separate discussion by itself later (see p.29 ).
Confining our discussion for the time being only to the first two types of
orientations, it can be said that the first case generally holds where the
organizer is also the laborer (i.e., when the unit is own-labor operated),
Production unit
organizer-labor
(own-labor)
I I ---
Non-organizer labor
(hired labor)
single fa
farm (ind
household
Owned land Rented land Wage system bonded labor system
(owner operation) (tenant operation) ('free' hired ('non-free' hired labor)
labor)
mily Many families
ividual (cooperative or Public enter- Private
farms) collective farms) prises (e.g. enterprises
state-owned (e.g. capitalist
plantations) farms, modern
plantations)
fixed
rents
in cash in kind
sharing
rents
debt-bondage
(e.g. early
plantations
with indentured
labor)
permanent bondage
(e.g. farm based on
slave labor)
Figure 1.3 Categorization of Agricultural Production Units
I1
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while the second case tends to be more relevant where non-organizer labor
(i.e., hired labor) utilization is significant. Thus, conceptually, much of
the traditional independent peasant household farming units can be described
as labor-oriented units, as are much of the small-scale self-employment in
the urban 'informal' sector. In principle, labor-oriented units need not be
small-scale, since large-scale collective or cooperative farming can also
be understood as units with largely a labor orientation. In practice,
however, in an economy based mainly on private ownership of factors of
production and with no large viable labor cooperatives, labor-oriented units
tend to be largely individual labor or family enterprises. In what follows,
therefore, we shall largely confine our analysis of own-labor or labor-oriented
units to family or individual labor enterprises.
This distinction between labor orientation and investment-return
orientation is crucial for understanding the differing labor allocation and
utilization strategies of own-labor units and hired-labor units.
Labor utilization strategy:
In a family-labor operated unit, the organizer (usually the head of
household) is committed first and foremost to realize a minimal level of
return to meet the needs of the family members. It is thus committed to
utilize as much family labor as is required to achieve this minimum return
from production. After this is met, if there is still surplus labor
available, this extra labor will be further utilized up to an 'income-leisure'
tradeoff reversal point. Thus, if there is no other available work
opportunity providing higher return than that provided from within the
family-operated unit, the family-operated unit is committed to utilize all
available family labor, through work-sharing or a higher labor intensity of
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('involution') if necessary, to achieve the level of return it needs.
Put another way, for a family-labor unit, the labor supply is given and
the production strategy is to maximize the return to labor (at least
up to its 'income-leisure' reversal point).
A commercially operated unit utilizing hired labor, on the other
hand, is organized for the purpose of maximizing the net return to the
organizer (rather than to the direct laborers). The share of production
return going to the hired labor is taken instead as a cost of production,
just like the cost of acquiring or utilizing other non-labor production
factors. Depending on whether the system of utilizing hired labor involves
fixed cost ('non-free' hired labor) or variable cost ('free' wage-labor),
the labor utilization strategy is different. In the former case of
'non-free' or bonded labor (e.g., indentured labor, slave labor), the
cost of labor use consists of an initial acquisition cost plus subsequent
expenditures for keeping the labor alive and working, which is thus
more or less independent of the actual intensity of use of the labor, i.e.,
'fixed.' In such a case, the utilization strategy would therefore be to
maximize labor use, i.e., to extract as much work from the labor as
possible, since higher use involves no extra cost. (Note, however, that
this pertains to labor already acquired only. Thus, when demand for labor
goes up, the organizer's response may be to increase the rate of utilization
of existing labor, rather than to acquire more laborers (since this would
require extra labor cost). In the latter case of 'free' hired labor or
free wage-labor, however, the cost of labor use is variable and depends on
the rate of labor use. The strategy of labor utilization thus depends on
the marginal contribution of each extra unit of labor input versus its cost,
and the actual intensity of labor use is made a function of the production
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technology adopted, which in turn is determined from overall profit-return
maximization. If labor cost goes up relative to other costs, capital-labor
substitution may be induced to reduce labor use; moreover, if the production
level is lowered and labor need reduced, the surplus hired labor would
simply be retrenched or 'fired'; no work-sharing, 'disguised-employment,'
or other 'involution' responses would be induced as in the case of
own-labor operation.
Relationship between technology and production organization
From the above discussion, it is clear that the choice of
technology is closely related to the production organization characteristics.
Indeed, in an economy where non-labor production factors are largely
privately owned, the extent of control individuals can exert over production
depends mainly on the size of the capital assets that they own. Hence, to
the extent that ownership of capital assets is unevenly distributed, as the
size of the capital requirement of a particular production technology goes up
(either due to increase in the scale of operation or increase in the capital
intensity, or both), fewer individuals would be in a position to acquire
ownership and control of that technology. In particular, to the extent
that most direct labor producers do not own many capital assets and that
no viable labor cuoperative exists, it can be expected that (1) the higher
the capital requirement of a production technology is, the smaller will be
the possibility of own-labor production units utilizing it; (2) as production
technologies of increasingly higher capital requirements are introduced
into a production activity, a decline in the proportion of own-labor units
operating in that activity will occur; (3) own-labor mode of operation tends
to be more significant in those activities with low capital input requirements.
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Mode of employment access and displacement
A basic distinction also exists between the conditions of access
to employment as an organizer of one's own production unit (whether own-labor
or hired-labor unit) and those as hired labor in a production unit organized
by others. In the former case, one either has to be a member of a collective
in control of an existing unit (e.g., a family enterprise) or else one has
to start a unit of one's own. The question is thus one of how the production
unit can be inserted within the economy to realize an adequate return to the
self-employed, and hence the issues involved are the conditions under which
such an insertion is possible. Obviously, the self-employed must have access
to the necessary non-labor capital inputs (either self-owned ('owner
operation') or rented ('tenant operation'), and must also have access to the
appropriate marketing channels or production locations (unless it is engaged
in subsistence production for home consumption). These factors will be
elaborated in greater detail later.
On the other hand, in the case of the hired-labor mode of employment,
the condition of access is governed by the employer's selection criteria as well
as by the degree of competition from other hired-employment seekers. The
different selection criteria that may be adopted by employers in different
types of production units are therefore factors of relevance in concrete
analysis, in addition to the general conditions of labor supply.
The converse of employment access is displacement from an existing
employment position. In the case of hired employment, displacement takes
place through the employer terminating the hiring arrangement. In the case
of self-employment, however, this takes place primarily through the
destruction of the production unit itself; this can happen through the
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organizer of the unit losing access to some essential non-labor production
inputs (e.g., landlord recalls his land) or marketing channel/production
location rights (e.g., government withdraws his license permit), or through
his inability to produce sufficient return from his production (due to
market competition). These observations will be elaborated more concretely
later.
Once the conceptual basis for this basic distinction between the
two "pure types" of production units is grasped, it is important next to
reintroduce other considerations (which up to now have been abstracted away)
that would further differentiate the labor utilization and employment access
characteristics of different production units.
(a) The case of partial own-labor and partial hired-labor operated units
We have so far assumed that a production unit is either own-labor
operated or else hired-labor operated, and that its production activity is
either labor-oriented or commercially oriented. Obviously, there are
'transitional cases' when a mixture of both own and hired labor is involved
and a mixture of orientations present. For example, an urban 'hawker' unit
may start off as a strictly labor-oriented enterprise using only family
labor, but to the extent that it succeeds in expanding its volume of sales,
it may begin to expand its non-labor input investments and also begin to
hire labor help; in the process, it thus becomes more oriented towards
maximizing profit return not only to the fixed capital invested, but also
to the "operating capital" of hiring wage labor. Similarly, many peasant
farms may resort to the use of temporary hired labor, and thus are not
really pure own-labor units. Such 'transitional' cases do not invalidate
the general distinction that we have identified between own-labor units
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and hired-labor units, but they do serve as reminders that concrete analysis
is needed in studying actual production units that have a mixture of
pure type characteristics.
(b) Internal differentiation of labor within the production unit and
stratification of levels of intermediaries in the control structure
We have so far implicitly assumed in our usage of the term
'organizer' and 'laborer' that the role of those denoted by each of these
terms was homogeneous. Further differentiation therefore needs to be
taken into account where this is not the case. Thus, in a family labor
unit, a distinction needs to be made between the head of household who
actually controls production decisions and other family workers (Figure 1.4(a)).
In the case of hired-labor units, a stratification of the hired labor into
a hierarchy of controlling relationships, with the top salaried staff assuming
an organizer role on behalf of the employer/owner, is the modus operandi
of the large modern corporate firms (Figure 1.4(b)).
This stratification of hired labor into different functional roles
within a unit of production corresponds to a need by the employer to maintain
control in a situation of increasing occupational specialization and technical
division of labor, and it has two modifying effects on the basic employment
strategy of a simple hired-labor unit:
(1) the division of labor tasks within a collective production unit means that
the productivity of the individual laborer may be tied to how the rest
of the unit performs, i.e., he cannot be evaluated individually, and
instead it is the productivity of the task or job that is specified in
advance, with the individual labor being fitted into the specified task,
Thus, the evaluation of labor becomes impersonal and ascriptive "screening"
criteria (e.g., education) are used instead.
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Figure 1.4 Differentiation of functional role in production units
A variation of this stratification mechanism is the contract labor
system where the direct control over the hiring and supervision of
production laborers is delegated by the organizer of the production unit
to a labor contractor.
employer
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(2) the mode of employment access may be governed by an internal labor
market, i.e., access to many occupational positions may be governed
by internal promotional policies, and outside labor can only gain
access at certain initial "ports of entry" (usually the bottom of the
occupational hierarchy) (Doeringer and Piore (1972)). Moreover, the
wage payment system may tend to reflect not only the external labor
market conditions, but also the need for an internal wage-contour system
to maintain the legitimacy of the hierarchical labor control relationships
within the enterprise (e.g., supervisors cannot be paid less than the
operatives he supervises, and seniority rules may dictate certain
pay-scale increase patterns).
In addition, of course, the greater differentiation of labor by
functional roles would lead to more complex social stratification patterns.
In particular, it gives rise to a new group of wage workers whose function
is to supervise and control other wage workers. These salaried functionaries
tend to occupy an intermediate position, both in terms of income and social
status, between the employer/owner and the direct laborers. To a large
extent, the differentiation of these salaried functionaries from the direct
laborers may also run along the "white-collar" vs. "manual workers"
distinction (although not all "white-collars" need to perform this
supervisory role).
(c) Further differentiation of the hired-labor system
The difference between 'free! and 'non-free' hired labor systems
has already been identified. Further differentiation of both may be
necessary in concrete analysis. Figure 1.5 has pointed out at least two
forms of 'bonded' labor ('indentured'.labor and 'slave' labor). The
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'apprenticeship' labor system (traditionally practiced in many urban
trades by Chinese in Malaya) can be interpreted as an 'intermediate' form
of 'bonded' labor system. A greater variation in the form of 'free' wage
labor utilization also exists. Thus, the labor hiring arrangement can be
casual and irregular or regular; it can be "unprotected" and hence
insecure (can be terminated at any time without notice or compensation)
or relatively 'protected' (through union bargaining and contractual
guarantees); the payment system can be one based on a fixed wage (in kind
or cash) per unit time of varying duration (hourly, daily, weekly or
monthly) or piece-rate (according to tasks completed); part of the wage
payment can be incorporated in subsistence expenses like housing provision
(resident labor) or other living allowances (medical care, transport,
education for children, etc.); finally, the wage employment may be
mediated through a labor contractor.
Any concrete analysis of the labor absorption dynamics must try
to explain why different hired-labor systems are in operation, how
changes in production organization may affect the kind of hired-labor
systems adopted, and how these different hired-labor systems affect the
overall labor absorption process. Thus, in comparing the desirability of
different wage employments, the nominal wage rate may be a poor guide if
the employment positions involve different degrees of security and upward
mobility prospects. Similarly, labor hired on the contract-labor system
may be retrenched more easily than the directly employed, as may non-
unionized labor in comparison with unionized labor.
(d) The impact of various forms of "external" control
We have so far assumed that the organizer of a production unit
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has complete control over the production process. This need not be so
in practice due to the presence of external controls.
(i) The pres.ence of rentier control over non-labor production factors
Part or all of the non-labor production factors in a production
unit may in fact not be owned by the organizer himself, but rented from
another rentier/financier. For example, in agriculture, tenant operation
is common, where the land cultivated by the farmer is not owned by him,
but rented from a landlord. Similarly, much of urban production activities
may be operated on credits from financiers. The extent to which these
rentier/financier elements may exert control over the production process
(and its output share) may affect the labor utilization characteristics
of the tenant production unit. For example, in tenant farm operation,
the kind of rental arrangement may reflect different degrees of landlord
control--a sharecropping arrangement, or one with the landlord also
controlling the fertilizer supplies, may involve greater landlord control
than the case of fixed-rent leasing. It has been generally assumed by
many economists that sharecropping may depress labor intensity and yield
as compared with fixed-rent leasing. As another example, consider the
"putting-out" system where the laborer owns the production tools but not
the raw materials that are supplied by a financier (who will also purchase
the output). Although under this system the laborers in the individual
units control the organization of their own labor process once they receive
the raw material supplies, it can be argued that the financier also exerts
considerable control (deciding how much work to contract out, etc.), and
that the payment made by the financier to the worker can be considered a
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form of wage. The putting-out system is thus an intermediate case
between own-labor and hired-labor operation, due to the presence of
financier control over part of the production factors.
A second and more drastic way in which rentier control can
affect the employment process is that the rentiers can terminate existing
tenant-operated units or deny the entry of new producers by withholding
from renting the production factors that they own. Indeed, the dislocation
of tenant farmers by landlords taking back their land to cultivate
themselves, and the foreclosure of owner-farmers' land due to inability
to repay debts to usurers have been two widely cited methods whereby
peasant farmers get displaced from their production units. More generally,
the level of insecurity of the production unit operating under rentier
control may be reflected in turn in the insecurity of the labor utilization
arrangement.
Finally, to the extent that rentier extraction reduces the
profitability of tenant production, it may either deter the entry of
potential tenant producers or reduce the viability of existing tenant
production units in their market competition with owner-producers.
(ii) The presence of external control over access to production location
or marketing channel
To the extent that the labor operation of a production unit
requires access to certain production locations or marketing channels
(on the input or output side) that are limited in their availability,
various forms of entry access control may be imposed. For example,
the location or route of certain consumer service activities (e.g., food
catering, retail trade or taxi service) may be spatially limited to a
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few well-established consumer areas or routes due to agglomeration
economies, the relative immobility of consumers, and the cost of
establishing new routes or advertising for new locations. Thus,
government licensing restriction/regulation can limit who, where, how,
and in what volume the activities can be carried out; alternatively, where
the entry rights have passed to private hands, "monopoly" rent can be
imposed for the use of such "rights of access" (as opposed to the use of
non-labor factors of production). An example of such "monopoly renting"
common in many urban service activities is the subletting of licenses
or permits (e.g., taxi and hawker operations).
As an example of market channel access control, the export-import
trades for certain goods may be monopolized by a few traders (e.g., agency
houses); local distributor/middleman units may thus be completely dependent
on these large wholesalers. Similarly, the local small manufacturer
producing on subcontracts from large firms is greatly dependent on the
latter for its operation. As still another example, household farmers in
public land development schemes may be required to sell their output only
to certain public agencies, and thus are different from the truly independent
household farm units in the traditional peasant sector.
The impact of these external control mechanisms on the employment
characteristics of existing production units and on the conditions of access
of new production units may be significant, though its precise nature can be
difficult to discern analytically.. As in the case of rentier control over
the use of non-labor production factors, the degree of insecurity of the
production units under such external control (due to the threat of displacement)
and the possible denial of access to new producers are relevant factors.
Thus, the small manufacturing enterprise operating on subcontract from a large
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firm may utilize wage labor on highly insecure wage arrangements, since
the enterprise's production activity itself is highly uncertain and
fluctuating.
The important point to emerge from this discussion of the
differentiation of organization structure of production units due to
the presence of external control is that the employment characteristics
of production units must be analyzed concretely in each case from the
standpoint of the structure of control (whose actions and decisions have
impact on how labor is utilized?) and the orientation of control (what are
the purposes of the controllers' actions?) involved, rather than mechanically
assumed from some a priori pure-type categorization. Thus, the effect of
passive rentier landlords on tenant farm operations can be very different
from the case of landlords who are commercially minded: the former may
increase rents when productivity-raising technical innovations are introduced,
while the latter may evict the tenants and become commercial farmers
thCmselves utilizing wage labor.
(e) The special case of public-sector organized units
The case of "public-service oriented units" has been mentioned but
not discussed so far beyond noting that it is confined to public-sector
organized enterprises. In principle, such a production unit is organized
on behalf of the "general public" by elected representatives and/or their
appointees. Finance for the enterprise generally comes from the Government
budget (which in turn derives at least in part from taxes), and thus the
Government has the legal ownership. In practice, the extent to which the
"general public" in fact exercises control over these units depends on two
things: the accountability of the management of the unit to the Government,
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and the accountability of the Government to the general public. It can
be said that few (if any) public service units really serve the general
population equally; rather, they tend to serve certain interest groups
more than others, either intentionally or unintentionally (due to certain
groups monopolizing access or manipulating it to their advantage). Indeed,
it has been argued persuasively by Elliott (1975) that the orientation of
many public-sector organized units in LDCs is often to build political
support for the ruling elites and to induce confidence in the existing
government system as much as to provide public services.
Elliott (1975) has developed his argument in a more general
context of analyzing government policies with respect to the control and
use of public-sector owned resources (e.g., public land alienation policies,
license award policies, public-sector operated credit facilities, etc.),
and he has coined the term "con-mech" (confidence mechanism) to generally
describe techniques used by the governing elites to induce confidence of
the disadvantaged population in the existing system. According to him, the
general characteristics of a con-mech are that:
1) it provides opportunities for individual enrichment to only a few, and
hence induces competition among the potential recipients;
2) there is, however, selective biases within this competition favoring
some more than others;
3) however, these biases are not too obvious to those who compete, i.e.,
the system must be sufficiently "open" to retain competitors' confidence
and/or bestow legitimacy on those who compete successfully;
4) it allows those who control the mechanism to acquire direct and/or
indirect benefits in the process.
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Interpreting some public-sector organized production or resource-
distribution units from the framework of their orientation as con-mech
(in addition to providing needed public services) may help to explain
their behavior better. Thus, the expansion of the public bureaucracy
may be understood not only from the standpoint of greater need for
administration and regulation as the economy expands, but perhaps in
addition also from the standpoint of providing favorable employment and
social mobility to a selected group within the population (through selective
biases based on education, race, or "patron-client" contact) and at the same
time legitimizes the bureaucratic elites' gaining greater control over the
economy. Similarly, the allocation strategy of public land settlement
openings may be partly influenced by its use as a con-mech.
In addition, in most LDCs today, there has been a trend toward
the formation of public corporations which have more of a commercial
orientation than a public-service one. For all intents and purposes, these
public corporations' management and employment characteristics may be
little different from the private corporate enterprises.
(f) A digression on the distinction between production, service, marketing
and "transfer" activities
In our discussion so far, we have made no distinction between
different kinds of production activities--in particular, the difference
between production of physical commodities and production of human services,
or the difference between marketing and "transfer"-activities on the one
hand and production activities "proper" on the other. It may perhaps be
argued that the indiscriminate use of the term "production units" to cover
units engaged in purely marketing activities also is misleading, since the
latter involve no production processes in the strict sense, or that they
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do not add to the 'value' of the goods and hence are 'unproductive.'
Similarly, how would one treat the case of "transfer" activities like
robbery and stealing? Does one regard the organized labor unit involved
in such activities as "productive" and thus constitute a 'production unit'?
In attempting to deal with these issues, it is important to
recognize that any attempt at making such hard and fast categorization of
activities as either 'productive' or 'non-productive' is fraught with some
elements of arbitrariness. Thus, most marketing activities also involve
transport labor; to the extent that the transport labor activities involved
in factory production proper are to be counted as productive labor, therefore,
the transport labor component of marketing has to be so recognized. Similarly,
there is a thin line between some retail marketing activities and human
labor service activities, e.g., food catering service, and any attempt at
categorization according to whether "processing and servicing labor" are
involved is bound to be somewhat arbitrary. Finally, whether a labor
activity is considered productive or not depends partly on one's frame of
evaluation. While a clear conceptual resolution of these production
evaluation issues is important in and of itself, for the purpose of our
study, we have basically taken the income-return orientation (whether as
return to labor (labor orientation) or as return to capital investment
(commercial orientation)) of a labor activity as a criterion for defining
a production unit. Thus, all marketing, servicing and "transfer" activities
are regarded as being carried out in specific "production units" to the
extent that they are engaged in to realize an income return. This criterion
is chosen because we are primarily interested in how labor is absorbed and
utilized in different labor activities, rather than on the evaluation of the
"value" or desirability of these activities from some social accounting and
appraisal perspective.
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1.3.2 Changes in the production organization structure over time:
conceptual formulation
We have so far only focused attention on the production organization
and employment characteristics of the different types of production units.
Obviously, any attempt at understanding how the production organization struc-
ture as a whole changes over time must begin by specifying the inter-relation-
ships between the different production units that make up the production
organization structure.
In an economy where commodity production has been generalized
(i.e., where production and consumption are mainly mediated through the
market), different production units in the economy can be inter-related to
each other in three ways:
(1) as competitors for the same input resources and/or the same
output market (competitive relationships)
(2) as the purchaser of output from, or seller of input to, one
another (input/output linkage relationships)
(3) the factor incomes generated by one unit provides the consumer
demand for the output produced by another unit (indirect consumption link-
age)
In particular, these inter-relationships between production units
can be generalized into inter-relationships between production organization
sectors. Thus, the dual-economy framework that underlies much economic
development theorizing is in reality an approach that begins by dividing
the production units in an economy into two production organization sectors
and'then positing various inter-relationships between them.
Depending on the assumptions made about the nature and relative
importance of these different relationships between production units or
production organization sectors, different theories of how production
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organization structure changes in the course of economic development can be
formulated. In particular, the competitive relationship between production
units can be conceived as an unequal one leading to concentration of produc-
tion (i.e., increasing displacement of small production units and monopoli-
zations of production by large units), or a relatively equal one with
relatively little tendency for concentration; the input/output linkage
relationship can be conceived of as one that is mutually complementary and
that stimulates the growth of each sector so linked, or as one that basically
results in the subordination of some (the smaller units) by others (the larger
units); the indirect consumption linkage relationship can be conceived of
as one where the high factor incomes generated by some units (e.g., the
"formal" sector) sustain or stimulate the production of other units (e.g.,
the "informal sector) (i.e., output stimulation effect), or alternatively,
as one where the low output product price of some units (e.g., the "informal"
sector) allows the factor income levels in some other units (e.g., the "formal"
sector) to be kept low (i.e., factor income depression effort). Finally,
production units can be conceived of as autonomous of each other, i.e., the
development of one does not affect the other.
Which of these conceptions are the relevant ones for a particular
economy is a question that should ultimately be decided by empirical evalua-
tion of the concrete situation at hand, although in the development litera-
ture, these different (and often directly opposing) conceptions have been
consolidated into different schools of thought or paradigms of approach.
For example, Tokman (1978) in his review of the dual economy literature,
has identified what he calls a "benign relationship" approach, which sees
the production units in the "formal" and "informal" sectors as being (1)
non-competitive with each other; (2) complementary to each other in terms of
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their input/output relationship; and 3)..linked in such a way that the high
income generated by the "formal" sector sustains the growth of the "informal"
sector. In short, the relationship between the two sectors is seen as
"benign", and an expansion of the formal sector is expected, in this view,
to stimulate the expansion of the informal sector also. On.the other hand,
another approach that To.kman (1978) identifies, that of "subordinated
integration", sees the formal-informal sector relationship to be diamet-
rically opposite to the previous approach:- (1) the competition for resources
is unequal between the formal and informal sector (due to input market dis-
tribution in favor of the former, or to outright monopolistic control by
the former (especially of technology)); the competition for output markets
is also unequal (concentration of production by the former) and moreover
leads to the progressive displacement of the latter; (2) the former "exploits"
the latter through "unequal exchange" in so far as input/output relation-
ship is concerned; (3) the low output price of the latter is responsible
for depressing labor cost in the former, thus facilitating high accumulation
rates in the former. In short, this approach sees the relationships between
the two sectors as largely "exploitative", leading to the subordinated
integration of the latter to generate a high rate of surplus accumulation
in the former.
Rather than assume a priori one or the other of these views, we
shall attempt in this dissertation to carry out a concrete analysis of each
situation to determine which of these views is more appropriate.
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1.3.3 The problem of ethnic differentiation in employment access
An outstanding characteristic of the employment structure of many
LDCs which had inherited the colonial legacy of a multi-ethnic (or
multi-national) labor force is the high degree of segmentation of employ-
ment along ethnic lines. This ethnic segmentation occurs not only vertically
along the occupational hierarchy, but also horizontally across production
activities. Moreover, this ethnic segmentation has in many LDCs persisted
even during the post-colonial period. Any attempt to explain the labor
absorption process in these societies must therefore come to grips with the
determinants of this phenomenon.
While the historical factors that initially shaped the pattern of
ethnic employment segmentation in these countries during colonial times
are generally well-studied, the processes whereby the segmentation patterns
were perpetuated or otherwise transformed during the post-colonial period
are not. In particular, in the case of Peninsular Malaysia, much has been
written on the historical formation of a "plural" social structure under
colonialism (e.g. Hirschman (1975), Arles (1971), Snodgrass (forthcoming),
Gardner (1975), B. N. Cham (1976)), but attempts to study the pattern of
post-colonial changes have been less systematic.
From the perspective of our framework, the pattern of ethnic
distribution within an employment structure at a particular point in
time can be analytically described as the result of two sets of factors:
(1) Workers of different ethnic origins, for some historical reasons, may
have different endowments which are of importance for gaining access
to certain employment positions. For example, if ethnic groups differ
systematically in their education attainment distribution, employment
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access based on educational screening will produce ethnic differentials
in occupational attainment. Similarly, if certain jobs are available
in the cities only, then rural-urban differential in residence among
ethnic groups will cause differentiation in access to these jobs, at
least in the short-run before population redistribution can occur to
equalize spatial access. Finally, if access to certain self-employed
occupations (e.g. retail shop proprietorship) is dependent strongly
on the size of family asset ownership, then differential in asset
ownership among the ethnic groups would again result in differential
occupational attainment.
(2) The conditions of access to employment may be based on explicitly
ethnic-ascriptive preferential criteria, so that workers of different
ethnic origins may have differential access even though they have
equivalent endowments. In the case of wage-employment, this occurs
through the employers having a preferential hiring policy, while
in the case of self-employment, members of certain ethnic groups
may be denied that possibility due to preferential access control
policy by other agents, e.g. rentiers may refuse to lease out
land to certain ethnic groups, or government licensing policy may
be biased in favor of certain ethnic groups.
Each of these two sets of factors, operating singly or in combina-
tion, will induce ethnic differentials in employment access. The crux
of the problem is in understanding how these two sets of factors are
determined in turn, and how they change over time. Depending on which of
these two sets of factors are more significant, the possibilities for
change in the ethnic distribution pattern may be very different. For
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example, if differential educational access among ethnic groups is the
main factor, then an equalization of educational access over time would
wipe out ethnic differentials in occupational attainment. On the other
hand, if ethnic differentials in employment are the result of conscious
discriminatory hiring policy of employers against a particular ethnic
group, then little change in the ethnic distribution pattern of employ-
ment can be expected until there is a change in employers' attitude,
or a change in the composition of the employers themselves.
It is important to recognize the cumulative effect of these factors
over time. Thus, to the extent that the endowments of individuals
(education,family assets, skills, etc.) are a function of the occupations
achieved by their parents, then an initial differential among the ethnic
groups of one generation may be transmitted into a magnified differential
in the following generations. Moreover, the two sets of factors may also
be interrelated over time. For example, to the extent that workers
of one ethnic group are being discriminated against gaining access to
certain occupations regardless of their educational attainment, they
may, over time, lose incentive in acquiring education. Similarly,
to.the extent that rural residents are being discriminated against
getting jobs in the cities even if they were to migrate and live in the
cities, they may have no incentive to make such a migration move.
Obviously, any attempt to analyze how the pattern of ethnic
distribution in an employment structure changes over time must be
grounded on a concrete understanding of the historical factors that initially
generated this differential and how these factors evolve over time. In
particular, the issue of whether a certain ethnic differential pattern
39
is due to differences in "endowments" or to ethnic-ascriptive employment
access criteria can only be resolved after one has properly identified
what constitute relevant "endowments" for employment access in the first
place. This will be the approach that we shall adopt in the case study
of Peninsular Malaysia.
1.4 The Case Study of Peninsular Malaysia
In Section 1.2, some of the questions that motivated this case
study have been posed. In light of the conceptual framework formulated
in Section 1.3, we are now in a position to identify more systematically
the major questions of interest in our case study. These questions will be
briefly listed in what follows to provide a basic guide to the substan-
tive analysis of this dissertation. In the course of the case study,
hypothesized answers to these questions will be formulated, and these
will constitute the major hypotheses to be empirically examined in this
dissertation.
Part I Impact of production organization changes in the rural hinter-
land on rural labor absorption
How has the structure of production organization in the rural
hinterland been transformed in the post-colonial period? Was there a
shift towards wage-labor operation in the traditional peasant sectors
as a result of the introduction of productivity-raising technological
innovations? Has this shift contributed to the displacement of owner-
operating and tenant labor from the peasant sector? And how has this
displaced labor been re-absorbed? To what extent has the development
of the plantation sector and public land settlement sector been suffi-
cient in re-absorbing the displaced peasant labor, and what process of
change in the mode of employment was involved in this re-absorption
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process? Or has out-migration of displaced rural labor to the urban
areas been significant?
Part II Impact of production organization changes in the urban sectors
on urban labor absorption
. How has the structure of production organization in the urban economy
been transformed in the post-colonial period? Has urban production become
increasingly concentrated in the public-sector as well as in large,
commercially oriented enterprises?
. What were the conditions of access to the different employment
positions generated? To what extent was there a vertical stratification
of occupational access based on educational attainment and family asset
ownership? And to what extent was there additional horizontal differen-
tiation across production organization sectors in terms of employment
earnings and security also, leading to the emergence of a blue-collar
"labor aristocracy" in the corporate sector?
. What were the impacts of these changes on the pattern of employment
segmentation by ethnic group? Has there been increasing desegmentation
vertically along the occupational hierarchy as well as horizontally across
production organization sectors?
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A note on data sources and methodology
To a large extent, the conceptual framework one uses to analyze the
world defines the empirical measurement one would make to examine the validity
of the hypothesis generated by that framework. Thus, an exclusive concern
with aggregate production growth rate leads to an exclusive concern with
measures of GNP. Any attempt to introduce new conceptual categories into
a concrete case study, therefore, has to confront the problem of finding
appropriate empirical data.
Given the rather general scope of this study, we have basically
chosen to rely exclusively on published primary and secondary data sources.
In particular, much use has been made of official published statistics on
Peninsular Malaysia. However, most of the available official statistical
data bases are oriented along either the "old orthodox" or "new orthodox"
framework. The same also applies to many secondary research data sources
that we shall rely on for empirical documentation. As such, a major task
of this dissertation has been to assemble., adapt and otherwise re-interpret
these existing empirical data for our purpose. In particular, much time
has been devoted to derive empirical estimates to operationalize various
conceptual categories which were previously not available. Sometimes, this
has involved re-interpreting data the originally intended purpose of which
is different from ours. It is hoped that some of these empirical estima-
tion work would provide a useful empirical foundation for other researchers
wishing to pursue analysis along a similar approach. It is further hoped
that the exercise itself would also serve the purpose of pointing out
gaps and deficiencies in existing empirical data bases, thus providing
directions for future empirical field work or for re-designing official
statistical data collection methodology.
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In view of the diversity of data sources consulted, we shall not
attempt to describe them here or even list down their names. Instead, in
each of the chapters, attempts will be made in the appropriate places to
identify and describe the nature of the data sources utilized to the extent
that it is deemed necessary (e.g., to qualify conclusions drawn from them
by ourselves or by others). The methodology adopted in the use and inter-
pretation of these data will also be explained where needed.
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1.5 Limitations of the dissertation
In concluding this introduction, it is necessary to draw atten-
tion to the limitations of the study to be presented.
At the most general level, it is recognized that an economy is
an interactive dynamic feedback system. In this dissertation, we have
chosen to focus primarily on how changes in the production organization
structure affect the employment structure and thereby the labor absorp-
tion process. Obviously, changes in the employment structure, through
their effect on income distribution, consumption demand pattern and
socio-demographic responses, would in turn affect the production organi-
zation structure. Similarly, the consequent changes in the social
stratification pattern, by generating new patterns of social contra-
dictions as well as new forms of political alliances, would in turn
lead to a re-organization of the structure of production organization.
We will not take these feedback responses into consideration in any
systematic manner not because we are ignorant of their existence, nor
because we feel that these aspects are already well-understood; rather,
the limited analysis of the present study should properly be viewed as
a small component part of a larger project aimed at understanding the
overall dynamics of social change in present-day Peninsular Malaysia.
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4 5
Part One Transformation of rural hinterland production organization
and its impact on rural employment structure
This part of our dissertation focuses on the process of
change in the structure of production organization in the rural hinter-
land and how these changes affect the pattern of rural employment.
We define the rural hinterland production activities to include all
forms of land-based agriculture as well as natural-resource extrac-
tion activities (fishing, mining, forestry/logging). From the perspec-
tive of our conceptual framework, we propose to differentiate hinterland
production into three production organization sectors:
(a) a peasant sector, consisting of largely own-labor
operating units (tenant or owner-operating units)
(b) a capitalist sector, consisting of production units
utilizing wage-labor
(c) a public sector, consisting of production units organized
(or otherwise controlled) by the public sector.
During colonial times, land-based agriculture was divided into
a smallholding agriculture sector and a plantation sector. The former
consists largely of own-labor units while the latter consists of generally
large commercial or capitalist enterprises utilizing wage-labor.
Fishing was largely a peasant activity, while mining (mainly tin-mining)
and forestry/logging were predominantly carried out by commercial
enterprises operating on a wage-labor basis. Participation of the
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public sector in direct organization of production was generally
negligible. Given this historical context, we shall adopt the term
peasant sector to cover all smallholding agriculture and fishing;
the term plantation (or estate) sector will be used in its usual
sense.
As we shall see, the post-colonial period brought about
drastic transformations of the structure of production organization
in the peasant sector. In particular, our focus of concern is on how
traditional peasant activities are being re-organized from an own-
labor mode of operation to a commercially-oriented, wage-labor mode
of operation, and what consequences this re-organization process has
on the existing owner-operating and tenant peasants. To what extent
are they being displaced from the land? And how are the peasant labor
so displaced (if indeed they are) being re-absorbed? Are they being
re-absorbed as wage-labor in the smallholding sector itself or in the
plantation sector? To the extent that the post-colonial period also
saw a dramatic rise in the public sector's role in direct production
organization, how significant is the public sector in re-absorbing rural
peasant labor? Or has the displacement process resulted in massive
rural-urban migration?
In order to answer these questions, it is necessary to first
develop an understanding of the process of change in production organi-
zation and its impact on employment structure in each of the major
peasant activities separately, given the heterogeneity of the peasantry
and the uneven pace of technological development in different peasant
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activities. Moreover, an understanding of the production organization
characteristics of the plantation sector as well as the public land
development sector is also necessary for assessing their role in labor
re-absorption. Who gets absorbed into these sectors? And what are
the labor utilization characteristics of these sectors?
Organizationally, this part of the dissertation is divided
into three chapters. Chapter 2 analyzes in some detail the changes in
productiQn organization and employment structure in the three major
peasant production activities: fishing, padi farming and rubber small-
holding operation. Chapter 3 next studies the changes in the planta-
tion sector as well as the development of the public land settlement
sector. Chapter 4 then attempts to synthesize the findings of these
disaggregated sectoral analyses to study the overall dynamics of
peasant labor displacement and re-absorption.
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Chapter 2 Transformation of the peasant sector: case study of fishing,
padi farming and rubber smallholding operation
This chapter begins our analysis of the labor absorption process
in the rural hinterland in the course of post-colonial development by
focusing on the three major traditional peasant production activities:
fishing, padi farming and rubber smallholding operation. Because of
the diverse nature of these different types of peasant production,
an individual case study approach will be adopted to analyze each of
these sectors separately, leaving the overall synthesis to a later
chapter (Chapter 4 ). In doing this, we shall avoid the mistake of
treating the peasantry as a homogeneous whole and drawing unwarranted
generalizations about its transformation.
2.1 Labor absorption in the fishing sector
Fishing has traditionally been an important activity among
the rural population of colonial Malaya. In 1957, at the time of
independence, fishing still absorbed 5% of the economically active
rural labor force (1957 Pop. Census). Even until today, fishery pro-
ducts continue to be the second major staple food (next to rice) for
the majority of the people and the biggest source of protein for the
rural population.
At the time of independence, fishing operations were under-
taken by about 60,000 fishermen (about 2/3 Malay and 1/3 Chinese)
scattered in about 350 fishing villages located along the 1,200 miles
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of coastline and river estuaries. The dispersal and typical small
size of the fishing villages reflected the economic conditions which
prevailed in the pre-colonial and colonial period when fishing was
primarily a peasant production activity carried out either in indepen-
1
dent family units or with cooperative labor-sharing arrangements.
Production was primarily for subsistence and for the local market;
there was no demand for fish as an export commodity by the colonial
power, and hence colonial capital did not penetrate into organizing
fish production, although substantial local (mainly Chinese) capital
did gain control over fish marketing and its financing.
Traditional fishing techniques, while not static but gradu-
ally evolving, were very labor-intensive; labor power, labor skill
and experience, not mechanical power, were the major determinants of
productivity. The number of people absorbed in fishing was essentially
determined by demographic growth and demand, as access to marine-
fish resources, unlike agricultural land resources, was essentially
free for all; moreover, the level of fishing was still relatively low
and did not yet threaten the ecological basis for its self-renewal.
These conditions of small-scale peasant fishing had been
drastically transformed in the post-war and particularly in the post-
colonial period with the introduction of new fishing technologies and
the spread of mechanization.
2.1.1 Development of mechanization
The post-colonial period witnessed a rapid increase in the
level of fish production in Peninsular Malaysia: between 1957 and 1974,
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the quantity of fish landings by weight increased four-fold or at a
rate of 8.4% per annum. This impressive gain in production has been
primarily the result of a dramatic pace of mechanization in the means
of production - the motorization of boats and the introduction of new
fishing gears and techniques.
a) Mechanization of fishing boats
Thile traditional fishing vessels consisted of sailing boats
which were limited in their capacity to cover catch areas and move
far offshore, the post-war period saw the introduction of engine-powered
vessels. There were two different phases in this mechanization process.
From 1947 to the late 1950s, mechanization mainly involved the fitting
of outboard motors. Since the early 1960s, however, the trend has
been towards the use of more powerful inboard diesel engines.
The pace of this mechanization development was rapid
(Table 2.1). Vhile there were only 114 mechanized boats in 1947, the
number has increased to over 18,200 by 1975. In the meantime, the
number of non-mechanized boats declined from over 16,100 in 1947 to
only 3,900 in 1975. The proportion of fishing boats mechanized thus
rose from less than 1% in 1947 to 26% in 1957 and over 82% in 1975.
Among the mechanized boats, the number with outboard motors has actually
declined since the early 1960s, while boats with inboard-engines have
increased both in numbers (by more than ten-fold between 1957 and 1975)
and as a proportion of mechanized boats (from 25% to 88% between 1957
and 1975).2
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Table 2.1 Proportion of fishing boats mechanized in Peninsula Malaysia,
1947-75
Non-mechanized
(%)
boats
99.3
93.1
80.6
73.6
62.1
45.4
26.0
17.7
Mechanized boats (%)
Outboard Inboard
All engine engine
0.7
6.9
19.4
26.4
37.9
54.6
77.8
82.3
n.a.
n.a.
16.8
19.9
21.2
17.3
10.7
9.5
n .a.
n.a.
2.6
6.5
16.7
37.3
67.1
72.8
Total number
of boats
16,215
22,606
23,429
23,824
23,549
22,520
20,306
22,165
Annual Fisheries Statistics (v.y.)
The figures pertain to licensed boats only. These figures may
differ from the actual number of boats in operation due to two
factors: some licensed boats may not be in operation, while
some boats in operation may be unlicensed, operating illegally.
Table 2.2 Distribution of
h.p. size
<10
10-60
60-100
inboard engined boats by horsepowers (h.p.) (%)
1962
67.3
29.2
2.1
100+
All
n
100
5,468
1968
55.0
33.4
6.7
4.9
100
10,584
1974
34.0
51.0
3.3
11.7
100
16,200
Min. of Agri. Statistical Digests (v.y.)
Almost all outboard-engined boats were less than
majority less than 5 h.p.
60 h.p., with
Year
1947
1953
1955
1957
1960
1965
1970
1975
Source:
Note:
Source:
Note:
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While traditionally small, non-mechanized fishing boats were
mainly confined to inshore catch (within the seven-mile limit), con-
current with the increasing mechanization of fishing vessels is the
trend toward increasingly larger vessels with higher power engines which
make offshore fishing (beyond the seven-mile limit and up to fifty miles
from the shore) increasingly possible. As Table 2.2 shows, the pro-
portion of boats with inboard engines which are over 10 h.p. grew
from 33% to 66% between 1962-74, while those over 60 h.p. rose from 3%
to 15%.
The pace of boat mechanization has been rather uneven spa-
tially, being fastest in the Northwest coast and slowest in the east
coast states. This is mainly because the major consumption markets
for fish are located in the west coast urban areas and the larger
number of financiers located there were in a position to initiate or
capitalize on the commercialization of the fishing industry.
b) Mechanization of gear: the growth of trawling
Fishing in Peninsular Malaysia has traditionally been charac-
terized by the proliferation and co-existence of a variety of gear-use.
Labor intensity and productivity vary greatly among these different
techniques, which also require different degrees of team cooperative
work. The seine-net gear, introduced in the 1950s, represented a
major technological advance in its time, being much more expensive as a
capital investment and requiring a larger team of labor as a unit of
production.3
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The major technological innovation in the post-colonial
period, however, has been the introduction of trawl gear (pukat tunda)
in the early 1960s, after a team of German specialists in Thailand
demonstrated that trawling was a profitable venture (Min. of Agri.
(1976): 233). Although initially banned by the Government, trawling
was nevertheless introduced illegally into Northwest Malaya in 1963-64
when 'konfrantasi' with Indonesia temporarily terminated the smuggling
trade between Malaya and Sumatra, and many of the vessels operating
on that trade converted to trawling (Ooi Jin Bee (1976): 317). In 1965,
the ban was lifted, and trawling licenses were issued under stringent
conditions at first to fishermen operating in certain areas in North-
west Malaya only, but subsequently extended to the whole of Malaya.
The expansion of trawling since 1965 has been extremely
rapid - between 1966 and 1974 the estimated number of trawlers in opera-
tion (licensed and unlicensed) increased more than ten-fold, from
425 to over 4,700. In terms of quantity of catch, as Table 2.3 shows,
the share by trawling rose dramatically from less than 1% in 1965 to
about 45% in 1974. While the fish landings by other gears stayed almost
stagnant between 1966-74, that by trawling expanded eight-fold. Yet
even in 1974, trawling constituted only 29% of the total number of gears
in use (Table 2.3), and probably employed only one-third of the fishermen
at work (Economic Report 1977/8: 157). As in the case of conversion to
mechanized boats, the spread of trawling has been spatially uneven,
being concentrated in the Northwest coast until recently.
In combination with the use of large boats operated by high-
power engines, trawling makes commercialized offshore fishing on a large
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Table 2.3 Distribution of fishing operations by type of gear, 1968 and 1974
Type of gear
Proportion of gears in
operation ( % )
Proportion of marine fish
landings by weight ( % )
1968
Trawl(pukat tunda) 9.2
seine net(pukat tarek) 12.8
drift net(pukat hanyut) 33.8
lines(pancing) 18-5
bag-net(pukat bakul) 6.8
lift net(pukat tanggok) 1.9
others 17.0
All 100
n = '000 14.2
total landings('000 tons)
1974
29.2
10.8
30.0
11.4
7.2
1.5
9.9
100
16.2
1960
36.2
10.7
6.8
10.3
8.0
28.0
100
1965
0.8
35.1
10.5
6.3
9.6
6.6
31.1
100
1968
19.1
43.2
7.4
4.8
5.7
4.3
15.5
100
139.5 198.4 339.5
source : Statistical Digest(v.y.)
note : gears in operation include both licenced and unlicenced gears.
Prior to 1968, only licenced-gear statistics were published.
Table 2.4 Labor input requirement and productivity of different fishing
gears, 1974
Type of gear
( a )
Average no. of fishermen
per fishing trip by gear
( b ) ( c )
Average productivity Average prod.
per gear (tons)/vear per fishermen(tons)
4 - 6trawling
seine net
drift net
17 - 20
2
4lines
40.8
50.0
5.1
6.9
6,8 '-10.2
2.5 -2.9
2.6
1.7
source (a) - estimates based on various sources. The estimates
are rough since figure depends on boat size and
engine power also
(b) -:computed from Statistical Digest 1974
(c) - derived from dividing (b) by (a)
1974
44.5
20.2
5.7
3.0
8.5
4.1
14.0
100
432.6
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scale possible. Compared with other existing techniques, the trawl
gear is much less labor-intensive, does not require as much labor skill
and experience, and can cover a much larger area of catch in a much
shorter time. Moreover, by being able to operate much further offshore
than other techniques, trawling makes demersal (offshore fish) as well
as pelagic (inshore fish) catch possible. These factors combine to
make trawling a more productive gear relative to other existing tech-
niques. This conclusion is borne out by Table 2.4, which shows the
different crew-size requirements for different gears in use and also
provides estimates of the average labor productivity of the different
gears as of 1974. While admittedly rough, these estimates do show
clearly that trawling is superior to other gears in terms of average
labor productivity.
2.1.2 Impact of mechanization on the structure of production
organization
Even prior to the large-scale introduction of mechanized boats
and trawling, rentier-ownership of fishing vessels and gears was already
widespread in the fishing sector of Peninsula Malaysia.4 This was the
result of a long gradual process of commercial and usurious penetration
on the one hand and dispossession of the poorer fishermen on the other.
This situation has undoubtedly been aggravated by the induction of
mechanization.
Inboard engines and trawl gears are very expensive. A typical
thirty-ton trawler may cost between $40,000 - $80,000, while a moderate
inboard engine may cost over $10,000.5 Such magnitudes of initial
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capital investment, plus further high operating and maintenance expen-
diture,6 are beyond the means of most fishermen whose mean income
has been among the lowest of the working population of the country.
Theoretically, therefore, one expects that, in the absence of
viable cooperative ownership by the poorer fishermen, only the few
better-off fishermen plus outside financiers would possess the means
to convert to or enter the off-shore trawling business, and that the
extent of non-owner operation would be very high in this mechanized
sector of the fishing industry.
Does the evidence bear this out?
Firstly, that the fishermen cooperative movement has largely
failed to be viable in terms of serving the interests of the poorer
traditional fishermen (at least up to the mid-70s) is by now a well-
documented fact (Gibbons (1977), Elliston (1977), Lawson (1975) and
Krzyaniak & Malik (1975)).8 Secondly, the assertion that most of
those who enter the off-shore trawling business were outside finan-
ciers has also been well-substantiated by various researchers in their
respective case studies (Gibbons (1977), Dahlan (1976) and Zaleha
Hassan (1977)). Our own calculation using secondary data compiled
from a study of a fishing village in Pahang (Table 2.5) provides
further confirmation. This shows that there is a positive correlation
between the degree of mechanization and the extent of non-owner operation.
This massive penetration of outside financiers into ownership
and control of mechanized fishing units has taken place mainly through
new investment, although take-over of existing fishermen's units has
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Table 2.5 Extent of non-owner operation by type of boat in Kuala
Pahang fishing village, Pahang
Type of boat % of operators not % of operators not
owning boat owning gear
No engine 25 7
Outboard engine 40 13
Inboard engine 85 57
Source: Calculated from survey data presented in UKM Jabatan Ilmu Alam
(1974)
also contributed. The sudden influx of many larger and more powerful
fishing units organized on a commercial basis drastically altered the
pace of marine fish resource extraction and posed a severe competition
to the existing fishermen.
Resource competitors, overfishing and displacement of the traditional
fishermen
As a renewable resource, the supply volume of fish available
at any one time is dependent on a dynamic ecological balance which can
be undermined if too high a rate of extraction is pursued ('overfishing')
or if its breeding environment is altered. In the short run, the intro-
duction of trawling and mechanized fishing may raise productivity of
fishing labor by permitting more efficient exploitation of existing
fishing grounds or by expanding into new offshore fishing areas pre-
viously inaccessible using traditional boats. In the longer-run,
however, if entry into fishing is unlimited and the rate of extraction
higher than the sustainable yield level, a situation of overfishing will
58
be created leading to rapid depletion of the supply of fish. This
will then cause a general fall in the productivity of all fishing
labor, regardless of the techniques employed, although some will
suffer more than others due to unequal competition. Such a situation
can be further aggravated if the fishermen respond to the falling
yield by intensifying their efforts (more frequent and longer trips
and invading each others' fishing grounds) rather than leave the fishing
sector. In addition, if there is significant entry of speculative
elements (with short-run, quick profit objectives) who resort to
indiscriminate fishing methods to raise their catch through using
nets with small-size mesh, the proportion of "trash"9 would be in-
creased, and breeding grounds further destroyed.
By all accounts, all of these phenomena - overfishing, inten-
sified competition for fishing grounds, and indiscriminate, quick-
profit fishing - have occurred in the West Coast marine fishing sector
within a few years of the introduction of trawling.
That the entry to trawling has been essentially unlimited
in the early years of expansion is seen not only from the rapid pace
of increase in the number of trawlers from 1966 up to 1972 (Table 2.6),
but more significantly, much of this early expansion of trawlers has
been illegal (i.e., operated without license). This high incidence of
illegal trawling entry - as much as 75% of the trawlers in operation
in 1968 and 62% in 1970 were illegal - suggests the relative inability
of the Government to control entry through licensing restriction.
The general fall in average productivity caused by such
over-expansion of trawlers is clearly demonstrated in Table 2.6. Note
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Table 2.6 Trend in trawling operation and productivity in Peninsular Malaysia
(a)
Estimated no. of
trawlers (licenced
and unlicenced)
425
1099
1309
2056
3548
4272
5378
3997
4717
4168
(b)
Average annual
landings per
trawler (tons)
57.6
52.9
49.7
27.4
23.9
26.3
20.4
37.8
40.5
43.8
(c)
Average monthly
earnings per trawling
crew member ($)
175
169
161
158
108
97
98
105
97
n.a.
sources : (a).& (b) - computed from Statistical Digest(v.y.) and
Econ. Report 197'f8
(c) - taken from Khoo Khay Huat(1978):Table 2. Note: data
pertain to trawling crews in Penang only
Table 2.7 Extent of idling of fishing gears other than trawl nets
Type of fishing gear
trawl net
drift net
seine net
bag net
lift net
all gears, excluding trawl
fishing gears in operation as a proportion of
fishing gears licenced ( % )
l9j8 1970
397.9
79.8
97.8
62.9
103.8
263.0
73.4
92.8
64.6
63.6
99.2
113.5
65.9
79.4
65.7
83.4
source : computed from Statistical Digest(v.y.)
Year
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
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that the subsequent rise in average productivity in 1973 is partly
contributed by the increasing spread of trawling to the East Coast
(which has not yet reached its saturation-yield level) and partly by
a decline in illegal trawling entry. This over-expansion of trawling
has not only led to a decline of productivity of trawlers, but has
similarly reduced productivity of other gears: between 1968 and 1970,
when productivity of trawlers declined by 52%, that of other gears
combined dropped 32%.10 A more direct substgntiation of this develop-
ment of overfishing comes from an official Fisheries Resources Investi-
gation undertaken in the early 1970s which estimated that the West
Coast demersal fish resources were being exploited at the rate of
93,000 tons per year when its sustainable annual yield was only
32,000 (Min. of Agri. (1976): 247).
Accompanying this trend of decline in catch by trawlers is
the rise of the proportion of "trash" landed due to the indiscriminate
use of trawl nets of mesh size smaller than those legally allowed to
increase catch yield. One study in Perak showed that the proportion
of trash in trawlers' catch rose from 31% in 1968-70 to 44% in 1973-75.
While sale of trash to the livestock feeds industry increases trawler
profit in the short run, its effect on the supply of fish in the
longer run is disastrous.
Even more dramatic is the growing trend of intensifying
competition for fishing grounds. Increasingly, off-shore trawlers were
found invading into the inshore fishermen areas from which they were
legally off-limit.12 Besides encroaching into the inshore fishermen's
resource-supply, the penetration of trawlers inshore has led to cases
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whereby inshore fishermen's gears were destroyed by the trawling action
of the trawlers. It has also been alleged that these trawlers are
destroying the inshore fish breeding grounds by their indiscriminate
trawling. The intensified competition for fishing grounds between the
trawlers and the inshore fishermen has led to many instances of violent
dispute between them, resulting in the burning of each others' boats
and sometimes even in death.1 3
The upshot of these developments - overfishing, resource com-
petition and productivity decline in the long run - is the gradual
displacement of the poorer traditional fishermen operating smaller
boats and less productive gears. To the extent that these fishermen
had failed to mechanize sufficiently or convert to trawling, they had
not benefited from the initial high returns to offshore trawling, but
had to share in the subsequent deprivation from the general decline in
fish supply as well as the threat of trawler invasion and even the
possibility of gear destruction. Increasingly, therefore, these fish-
ermen are being forced out of fishing due to declining returns. Already,
as Table 2.7 shows, a growing trend of fishing gears being left idle
instead of being put into operation has developed among fishermen opera-
ting gears other than trawl nets in the early 1970s.
2.1.3 Impact of production organization changes on labor
What are the impacts of these processes of change in the produc-
tion organization structure of the fishing sector on fishing labor?
Firstly, we would argue that they lead to an increase in the
proportion of fishing labor which does not own the means of fishing,
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based on the following considerations. On the one hand, to the extent
that the penetration of outside financiers into direct ownership and
control of fishing units result in the organization of these units as
commercial enterprises, hired labor would be utilized in these enter-
prises. On the other hand, to the extent that the process of displace-
ment reduces the number of owner-operated fishing units, a decline in
the number of fishermen working as owner-operators or as family labor
of the owner-household would result. Together, therefore, these two
trends appear to increase the proportion of working fishermen who do
not own the means of fishing.
How does this hypothesized shift towards non-owner labor utili-
zation bear out empirically? Due to the lack of data for the earlier
period prior to large-scale mechanization and trawling, it is unfor-
tunately not possible to document the trend in labor utilization mode
rigorously, but the available data as assembled and summarized in
Table 2.8 do uniformly show a high incidence of non-ownership among
fishermen in the post-colonial period; moreover, the only case for which
comparable studies over time has been made (Perupok, Kelantan) does seem
consistent with the hypothesized trend (Table 2.8 (c)).
Secondly, it is argued that there has been a shift from
tenant-operation to wage-labor operation among fishing units operated
by non-owners. This argument is based not so much on the observed
changes in the labor payment system as on the shift in the degree of
control over the fishing operation by labor. Traditionally, a variety
of labor payment systems were practiced by rentiers of boats and gears.
The complexities of these different systems vary with the type of gears
involved as well as with the locality, but generally they all can be
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Table 2.8 Extent of non-owner operation in the fishing sector of
Peninsular Malaysia
% of fishermen who
do not own boats they-
operate
% of fishermen who
do not own the gears
they operate
a) All fishing households
in Peninsular Malaysia
1970
b) East coast & northwest
coast fishermen - 1971/2
c) Perupok ,Kelantan - 1940
1963
1975
62
82 - 85
67
71
increased
n.a.
n.a.
40
85
increased
Kangkong,Kedah
% of fishing boats
operated by non-owners
% of fishing gears
operated by non-owners
e) Kuala Sungei Baru(1966)
- motorized boats
f) Kuantan & Pekan District,
Pahang (1973)
g) Trengganu State(1975)
- motorized boats
sources :
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69
70
n.a.
61
n.a.
a - 1970 Pop. Census, cited in Economic Report 19 8
b - cited in Economic Report 1977 8
c - 1940,1963 compiled from Firth 1966); 1975 from Dahlan(1977)
d - S.Husin Ali(1976)
e - cited in Elliston(1967). Figure pertains to sum of pro-
portion of boats owned by fish dealers(9%) and men of
other occupations(58%)
f - UKM Jabatan Ilmu Alam(1974). Of the boats and gears owned
by operators, 9/ and 8% were only ownd cooperatively
g - Wan Manan,unpublished
d) 71 71
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said to involve some principle of output sharing somewhat similar
to the cropsharing system (pawah) practiced in padi farming and other.
smallholding agriculture in Malaya.15 The system that has been developed
for trawlers (the "panggu system") follows this basic principle, and
involves the fish-landing proceeds net of operating cost (fuel, food,
ice, etc.) to be divided 50% to the owners and 50% to be shared by the
crew of fishermen, with proportionately more share to the head-fisher-
man (taikong). ihile it is debatable whether this payment to labor
should more properly be regarded as wages rather than as return to
labor net of rent, it remains true that the form of the payment has not
qualitatively changed much with the introduction of trawling. What has
changed significantly, however, is the relative loss of control over
the fishing process by the labor employed in trawlers in comparison with
those operating other gears. Most traditional techniques of fishing
are highly dependent on the skill and experience of the labor involved,
and thus close supervision of the fishing operation by.the rentier-
employer (who does not have such skills and experience) is not prof-
itable for him. Trawling greatly reduces this dependence, thereby
making direct management-control by the owner-employer over the scheduling
and operation of his fishing unit possible. Moreover, by thus de-
skilling labor, trawling frees the employer from being tied to particular
skilled fishermen, and allows him to recruit his crew through the
unskilled wage labor market. It is these labor utilitization charac-
teristics, rather than the formal structure of labor payment, that
justify the categorization of trawling labor as being more like wage-
labor than tenant-labor.
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Thirdly, associated with these changes in the mode of labor
utilization, we argue that many existing traditional fishermen are
increasingly being made underemployed despite the expansion of fish
production. It has already been pointed out that trawlers have lower
labor absorption capacity per unit output than other existing tech-
niques. To the extent that the introduction of trawling marginal-
izes other fishing units, therefore, the labor that is displaced may
not be sufficiently re-absorbed by the trawlers. More important,
however, is the possibility that the labor that gets absorbed into
trawling may not come from the displaced traditional fishermen them-
selves.
This can be so for several reasons. Firstly, by de-skilling
labor, trawlers do not need to employ the experienced fishermen,
but can recruit from among the larger pool of unskilled labor outside
the fishing sector; these unskilled labor may be prepared to accept
lower wage-payment. Secondly, many of the traditional fishermen may
prefer to remain as independent (though underemployed) producers
rather than work as wage-labor in trawlers where their skills are not
of value and employment not necessarily secure. Empirical evidence in
support of these factors can be adduced for Northwest Malaya. In his
study of fishermen in Penang and Kedah, Gibbons (1977) found that only
a minority of traditional fishermen had become crew members of trawlers
(20% in Kedah and less than 10% in Penang), and that many of the laborers
recruited by trawlers were formerly underemployed urban youth. More-
over, the earnings of ordinary crew on trawler boats were on the whole
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not significantly higher than those on boats using traditional gear.
Finally, wage-labor employment in trawling appeared to be quite un-
stable; one study found that an average trawler changed 60% of its
deckhands within one year, even after excluding crew changes due to
change in ownership (cited in Elliston (1977): 131)). Such magnitude
of crew instability suggests a volatile wage-labor market that provides
insecure employment opportunities.
A further reason for the traditional fishermen not to be
employed in trawling is that the spatial location of trawler employment
may be far from the location of the traditional fishermen who are rendered
underutilized by trawling over-fishing. As mentioned earlier, tradi-
tional fishing activities were dispersed in many small, isolated fishing
villages along the coastline. The use of large mechanized boats, however,
entail some concentration of landing points at suitable deep-water
berths that also give easier access to marketing and supply facilities.
This means that mechanized fishing and trawling tend to be concentrated
in the larger ports, a tendency further accentuated by the focusing of
Government capital investment programs (berth and ice-factory construc-
tion, etc.) in the larger ports. To the extent that it is in the smaller
fishing villages that the underemployed fishermen tend to be located,
their re-absorption in trawlers and mechanized fishing would therefore
entail their physical transfer from their dispersed villages to the
few larger ports where landing of large mechanized boats and trawlers
are concentrated. The resistance of these fishermen to dislocation from
their communities may therefore reduce their opportunities for employment
in trawlers. Empirical evidence on this factor can again be adduced,
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this time for the East Coast. A study of two fishing districts in
Pahang in 1973 (cited earlier in Table 2.8 (f)) found that the majority
of mechanized boats were concentrated in the larger fishing villages,
while data presented in Lawson (1974) for the whole of East Coast
support a similar correlation of degree of mechanization with size of
fishing centers. As for the location of underemployed fishermen,
Lawson (1974) has found that, while it was the smallest fishing commu-
nities in the East Coast that registered the fastest increase in the
number of fishermen, it was also there that the lowest rate of in-
crease in productivity per head was registered compared to bigger cen-
ters; in fact their productivity fell by one-third between 1971-73
while the five largest centers registered an increase of 20% (Lawson,
(1974):8). All this suggests not only a greater concentration of under-
employed labor in the smallest communities, but also a lack of geographi-
cal mobility among the fishermen located there.
In summary, it can be concluded that the absorption of tra-
ditional fishermen into trawling and larger-scale mechanized fishing
has so far not been significant, even though many of these fishermen are
being rendered surplus by the effect of over-fishing.
How significant has this labor surplus creation among tradit-
ional fishermen been? Precise estimates are difficult and fraught with
methodological problems, but a calculation by the Fisheries Department
can be cited which suggests that about 24% of the East Coast fishermen
in 1971 can be considered surplus (cited in Lawson (1974): 2). Esti-
mates for the West Coast would be higher in view of the higher development
of trawling and mechanization there. This surplus labor can manifest
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itself in many forms, given a fixed amount of labor-time idled or
rendered non-productive, it can be either distributed among many
fishermen each underutilized but refusing to leave the fishing sector,
or it can be concentrated in a few fishermen becoming totally unemployed
and forced out of fishing. In so far as many of the traditional fish-
ermen are located in small fishing communities that lack suitable land
for agriculture and are remote from urban labor markets, the unwilling-
ness of these fishermen to migrate from their communities would there-
fore tend to result in a sharing of labor surplus or "involution"
(Geertz (1963b)). This seems to have happened in many of the small
fishing communities in the East Coast in the early 1970s, as pointed out
earlier. For the country as a whole, the number of fishermen reported
to be operating licensed boats and gears appeared to have been steadily
increasing since independence (Table 2.9(a)). Bearing in mind that
these figures do not include fishermen operating unlicensed gears or
boats, the actual increase in the number of fishermen operating in the
late 1960s over the earlier period must have been higher. This seems
to suggest a situation of labor surplus involution since the late
1960s which might have continued into the mid-1970s at least. In the
longer run, however, such a situation cannot persist, and outmigration
of the displaced traditional fishermen would be of growing importance
in the future. Already, it has been recognized by the Government that
"...a significant number of these fishermen will need to be encouraged
and assisted to branch out into alternative occupations, in particular,
settlement on new public land development schemes." (TMP: 174 ).
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Changes in ethnic composition of fishermen
The proportion of Chinese fishing labor has steadily increased
since the post-war years while Malay fishing labor as a proportion has
declined (Table 2.9 (b)). (Note that the figures given in Table 2.9(b)
actually understate the relative increase of Chinese labor, since these
figures pertain to fishermen on licensed boats and gears only, while
most of the labor in illegal trawling is Chinese.) This relative in-
crease of Chinese share in the fishing labor force is largely accounted
for by the concentration of control over the development of trawling
and large-scale mechanized fishing by Chinese financiers. Besides a
likely preference for employing Chinese labor by these Chinese financiers,
the larger supply of unemployed urban Chinese youths in the West Coast
who are prepared to accept the relatively insecure wage-employment in
trawlers has also been a factor. However, with the growth of private
Malay financiers and more importantly the public-sector entry into
mechanized fishing in the East Coast where Malay labor predominates,
this trend of increasing Chinese share of fishing labor may likely be
reversed in the near future.
2.1.4 Entry of the public sector and its impact
A factor of increasing importance in changing the production
organization structure of the fishing industry in the future is the role
of the public sector.
Until the 1970s the public sector has played a minimal role
in the fishing sector. Its main function lay in fostering fishermen
cooperatives, licensing, and enforcing fishing regulations, but it has
not been effective in all these as mentioned earlier. Following the
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Table 2.9 Number of fishermen (operating licensed boats and gears only)
and their ethnic composition in Peninsular Malaysia
Ethnic composition (%)
Year Total No. ('000) Malay Chinese Indian & others
1949 76.1 72.6 26.1 1.3
1954 49.5 68.0 30.6 1.4
1957 49.4
1959 50.5 66.0 33.1 0.9
1962 55.5
1964 61.5 60.3 38.6 1.1
1967 62.2
1969 63.6 54.8 44.4 0.8
1972 69.3
1974 70.8 55.1 43.2 1.7
1975 73.3
1976 65.3
Source: 1949-54 - Dept. of Fisheries, cited in IBRD (1955)
1959-74 - Annual Fisheries Statistics
1975-76 - MSB Aug./1977
introduction of the New Economic Policy (NEP), however, the public sector
has begun to penetrate into the direct organization of fishing opera-
tion. In 1971, a public corporation called MAJUIKAN was established
mainly to develop and operate a large fleet of modern trawlers of its
own and to construct modern fishing harbor, storage and marketing
facilities. All of these are aimed at creating an integrated
complex of modernized fish production, processing and marketing all
under direct public control and management. The entry of the public
sector into the direct organization of fish production is facilitated
by the Government restricting the issuance of new trawling licenses to
MAJUIKAN vessels only (Lawson (1974): 11). In terms of employment,
MAJUIKAN-operated vessels are run on the same wage-payment system as
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private trawlers. Although initially the share to MAJUIKAN fishermen
was 55%, this was later cut back to be the same as that for private
trawlers (50%). Thus, in practice, MAJUIKAN has become just another
employer of fishing labor, albeit the biggest one: by the end of -.
1975 it operated a fleet of 98 trawlers from six different ports and
employed over 1,000 fishermen in off-shore fishing as well as in storage
and processing (TMP: 288). Bj 1980, it expects to construct 240 more
trawlers and 20 purse-seiners (TMP: 302). Paradoxically, this expan-
sion of a public corporation-controlled trawler fleet has led to
added competition between them and the traditional non-trawling small
fishermen in the same way as private trawlers have done in the West
Coast. Thus, it has been reported that in the Trengganu fishing areas,
MAJUIKAN trawlers were found in very close inshore waters posing a
direct threat to the traditional fishermen operating there (Lawson
(1974):ll). It thus appears that the penetration of the public sector
into direct organization and control of fish production will hasten
the displacement of traditional peasant fishermen from fishing.
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2.2 Transformation of the labor absorption pattern in padi
farming: the impact of Green Revolution
Padi farming has historically been the most important form of
peasant production among the Malays in Peninsula Malaysia. Unlike
rubber smallholders, padi farmers were spatially more concentrated
(Figure 2.1). The oldest padi farming areas were concentrated in the
northern states of Kedah, Perlis, Kelantan and Trengganu where padi
farming activities had long predated the coming of British colonialism;
indeed, the padi farming peasantry in these areas were the major source
of surplus upon which the traditional pre-colonial Malay tributary
16
political system rested. The other major padi farming areas in
Peninsular Malaysia were mainly created as land colonization schemes
by the colonial authorities during the colonial period (e.g. Krian and
Sungei Manik in Perak were started in 1904 and 1934 respectively, while
Tanjong Karang in Selangor was started in 1936).
The process whereby British colonial policies created the
conditions for the differentiation of the padi farming peasantry is
by now well-documented (Lim Teck Ghee (1977), K. S. Jomo (1977)).17
What we wish to examine here is the extent to which the spread of
double-cropping and the introduction of 'Green Revolution'-technologies
in the post-colonial period have accelerated or otherwise altered these
differentiating processes through their impact on the structure of
padi production organization and consequently on padi farming labor.
Has there been an overall increase in labor absorption capacity in the
sector, or has there been a tendency for capital-labor substitution
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Table 2.10 Planted acreage, average yield per acre and extent of
double-cropping in padi farming, Peninsular Malaysia 1956-74
main season
planted yield
acreage('000) (gantangs/ac.)
832 365
868 399
886 411
896 408
946 431
893 412
920 444
Total production (million gantangs) :
sources :
off season
planted yield
acreage('000) (gantangs/ac.)
7 369
21 443
49 436
104 456
238 481
488 495
527 511
1957 - 322
1963 - 397
1975 - 670
1956-1972 - Selvadurai(1972a)
1974/5 - Lin. of Agri.(1976)
note : figures pertain to wet padi only. A
under dry padi cultivation which has
over the years.
small amount of land is
steadily declined in size
y ear
1956/57
1959/60
1962/63
1965/66
1968/69
1971/72
1974/75
double-
cropping
0.8
2.4
5.5
11.6
25.3
54.6
57.2
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contributing to the creation of surplus labor? Has the induced change
in the tenurial structure of production organization contributed to
the growth of a landless peasant labor population?
2.2.1 Expansion of padi production and technological transformation
Between 1957, the year of independence, and 1975, total padi
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production in Peninsular Malaysia more than doubled. Significantly,
this expansion of production has been achieved with very little increase
in the aggregate area of land utilized for padi production (Table 2.10(a)).
Instead, the increase in production has derived from a moderate increase
in the yield per crop and more importantly from a higher intensity of
production per unit of land (double-cropping). As shown in Table
2.10(b), the average yield per crop of wet padi has increased moder-
ately by about 23% and 36% for the main and off-season crops respec-
tively between 1957 and 1974. The rise of double-cropping, however,
was much more drastic: while less than 1% of the wet padi land in
1957 was double-cropped, by 1974 it has risen to over 57%.
Both of these sources of growth in padi production have been
made possible by the spread of what is now commonly referred to as
'Green Revolution' (GR) technology: a combination of large-scale
water irrigation works (usually undertaken by the public sector), the
planting of high-yielding varieties (HYV) seeds with shorter maturation
periods, and the adoption of a package of complementary agri-chemical
inputs (fertilizers, pesticides and fungicides, etc.) and mechanization
techniques plus associated institutional services (extension work,
credit facilities, etc.)
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Spread of irrigation works
The provision of irrigation facilities is crucial for the
introduction of double-cropping because of the need to ensure the
availability of water supply in the dry season; indeed, double-crop-
ping has so far been confined exclusively to the major padi farming
areas where large-scale river-damming and irrigation facilities have
been constructed.
Construction of water irrigation facilities has been a
major item in the public sector's agricultural and rural development
programs, consuming 17%, 23%, 36% and 13% of the total agricultural
development expenditures for the four 5-year plan periods from
1956-60 to 1971-75, respectively. 1 9 Province Wellesley was the
first area in Peninsula Malaysia to begin double-cropping, but develop-
ment on a large scale did not occur until the early 1960s. Double-
cropping was introduced in Tanjong Karang (Selangor) in 1961, Pasir
Mas (Kelantan) in 1962, and Krian and Sungei Manik (Perak) in 1965.
The most dramatic spurts came in 1969 when the first phase of double-
cropping began in the Muda Irrigation Project area in Kedah (the largest
rice-growing area of the country) followed by the Kemubu Irrigation
Project area in Kelantan (the second largest rice-growing area) in
1972 and Besut (Trengganu) in 1975. By the end of 1975, all the
major padi farming areas of the country had been covered by water irri-
gation works (see Figure 2.1), and future expansions of double-cropping
will have to be slower and depend mainly on many small, increasingly
high-cost facilities requiring mechanical pumping.
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Figure 2.1
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Spread of HYV 2 0 utilization
The use of HYV seeds was negligible at the time of independence.
It then increased significantly to 10.3% of all planted area in 1965-66
and had reached 37.5% by 1974-75 (Wbrld Rice Statistics (April 1977,
revised ed.): Table 13). In areas where conversion to double-cropping
has 6ccurred the rate of adoption has been much higher. For instance,
in Muda area, the proportion of farmers growing HYVs rose from less than
2% in 1966 to 43% in 1969, and by 1973, 85% of main-season planters and
92% of off-season planters had adopted HYVs (Goldman and Squire (1978),
FAO/brld Bank Muda Study).
Increase in chemical fertilizer utilization
Associated with the spread of HYV-planting is a rapid increase
in chemical fertilizer application. In Muda area, for example, esti-
mated nitrogen use has risen from 8.8 kg/ha to 45.6 kg/ha between 1965
and 1973 (FAO/World Bank 1972/3 Muda Study).
2.2.2 Impact of changes in production technology on labor absorption
intensity
At any one time, the amount of labor absorbed in padi farming is
determined by the area of land put under padi cultivation, the intensity
of cultivation (single- or double-cropping per year) and the factor
intensity of labor input in the production techniques adopted. Over
time, each of these factors can change. As shown earlier, however, the
spread of GR technologies has not induced much expansion of new land under
padi, while the expansion of double-cropping has been largely limited
by the pace of Government investment in irrigation works, with adoption
being virtually complete where feasible (after some initial lag). What
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needs to be examined next are therefore the changes in labor intensity
in production due to changes in production techniques.
The labor process in padi production
Padi production involves a seasonal cycle of labor operations:
land preparation (ploughing and harrowing), nursery preparation of
seedlings, bund repair and irrigation water control, transplanting,
weeding and agro-chemical application (fertilizers, pesticides, etc.),
crop harvesting (cutting, threshing and winnowing), drying, storage
and transport.21 Each of these operations may require complementary
capital-equipment inputs. How labor intensive each of these operations
is depends on the form of complementary capital input utilized.
Traditional padi farming techniques utilized little mechanized
implements and virtually no mechanized power source.22 Consequently,
the most labor consuming parts of the cycle of operations in padi pro-
duction had been land preparation, transplanting and harvesting. 2 3
The package of technological transformation that accompanies
the introduction of double cropping and HYV-planting can be conceptually
categorized as output-enhancing or labor-saving innovations. Basically,
the first set of innovations raises productivity through agro-chemical
applications on the input side, while the second substitutes mechaniza-
tion for labor. The higher use of agro-chemical application is expected
to increase labor input, not only directly, but also indirectly through
its effect on crop yield (a higher crop yield requires a larger amount
of harvesting labor, etc.), although its precise extent is difficult to
quantify. Of greater importance, though, is the extent of reduction of
labor due to mechanization.
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Mechanization of land ploughing
Table 2.11 compares the average labor-input requirement per
acre of land to be ploughed for the different ploughing techniques,
ranging from the purely human-labor powered and draught-animal powered
methods traditionally practiced to the more powerful tractor operation
introduced in recent years.24 It is seen that the most capital-inten-
sive method may perform over 70 times faster than the most labor-
intensive method.
Mechanization of crop harvesting
A wide range of techniques were traditionally practiced in
the three operations of crop-cutting, threshing and winnowing. Table
2.12 compares the average labor input requirement for the three opera-
tions combined together, ranging from the most labor-intensive among
existing methods to that of fully-mechanized combine-harvestors being
proposed and developed. It is seen that the latter may save labor
by as much as a factor of 60 under ideal operating conditions.
It can be readily appreciated that a whole range of
combinations of agro-chemical application practices, level of yield,
and extent of labor-substituting mechanization practices are possible,
and that the actual impact on labor utilization per area of crop there-
fore depends on the adoption rate for each of the individual components
of the new technology.25 We therefore turn next to examine the
available empirical evidence for different padi farming areas in
Peninsular Malaysia.
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Table 2.11 Labor input requirement (in mandays/acre) for different
land ploughing techniques
One man "tajak" ploughing
One man-buffalo team
One pedestrian tractor
One 60 hp, 4-wheel tractor
One 70 hp, 4-wheel tractor
7-10 days/acre
4.9 days/acre
1 day/acre
0.18 day/acre (or 5.7 acres/day)
0.13 day/acre (or 7.8 acres/day)
Sources: Compiled from Afifuddin (1974), Bell et al. (1977) and
Selvadurai and Narkswasdi (1968)
Table 2.12 Labor input for combined padi harvesting, threshing and
winnowing under alternative techniques in operation and
proposed in Malaya
Technique
Labor input (worker-hrs.
per hectare)
1. Hand reaping with sickle plus hand
threshing
2. "Traditional" method of cutting and
threshing
3. Hand reaping with sickle plus threshing
with small thresher driven by stationary
engine
4. Reaping with semi-mounted binder plus
threshing with large semi-mounted
thresher
5. Reaping and threshing with pedestrian
combine
6. Reaping and threshing with 7-foot combine
314
296
284
89
20
5
Source: Adapted from Bartsch (1977): Table A.15.
Note: Estimates for the mechanized techniques are overly optimistic
since they do not take into account breakdowns and rapair time.
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The pace of mechanization of land ploughing
Although there had been a slow increase in the use of tractors
for land preparation throughout Malaya even prior to the widespread
conversion to double-cropping, it is in areas where double-cropping
has been introduced that the fastest pace of adoption of tractor
ploughing has taken place. As shown in Table 2.13 (a), adoption of
tractor ploughing had been virtually completed in Muda and Tanjong
Karang within a few years after double-cropping began. A similar trend
was observed in the case of Salor and Meranti in Kelantan.
Much of this conversion to tractor ploughing has taken the
form of hiring tractor services, as the proportion of farmers owning
tractors themselves is still relatively small (Table 2.13 (b)). However,
tractor ownership (including multiple-tractor ownership) appears to have
grown considerably too, as shown by the data for Muda and Tanjong Karang
in Table 2.13 and further corroborated by indirect evidence of rapid
increase in tractor sales.26
Table 2.14 documents the inverse relationship between the
proportion of farmers using tractors and the amount of labor input re-
quired in land ploughing for different padi farming areas in Malaya.
It also documents clearly the drastic reduction in labor per acre of
land ploughed that has occurred as a result of mechanization of ploughing
in Muda and Tanjong Karang; in the former labor intensity per unit land
and nursery preparation has been more than halved between 1969 (when
the first phase of double-cropping was introduced) and 1974/5; in the
latter case the decline was by a factor of over 3.
The rapid pace of adoption of labor-saving mechanization
following the introduction of double-cropping has been partly necessitated
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Table 2.13 Pace of adoption of tractor ploughing
(a)
in padi farming
(b)
% of farmers
using tractors
All Kedah,
Muda Area,
Muda Area,
Muda Area,
Muda Area,
1960 (1)
1966 (2)
1969 (3)
1973
1974/5
0.2
32.0
94.0
85.0
99.0
% of farmers
owningtractors
1.0
3.8
4.9
n.a.
Tanjong Karang, Selangor
1966 (6)
1975/6 (Sawah Sempadan) (7)
Kelantan
Kemubu A , 1969 (8)
Meranti 9- 1968
(9) 1971Salor - 1968
1971
11.8
100.0
3.0
12.0
98.0
28.0
98.0
Perak (10)
Changkat Jong, 1970
Sungei Manik, 1970
82.0
53.0
Sources:
(1) - Computed from 1960 Agri. Census
(2) - 1966 Muda Farm Survey
(3) - Doering (1973)
(4) - Computed from FAO/Wbrld Bank Muda Survey
(5) - Goldman and Lyn Squire (1978)
(6) - Computed from Selvadurai and Nakswasdi (1968)
(7) - Computed from Fredericks, et al. (1977)
(8) - Computed from Selvadurai, et al. (1969b)
(9) - Moktar b. Tamin (1975): Table 3, 15.
(10) - Computed from Selvadurai (1972b)
Kedah
1.0
12.3
n.a.
n.a.
4.0
n.a.
9.0
2.0
12.0
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by the need to speed up the land ploughing operation in order to meet
the tighter time-schedule required by double-cropping. The development
of a competitive tractor-service rental market, at least initially, has
also undoubtedly contributed to the above. In Muda, for example, while
the charge per acre for both tractor and buffalo ploughing was between
$31-35 in 1961, keen competition among contractors of tractor-service
had by 1971 driven the price of tractor-ploughing down to less than $13
per acre, or only 38% of the cost a decade ago (Jegatheesan (1974): 32).27
Finally, active promotional policies by the Government as well as inter-
national tractor-producers have probably also contributed.
Adoption of mechanized harvesting
Harvesting has traditionally been the most labor-intensive opera-
tion in padi cultivation. Early attempts at experimenting with combine
harvestors had proven to be uneconomical due to low productivity (arising
out of operational breakdown and repair costs problems) in relation to
high acquisition cost.28 Nevertheless, by 1971 nine combine harvestors
(each capable of harvesting 1120 acres within the 4-week ploughing
schedule) were already reported to be in operation in Muda, and that
the equivalent of about 2,000 laborers was estimated to have been
replaced by them (Afifuddin (1974): 43). Although some researchers were
still able to report as of 1976 that "mechanical harvesting and threshing
equipment had not been adopted in Muda area due to soil conditions and
economic factors" (Goldman and Squire (1978): 41), by mid-1978 mechan-
ized harvesting had definitely been introduced on a large-scale in
Muda.29 Combine harvestors operated by both MADA and private contrac-
tors were reported to be providing integrated harvesting and threshing
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Table 2.14 Labor Input Per Acre Per Crop for Land
labor input in land
ploughing (mandays
per acre)
percentage of
farmers using
tractors
Less mechanized areas:
Malacca (1966)a
North
South
Central
Whole State
Kemubu (1968)b
More mechanized areas:
S. Manik (1970) C
Provinae Wellesley
(1968)
C.Jong (1970)c
Tanjong Karang
1966 a
1975/76 e
Mudaf
1969
1973
1974/75
14.0
13.0
8.9
11.0
9.5
8.6
5.6
6.8
7.5
2.2
3.6
18.1
25.4
15.8
3.0
53.0
70.0
82.0
11.8
100.0
93.4
n.a.
99.0
11.8
6.1
5.4
Sources: a - Selvadurai &Nakswasdi (1968)
b - Selvadurai et.al. (1969b)
c - Selvadurai (1972b)
d - Selvadurai et. al. (1969a)
e - Fredericks et. al. (1977)
f - Goldman & Squire (1978)
Notes: (1) For Tanjong Karang, the 1966 figure refers to Tanjong Karang
as a whole, whereas the 1975/76 figure refers to Sawah Sempadan
area only
(2) Figures for Muda include nursery preparation labor also
Ploughing in Padi Farming
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services at $55-70 per relong ( compared with $80 for hand-harvesting).
These mechanized services were reported to be 5-20 times faster than
hand harvesting and moreover they also obviate the additional labor
requirement for threshing and winnowing.
Overall impact of technological changes on labor utilization per acre
Table 2.15 summarizes the overall changes in labor input
intensity in the two padi farming areas of Muda and Tanjong Karang
following the adoption of double-cropping and HYV-planting. A dramatic
decline in the labor-input per acre per crop is observed in both areas,
so that despite the double-cropping per year and the higher crop yield,
there was only a 39% rise in the labor-input requirement for the entire
year in Muda (instead of 100% or more if no labor-saving innovation
has occurred); in the case of Tanjong Karang, there was even an
absolute decline of 12% over an entire year. Bearing in mind that
these drastic reductions in labor absorption intensity had occurred
before the introduction of labor-saving combine-harvesting, an even
more dramatic displacement of labor can be expected in the next few
years as combine harvesting becomes widespread.
2.2.3 Transformation of padi production organization structure in
the Green Revolution
In our analysis of the impact of technological adoption on
labor absorption intensity so far, we have only focused on the average
changes aggregated over all padi farms; differences between different
types of farm units were ignored. We shall now redirect our attention
to the structure of production organization in padi farming and study
how it has been transformed following the introduction of GR technologies.
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Table 2.15 Change in Labor Input per Acre for Two Double Cropping
Padi Farming Areas
Labor-input per acre (Mandays)
(per season) (per year)
Muda
1969 (before double cropping)
1973 (after double cropping)
1974/75 (after double cropping)
% Change, 1969 to 1974/75
Sawah Sempadan,
Tanjong Karang
1966 (before double cropping)
1975/76 (after double cropping)
% Change, 1966 to 1975/76
41.6
38.3
28.9
41.6
76.6
57.8
39%
52.5
23.2
52.5
46.4
-12%
Sources: For Muda, the per season data are from Goldman & Squire (1978);
the per year data for 1973 and 1974/75 are assumed double the
per season figure. For Tanjong Karang, the 1966 figure is from
Selvadurai and Nakswadi (1968), and the 1975/76 per year figure
is from Fredericks et al (1977); the per season figure is taken
as half that of the per year value.
Note: The 1973 figure for Muda is for non-acid soil only, while the
1974/75 survey has 'over-representation' of acid-soil farms.
Since non-acid soil tends to give higher yield, thus necessitating
higher harvesting labor-input, it is therefore likely that the
1973 figure overstates the labor-input magnitude, while the 1974/
75 figure understates it.
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a) Characterization of the production organization structure
in padi farming
As noted earlier, traditional padi farming was primarily a
peasant form of production with the individual households being the
independent units of production organization. In view of the relatively
little use of mechanized implements (footnote 22), the most important
inputs in traditional padi farming were land and labor. The predomi-
nance of land in total farm capital has continued into the post-colonial
period, as the various farm survey data summarized in Table 2.16 indicate.
Given this importance of land as a productive resource in padi
farming, the land-tenurial status of the producers becomes an important
characteristic in defining the production organization structure in
padi farming. Basically, from the standpoint of land tenure, three
types of farm production units can be usefully distinguished:
(1) the owner-operated farm, where the farming household has ownership
of the entire farm land that it cultivates; (2) the owner-tenant
operated farm, where the farming household owns only part of the land
it cultivates, the remaining being rented or leased from someone else;
(3) the pure tenant-operated farm, where the entire farm cultivated
by the farm household is rented from someone else.
The difference between farmers of different tenurial status
from the standpoint of farm capital ownership are brought out very
clearly in Table 2.17, which shows that the average owner-operator
has between 4 and 15 times the value of farm capital as the average
tenant operator, while the average owner-tenant operator is slightly
behind the owner-operator. This suggests that the owner operators
tend on the whole to be slightly better off than the owner-tenant
operators, who in turn end up to be much better off than the pure tenants.
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Table 2.16
type of
farm capital
Structure of farm capital of owner-operator in padi farming
valu'd of farm capital of owner-operator by type (%)
Kemuba P.Wellesley S.Manik C.Jong
1968 1968 1970 1970
Kg.Hutan Chengal
1973/4
padi land 72
structures 19
implements/supplies 2
livestock 7
TOTAL 100
sources various Min. of Agriculture farm surveys
Fujimoto(1976)(for Kg. Hutan Chengal)
cited earlier;
Table 2.17
Padi farming
area
Value of farm-capital ownership of padi farmers
tenurial status ($)
Owner-operator owner-tenant
operator
tenant-
operator
(c)
of different
(a)/(c) (a)/(b)
Kemubu(1968) 3819
P.Wellesley(1968) 8428
C.Jong(1970) 5645
S .Manik(1970) 4633
Kg.H.Chengal(1973/4) 7050
same as Table 2.16
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10
2
84
11
4
T.Karang
1975/6
88
2
5
2
67
16
16
1
100
63
1
36
100 100
5
100 100
2496
6321
4847
2548
4055
970
928
976
332
461
3.94
9.08
5.78
13.95
15.29
1.53
1.33
1.16
1.82
1.74
sources :
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In addition to land and other farm capital ownership, the
size of the production unit as measured by land acreage cultivated is
also an important factor in differentiating padi producers. An owner-
tenant operator (or even a pure tenant operator) cultivating a large
farm can achieve a higher household income than an owner-operator
cultivating only a small plot. Thus, it need not be assumed that owner-
tenant operators are always worse off than owner operators; indeed,
some owner-tenant operators are commercial farmers seeking to expand
production through using hired labor, while others may have insufficient
land of their own to fully absorb family labor, and thus rent in addi-
tional land to ensure adequate subsistence for the whole family. It
would be useful to distinguish the two cases, although data limitations
make it impossible to do so with any precision. To the extent that
the pure tenants are totally without land, however, they do tend to be
among the poorest.
From the standpoint of farm size and tenurial structure, the
production organization structure of Malayan padi farming was charac-
terized by (i) the typical small size of production units, and (ii) the
prevalence and increasing trend of tenancy (at least until the late
1960s).
(i) Typical small size of padi farms:
Table 2.18 shows estimates of the size distribution of padi
farms in Peninsular Malaysia in 1960 (according to the 1960 Agri. Census)
as well as in various farming areas surveyed in the post-colonial
period by the Ministry of Agriculture. It can be seen that, for the
country as a whole, farm sizes were indeed small, with over half the
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Table 2.18 Size distribution of padi farms in Peninsular Malaysia (%)
Farm size
(acres)
All
P. Malaysia
1960
P. Wellesley
1968
Krian
1970
T. Karang Besut Kembu
1966 1977 1968
<1
1-2
2-3
3-4
4-5
5-7.5
7.5-10
10+
All
Avg. ac.
per farm
1
14 29
27 30
26 18
15
9
8
100
4.5 3.2
Sources: 1960 Agri. Census and various Min. of Agri. farm surveys cited earlier.
3
K.
Trengganu
1970
10
23
21
14
10
15
9
39
13
16
12
19
22
26
20
12
17
13
23
10
18
24
10
35
31
19
10
4
3 1
100
8
6
100
4
3.1
2
3.3
100
3.1
100 100 100
2.2 n. a.
farms being less than 3 acres and over three-quarters less than 5 acres.
Furthermore, from the farm survey data, it appears that those farming
areas that were longer in existence (Kemubu, K. Trengganu) had a higher
incidence of small farms compared to those padi schemes settled during
the colonial period (Province Wellesley, Tanjong Karang). This observation
is consistent with the argument that demographic pressure and land sub-
division processes had longer periods to work out their effect on the
older farming areas. Finally, the relative low occurrence of large
farms (above 10 acres) is understandable given that traditional padi
farming was organized as household production units. The lack of mechan-
ization precludes management of too large a farm area by family labor
and excess land would be rented out instead.
ii) Prevalence and increasing trend of tenancy:
In addition to being typically small in size, padi farms in
Peninsular Malaysia were also characterized by the prevalence of tenancy.
It has been estimated that more than half of the padi farm operators
in Peninsular Malaysia in 1970 were owner-tenant or pure tenant opera-
tors (Table 2.19), and that about 40% of the total padi farm land in
1970 was under tenancy (Selvadurai (1972a)).
It has been generally observed (e.g. Huant (1975)) that tenancy
in padi farming was higher in areas where production was more market-
oriented or where padi farming was the principal source of income due
to relative lack of alternative job opportunities. For example, the
1960 Agri. Census shows that the incidence of tenancy was much higher
among specialized padi farms than among non-specialized farms (Table 2.19(a)).
This cross-sectional observation is consistent with the argument that,
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Table 2.19 Tenurial structure in padi farming in Peninsular Malaysia
a) Peninsular Malaysia as a whole Distribution by tenurial status (%)
1 other single
() 1960 - specialized3  No. of farms owner tenant 
mixed tenant tenure
padi farms only 140,000 38.4 15.0 9.6 31.4 5.6
- all padi farms 256,000 48.1 14.0 17.3 16.6 4.0
owner owner-tenant tenant
(ii) 1970 - all padi farms 260,000 48 25 27
b) Various padi farm areas
P. Wellesley (1968) 44 17 39
Krian (1970) 37 22 41
C. Jong (1970) 84 14 2
S. Manik (1970) 67 20 13
T. Karang (1966) 62 23 15
Besut (1970) 45 21 34
T. Trengganu (1970) 18 10 70
Kemubu (1968) 58 22 20
Tanjong Pauh (1975) 57 33 10
Meranti (1972) 43 30 27
Salor (1972) 58 31 11
Lemal (1975) 32 50 18
Sources: a) (i) - 1960 Agricultural Census
(ii) - estimates by Selvadurai (1972a)
b) various farm surveys by Ministry of Agriculture cited earlier;
Kessler (1978) and Moktar Tamin (1975)
Notes: 1 - Includes T.O.L. (Temporary Occupation License owners)
2 - Includes "other unclassifiable joint ownership"
3 - farms with three-quarters or more of their acreage under padi
For comparison between 1960 and 1970 in a), the category "other single
tenure" can be grouped within "tenant", while "mixed" can probably
be regarded as partly "owner" and partly "owner-tenant".
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over time, as padi farming becomes more market-oriented, as the process
of peasant land subdivision, concentration and dispossession becomes
more developed, and as demographic pressure builds up without the
opening up of more land or other job-opportunities, the degree of
tenancy would tend to increase as the more immiserized farmers resort
to renting land to maintain their subsistence.
This hypothesis of a trend toward increasing tenancy in general
and pure tenancy in particular in Malayan padi farming appears to be
valid at least up to the late sixties prior to the large-scale intro-
duction of double-cropping and HYV-planting. It has been documented,
for example, that there was a significant movement from owner-operation
to tenant-operation in the major padi farming areas in northern Malaya
in the period just prior to independence - as much as 20% of padi land
in Kedah and Perlis had passed from owner to tenant operation between
1950 and 1955, while in S. Manik, 26% of the land in Stage I and 22%
in Stage II were found under tenancy in 1957, 25 years after equal-size
lots were alloted to the original settlers (T. B. Wilson (1957, 1958)).
Moreover, the trend for S. Manik appears to have continued in the post-
colonial period; in 1970, while the proportion of land under tenancy in
Stage I was down slightly to 21%, that for Stage II had increased to
39% (Selvadurai (1972b)). More generally, for the country as a whole,
the proportion of pure tenants appears to have increased between 1960 and
1970 (Table 2.19).30
b) The impact of double-cropping and associated technological changes
To what extent have these production organization characteris-
tics of padi farming in Peninsular Malaysia been transformed by the
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large-scale introduction of double-cropping and associated technological
transformation? Does the Green Revolution induce the growth of large
farms? And does it tend to accelerate the trend of increasing tenancy
or reverse it? Before examining the available empirical evidence, a
brief discussion of the theoretical expectations is in order.
There is by now a vast literature on the impact of Green
Revolution in developing countries throughout the world.31 In spite of
the variety of theoretical approaches and ideological orientations
adopted, there is now a general consensus that the introduction of
GR technologies has differential impacts on different groups of farm
producers; the debate that continues pertains instead to what exactly
these differentiating mechanisms are in concrete situations, and whether
these differentiation consequences were to be judged desirable or un-
desirable. In what follows, we shall confine our discussion to the
differentiating impacts of GR technologies on the structure of farm
32
production organization only.
From the production standpoint, the introduction of GR
technologies raises the output per unit land by increasing the share
of capital and technological inputs. The crucial question is, how is
this increase in return to production distributed between the producers,
the land-owners and the owners of the new capital and technological
inputs? Obviously, in the case when all producers are also landowners
and they all have equal access to the new technologies and capital inputs,
then any differentiation in the rate of return to producers -could only
be due to differentials in their production efforts and ability. To
the extent that this case does not hold, differentials in capacity to
benefit from the new technologies would be created between farmers, and
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this uneven distribution of benefits could be accumulated to further
accentuate the initial differentials.
i) Differential access to capital and technological inputs
This can happen in several ways. Firstly, there may be distor-
tion in input market channels or prices. Small farmers may be denied
access to certain credit facilities altogether, or may have to pay
higher interests. Secondly, the new technological inputs may not be
scale-neutral: certain inputs may be "lumpy", and are thus either
beyond the means of the small producers, or the benefit from owning
them may only be fully realized by operating at a larger scale. Thirdly,
to the extent that some of these input factors are controlled by public-
sector agencies and institutions, different farmers may have different
access to these institutions.
The nature and implication of these possible market and
public-institutional biases have been succinctly expressed by Keith
Griffin:
Extension agents concentrate on the large farmers; credit
agencies concentrate on low risk borrowers; those who
sell fertilizers, pesticides and other chemical inputs
concentrate on cultivators who are likely to buy large
quantities. State organizations tend to provide services
to those from whom the government seeks approvals, and
in most instances, these are the large landowners. Un-
less there is "scale neutrality" in the institutions
which support the GR, i.e. unless small peasants have
equal access to knowledge, finance and material inputs,
innovation will inevitably favor the prosperous and the
secure at the expense of the poor and the insecure.
(Griffin .(1974b):192-3)
To what extent have these differential access conditions
operated in Malayan padi farming? No comprehensive and definitive study
t
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on this subject is available as yet, but the sketchy evidence we have
compiled and summarized in Appendix 2.1 suggests that some bias against
the smaller and poorer farmers does exist.
To the extent that the new technologies provide increasing
return to scale, they would not only accentuate the differentials in
returns to large and small producers, but they would also induce those
with more resources to expand production at the expense of the less well
endowed, given that no new land resources can be made available.
While it is generally recognized that the biological-chemical
input component of the GR technology is essentially scale-neutral
(Ruttan (1977)), the mechanization component is generally recognized
to be non-scale-neutral, in view of its lumpiness. Although the use
of lumpy mechanized inputs can be partly made "divisible" by the develop-
ment of market rental services (whereby the producers rent the use of
the mechanized inputs on a contract-fee basis), it remains true that
the larger farmers can achieve higher return by owning the mechanized
equipment to operate their own land as well as to rent out to others,
and thus will be motivated to do so. Moreover, mechanization enables
the large farmer to manage and control farm production on a larger scale
using hired labor, and this would provide further inducement for him to
expand.
ii) Differential access to land:
In addition to differential access to capital and technological
inputs, differential access to land can also be important. Those who
previously rented land from others may be made worse-off in two ways:
(1) the effective land rent may be raised to capture most if not all
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of the increased production return away from them; (2) they may find
their land rental contract terminated by landlords preferring to
recall the land for their own operation, or alternatively, larger
farmers who are prepared to pay higher rent may bid land away from
the small owner-tenant or pure tenant farmers.
The precise combined effect of these different factors - extent
of land rent raising, withdrawal of land from the rental market by
landlord for their own operation, and different propensity and ability
of different farm operators to compete in the land rental (and even land
sale) market - can only be determined through a concrete analysis of the
nature of the landowners and the institutional factors that affect the
operation of the land rental market (kinship factors, etc.). Such a
comprehensive analysis is outside the scope of this thesis,33 but evi-
dence from other developing countries which have undergone the GR earlier
suggests the following:
(1) there is a tendency for pure tenant farmers and the
smaller owner and owner-tenant farmers to be made worse-off relative
to the larger owner-farmers and owner-tenant farmers; in particular,
displacement of pure tenants may occur to such an extent that the his-
torical tendency of increasing pure tenant operation may actually be
reversed;
(2) the distribution of farm size may become more concen-
trated due to the inability of the small owner-farmers to rent in
additional land (thus reducing their farm size), which are instead
bid away by larger farmers who expand through renting in extra land;
(3) along with this increase in farm size concentration is
the growth of large farms organized on an increasingly commercial or
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capitalist basis (through mechanized farm management and hired
labor utilization).
To what extent have these hypothesized tendencies occurred
in Peninsular Malaysia?
(1) The pure tenant displacement hypothesis
The only padi farming area of Peninsular Malaysia where trend
data on tenancy structure before and after the large-scale introduction
of double-cropping can be pieced together in some details is Kedah;
Table 2.20 summarizes the relevant information assembled from many
different diverse sources. While these data sources are strictly
speaking non-comparable in some cases due to differences in coverage,
they do display sufficient consistency as a whole. In the absence
of more systematic knowledge, therefore, tentative conclusions shall
be drawn based on them.
The single most important observation from the data in
Table 2.20 (a) is that they all point to a decline over time in the
proportion of pure tenants and also (except for the case of Padang
Lalang village) an increase in the proportion of owner-tenants while
the proportion of owners stayed more or less constant. Given the
extremely small sample size for the last observation point of the
Padang Lalang village survey, the significance of its exceptional
behavior can be discounted. Hence, although these data do not provide
direct causal evidence of the impact of the introduction of double-
cropping (the first phase of which began in 1969), they are at least
consistent with the hypothesis that the introduction of double-cropping
and associated technological changes induce a decline in pure tenancy
34
and a rise in owner-tenant operation.
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Table 2.20 Tenurial Structure of Padi Farmers, Kedah
Owner-tenant
Operator
Pure tenant
Operator Others
a) 1. All Kedah
1955
1970
2. Muda Area
1955
1966
1970
1973
1974
3.
4.
46
45
38
44
14
42
41
17
20
20
14
19
19
28
Kubang Pasu District, within Muda area
1966 42 18
1973
(locality 42 28
D-II only)
Padang Lalang Village, within Muda area
37
35
42
41
40
39
31
38
30
- 63 657
- 81 000
1
46 547
2 476
n.a.
801
n.a.
2 608
112
1964 27 25
1968 34 26
1975/76 57 17
Muda Area 1973 by length of double-cropping
all single-
cropping
all double-
cropping
1st and 2nd
year double-
cropping only
3rd and 4th
year double-
cropping only
46
42
38
44
10
19
15
23
Owner
Operator
Sample
size
b)
47
40
26
114
119
23
44
39
47
33
39
762
328
434
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Sources:
(a) 1 - 1955 - Census of Padi Planters in Kedah 1955.
1970 - Estimates by Selvadurai (1972a).
2 - 1955 - Census of Padi Planters in Kedah 1955, figures pertain to
farms in the "Main Plains" only (District of Kubang
Pasu, Kota Star, Yen and Kuala Muda) which roughly approxi-
mate the Muda Irrigation Scheme area.
1966 - Min. of Agri. (1967), Farm economic survey of Muda River
Project 1966.
1970 - Doering (1973).
1973 - Calculated from World Bank/FAO Muda Study Appendix tables.
1974 - Kasanyno, cited in Jomo (1977).
3 - 1966 - Farm Econ. Survey of Muda 1966.
1973 - Lein Teck Ghee et al. (1974).
4 - Kuchiba, article in Southeast Asian Studies (exact reference mis-
placed).
(b) Calculated from World Bank/FAO Muda Study Appendix tables.
Table 2.21 Area of padi land under tenancy in Muda area, Kedah
Muda area
1955
1966
1973
% of land under tenancy
54.4
52.5
45.0
Sources: 1955-1966, as in Table 2.20.
1973 - Bell and Hazell (1977): 5.
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More direct evidence for testing this hypothesis is found in
Table. 2.20 (b), where a breakdown has been made of tenurial structure
of farms by the length of adoption of double-cropping at the end of the
1972/3 season in Muda. Comparing first farms that had double-cropped
and farms that remained single-cropped, we see that the double-cropping
farms had a lower incidence of pure tenants and higher incidence of
owner-tenants. Next, comparing the double-cropping farms by length of
adoption, we see that farms that had adopted double-cropping earlier
had a lower proportion of pure tenants and higher proportion of owner-
tenants. These cross-sectional observations again support the hypothe-
sis of declining pure tenancy and rising owner-tenant operation due to
double-cropping.
Since farms that were double-cropped earlier were also areas
first reached by the Muda irrigation schemes, it is still possible
that the observed differences were due to initial differences in
tenancy pattern rather than to the effect of double-cropping. It
would therefore be more useful to have direct evidence of actual conver-
sion of tenant-operated farm land to owner-tenant or owner operation
following the introduction of double-cropping'in order to confirm the
correlation observed so far. Such evidence has indeed been reported by
one study in Muda which found that about 2% of the tenant-operators had
their land taken back by the landlords who wanted to operate the land
themselves (cited in Afifuddin (1974): 44).
How have these opposite trends - declining pure tenancy on the
one hand and increasing owner-tenant operation on the other - affected
the overall share of padi land under tenancy? Has the decline in land
under pure tenancy been greater than the increase in land rented by
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owner-tenants? It appears to have been so in the case of Muda according
to Table 2.21 which shows an overall drop in the proportion of padi land
under tenancy from over 50% prior to double-cropping -introduction to
45% three years after the first phase of double-cropping began.
How representative are these findings in the Muda area for
other padi farming areas in Peninsula Malaysia presently undergoing the
transition to double-cropping and HYV-planting? Available evidence
pieced together for Sawah Sempadan area in Tanjong Karang, Selangor,
and Province Wellesley, appears to show a similar trend of declining
tenancy (Table 2.22), but in the former case the small sample sizes
and non-comparability of sampling procedures for the two observation
points preclude any firm conclusion. Data for other padi farming areas
covering both before and after the introduction of double-cropping
and GR technologies to permit a more general confirmation unfortunately
do not exist. In any case, since this technological development is
recent, the time may still be too short for any distinct structural
trend to be sufficiently formed as yet.
(2) The increasing farm size concentration hypothesis
The only padi farming area in Peninsular Malaysia where
reasonably comparable trend data on farm size distribution covering before
and after the introduction of double-cropping exist is, again, the Muda
area. Jegatheesan (1977) has compiled the available farm size distri-
bution data for Muda between 1966 and 1975 and also calculated the
Gini coefficient for these distributions. His finding was that there
has been an increase in the Gini coefficients between 1966 and 1975
(0.354 in 1966, 0.360 in 1972/3 and 0.383 in 1975), thus providing
Table 2.22
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Change in tenurial structure of padi farming following
double-cropping, P. Wellesley and Sawah Sempadan
(1) P.Wellesley year
1960
1968
(2) Sawah Sempadan,
Tan jon- Karang
owner
31
44
year
1966 c
1975/6
owner-tenant
15
17
owner
71.7
87.7
mixeda
6
owner-tenant
18.3
10.9
sources : (1) 1960 - 1960 Agricultural Census
1968 - Selvadurai et. al.(1969a)
(2) 1966 - Selvadurai & Nakswasdi(1968)
1975/6- Fredericks et. al.(1977), inferred from text
notes : a - includes "other unclassifiable joint-ownership"; this category
can be taken to be either owner or owner-tenant
b - includes"other single tenure"
c - sample pertains to padi farmers resident in farming area only;
those living outside were excluded. This may thus have inflated
the proportion of owner-operators artificially.
Table 2.23 Change in farm size distribution in Nuda area, 1955 - 1975
Distribution of
number of farms (%)
1955 1966 1972 1975 Change, 1966-75
less than 2.8 ac. 33
2.8 - 5 ac. 28
5 - 10 ac. 32
10+ ac. 7
Distribution of
farm area (%)
less than 2.8 ac. n.a.
2.8 - 5 ac. n.a.
5 - 10 ac. n.a.
10 + ac. n.a.
Average farm size(ac.) 5.1
1966-75 
-
1955 -
Jegatheesan(1977), adapted
1955 Census of padi farms, Kedah, adapted. Figures
pertain to only farms in the "main plains "(Districts
of Kubang Pasu,Kota Star,Yen and Kuala Muda) which
roughly approximates the Muda Irrigation Scheme area
tenant
48'
39
tenant
10.0
1.4
38
31
25
6
17
30
34
18
4.1
46
33
21
22
34
44
4.0
47
33
13
7
21
34
25
21
+ 9
+ 2
-12
+ 1
+ 4
+ 4
- 9
+ 3
sources :
4.0
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support for the hypothesis that farm size concentration has increased
over the period of transition to double-cropping.
To highlight the source of this change in farm size distri-
bution, we have aggregated his more detailed farm size breakdown (as
well as converted his farm size measure from relong to acre) and also
included data compiled for an earlier year (1955) to arrive at
Table 2.23. It can be seen that there has been a definite decline in
the share of "medium"-sized farms (5-10 acres) and a definite increase
in the proportion of "small" farms (less than 5 acres, with those less
that 3 acres increasing more). The share of large farms over 10 acres
seems to have increased slightly between 1966 and 1975, both in number
and area.
(3) The emergence of large commercial farmers hypothesis
It is difficult to define precisely what exactly constitutes
a "large commercial" farm, and any such attempt is bound to have some
elements of arbitrariness. Nevertheless, if we take ownership of
tractors and utilization of a significant amount of hired labor (say
over half the total labor input) as criteria for the commercial or
capitalist orientation of the farmers, then Table 2.24 (adapted from
Bell and Hazell (1977)) is sufficiently suggestive for our purpose,
in the absence of more detailed information breakdown. From Table 2.24,
it is seen that the group of farmers owning tractors constituted 3.6%
of all farmers (or about 2,000 out of the total 52,000 odd farmers in
the Muda area), and this group on the whole owned 1.3 tractors per
farm and three times as much land as the average small farm, operated
more than twice the average farm size of the Muda area as a whole,
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Table 2.2k' Characteristics of double-cropping padi farmers in Muda by
land and tractor ownership, 1973
Pure Small-
Tenants farms
ownim
land
Large
farms
owning
land
Large
farms
owning
land &
tractors
aAll
% distribution
Padi land owned
(relongs)
Padi land rented
in:
all
from kin only
Padi land rented
out:
Padi land operated
Net family capital
worth ($)
Net Annual Income
($, all sources)
% of non-padi
income
Number of pedestrian
tractor owned
Number of buffaloes
owned
% hired labor in
total labor use in
padi fanming
labor hired out as
% of labor hired in
37.8 17.5
3.0
4.7
1.9
4.7
3608
1666
28
0.7
0.6
0.5
3.2
8512
1532
33
36.2
5.7
1.5
1.1
0.6
6.6
13993
2139
21
3.6
8.7
4.7
3.2
13.4
95 .1
n-a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
5.6
22729 n.a.
3676 n.a.
14 n.a.
1.3
0.31
45
53
0,27
32
110
0.45
53
17
n.a.
0.64
65
4
source : Bell & Hazell(1977)
notes: a- 4.9% of the farmers are single-croppers
b- "Small farms owning land" are all farms
than 1.2 relong operating land per farm
defined conversely
& hence excluded
owning some land, and with less
household member; large farms are
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utilized more hired labor (65%) than family labor, and earned more than
twice the net income of other farms. These data pertain only to 1973;
in view of the increase in farm size concentration since then and the
increase in mechanization, this group of commercial farmers must have
increased in size since then.
In summary, it appears that each of these hypothesized trends
- displacement of pure tenants, increasing concentration of farm sizes,
and the emergence of large commercial farmers - has been manifested
in Malayan padi farming areasthat have undergone the GR, at least in
those cases where information is available to the present researcher.
2.2.4 Impact of Green Revolution on the mode of employment
How has the mode of employment changed in association with
the rapid reduction in labor input per crop and the transformation of
the size and tenurial structure of production documented in earlier
subsections?
a) Characteristics of labor utilization in traditional padi
farming
Although traditional padi farming was organized on the basis
of household production units, with the household that controlled the
production unit also providing the bulk of the labor, the use of
hired-labor was nevertheless also prevalent. According to the
1960 Agricultural Census, 46% of all specialized padi farms reported
the use of non-family labor. Table 2.25 further documents the extent
of hired labor utilization in various padi farming areas surveyed in
the post-colonial period.
This prevalent use of hired-labor even before the GR has to
do with the nature of padi production, which involves a seasonal cycle
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of operations that require highly uneven labor input intensity over
time. The operations of land preparation, transplanting and harvesting
require a lot of labor and need to be completed within short periods,
whereas the operations of weeding, crop-care, etc. require much less
labor and can be spread out over the planting period. The production
35
cycle therefore consists of a series of labor demand peaks and slacks,
and hired labor often becomes necessary to supplement family labor
during the labor demand peaks.
This peak demand labor supplementation characteristic of hired
labor is brought out clearly in Table 2.25. The incidence of hired
labor is seen to be very high for the labor-intensive operations of
transplanting and harvesting, but smaller in most other operations.
There are theoretically three possible sources of hired-labor:
(1) members of farm-operating households who, in addition to working
on their own farms, hire themselves out to work on other farms;
(2) pure agricultural laborers who do not themselves operate any farm
units, but make their living entirely by working on others' farms as
wage-labor; and (3) external seasonal in-migrant laborers. Except for
Kedah, hired labor of the type (2) and (3) were traditionally not sig-
nificant as a labor source, and the main bulk of hired labor supply was
accounted for by the farm household members themselves hiring out to
each other.
This is possible because the labor demand cycles of different
farms in the same farm area can be sufficiently staggered with respect
to each other such that the slack periods of some farms are on aggregate
balanced out by the peaks of others. The same farm household can then
hire themselves out to other farms during the slack period of their own
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Table 2.25 Percentage hired labor in total labor-input in various padi
production operations for various farming areas, Peninsula Malaysia
Province
Wellesley
(1968)
(double-
cropping)
Muda
(1966/67)
Changkat
Jong
(1970)
Tanj ong
Karang
(1966)
Sungei
Manik
(1970)
(double- Kembu
cropping) (1968)
Nursery
Land Preparation
Transplanting
Weeding
Application of
pesticides, etc.
Harvesting
Transportation of
padi
All operations
Avg. padi farm size
Avg. number of farm
family workers on
own padi farm
(Off-farm)
Avg. labor input
per acre (mandays)
Source: Various Min.
(for Muda).
of Agri. farm surveys cited earlier; Jegatheesan (1974)
20
92
20
5
90
18
29
91
18
10
79
39
60
6
n.a.
11
7
60
2
39
40
26
7.7
4.3
(0.4)
30.5
6
7
24
11
3.3
3.3
(1.6)
41.7
6
15
6
29
14
3.8
(1.3)
3.3
9
5
22
21
79
15
15
2.2
2.6
(0.8)
39.5
2.7
(0.9)
33.8
2.5
n.a.
n.a.
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farm's production cycle while hiring in labor during their peak period.
Of course, some farms would hire-in more than they hire-out in aggre-
gate, and vice-versa, depending on the farm households' own family
labor supply in relationship to their farm size. This is in some sense
a form of labor exchange, although the "exchange" is mediated by wage-
payment (either piece-rate according to task performed, or according
to labor-time, and could be in kind or cash) rather than being truly
cooperative labor-exchange arrangements as were in fact more commonly
practiced in the past ('gotong-royong' and 'berderau'). Moreover, much
of this hired labor tended to be of a "casual" basis, i.e. engagement
for short period or according to specified task performed, rather than
regular or permanent. Indeed, according to the 1960 Agricultural
Census, of those farms reporting the use of non-family labor, 23% re-
ported "occasional hired labor", 36% "exchange-labor", 26% a combination
of the above, and only 15% utilized "contract-labor". Except for the
last, the other categories can all be regarded as casual.
Two important observations follow from the above characteriza-
tion of labor utilization in traditional padi farming. The first is an
explanation of the fact that a large number of farm household members often
had to seek off-farm work (which suggests aggregate farm labor surplus)
even though labor was hired in. 36Aside from the fact the off-farm work
was necessary during the off-season prior to double-cropping, and aside
from the possibility that off-farm work may provide better returns to
labor, it can be seen that the short periods of peak labor work were
quite insufficient for fully occupying the extra household members
throughout the production cycle, thus necessitating off-farm work even
during the planting season. The co-existence of aggregate farm labor
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surplus and hiring in of labor during labor demand peaks is therefore not a
contradiction.
The second observation is that even though hired labor utilization
was prevalent, there was no necessary separation of the suppliers and employ-
ers of hired-labor into two distinct and mutually-exclusive groups, i.e.,
a permanent and significant class of pure wage-labor had not been produced
alongside the creation of a class of exclusively wage-labor employing farmers.
As long as the option for operating one's own farm (whether on own or rented
land) is possible and preferred, and as long as hired-labor is used mainly
on a casual basis to supplement family labor, no significant class of pure
wage-labor could be created or demanded.
b) The impact of Green Revolution
How have these characteristics of labor utilization in traditional
padi farming been transformed by the large-scale introduction of double-
cropping and associated technological as well as production organization
structural changes?
Firstly, the introduction of double-cropping by itself has two
direct effects on the annual cycle of labor utilization. On the one hand,
it creates new on-farm labor demand during the otherwise off-season period.
This would lead to a combination of: a transfer of household labor from
off-farm work previously engaged in during the off-season, an uptake of
otherwise idle household labor, or a resorting to the use of hired-labor
(perhaps to even higher extent than during the main season). A decline in
off-farm work by padi households has indeed been reported in the Muda area
since the introduction of double-cropping, and a similar conclusion can be
37
reached in the case of Tanjong Karang.
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The second effect of conversion to double-cropping is that it
shortens the main planting season by "telescoping" or compressing the labor
operation schedule for the main season crop. This not only requires the
labor intensive operations to be completed in a shorter time, thereby accen-
tuating the labor peak demand effect, but it also forces a greater synchroni-
zation of the production cycles of farmers in the same area. The latter
effect is further aggravated where water supply is from irrigation facilities,
as the farmers would then have to time their planting operation in accordance
with the water-release schedule. This simultaneous accentuation of the-labor
demand peaks of all farmers and reduction of the possibility of staggering
the peaks of different farmers thus creates a seemingly paradoxical situa-
tion, whereby a simultaneous growth of labor shortages (during the labor
demand peaks) and labor surplus (during the slack periods) is generated,
even though no aggregate change in labor input requirement over the whole
production cycle has actually occurred. There would thus be an increase
of demand for hired labor from outside the double-cropping farming households them-
selves during the peak periods, while the surplus labor from the double-cropping
farming households during their slack periods may not be able to find employ-
ment in padi farms.
In addition to these direct effects, the introduction of double-
cropping and Green Revolution technologies also affect the mode of labor
utilization through their impact on the production organization structure. It
has already been documented in 2.2.2 that the introduction of double-cropping
has induced an overall rapid pace of labor-substituting mechanization to reduce
aggregate labor requirement as well as to speed up operations to meet the
tighter production schedule. However, the actual propensity for mechanization
113
would vary between different farms and depend on the structure of production
organization. In particular, the tendency for farm size concentration
(documented in 2.2.3) leads to the development of larger farms that would
have higher non-family labor demand. These larger farms would therefore have
greater incentive to mechanize to reduce labor cost. This argument is borne
out by two empirical observations.
Firstly, from Table 2.24 earlier, it is seen-that, at least in the
case of Muda, farms that own tractors tend to be the largest. Secondly,
from Table 2.26 it can be seen that there is an inverse correlation between
farm size and labor-input intensity per acre. The data pertains to Tanjong
Karang and Muda area only, but is expected to hold in other farming areas,38
given the widespread occurrence of this farm production relationship as repor-
ted in many other different countries. Taken together, these two observations
support the hypothesis that, as farm sizes become more concentrated, further
reduction of labor intensity per acre will occur through mechanization.
In addition to attempts to reduce labor input per acre, the larger
farms could also resort to higher utilization of hired-labor to meet their
higher labor requirement. There would thus be a tendency for the larger farms
to use more hired labor than smaller ones, and this is confirmed by data from
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Muda and Tanjong Karang again.
The effect of GR on labor utilization has so far been examined
from the labor demand side; equally significant, however, is the changes
in the labor supply side. Firstly, to the extent that pure tenants are being
increasingly displaced (as suggested by the empirical evidence reviewed in
2.2.3), there would be a decline in the number of households operating their
own farms and a corresponding increase in the number of pure agricultural
wage-laborers, unless the displaced households could be absorbed in non-padi
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Table 2.26 Labor intensity and productivity of padi farms by farm size
a) Kuda area 1972/3
labor intensity
(mandays/ac.)
yield(gantangs/ac.)
labor productivity
(gantangs/manday)
farm
<1.4 1.4-2.8
39.6
737
18.6
35.9
655
18.2
size(acres)
2.8-4., 4.3-5 . 7
30.6
711
23.2
28.7
646
22.5
29.6
710
24.0
5.7-7.1 7.1 + all
26.8 32.7
638 687
23.9 21.0
b) Tanjong Karang 1975/6
< 2
labor intensity
(mandays/ac.)
yield(gantangs/ac.)
labor productivity
(gantangs/mandays)
30.3
565
18.6
farm size
2-4
23c5
517
22.0
sources (a) - FAO/World Bank Muda Study 1972/3, cited in Barnum &
Squire('1?7&)
(b) - Fredericks et. al.(1977): Table 7, Table 11
note : data have been converted from man-hour and relong units used in
the original source for (a) and from lbs. for (b) for convenience
of comparison
(acres)
4-9
19.9
494
24.8
all
23.2
525
22.6
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work or otherwise migrate out of the farming region. Secondly, to the
extent that the emergence of large farms is at the expense of reducing the
farm size of the smaller farmers, the problem of family labor surplus on
these smaller farms would be aggravated, and large numbers of the labor from
these farms may in effect be reduced to permanent hired-labor in the sense
that they have to work on others' farms most of the time, not having enough
land of their own to cultivate and not being able to secure additional land
tenancy contract.
Taking these considerations of the changes in the labor supply and
demand conditions together, it appears that the introduction of GR in padi
farming may have two long-run impacts on the mode of labor utilization.
Firstly, it appears to increase the proportion of padi farming labor being
utilized in the form of hired labor in the long run, although in the short
run mechanization and the transfer of farm family labor from off-farm work
back to on-farm work may counteract this tendency. Secondly, it tends to
create a greater separation of the employers and suppliers of hired labor
into two polar groups: a group of large, commercial farmers who only hire
in labor and do not hire out, and a group of permanent landless agricultural
laborers who hire themselves out exclusively and regularly to earn their
living. Although the actual pace of increase in the size of this latter
group of permanent hired laborers may be partially offset by the growth of
new sources of seasonal in-migrant labor, its overall tendency to increase
is not likely to be revered in the long run.
As the GR transformation in padi-farming in Peninsular Malaysia
has only been recent, it is not possible as yet to document the precise extent
of these hypothesized tendencies, but preliminary suggestive evidence can be
cited. First, with respect to the hypothesis of increasing incidence of
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hired labor utilization, Table 2.27 suggests that there has indeed been such
a trend in Tanjong Karang and (less significantly) in Muda also. Moreover,
from Table 2.25 earlier, the fact that Province Wellesley, which has the
longest history of double-cropping, also has the highest incidence of hired-
labor utilization, lends further support.
With respect to the hypothesis of increasing polarization of the
suppliers and employers of hired-labor, the evidence is more sketchy and
requires some piecing together. First, Table 2.25 earlier suggested that, in
the case of Muda, the largest commercial farmers who owned tractors tend to
hire out little labor themselves while hiring in proportionately much more
wage-labor than other farmers. This suggests the existence of some polari-
zation on the demand side. Second, on the supply side, it has been estimated
that only 30% of the hired labor utilized in double-cropping farms in 1972/3
in Muda were supplied by double-cropping farm households themselves
Table 2.27 Trend of hired labor as a proportion of total labor input in
padi farming (%)
a) Muda area 1972/3 b) Sawah-Sempadan, Tanjong Karang
Single cropping farms - 42.9 1966 4
lst yr. double-cropping farms - 42.9 1975/6 19
2nd yr. double-cropping farms - 45.6
3rd yr. double-cropping farms - 46.3
4th yr. double-cropping farms - 46.4
Sources: (a) Calculated from data given in FAO/World Bank Muda Study Vol. 2:
Table 33 for acid and non-acid-soil farms separately and then
weighing them according to their sample cell sizes as given
in Table 11.
(b) Compiled from Selvadurai and Nakswasdi (1967) for 1966 and
Fredericks et al. (1977) for 1975/6.
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(Goldman & Squire (1978): 17). Where was the other 70% from? Three sources
are possible: (1) seasonal in-migrant labor from outside the farming region;
(2) single-cropping padi households and other farmers (e.g., rubber small-
holders) in the more peripheral parts of the Muda area not served by irrigation
waters; and (3) landless agricultural laborers residing in Muda itself. While
external seasonal in-migrant laborers from Thailand and Kelantan were tra-
ditionally important sources of hired labor (mainly for harvesting) in the
Muda area (averaging 13,000 per year between 1961-69), it is known that the
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migrant labor from Thailand has been prohibited from Muda since 1970, while
those from Kelantan have declined drastically since 1970/71 due to the
development of a large-scale double-cropping irrigation scheme in Kemubu,
Kelantan itself (Doering (1973): 109). It therefore seems that external
seasonal migrant labor could not have accounted for much of the hired
labor utilized in Muda in 1972/3. Of the other two sources, it has been
estimated that about 8% of the 51,000 odd padi farming households in Muda
were pure landless wage-labor households (FAO/World Bank Muda 1972/3 Study).
The extent of hired labor supply from peripheral single-cropping households
is not known, but is probably less than that by the landless agricultural
41
laborers.
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2.3 Labor absorption in rubber smallholding production
A rubber smallholding has been defined for official statistical
purposes as a rubber land holding (which can be in more than one parcel) of
size less than 100 acres under a single unit of ownership. This definition
distinguishes the rubber smallholding sector from rubber estates which we will
examine in Chapter 3. The rubber smallholding sector currently produces more
than half of Malaysia's total rubber output and 20% of the world's natural
rubber.
In terms of both land acreage occupied and as well labor absorbed,
rubber smallholding production constitutes the single largest sector of smalZ-
holding agricultural production in Peninsular Malaysia, surpassing even padi
farming. Moreover, unlike padi farming, rubber smallholding production involves
significant participation of non-Malays in terms of both land ownership and
labor. Despite its importance as a sector of labor absorption, however, there
has been surprisingly little systematic empirical research on its labor employ-
ment characteristics and how they have changed over time. Given this limita-
tion of empirical data, the analysis presented in this section will of necessity
be less detailed than the case for padi farming.
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2.3.1 Changes in the production organization structure of rubber smallholdings
in the post-colonial period
Three types of rubber smallholdings can be usefully distinguished in
the post-colonial period: the first is the unorganized individual smallholdings
largely alienated before Independence; the second is the smallholdings that were
created from subdivision of estates in the 1950s and 1960s; and the third is
the newly-planted smallholdings developed by various Government-organized
schemes since Independence.
Table 2.28 shows the pace of expansion of rubber smallholding acreage
in the post-colonial period while Table 2.29 shows the breakdown of this expan-
sion by types of smallholdings. It is seen from Table 2.28 that the land acre-
age under rubber smallholdings cultivation has expanded fairly rapidly between
1955-65 (over 3% p.a.) but the pace of expansion has declined somewhat after
1965 (about 1% p.a. between 1965 and 1974). The bulk of the increase in
rubber smallholding acreage since 1961 has been due to estate-subdivision and
the development of various Government-organized schemes (Table 2.29). The alien-
ation of land for rubber smallholdings on an individual application basis has,
as a matter of policy, been stopped in the post-colonial period, and the increase
in the acreage of this type of holding has therefore been negligible after in-
dependence. Indeed, the share of individual smallholdings in the total acre-
age has declined from virtually 100% in the pre-independence period to only
64% by 1972. The decline in the pace of expansion of rubber smallholdings
acreage since the -mid-1960s was due to a slowdown of estate subdivision as well
as a decisive policy shift (in the face of declining price prospects for
rubber export) towards planting oil palm instead of rubber in Government-
organized schemes.
Associated with this expansion of rubber smallholding acreage is an
increase in replanting. The process of replanting is required since rubber
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Table 2.28 Expansion of rubber smallholdings in Peninsular Malaysia,
1955-1974
Acreage('000)
1783
2099
2525
2662
2762
Period
1955-60
1960-65
1965-70
1970-74
1955-74
Average increase
per year ('000ac.)
63.2
85.2
27.4
25.0
51.5
Average rate of
increase per
year ( % pea.)
3.32
3.76
1.06
0.93
2.33
Source : RSH(v.y.), MSB(v.i.)
Table 2.29 Distribution of rubber smallholdings by types over time
Smallholding type
Acreage ('000)
1952 1961 1972
Individual holdings 161
Estate-subdivided holdings -
Holdings in Government schemes -
6 1700 1713
217
120
360
626
100 83 64
11 13
6 23
1616 2036 2699
Sources 1952,1961 - J.C.Jackson(1974)
1972 - Lim Sow Ching(1972)
Year
1955
1960
1965
1970
1974
All
%5
1972
100 100 100
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trees normally have a mature productive period of only 30 years or so, beyond
which yield would rapidly decline. Prior to 1952 very few of the rubber
smallholdings had undergone replanting; a survey in 1952 found the majority
of smallholders' rubber trees over-aged and of declining yield, with as much
as 67% of the acreage having trees over 30 years and 27% over 40 (Min. of
Agri. (1976): 42). Since 1952, however, replanting has been encouraged by
a program of Government subsidies (Rubber Industry Replanting Board (Fund B))
financed largely by a compulsory cess (tax) on rubber export. A rapid pace
of replanting has followed amounting to 1.2 million acres between 1953-73
42
or 72% of the 1953 planted acreage.
Table 2.30 gives a more detailed description of the characteristics
of the different types of rubber smallholdings as of 1972. From the produc-
tion organization point of view, a more useful distinction is between small-
holdings owned and controlled by private individuals and those smallholdings
under centralized management and control by a public land development author-
ity. In this regard, the unorganized individual holdings, the estate-subdivided
holdings, and holdings in the "other subsidized" and "unsubsidized" schemes
as shown in Table 2.30 can all be classified in the first category. In 1972,
this constitutes about 86% of the acreage and holdings.
It has been estimated by Lim Sow Ching (1974) that there were about
420,000 rubber smallholdings in Peninsular Malaysia in 1972 (Table 2.30). The
number of holdings has evidently been increasing over the post-colonial period
along with the expansion of new planting and estate subdivision., and it is
also likely that subdivision and fragmentation of existing smallholdings may have
further contributed to the increase. Although no precise estimate of the pace
of this increase has been made, evidence from three official statistics sources
can be cited.
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'Table 2..30 Characteristics of Rubber Smallholdings in Peninsular Malaysia,1972
Average
holding
size( ac. )
% under
high-yielding
material
Individual
smallholdings 1713
Smallholdings from
subdivided estates 360
Government schemes
-FELDA 188
-Fringe Alienation 129
-FELCRA 24
-State Schemes 36
-Other subsidized
schemes 117
-unsubsidized sch. 132
ALL 2699
Source : Lim Sow Ching(1974)
Planted
acreage('000)
no. of
holdings
('000)
% mature
636.4
10.0
9.1
5.4
5.4
4.4
267
36
20.6
23.7
4.4
8.1
33.8
22.2
419
62
100
88
73
95
100
95
75
69
48
48
62
65
73
70
3.5
5.9
6.4 70
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The first is an enumeration by the Department of Statistics in 1952
which found 393,000 registered rubber smallholding lots; however, since there
may be more than one registered lot per holding, the actual number of hold-
ings must have been lower and more likely around 260,000 (assuming 1.5 lots
per holding). Secondly, the 1960 Agricultural Census enumerated only 175,000
holdings, but this is because it specifically excluded holdings owned by
dwellers in many urban areas. Finally, a total of 405,600 rubber smallhol-
ders was recorded by RISDA in 1974; this figure, however, excludes holdings
in land/settlement schemes developed by public land development authorities
as well as those individual holdings that failed to register with RISDA (due
to e.g. improper land titles), and covered only 83% of the total rubber small-
holding acreage in 1974.
There has similarly been no precise estimate of the pace of change
in the size distribution structure of rubber smallholdings over the post-colon-
ial period, but Table 2.31 (a), which summarizes evidence from the three
official sources just cited, does seem to indicate that the size distribution
of rubber smallholdings in Peninsular Malaysia has remained very skewed over
the period 1952 to 1974, with the majority of holdings concentrated in the
small size categories: in both 1960 and 1974, over 60% of holdings were less
than 5 acres in size, over 85% were less than 10 acres, and over 97% less than
43
25 acres. The typical small size of rubber smallholdings in the post-colonial
period can be further substantiated by the more localized survey findings
summarized in Table 2.31 (b). These studies found between 30% and 90% of the
holdings to be less than 5 acres in size.
Ownership distribution by ethnic group
Unlike padi farming, where the overwhelming majority of the farmers
are Malay, in rubber smallholding a significant proportion of the smallholders
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Table 2.31 Distribution of Rubber Smallholdings by Size (%)
b) Local/Regional distribution
a) Country-wide
Size
(acres)
3
3-5
5-10
10-15
15-20
20-25
25-30
30-50
50 +
1952
\Q98-
I
1
)
All
n('000)
Mean size
(ac.)
distribution
1960 1974
41
23
23
1. 11
1.7 2
100 100
393.2 175.3
4.1 5.2
West Bentong Selangor
Johore
1971
11
18
39
17
12
3
62
27'
6
3
100
405.6
Pahang
1968
49
23
17
( 10
1962
21
67
"Negri
Sembilan
1968
30
24
24
12
23
2
100 100 100
9.9 9.1 3.95.6
100
6.7
(a) 1952 - J.C.Jackson(1964)
1960 - 1960 Agricultural Census
1974 - RISDA
(b) West Johore - Selvadurai(1972c)
Bentong,Pahang - P.K.Voon(1972)
Selangor - Bevan(1962)
N.Sembilan - R.Ho, cited in Tan Tat Wai(1977)
Pasir IHas - N.Nash(1974)
Pasir Mas
Kelantan
1970
74
17
9
sources :
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is Chinese. This is manifested not only in the significant number of Chinese
labor engaging in rubber smallholding production44 but also in the share of
holdings and land acreage owned by Chinese (Table 2.32). In 1952, Chinese
owned 27% of the holdings and 41% of the acreage, while the Malay share was
66% and 47% respectively. By 1974, the shares of both Chinese and Malay had
increased slightly at the expense of Indian and others. As these estimates
pertain only to private holdings outside public settlement schemes like FELDA
and State Schemes, which are predominantly Malay-operated (see Table 2.32),
the overall share of Malay-controlled holdings in 1974 was higher than that
indicated by the RISDA figure. The biggest factor contributing to the overall
increase in Chinese share in the post-colonial period is their disproportionate
gain in smallholdings subdivided from estates (Table 2.32).
According to the study of estate subdivision by Ungku Aziz (1963),
only 7.9% of the new owners of subdivided estate land became owner-operators.
37% maintained occupations in commerce and trading and 5% were government
employees and teachers. Significantly, the proportion of new owners who
became owner-operators was highest for Chinese (37.3%), followed by Indians
(9.4%), and least for Malay (7.3%). Thus, to the extent that subdivided
estate land was taken over by absentee landlords, it appears that the incidence
of absentee landlords among the Malay new owners was highest. If true, this
observation goes against popular perception.
Chinese-owned holdings tend on the whole to be larger in size than
the Malay-owned ones, at least as far as the private holdings outside Government
land schemes are concerned (Table 2.33). This situation had already existed
by 1952 and indeed much earlier, but the disproportionate gain of Chinese
over smallholdings subdivided from estates (which tend to be larger in size,
see Table 2.30) may have raised the average size of Chinese holdings -further
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Table 2.32 Distribution of rubber smallholding owners by ethnic group ( % )
Type of Smallholdings Malay
1952 - all smallholdings 66(47)
1952-602- smallholdings
from subdivided estates
5
19683- Government Schemes
-FELDA 92
-Fringe Alienation Sch. 87
-State Schemes 92
-Other subsidized Schemes 75
-Unsubsidized schemes 36
19744- all RISDA-registered 67(50)
smallholders
Regional Location of
Smallholdings
Selangor 
- 19625 6N .Sembilan -71968
Pahang -1968
40
45
82
Chinese
27(41)
80
5
11
7
19
.63
32(48)
58
55
15
Indian & others
7(12)
15
3
2
1
6
1
1(2)
.2
3
Note : Figures in bracket refer to percentage share of acreage
1 - J.C.Jackson(1964), figures refer to ownership of registered
lots. A person may own more than one lot.
2 - Ungku Aziz(1963) : 81
3 - Lim Sow Ching(1968), cited in Tan Tat Wai(1977):Table 3.4
4 - RISDA
5 - Bevan(1962)
6 - R.Ho(1968)
7 - Voon Phin-keong(1972), figures refer to holdings that were
replanted between 1952 and 1968 only
Sources :
128
since 1952. In spite of this, it is important to note that significant propor-
tions of Chinese smallholdings remain small in size in the post-colonial
period: 78% of Chinese smallholdings registered with RISDA in 1974 were less
than 10 acres, and 60-66% in the survey by R. Ho and Voon (1972).
The Chinese-owned smallholdings tend to be geographically concen-
trated in the West Coast areas and are mostly found near urban centers or
around new villages (Fryer and Jackson (1966)). Malay holdings tend to be
more dominant in the east coast areas, and are either scattered around numerous
small rural kampong settlements, or concentrated in compact Government settle-
ment schemes. These differences in geographical location have significant
implications on the kind of off-rubber farm employment opportunities: for
Malay smallholders in traditional kampong settlements, off-rubber farm work
tends to be from other farming activities; for the Chinese smallholders, on
the other hand, their off-rubber farm earnings tend to come from wage-employ-
ment (in tin mines, estates, sawmills, etc.). For settlers in public land
settlement schemes that are situated in isolated areas, the lack of alterna-
tive employment is beginning to pose problems for their dependents.
2.3.2 Change in production technology and its impact on the labor process
The labor process in rubber smallholding production involves basically
tapping and collecting latex from the rubber trees, and processing the latex
into one of several possible product forms. As a crop, latex-yield from rubber
trees is perennial. Once planted, a rubber tree takes about seven years to
mature, but thereafter it has a productive life of about 30 years, although
yield begins to decline after the first 15-17 years.
The technological changes introduced in rubber production can be
classified into three types: the first type raises potential latex yield
through botanical-chemical innovation on the input side; the second raises
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the labor efficiency of yield extraction through improvement in tapping and
collection techniques; while the third upgrades the usefulness of the product
for industry through improvement in processing technology on the output side.
a) The use of high-yielding planting materials
The first type of innovation involves principally the introduction
of increasingly higher yielding planting materials (clonal seedlings and budded
materials instead of the traditional unselected seedlings). The adoption of
such HY-materials substantially raises productivity per acre and thereby the
productivity per worker, everything else being equal; indeed, the extent of
adoption of these planting materials, more than any other factor, accounts
largely for the productivity-differential between the estate and smallholding
sector (Barlow (19 7 8 )).45
While the diffusion of knowledge of HY-materials has since the 1950s
become widespread and their supplies (plus complementary extension services)
generally available, the actual benefit from the technology can only be
realized in new-planting trees or when replanting; existing trees cannot be
affected. To the extent that the poorer and smaller smallholders face a
greater handicap in replanting,46they are less able to benefit from the
technology (or lag behind in doing so, even though they pay the same export
tax as other rubber producers that goes toward financing the research and
4~7
development of the technology. The differentiating impact this has on income
return to rubber smallholding has been well-documented (Tan Tat Wai (1977)).
b) Rubber tapping and collection techniques
While the technique of tapping has been gradually improved over the
years (Barlow (1978)) there has been no labor-substituting mechanism innovation
as yet. Instead, attempts to reduce labor input have taken the form of
Average size of rubber smallholdings by ethnic origin of owner (acres )
Country-wide estimate
1952-registered lots 1 3.2
1957/8-replanted holdings only 4.2
1974-RISDA registered holdings 4.2
Regional/loca estimate
Selangor-1952' 4.9
Selangor-1962 3.2
N.Sembilan-1967 2.9
West Johore-1971 8.3
Bentong,Pahang-1968 5.9
Malay Chinese
6.9
10.4
8.4
10.1
4.4
9.8
15.9
9.8
Sources : 1 - Smallholders' Advisory Service(1960),as
2 - Voon Phin-keong(1967)
all others - as given in Table 2.3.
cited by Barlow(1978):231
Labor-land ratio in rubber smallholding operation
Acreage/tapper Planting density
(no.of trees/ac.)
Task size
(no. of trees/tapper)
Private
Smallholding
- Ho(1967)
-Noor & Arun (1968)
- Barlow(1978)
FELDA
State Schemes
Fringe Alieaation
Estate
Rubber Replanting
Board(Fund B) recom-
mendation
sources : Lim Sow Ching & Chong Kow Ming(1974); others as cited
Table 2.33
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Indian
6.4
9.4
9.9
7.6
All
4.1
5.6
3.9
6.7
9.9
9.1
3.3
4.9
4.7
3.2
8.2
120-140
160
320
250
367
332
351
500-600120
150-70
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optimizing the system of tapping assignment. Generally, the estates adopt
tapping on the same trees on alternate days to reduce labor cost, while
most smallholders tend to tap the same trees daily or two out of three days
to maximize labor utilization (Barlow (1978)).
The labor input requirement in tapping can be best measured in
'task size', the number of trees covered per working day per worker. Given
the density of tree-planting and the frequency of tapping, this can be con-
verted to a measure of the labor-input per acre of land. Due to differences
in tree density and frequency of tapping, it is not possible to define pre-
cisely what a normal area/tapper ratio should be. If we assume daily tapping,
a task size of 350-500 and a planting density of 100-170 trees/acre, then
the range of acreage that can be covered by one tapper would be between
2 and 5 acres; these being increased to 4-10 if alternative-day tapping is
practiced. Given that the majority of smallholders practice daily and
"2-out-of-3" tapping, a holding of less than 5 acres and planting density
around 135 trees/acre would typically absorb only one full-time worker.48
Since over 60% of all rubber smallholdings in Malaya are less than 5 acres,
it appears that large numbers of rubber smallholding households would need
to find off-rubber farm employment for their other family members.
Using data from studies on rubber smallholdings in Pahang, Johore
and Selangor, Ho (1967) has calculated the labor input requirement to be 2.4
man-hours per acre (1.5 for tapping, 0.4 for collecting and 0.5 for transport
and processing) or 3.3 acres per person per 8-hour working day. His estimate
of the task size came to 320, which is higher than Barlow's (1978) estimate
of 250. Table 2.34 compares these estimates for the private smallholdings
with those for the Government schemes and estates, and it appears that the
latter adopt higher task sizes than private smallholdings. If planting
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density remains constant, therefore, the expansion of the newer Government
schemes and the spread of estate-type of tapping-assignment practices would
reduce labor absorption capacity per acre of rubber land.
Another development of future importance in reducing labor input
per acre in the rubber smallholding sector is the introduction of polybags
for latex collection instead of cups. The bags can be collected at inter-
vals of four to five days instead of daily, thus reducing collection labor
(Thoburn (1977): 140-1). This has apparently begun to take place in the
estate sector and has contributed to the displacement of labor from that
sector, and the same may occur in the larger smallholdings using wage-labor.
c) Changes in processing technology 49
Unlike the case of rubber production, the processing of rubber has
undergone significant technological transformation, as a result of continuous
need to upgrade the usefulness of the product for industry. While the
traditional technique of unsmoked rubber sheet production (USS) involves
simple implements of coagulating tin-cans and hand-operated rollers, the
production of smoked rubber sheet (RSS) involves smokehouse facilities
which are beyond the means of most smallholders. The technique of latex-
concentrate and, more recently, block-rubber production involve even higher
capital investment and technological sophistication. Moreover, significant
scale-economy of operation exists in the production of RSS rubber and the
more recent products. Given the significantly higher requirement of capital
inputs in the newer processing technologies, one can expect that the produc-
tion organization and control of this activity would increasingly rest in
those who control the capital and/or technology, rather than in the labor
which engages in it. The validity of this observation will be examined later.
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2.3.3 The impact of changes in production organization structure on
the mode of employment in rubber smallholdings
In discussing the dynamics of labor absorption in rubber smallholding
production a distinction needs to be made between smallholdings that are owned
and controlled by private individuals and those holdings in Government-organ-
ized schemes where centralized management and control by the public land
authorities is involved. As we shall be examining the latter type of
Government-organized smallholdings in greater detail in the next chapter,
the discussion here will focus mainly on the mode of employment in the
privately-owned holdings.
As a production unit, a privately-owned rubber smallholding can be
operated by family labor, tenant labor or wage-labor. Unlike padi farming,
which involves a more complex labor process and a seasonal cycle of opera-
tions requiring close coordination and supervision by the producer-household,
rubber production is individualized and routinizable on a daily basis
throughout the productive life-span of the rubber trees. Thus, the problem
of seasonal labor demand requiring the hiring of casual labor to supplement
family labor during peak period does not apply to rubber smallholding opera-
tion. If land owned exceeds what family labor can operate, the surplus land
will either be rented out to tenant operators or operated by wage-labor; in
either case the non-family labor contract tends to be on a more regular basis,
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not casual.
a) Extent of non-owner labor utilization
In so far as non-owner labor is being used to supplement owner-family
labor, one expects the proportion of non-owner family labor utilized to be
correlated with the size of the holding: the larger the size, the higher the
share of non-owner family labor. In addition, to the extent that absentee-owners
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and non-operating landlords tend also to be owners of the larger holdings,
the use of non-owner family labor would also be higher among larger holdings.
These observations are largely confirmed by data from the 1960 Agricultural
Census (Table 2.35) which shows that the proportion of holdings using some
non-owner family labor increases steadily with size (from 14% among holdings
less than one acre to 95% among holdings bigger than 50 acres). Overall,
35% of holdings utilized some non-owner family labor.
However, there are other factors besides size of holding that may
affect the extent of non-owner labor utilization, and which may explain why
even among the smallest holdings the extent may be high (from Table 2.35,
more than 20% of the holdings less than 5 acres in size were operated entirely
by non-owner labor). First, many rubber smallholding-owning households may
have other forms of employment besides tapping rubber on their own holding,
and thus the use of non-owner labor in their holding may reflect a labor allo-
cation strategy rather than actual family labor shortage relative to rubber
land owned. Second, many rubber holdings may be fragmented into dispersed
parcels, and from the owner's point of view, it may be more efficient for the
more distant parcels to be rented out while renting in nearby land to absorb
their own family labor. Third, some owners of very small holdings may still
rent their land out because they are too old to work themselves.
b) Mode of non-owner family labor employment
Non-owner family labor employment can be in the form of either tenant-
labor or wage-labor. In the case of padi farming, we have seen that the
distinction between tenant-labor and wage-labor is clear-cut and that fixed-
rent tenancy is more significant than share-cropping. There are two reasons
why we expect the situation to be quite different in the case of rubber
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Table 2.35 Mode of labor utilization in rubber smallholdings by
Peninsular Malaysia, 1960 ( % )
size of holding,
Smallholding
size group
(acres)
0 -1
1,2
2 -3
3 -4
4 -5
5 -10
0 - 10
10 - 15
15 - 25
25 
- 50
50 - 100
All
family
labor
only-
86
80
73
71
68
58
70
46
29
17
5
65
family labor
and share-
cropping
2
1
2
4
3
8
4
11
17
19
15
6
Share-
cropping
only
12
19
25
24
27
32
25
37
42
47
47
Contract
labor
only
1
1
1
1
27
Wage
labor
only
2
2
1
4
9
12
24
2
% of holdings
in each
size group
6
35
} 23
23
87
7
4
2
100
(n=116,516)
Source : Agricultural Census 1960, Vol.6, Table 437
Table 2.36 Mode of labor utilization in rubber smallholding by size of holding
and ethnic origin of owner, Selangor 1962
Holding size
(acres)
less than 3
3-6
6 +
All
Ethnic origin of owner
% of holdings operated
by hired-tappers
76
81
89
81
61
95
% of hired-tapper
on sharecropping system
36
15
17
45
6
source : Bevan(1962)
Malay
Chinese
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smallholding operation. First, rubber smallholding production faces much
greater uncertainties in return (due to significant fluctuation in rubber
prices) than padi farming (when output price is Government-regulated). To
the extent that crop-sharing can be viewed as a rent adjusted to the output
price level, therefore, it provides more security to the landlord, and thus
would be more likely to be imposed. The second reason has to do with the
relationship between yield, labor input and resource depreciation in the long
run. On the one hand, the level of rubber latex output is directly related
to the intensity of tapping; on the other hand, too intense a rate of tapping
in the short-run may drastically reduce the long-run sustainable yield of the
rubber trees. By imposing a fixed rent, the landlord has no control over, and
does not profit from, a higher intensity of labor input. Thus, from the
landlord's point of view, a share-cropping arrangement (tying his share to
the output) or a piece-rate wage payment arrangement (tying his share to the
labor input) would ensure a better return to his capital investment. In prac-
tice, the distinction between the two forms of arrangement is sometimes not
very clear-cut.
From the above discussion, it appears that there is a tendency for
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non-owner family labor employment to take the form of either sharecropping or
piece-rate wage payment, rather than fixed-rent tenancy. This tendency may
however be counteracted by other factors. For example, to the extent that a
sharecropping system requires a closer level of landlord supervision to ensure
his cropshare extraction, an absentee-landlord may actually prefer a fixed-
rent tenancy or fixed-wage contract arrangement which he may find easier to
administer. The size of the holding may also be a factor; where holdings
are large and require the employment of more than one worker, contract wage-
payment based on "task size" allocation as practiced on estates may be more
efficient from the landowner's viewpoint.
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What is the actual evidence on the relative incidence of the
different forms of non-owner labor utilization arrangement? Table 2.35,
which we referred to earlier, summarizes the relevant evidence from the
1960 Agricultural Census. It shows that the majority of smallholdings that
utilized some non-owner family labor did so under the sharecropping system
52(94%) as opposed to wage-labor and contract-labor (6%). Moreover, it shows
that the proportion of wage-labor arrangement increases relative to that
of sharecropping as the size of holding increases. This is as expected from
our earlier discussion and further confirmed by Bevan's (1962) data (see
Table 2.36 (b)).
Apart from the 1960 Agricultural Census, there have been a few
more localized studies on rubber smallholdings which can provide some infor-
mation on the characteristics of non-owner family labor utilization. Table
2.37 summarizes the relevant evidence from several available studies. Due
to the rather localized nature of these studies, the general smallness of
their sample coverage, and the differing terminologies used (in some of
these studies no distinction is made between the different forms of non-
owner family labor utilization, and in some the term tenancy appears to
cover both sharecropping and fixed-rent arrangement), whatever inference
is drawn from them can only be tentative. Nevertheless, in the absence of
more systematic knowledge, the following observations can be attempted.
To begin with, the RRIM (1964) data appear to confirm the relative
importance of sharecropping, piece-rate wage and daily-wage, in that order.
The study in Kedah similarly suggests the dominance of sharecropping.
However, the study by Fisk (1961) for Selangor shows a high incidence of
fixed-rent tenancy and thus seems to contradict theoretical expectation.
However, a high incidence of absentee-ownership (about 25% of the Malay
landowners were absentee-landlords) was also found, which may, therefore,
Extent and characteristics of tenant/hired-labor operation
in rubber smallholding production
Source and location
of survey
Selangor
Fisk(1961) - Batang Kali,
a Malay Reservation area
Fryer & Jackson(1966) -
Rasa village in Ulu Selangor
mukim
Bevan(1962) - a coastal area
in Selangor
Johore
Brown(1960)
Husin Ali(1964) - Kg.Bagan
Selvadurai(1971) - West Johore
Pahang
Ho(1970) - Temerloh
Kedah
Wan Ariffin(1976) - 5 villages
in Sik mukim
RRIM(1971) - survey of 7,809
rubber smallholdings in all
states of Malaya that were
included in RRIM's Yield
Stimulation Project
RRIM(1964) - survey of 1043
rubber smallholdings
Extent and characteristics of tenant/hire-labor
operation
80o of holdings tenant-operated, of which 21% were
under sharecropping, 64% fixed rent in kind, and
14% fixed rent in cash
39 % of holdings operated by tenants, of which 30 %
involves rent payment in cash, 70 %o payment in kind
81% of holdings operated by hired tappers, of which
17% were under share-cropping and 83% under wage-
contract
22% of holdings owner-tenant operated, and 14 % of
of holdings pure-tenant operated
53% owner-tenant or tenant-operated
18% of holdings operated with some non-family labor,
and 23% of holding-owner rented out some land
46% of holdings tenant-operated
46% of labor with. rubber-tapping as main occupation
were tenants; of these, 76% were under sharecropping
43% of holdings were share-tapped while 57% were
owner-tapped overall; incidence of sharetapping
were lowest in Johore(23%) and Selangor(33) and
highest in Perak(53%) and Kelantan(52%)
54% of holdings under owner operation with family
labor, 31% under sharecropping, 11% under piece-
rate wage, and 4% under daily wage
Table 2.37
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Table 2.37 (Cont.):
Sources: Brown (1960) - as cited in Hill (1967).
RRIM (1964) - as cited in Barlow (1978).
Others as cited.
Table 2.38 Proportion of hired labor in total rubber smallholding employment
1957 and 1970
Total employment Proportion hired labor
in rubber smallholding All Malay Chinese
('000) % % %
1957 332 57 47 76
1970 409 54 51 67
Source: Estimated from 1957 and 1970 Population Census and Ministry of Labor
AR (1957, 1970)
Note: 1957 - From 1957 Pop. Census tabulation of employed by industry
(Appendix Table 12), figures on (a) all employment in rubber
cultivation by ethnic group and (b) wage employees in rubber
cultivation by ethnic group can be obtained. From the 1957
Min. of Labor AR, figures on (c) rubber estate employment can
be obtained. All employment in rubber smallholding can there-
fore be estimated as (a)-(c), while the proportion of hired labor
in total rubber smallholding employment can thus be estimated
as ((b)-(c))A(a)-(c)).
1970 - A similar estimation procedure is used, but since the 1970
Pop. Census tabulation of employment by industry does not
give breakdown by wage-employment, the occupation table
(Appendix Table 4.21) is uLsed instead. An adjustment to ex-
clude managers from the estate employment figures in the 1970
Min. of Labor AR is needed, since the 1970 Pop. Census has
separated out managers from employment in rubber cultivation.
It is not clear from the Census report whether "employees"in rubber
cultivation include also share-tappers. Probably a large number
of share-tappers were indeed so classified.
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partly explain the high fixed-rent tenancy. The Fryer and Jackson (1966)
study does not indicate whether or not the rent payment was in the form
of share-cropping, and is of no use in resolving the issue. The other studies
for Johore and Pahang are similarly un-informative on the matter. Finally,
the RRIM (1971) study seems to imply that all non-owner tappers are share-
croppers, but this could be the result of loose terminology.
In summary, the available data seem to correspond to theoretical
expectation, but a firmer conclusion can only be drawn through further
empirical research in the future.
It has often been asserted that Chinese owners tend to adopt the
wage-labor system rather than sharecropping. Bevan's (1962) study in
Selangor appears to confirm this assertion (Table 2.36), but his small
sample makes it difficult to generalize. On the whole, the fact that there
are more Chinese among owners of larger holdings is undoubtedly a contributing
factor.
c) Change in the extent of tenant/wage labor utilization over time
The incidence of tenant/wage-labor operation had been significant
in rubber smallholding even during the colonial period. A report by an
official Joint-Working Party on the Rubber Industry in 1953 estimated that
paid labor, including labor on the 'bagi dua' system, was employed on about
58% of the total planted acreage owned by smallholders (Labor Dept. AR
1955: 17). An even earlier study in 1930 by RRI (cited by Lim Teck Ghee
(1977)) found two-thirds of smallholdings surveyed to be employing some
wage/tenant labor.
How has the extent of tenant/hired labor operation in rubber small-
holdings changed over time in the post-colonial period? Despite the importance
of this question, there has been no study providing empirical evidence on the
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subject. As a preliminary attempt in this direction, we have derived from
the 1957 and 1970 Population Census estimates of the proportion of 'employee'
labor among all rubber smallholding workers (Table 2.38). These estimates
show that more than half of the labor engaged in rubber smallholding operation
was 'employee' labor in both 1957 (57%) and 1970 (54%). Given the uncer-
tainties in the data, the closeness of the two estimates can be interpreted
to mean that there has been little between 1957 and 1970.
How do these estimates compare with other available evidence? From
Table 2.37 the two RRIM studies show 46% and 43% respectively of the hold-
ings to be non-owner operated. Note that these figures apply to the share
of holdings, not the share among the labor engaged; the latter will be higher
since larger holdings employ more than one worker per holding, and the inci-
dence of non-owner operation is higher among larger holdings, as documented
earlier. With the above consideration in mind, the estimates in Table 2.38
appear consistent with the RRIM survey data. Finally, the 1960 Agricultural
Census data indicated a much lower proportion (35%) of holdings utilizing
non-owner family labor than the RRIM figures, but this may have been partly
accounted for by the possible exclusion of many larger urban-based holdings
(which are expected to have higher incidence of tenant/hired labor). Over-
all, the available data indicate a continuing trend of high incidence of
tenant/hired labor utilization in the post-colonial period, although there
exists wide variation according to locality as documented in Table 2.37.
It can also be seen that a larger proportion of Chinese smallholding
workers than Malay were hired labor (Table 2.38). This is due largely to
the more urban locations of the Chinese (where wage-employment practices have
been more established), their higher tendency for being employed by the
larger owners, and their greater degree of landlessness.
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To the extent that the holdings in Government-managed and controlled
schemes (FELDA and State Schemes) are intended to be operated by the family
labor of the settlers only, the increasing concentration of new rubber land
development in such schemes since the early 1960s would imply a reduction
in the share of hired/tenant labor, at least in the short run. Since there
was no significant overall decline in the share of hired/tenant labor between
1957 and 1970, therefore, one suspects that its effect has been counteracted
by an increase in the incidence of hired/tenant labor among private small-
holdings. In the longer-run, however, the use of hired labor may be prevalent
even in these government schemes; already, it has been reported that "the
more elderly settlers are finding it increasingly difficult to manage without
paid labor" (Lim Sow Ching (1975): 58). Furthermore, as we shall document
in Chapter 3, there has been a trend since the early 1970s for these
Government-controlled smallholding schemes to be replaced in importance by
Government-owned estates, so that the use of wage-labor would definitely
increase in the future, although this wage-labor may no longer be categorized
as wage-labor in the smallholding sector. Already, RISDA has introduced
new block-planting schemes which are plantations employing wage-laborers.53
It is also reportedly planning to purchase existing private plantations for
the same purpose (Min. of Agri. (1976): 51; Lim Sow Ching and Chong, K. M.
(1974)).
d) Changes in the mode of labor utilization in rubber processing
Our discussion so far has focused on the changes in the mode of
labor-utilization in rubber smallholding production; we will turn now to
examine the changes in the sphere of processing.54
Figure 2.3 summarizes the structure of production organization in
smallholder rubber processing in the mid-1970s. Traditionally, most rubber
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smallholders processed their own latex individually producing USS-rubber
and scraps. The spread of RSS-techniques of processing, however, has led
to an expansion of private commercial smokehouses and public-operated
group processing centres (GPCs) as these facilities are beyond the means
of most smallholders. These facilities are operated on a commercial basis,
charging fees for the services they render. More recently, the development
of block-rubber processing techniques and the SMR (Standard Malaysian
Rubber) quality-control schemes have led to the growth of Central Processing
Factories which purchase latex from the smallholders directly. By the mid-
1970s, therefore, individual processing has declined to only 80% of total
smallholder production, and a significant 16% sold their latex directly
to Central Processing Factories rather than engaging in processing themselves
(Table 2.39). This trend of increasing penetration of outside control (by
private commercial enterprises or public-operated commercial enterprises)
over the processing of smallholder rubber is expected to continue in the
future.55
144
Figure 2.3 Structure of smallholder rubber processing
Production
Tapping in
rubber small-
holding
latex
Processing Product
processing within unsmoked
individual smallholding -+ rubber-sheets
using family labor (USS) &
scraps
processing in private
commercial smokehouses
or public Group Pro-
cessing Centres, using
smallholder's own
family labor and/or
hired labor
sale of latex by small-
holders to Central Pro-
cessing Factories, whit
employ wage-labor to
operate the factories
unsmoked
rubber-sheets
> (USS) &
smoked rubber
sheets (RSS)
Marketing
sale by small-
holder to
local dealer
block SMR rubber-> marketing done
& latex concen- by organization
t± trate owning the
factories
(oARDEC, FELDA
Or Private)
Table 2.39 Smallholders' rubber production by mode of processing, 1974
mode of processing % of total production
Individual processing
Group processing
-in private GPCs
-in public GPCs
Central Processing
-in MARDEC factories
-in FELDA factories
-in Private factories
source : Lim Sow Ching(1975)
80.0
1.5
2.3
16.2
8.6
0.7
6.9
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Appendix 2.1 "Institutional bias" in padi farming
There has been no comprehensive study on the extent of
institutional bias in Malayan padi farming, but scattered evidence culled
from diverse sources that we shall present below suggests that it may be
prevalent.
The first set of suggestive evidence pertains to conditions of
access to Government credit facilities. A Ministry of Agriculture study of
Tanjong Karang in 1966 stated that the Government loan made available to
farmers to purchase small tractors carried the condition that the security
required was 9 acres of padi land (Selvadurai and Nakswasdi (1968): 39); the
average padi acreage per farm in the area at that time was only 4.5 acres,
and only 3% of the farms were over 10 acres. Another study of Tanjong Karang
a decade later found that the National Agricultural Bank (Bank Pertanian)'s
mortage credit facilities were "restricted to those owner occupiers who,
following the purchase of additional land, will have an operational holding
of at least 7 acres." (Fredericks, et al. (1977): 9). More generally, the
Padi Production Credit Scheme of Bank Pertanian was found to.be disbursed to
farmers operating the relatively larger farms. Between 1970 and 1975 cumula-
tive, the average acreage of farmers who were approved credits under the
Scheme was 5.2 (for the first season crop) and 5.3 (for the second season
crop) respectively (Bank Pertanian AR 1975); this was considerably higher
than the average padi farm size in the country (estimated to be only 3.1 acres
in 1970, with 78% of the farms less than 5 acres) (Selvadurai (1972a): Table 4.1).
Moreover, the trend over time in the average acreage per farmer receiving
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credit has been increasing: in 1970 (the year when the facilities were intro-
duced), the average acreage was only 4.4 for the first season and 4.5 for the
second. The value of credit per acre has also more than doubled within
the same period. (Min. of Agri.(1976))
The second set of suggestive evidence pertains to membership in
Farmers' Association (FA) and other rural institutions. Table 2A below sum-
marizes information from three studies that did classify membership partici-
pation by status of the farmers. While admittedly scanty, the data show that
(1) the larger farms participated more in FAs and rice-milling cooperatives;
(2) the owner and owner-tenant farmers participated more in FAs. To the
extent that membership in FA is a pre-condition for receiving benefits from
it, the differential participation reflects a possible bias.
A third set of suggestive evidence relates to the zakat, a
religious tax (tithe) levied on all Muslim farmers, officially at a flat rate
of 10% on all farms with gross padi output above one ton, although actual prac-
tice of tax collection varies with the locality. The tax is imposed on the
farm-operators, not the landowners. It is estimated from the Ministry of
Agriculture's socio-economic surveys of various farm areas that the zakat took
from 6% (Kemubu) up to 10% (Krian) of the total value of production in the
various padi farming areas (Selvadurai (1972a): Table 6.1); the 1973 Muda
survey by FAO/IBRD found that zakat took an average of 6% off farm family
income. This is a significant burden, especially for the poorer farmers (most
farmers, even the poorer ones, produce more than the taxable level of padi
output). In fact, it has been reported that many of the younger farmers in
Kedah and Perlis were beginning to refuse to pay the zekat (Doering (1973): 186)).
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Table 2A Proportion of Farmers of Different Status who are
Members of Farmers' Association
Farmers by size
of operation
small
medium
large
Percentage membership in F.A.
T. Karang
(1975/6)
70
92
71
D-II Locality,
Muda(1973)
27
37
52
% membership in
rice milling
cooperative
T. Karang(1975/6)
10
23
29
Farmers by
tenurial
status
owner
owner-tenant
tenant
Percentage membership in F.A.
D-II Locality,
Muda (1975)
38
55
32
Kg. Hutan
Chengal,
Kelantan
(1973/4)
87
69
33
Sources: Various farm surveys, cited earlier.
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Appendix Table 2B
Trend in Rental Systems in Padi Cultivation in Kedah
Notes: (a) = acid soil farms
(b) = non-acid soil farms
Sources: 1949, 1955 - T.B Wilson (1957)
1964 - Kuchiba and Tsubouchi (1967)
1966 - Muda Survey (1966)
1967 - Hor" (1972)
1973 - USM-MADA (1973)
- FAO/World Bank (1975)
Crop Fixed rent Fixed rent Long lease
sharing in kind in cash in cash Others
(pawah) (sewa padi) (sewa tunai) ('pajak')
1949-All Kedah n.a. n.a. 3 n.a. n.a.
1955-All Kedah 1 71 16 12 -
1964-Padang Lalang - 73 20 2 5
1966-Muda Area 3 48 49 - -
1967-S.Bujor - 46 43 5 7
1970-Muda Area -- 36 64 - -
1973-D-II Locality 2 19 77 2 -
1973-Muda Area (a) (b) (a) (b) (a) (b) (a) (b) (a) (b)
-single - - 27 12 46 79 - - 27 9
cropping
-1st yr. 2-C - 0.3 30 19 64 74 - - 7 7
-2nd yr. " - 0.2 23 16 77 81 - - - 3
-3rd yr. " - - 10 16 90 83 - - - 1
-4th yr. " - 4 8 13 92 80 - - - 2
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Appendix Table 20
Mode of farm operation and labor utilization in coconut
smallholdings, 1964-65
Average
farm size
(acres)-
% of farms
operated by
tenants
hired labor as
% of total
farm labor
Selangor/Perak
Johore
Kelantan
All
Sources: Min. of Agri.(1976):Table 5.7, Tan Tat Wai(1977): Table 3.9
11.6
9.5
2.7
n.a.
13
14
16
n.a.
83
50
17
69
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Footnotes
Chapter 2
1 - See R. Firth (1966) for a detailed description of the production
organization characteristics in a fishing village in the East
Coast in 1940.
2 - See Tan Tat Wai (1977): 94-97 for a more detailed analysis of the
dynamics of this conversion process.
3 - R. Firth (1966) has analyzed the changes in the production organi-
zation structure of fishing in an East Coast fishing village as
a result of the introduction of seine nets in the early 1960s.
4 - Documented evidence is sketchy, but' see Firth (1966), and Report
of the Committee to Investigate the Fishing Industry.(1956).
The latter report found that "the great majority of fishermen have
no boat or gear of their own." (p. 5) A small study by Burgess
and Laidin in 1949 for a village in Malacca found only 5 out of
14 boats were non-owner-operated, while a 1959 study of Batu Maung,
Penang found 1/3 of the bagnet gear were operated by non-owners
(Elliston (1966)).
5 - Figures are according to Chopra, M'sian Business (Feb. 1975): 8-17.
By contrast, a complete outfit (boat, outboard engine plus net) for
a traditional jaring vessel cost only about $5,000 in the mid-1960s
(Elliston (1966): 19), while a seine-net gear cost about $11,000-
$20,000 in the early 1970s (Yap Chan Ling (1973)).
6 - For example, cost of diesel alone may come to over $2,000 a month
per boat. The deposit for a trawler gear license may be as high
as $1,000.
7 - For information on the income levels of fishermen, see TMP, Economic
Report 1977/8 (section on "quality of life of fishermen"), Anand
(1978) and Tan Tat Wai (1977). According to the Economic Report
1977/8, in 1975, 56% of fishermen had average monthly income less
than $125, 40% between $125 and $300, and 4% over $300. East Coast
fishermen generally earned less than West Coast fishermen because
of underemployment during the monsoon season when little fishing
can be done.
8 - Gibbons (1977) has identified three inter-related factors for the
failure of the cooperative movement to serve the interests of the
fishermen: administrative incapacity, elite manipulation at the
local level and interference by Federal and State politicians. His
description of how the second factor operates is worth quoting at
length:
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Manipulation of trawler co-operatives by local elites
for their own short-term benefit and that of their supporters
has been a major reason for the ineffectiveness of these
societies in goal attainment. Control of these co-operatives
by local political and economic elites was made likely by
the decision to open up membership to non-fishermen, i.e.,
local political and economic entrepreneurs and boat owners.
Such people were likely to be elected to the committee. In
fact this happened with such regularity and in such a pattern
as to make the composition of these committees highly pre-
dictable. The chairman and/or secretary would be local UMNO
leaders, often the chairman and secretary of the local UMNO
Branch; the treasurer, a Chinese businessman, either a supplier
of oil and/or ice to the society or a boat owner and fish
dealer; and the rest of the committee would contain other lo-
cal Malay notables often connected with UMNO, e.g., the ketua
kampung, retired non-commissioned officers from the police or
army or even retired drivers and one or two additional Chinese
towkays, again either suppliers or boat owners and fish dealers.
Absent from the committee or present in very small numbers
would be active fishermen. Once in control these local elites
had little difficulty in utilizing the co-operative primarily
for their own gain. Judging from the high frequency with which
we encountered allegations to this effect, 'it was (and is)
wide-spread. Under these circumstances the co-operatives
were not interested in exercising control over their boats
and crews, in attracting non-trawling, small-scale fishermen,
or in ensuring that the benefits from trawling were distri-
buted equitably.
(Gibbons (1977): 110)
Krzyaniak and Malik (1975) came to a similar conclusion: "'fishing
cooperative' is a misnomer.. .the members are not fishermen, but
financiers. Fishing cooperatives seem to be clubs or trade restrain-
ing associations, strengthening the position of the financiers
against fishermen." (p. 138, fn 11). According to Lawson (1975: 25)
the attempt to replace the cooperatives with new Fishermen's Asso-
ciations (FAs) by MAJUIKAN has apparently also made little impact
as yet in improving the conditions for traditional fishermen, and
few of the FAs are fully operative. Finally, a government input
subsidy scheme introduced in 1972 has apparently "enabled a few
favored fishermen to benefit from extremely good terms" and was
suspended in 1974 because "...the administration of subsidies
became subject to political interference and abuse". (Lawson (1975):
25).
9 - "Trash" is fish too young to be edible, and is used mainly as ferti-
lizer or food meals for animals.
10 - Calculated from Min. of Agri., Statistical Digest (v.y.). See also
Consumers' Association Penang (1977: Table 1) for documentation
of the decline in trawler productivity in Perak, Penang, Kedah and
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Perlis. The catch per trawler in 1972 was only 5% that in
1966. A more localized study of overfishing by trawlers in
Dindings, Perak can be found in Yap Chan Ling (1973).
11 - GohCheng Teik (1977). A study by the Consumer's Association of
Penang (CAP) claimed that 70-89% of trawler landings consist of
trash fish (CAP (1977): 13). It also estimates that the propor-
tion of trash in total fish landings for the country as a whole
rose from 16% in 1968 to 33% in 1975.
12 - The Fisheries Act 1963 requires trawlers of less than 25 tons and
less than 60 h.p. to be used in waters 3 miles beyond off-shores;
for those of more than 25 tons and more than 60 h.p., the limit
is beyond 7 miles, and for those more than 100 tons and 200 h.p.,
12 miles and beyond. In Penang, however, all trawlers were required
to be beyond 7 miles (Goh Cheng Teik (1977)). One added reason
for trawlers to move inshore is that some trawlers specialize in
catching of shrimp, which are to be found more in shallow waters.
In Penang, Kedah and Pangkor, the prevalence of inshore trawling
was also contributed by the fitting of trawl gears to boats too
small and insufficiently powered for off-shore fishing.
13 - Between 1964 and 1976, a total of 113 incidents involving 437
trawlers and 987 inshore vessels were reported for the whole of
Peninsular Malaysia, in which 45 vessels were destroyed, 62
vessels sunk and 34 lives lost. 84% of the incidents occurred
in Perak and 11% in Penang. For more details, see Goh Cheng Teik
(1977).
14 - The dynamics of overfishing described here is not unique to
Peninsular Malaysia. There are reports in the world press every
year about the "disappearance" of anchovies, salmon, sardines,
halibut, cod, herring, haddock, etc. The classic example is the
Peruvian anchovy fishing industry. The expansion of export demand
for fish meals (to hasten the fattening of table birds and hogs
for American consumers) induced a massive influx of new commer-
cially-oriented fishing units, and within a few years, anchovy
practically "disappeared" due to overfishing. A similar situation
appears to be developing in India; see J. Kurien (1978) "Entry of
big business into fishing: its impact on fish economy," Econ. &
Pol. Weekly(Sept. 9, 1978): 155-65.
15 - In a Trengganu fishermen survey (Jabat Ilmu Alam, UKM (1975)),the
share for the boat-owner with jaring gear was 35%; for bubu, it
was 20%, while for the pancing type, one-third.
16 - See Gullick (1958), Kessler (1978) among others for useful des-
cription of the pre-colonial Malay political system and their
consequent transformation by British colonialism.
17 - Other useful accounts of the historical changes in padi cultivation
in Peninsular Malaysia include Cheng Siok Hwa (1969), Goldman (1975),
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Jackson (1972), Rudner (1974), Kratoska (1975) and Doering
(1973). For more general ovewview and useful statistical infor-
mation, see Selvadurai (1972a) and Min. of Agri. (1976: chapter
on padi).
18 - In 1957 Peninsular Malaysia produced 322 million gtgs of padi;
by 1975 it has risen to 670 million gtg.(MSB (v.y.). This has
led to substantial achievement of self-sufficiency in rice:
while Peninsular Malaysia produced only about 60% of domestic
rice requirements in 1957, by the mid-1970s the share had in-
creased to over 90%.
19 - Computed from the various five-year plans.
20 - These include the following varieties (date introduced in brackets):
Malinjah (1964), Mahsuni (1965), Ria (1966), Bahagia (1968),
Murni (1972) and Jaya (1973). For a more detailed discussion of
the history of HYV adoption in Muda, see Abu Hassan (1979): Chap. 3.
21 - Further processing (milling, parboiling, etc.) are required
before the padi can be converted into the form of edible rice,
but these operations are usually undertaken by a different
sector of labor rather than the padi farmers, and hence will
not be examined here.
22 - In 1960, only 2% of all padi farms in Malaya owned any mechani-
cally-powered equipment (tractor, mechanized plough and harrow,
etc.), while another 3% used but did not own any of such equip-
ment. (Computed from 1960 Agri. Census, Vol. 5).
23 - This is illustrated by field-survey data from Kemubu area, Kelentan
in 1968, at a time when double-cropping was not yet introduced
and mechanization was negligible. The three operations of land
preparation, transplanting and harvesting constitute 24%, 35%
and 27% of the total labor inputs respectively, or 86% combined.
24 - The preparation of land usually consists of two rounds of plough-
ing operations, and it is therefore possible (and actually
commonly practiced) for the two rounds to be done by different
techniques, e.g. a tajak ploughing followed by buffalo ploughing,
or a buffalo ploughing followed by a tractor one.
25 - Bortsch (1977) cited a study in one padi farming area in India
(Cuttack, Orissa) where the following changes in the index of
labor input per unit land were obtained:
Mechanical technology/Biochemical Technology
Traditional Improved HYV
Traditional techniques 100 113 123
Partial mechanization 59 63 68
Full mechanization 43 46 50
(Source: Bartsch (1977): Table 2.17)
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26 - Sales of pedestrian and four-wheel tractors had risen sharply
since the mid-1960s (see Len-(1974/5), "The use of agricultural
tractors in mechanization of crop production in Peninsular
Malaysia", The Malayan Agriculturist, Vol. 13: Fig. 1 and 2)
for the whole country; for Muda area alone, between 1967-1972,
a total of 3178 tractor sales were recorded (FAO/World Bank Muda
Survey).
27 - The competitiveness of tractor ploughing has apparently continued
since then, despite inflation. Between 1970 and 1976, tractor
hire cost index has gone up from 100 to 138, much less when com-
pared with the increase in the labor cost index (from 100 to over
200) and the padi price index (100 to 184) and comparable with
that of the Consumer Price Index (excluding rice) (100 to 140)
(Goldman and Squire.(1978): Table 7).
28 - Jegatheesan (1974): 33, citing conclusion of MADA's Econ. Report
on Combine Harvesting Padi in the Muda Irrigation Scheme (1970,
Dec., mimeo).
29 - Private communication.
30 - Associated with these changes in the tenurial structure is the
shift in the land rental payment system. Traditionally, a variety
of systems of land rental payment were practiced: cropsharing
(pawah), fixed rent in kind (sewa padi), or cash (sewa tunai)
and other less common ones (pajak, jual janji, gadai). The rela-
tive incidence of these different systems varied with the farming
regions and localities (e.g. sharecropping was more prevalent in
the east coast farming areas), but there has definitely been a
shift towards fixed renting in cash in the post-colonial period.
(Y. Huang (1975), K. S. Jomo (1977)). Appendix Table 2B documents
this shift for Kedah in greater detail.
31 - See, for example: H. M. Cleaver, Jr. (1973) "The contradictions of
the Green Revolution" (in C. K. Wilbur (ed.)(1973) The political
economy of development and underemployment); K. Griffin (1974);
Poleman and Freebairn (ed.)(1973), Food population and unemployment:
the impact of the Green Revolution (N.Y.: Praeger); A. Pearse (1977);
Ruttan (1977); IRRI (1975); ADB (1977), and M. Lipton (1978), "Inter-
farm, inter-regional and farm-nonfarm income distribution: the
impact of the new cereal varieties" (in World Development 6(3):
319-338).
32 - For studies on the impact of GR on income distribution among padi
farmers in Peninsular Malaysia, see e.g., Goldman and Squire
(1978), Fredericks, etc. (1977), Tan Tat Wai (1977) and Jegatheesan
(1977). It is important to note that our discussion will be con-
fined to differentiation within padi farming areas undergoing the
Green Revolution transition only; the differentiation between farmers
in double-cropping areas and those in areas where double-cropping
is not possible will not be treated.
155
33 - See Goldman and Squire (1978) for a study of the land rental market
in Muda in the course of transition to double-cropping. Appendix
4.1 also provides some information on the nature of the landlordism.
In Muda in 1972/3, it was estimated that operating farm households
owned about 55% of the total padi land. A further 25% of the land
was owned by close kin of farming households who were not actively
farming themselves, and the remaining 20% was owned by "non-kin"
landlords (shopkeepers, civil servants, local aristocracy, etc.)
who leased the land out to farming households. About 40% of the
operating farm households were pure tenants, but even among those
owning land there was a tendency to exchange land parcels on a lease
basis due to problems of fragmentation of land holdings and the
desire of many households to consolidate an operating farm unit
close to their homes (Bell and Hazell (1977)).
34 - K. S. Jomo (1977) suggested this hypothesis for Muda on the basis
of much less detailed evidence presented.
35 - See Purcal (1963) for a graphical illustration of the distribution
of labor inputs over a production year.
36 - See Table 4.6 in Chapter 4 for documentation on the extent of off-
farm work among padi farmers. See also Huang (1975) for further
evidence.
37 - See FAO/World Bank Muda Study and Fredericks, et al. (1977).
38 - Purcal (1963) also confirmed this inverse correlation of farm size
with labor intensity in his study of padi farms in Province Wellesley.
39 - See Goldman and Squire (1978): Table 6 and Fredericks et al. (1977).
For example, the latter study of Tanjong Karang found that hired labor
constituted 8.3% of total labor input for farms of size less than
2 acres, which increased to 16.7% for farms between 2-4 acres and
29.1% for farms between 4-9 acres. Purcal (1963) also confirmed
this correlation of hired labor utilization with farm size.
40 - However, the ban has apparently been lifted since 1976 (Private
communication).
41 - Impressionistic accounts suggest that many peasant-laborers pre-
viously working as rubber smallholding share-tappers in the neigh-
boring areas (e.g., Sik/Baling region) are moving into Muda as
wage-laborers also.
42 - Estimated from ASB (1975) and RISDA records.
43 - A more recent estimate is that 55% of rubber smallholdings are less
than 5 acres in size (Sein Wong Kooi and Yeah Onn Chye (1976), cited
by Rabiah Tabib (1978)).
44 - There is no official data on ethnic distribution of rubber smallhold-
ers, but from the 1970 Population Census, figures on employment in
rubber cultivation by ethnic groups can be obtained. Subtracting
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from these the figures on employment in rubber estates (as provided
by the Min. of Labor AR, 1970) gives us an estimate of the ethnic
distribution of rubber smallholding employment. The result is as
follows: out of about 409,000 employment in rubber smallholding
in 1970, about 76% were Malay, and 24% were Chinese.
45 - Barlow (1978: 276-7) has summarized evidence on the possible scale
economies of rubber production (excluding processing), and concludes
that there is no relationship between area of holding and the cost
per unit of output produced, after controlling for the planting
materials. It is thus a myth that plantation rubber production is
more "efficient" than smallholdings. On the other hand, he did find
that different mode of labor utilization leads to different produc-
tivity, after controlling for planting materials. Own-labor operation
has the highest productivity, piece-rate second, share-cropping third
and daily-wage operation the lowest (Barlow (1978): Table 9.2).
46 - See Barlow (1978: 233-4) and Tan Tat Wai (1977): Chapter 3) for detailed
discussion of the difficulties faced by the poorer smallholders to
replant.
47 - In fact, rubber smallholders bore a higher burden of export taxation
than rubber estates in the financing of replanting, even though
they replanted less than the estates (Edwards (1970): 238-47 and
A. Tan (1967)). The situation may have ameliorated somewhat since
1973 when estates were no longer allowed to get refunds unless they
replant, but the bias still persists (FEER (Sept. 15, 1978) and Tan
Tat Wai (1977)). In the mid-1970s, an average rubber smallholder
is required to pay about one-quarter to one-third of his (potential)
income in taxes (Mhd Ariff bin Hussein (1977)); this is a higher tax
burden than even the very rich in the country. Tan Tat Wei (1977)
has also noted the historical bias of Rubber Research Institute's (RRI)
research effort in favor of the estate sector and neglecting the small-
holders' problems.
48 - Roughly the same conclusion (about 5 acres per full-time worker) has
been reached by Barlow and Chan (1966) and Thoburn (1977).
49 - For a survey of rubber-processing technologies, see Barlow (1978):
Chapter 5.
50 - According to the 1960 Agri. Census, among rubber smallholdings that
reported the use of non-family labor, 78% reported the use of
"permanent job" or "regular" laborers, 29% "contract job" laborers,
24% "occasional job" laborers, and 6% "exchange job" laborers (Vol.
12 "Farm Labor"). Note that the percentages do not add up to 100
because some holdings may employ more than one type of laborer.
The corresponding figures for wet padi farms were 1%, 32%, 41% and
55%.
51 - In the majority of cases where share-cropping is practiced, the
share to the tenant is usually half of the latex (hence the popular
term bagi dua) and all of the scraps. Exceptions do exist, however,
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often pointing to a more disadvantaged position for the tenant-
labor. Thus, in an examination of 151 cases of share-cropping
practiced in smallholdings formed from estate subdivision, Ungku
Aziz (1963) found 71% to be on a 50:50 share basis, 24% with the
tenant receiving 40%, and 5% receiving less than 40%, with as
little as 28% in some cases.
52 - According to the 1960 Agri. Census, among rubber smallholdings
employing "permanent" non-owner family laborers, 88% were on
bagi dua, or payment in kind (calculated from Table 1045).
53 - Some of these wage laborers who are replanting smallholders may,
however, be given some share-ownership of the plantations. See
Min. of Agriculture (1976) for details.
54 - For a survey of recent changes in smallholder rubber processing
technologies and their adoption pattern, see P. K. Voon (1977b).
For studies of the smallholding rubber marketing structure, see
Lim Sow Ching (1975) and Tan Tat Wai (1977). It is known that
the smaller rubber smallholders tend to produce unsmoked rubber
sheet and latex more than the larger-operators. According to the
1954 Mudie Report, for holdings less than 3 acres, the proportion
producing unsmoked sheet and latex was 89%, whereas for holdings
between 60-100 acres, the share was only 36%. More recent figures
are unfortunately not available.
55 - For example, rubber smallholders in FELDA schemes "sell" their
latex to FELDA and do not engage in any processing themselves.
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Chapter 3 Transformation of the Plantation Sector and Growth of the
Public Land Development Sector
The purpose of this Chapter is to examine the structure of
production organization, and labor utilization in the remaining sectors
of the rural hinterland--the plantation sector and the public land
development sector.
3.1 The Plantation Sector
Conceptually, plantation agriculture as a mode of production is
distinguished from smallholding agriculture in that a plantation is
organized as a private capitalist enterprise utilizing a wage-labor
force and is run by either the individual proprietor or by a management
staff. In practice, a plantation in the Malayan context has been defined
for official statistical purposes as any unit of agricultural production
under a single legal ownership covering 100 acres or more; that is, the
criterion is purely one of size. To the extent that there are
agricultural enterprises of less than 100 acres that have the characteristics
of plantation as defined conceptually, the official statistical criterion
is likely to underestimate the true extent of the plantation sector.1
Since there is no alternative empirical data base other than the official
statistical records, however, we will in this dissertation adopt the
official definition as an adequate proxy for the plantation sector.
A considerable body of research has been built up on the
historical development and various general economic and technological
aspects of the rubber (and to a smaller extent, oil palm) plantation
industry of Peninsular Malaysia.2 Little of this research literature,
however, has dealt with the changes in the structure of employment in the
plantation sector as a whole in the post-colonial period. Much of the
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analysis presented here has therefore relied upon primary official
statistical records.
3.1.1 Post-Colonial Transformation of the Plantation Sector
In terms of land acreage, the plantation sector has experienced
little expansion in the post-colonial period (Table 3.1). This small net
increase in the plantation sector is, however, the combined result of two
opposite trends: a drastic drop in the acreage under rubber (a one-fourth
decline between 1960-1973) together with an even more dramatic rise in the
acreage under oil-palm cultivation (a five-fold increase between 1960-1973).
Consequently, the share of plantation acreage under rubber has dropped from
nine-tenths to less than two-thirds, while that of oil palm rose from
6% to 31%.
The trend of decline in rubber plantation acreage is itself the
net result of two tendencies: a slow pace of new planting counteracted by a
rapid pace of loss due to (i) subdivision into smallholdings and (ii)
conversion into oil-palm cultivation.
a) Subdivision of Rubber Estates4
Subdivision of estates first started in the northern states of Kedah
and Penang in 1951 and rapidly spread throughout the Western rubber belt
within a few years, reaching a peak around 1958-1960, immediately after
the year of Independence. After a decline in the early 1960's, the pace of
subdivision appears to have picked up again in the mid-1960's. Overall,
as shown in Table 3.2, between 1950 and 1972 a total of 360,000 acres of
rubber land involving over 340 estates had been subdivided, displacing
an estimated number of over 31,000 estate workers.
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Table 3.1 Distribution of Plantation Acreage by Crop-type, 1953-1973
% Change
1953-1960 1960-1973
Rubber
Oil Palm
Coconut
Others (sugar
cane, tea,
pineapple,
cocoa
All
Total acreage
('000)
-5
+25
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
Acreage distribution (%)
1960 1970 1973
89
6
-25
+403
-36
+105
+3
74
22
3
1
65
31
2
2
100 100 100
2167 2158 2229
Source: Ministry of Agriculture, Statistical Digest (v.y.)
Table 3.2
Area affected Number of estates Estd. no. of workers
('000 acres) involved displaced ('000)
1950-61
1962-6 4
1965-67
Total 1950-67
1968-72
Total 1950-72
231.9
8.1
93.9
333.9
26.0
360.0
290
4
46
340
n.a.
n.a.
15.6
0.8
11.6
28.0
3.4
31.4
Sources: 1950-67 from NUPW Research Dept., cited in Nijhar (1976)
Appendix Table C.6.
1968-72 Area figure estimated from Table 2. , and number of
workers displaced estimated using average (employment/acreage
planted) ratio for 1968-72.
Pace of Estate subdivision,. 1950-1972
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The early phase of this subdivision process (1960-61) was part
of a larger process of divestment by the smaller British plantation interests
in Malaya. By early 1950's, many of these British rubber plantations had
their rubber trees nearing the end of their productive age and were thus
faced with the choice of finding capital to replant or selling off. With
the approach of political independence, many of these companies, especially
the smaller ones, felt uncertain about the political future of Malaya and
were reluctant to replant; others were interested in moving their capital
to other British colonies (e.g., Nigeria) where more profitable prospects
had been opened up. 5 Subdivision of the estate acreage to be sold off in
parcels to local investors therefore became one way for this divestment
to take place, the other method being selling off the entire holdings to
the larger estate interests who were eager to consolidate and expand their
holdings through takeover of the smaller ones. It is also possible that
some of the subdivisions may in fact have been "pseudo-subdivisions"
arranged to take advantage of the higher replanting grant available to
smallholders.6
b) Conversion to Oil Palm Planting
Conversion of rubber acreage to oil palm began on a large scale
in 1963. Induced partly by the declining price prospects for rubber export
in the early 1960's and the growing profitability of oil palm planting,
many estates, predominantly the foreign-controlled ones, took advantage of
the circumstance of their rubber trees reaching the end of their productive
age to "rejuvenate" their capital investment by conversion to oil palm
planting instead.
3.1.2 Change in the ownership and size structure of plantation production
The plantation sector has traditionally been dominated by foreign
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(mostly British) ownership and control in the colonial period, the
participation of local capital being small and concentrated in the smallest
acreage size (Table 3.3). Since independence, there has been a progressive
penetration of local capital into the plantation sector, but much of this
penetration still tends to be concentrated in the smaller-size estates.
Indeed, in spite of the increasing local equity capital participation,
foreign control appears to have become strengthened in the post-colonial
period due to increasing concentration of ownership among the larger
plantation groups within the foreign sector itself.7 An astonishing pace
of amalgamation and takeover of the smaller plantation companies by the
largest British plantation groups and agency houses took place immediately
after independence,8 and the process of concentration appears to have
continued since. By 1974, the top 7 plantation groups and agency houses
alone owned 45% of the rubber estate acreage and 58% of the oil palm
estate land.9
The impact of these changes in the ownership and control structure
on the size distribution of plantations has been different for the rubber
and oil palm estates (Table 3.4). In the rubber estate sector, the
simultaneous trends of an increase in the class of local plantation owners
(who are small but numerous) on the one hand, and the growing consolidation
of the larger companies and agencies on the other have together led to a
"polarized" pattern of growth in the size distribution structure, that is,
a decline in the share of the "medium-size" estates (1000-2000 acres) has
occurred (Table 3.4 a).1 0
With respect to the oil palm estates, however, the trend has been
consistently towards increasing concentration of production in the larger
estates, the penetration by smaller estate producers being insignificant
(Table 3.4 b). The reason for this difference has to do with the higher
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Table 3.3 Share of Foreign-owned Estatea Acreage (%)
Rubber Oil palm
Estate Acreage Size
less than 500
500-1 000
000-2 000
000-3 000
000-5 000
over 5 000
All
1973
8
47
80
}90
88
70
14
32
49
66
76
67
52
1973
}52
82
80
91
100
85
21
37
47
72
59
73
60
Source: RSH (v.y.)
Notes: a - Refers to estates with more than 50% of its share capital
owned by non-Malaysians
b - Refers to "European" share only; may understate actual non-
Malaysian share since part of the "Asian" share may also be
non-Malaysian
Table 3.4 Size Structure of Plantation Production
a) Rubber Estates
Distribution of estates(%) Distribution of estate acreage(%)
Estate acreage size
Less than 500
500-1 000
000-2 000
000-5 000
over 5 000
2030000 1859000 1457000
b) Oil Palm Estates
Distribution of estates(%) Distribution of estate acreage(%)
Estate acreage size
Less than 1 000
1 000-2 000
2 000-5 000
Over 5 000
All
1966
63.8
15.4
15.9
5.9
100
(n=188)
1973
54.8
12.8
21.0
11.4
100
(n=281)
1966
14.8
16.1
30.4
38.8
100
(256 200)
1973
9.0
9.6
34.4
47.0
100
(536 000)
Sources: RSH (v.y.), and, Oil Palm, Coconut.and Tea Statistics 1966 &1973
Notes: "Rubber Estates" ("Oil Palm Estates") figures pertain to estates
with rubber(oil palm) as sole or main crop; they accounted for 71%
(79%) of all rubber (oil palm) estate acreage in 1973.
1
2
3
1
2
1954
64.2
12.5
12.8
8.3
2.1
100
2489
1965
63.1
12.4
11.9
9.7
2.9
100
2049
1973
66.1
12.2
11.1
8.6
1.9
100
1908
1954
15.9
11.2
22.7
31.1
19.1
100
1965
14.1
10.1
19.0
33.8
23.1
100
1973
16.3
11.7
20.6
34.9
16.5
100
164
capital intensity of oil palm estate investment, the greater difficulty
of the smaller capitalists to acquire land, and the initial monopolistic
control over oil palm production technologies by the large plantation
companies.
3.1.3 Impact on employment structure
How have these changes in the structure of production of the
plantation sector affected the pattern of employment there? Has the
aggregate level of employment in the plantation sector declined? How
has the mode of employment (contract labor system vs. direct wage-labor,
resident vs. non-resident labor) changed? And have these changes affected
the different ethnic groups in the estate labor force equally? We shall
examine each of these questions in this section.
a) The decline in aggregate employment and labor intensity per acre
Figure 3.1 shows the trend in aggregate employment in rubber
estates, oil palm estates and all estates combined. It is seen that
employment in rubber estates fluctuated around 280,000 between 1947 and
1963, but subsequently declined dramatically; by 1976 it had dropped to
less than 180,000--a decline of 38% from that of 1963. Oil palm estate
employment has steadily grown since 1957, but it was not able to compensate
for the fall in rubber estate employment until the mid-70's, when the
level of total estate employment appeared to have stabilized. Overall,
between 1963 and 1974, the plantation sector lost about 63,000 laborers--
a decline of about 20%.
This trend in rubber estate imployment is due to two factors:
an overall decline in the rubber estate acreage and an overall increase
in the land-labor ratio.
320
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O 260
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The declining trend of rubber estate acreage in the post-colonial
period has already been mentioned in Section 3.1.1. Table 3.5(a) shows
that the land-labor ratio in rubber estates (measured as total planted
acreage/total employment) registered a decline in the late 1950's and
early 1960's, but had been increasing subsequently. To check that this
subsequent increase was not just due to a greater share of immature (hence
non-producing) acreage within the total planted acreage in later years,
.we had also computed the (mature acreage/tapper employment) ratio
(Table 3.5(b)]. A similar trend was observed.
The implications of these observations is made explicit in Table 3.6,
where we have compared the actual observed rubber estate employment changes
with what would have been the case if the land-labor ratio had been held
constant. As much as 24% of the observed employment decline between 1963
and 1974 was due to a lowering of the labor intensity per acre.1 1
As Table 3.7 shows, the distributional impact of this overall labor
density decline has been highly uneven across estates of different sizes.
In 1960, the smallest-sized estates' land-labor ratio was close to the
average for all estates; by-1973, it had declined by 19% while the average
for all estates rose by 12%. Thus, while the smallest estates were becoming
more labor intensive, the larger estates were becoming less so. The overall
trend of declining labor intensity was due to the domination of the latter.
Table 3.5 (c,d) also shows the land-labor ratio for oil palm estates.
Two points should be noted: first, oil palm estates have a lower labor
intensity per acre than rubber estates, so that conversion from rubber to
oil palm reduces labor absorption per acre; second, the labor intensity per
acre in oil palm estates has also been progressively declining since 1957
(even after separating out the immature acreage), so that, over time, the
labor absorption capacity of oil palm estates decreased: between 1957 and
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Table 3.5 Land-labor Ratio in the Plantation Sector
Rubber Estates
(a) (b)
planted acreage mature acreage
employment tapper
7.0
7.3
6.8
6.7
7.3
7.6
7.8
7.5
n.a.
8.9
7.5
7.3
8.2
8.9
9.3
10.0
Oil Palm Estates
(c) (d)
planted acreage mature acreage
employment employment
n.a.
8.1
8.7
10.0
9.7
11.4
12.8
14.1
n.a.
n.a.
6.5
6.9
6.1
6.5
8.8
9.7a
Source: Computed from RSH (v.y.), Ministry of Labor AR (v.y.), Oil Palm,
Coconut and Tea Statistics (v.y.)
Note: a The figure is for 1973, as mature acreage figure for 1974 is not
available.
Table 3.6
Rubber
Estates
1963-74
Oil Palm
Estates
1957-74
Effect of land-labor ratio changes on estate employment
(a)
Total change in
employment observed
('000)
97.5
40.1
(b)
Change in employment due
to change in land, assuming
constant land-labor ratio
(?000)
-74.5
69.5
Source: (a) Ministry of Labor AR (v.y.)
(b) computed from data in Table 3.5 and sources cited therein
1950
1957
1960
1963
1966
1969
1972
1974
(a) - (b)
-23.0
-29.4
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Table 3.7 Change in Land-labor Ratio in Rubber Estates by Size of Estates
Estate Acreage Size
less than 500
500-1000
1000-2000
over 2000
All
(Total acreage/Employment)
1960 1965
6.7
6.7
5.7
7.4
6.9
6.4(5.6)
6.4(6.5)
6.2(6.3)
7.4(8.1)
6.9(7.1)
Source: Computed from RSH 1960,1965 and 1973
Note: Figures in parentheses refer to (acreage tapped/number of tappers).
Table 3.8 Total Labor Displacement from the Plantation Sector 1950-1972
(a) Total labor displaced from rubber estates
i. Labor displaced due to subdivision
ii. Labor displaced due to increase in land-labor ratio
iii Labor displaced due to conversion to oil palm and
other uses
(b) Net labor absorption in oil palm estates
(c) Net labor displacement from rubber and oil palm
estates combined
89 000
31 400
18 200
39 500
35 100
54 000
Source: (a), (b): Computed from RSH and Ministry of Labor AR (v.y.)
(i): From Table 3.2
(ii): computed from RSH
(iii): derived from subtracting (i), (ii) from (a)
(c): derived from subtracting (b) from (a)
1973
5.4
8.7
8.2
8.2
7.7
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1974, the actual observed increase in oil palm estate employment would
have been larger by 73% if labor intensity had not declined (see Table 3.6).
Table 3.8 summarizes the contributions of the various factors
(subdivision, declining labor intensity, and diversification to oil palm)
toward the overall displacement of labor from the plantation sector.
It is seen that the employment increase in all oil palm estates between
1950 and 1972 was not sufficient to offset the displacement of labor from
rubber estates converted to oil palm alone.
b) Change in the occupational wage-payment structure
Table 3.9 shows the occupational structure of rubber and oil
palm estates, while Figure 3.2 illustrates the hierarchical relationships
between the different occupations. According to Colletta (1976), three
distinct classes can be identified within this occupational hierarchy:
managerial, staff and laborer. The manager and his assistants are said
to form the top crust of the estate system's social strata. The office
clerk, factory skilled artisans and hospital attendants, being in a staff
relation to the management level, are said to form the second level of
hierarchy, receiving better housing and higher salaries and fringe
benefits than the third level, which comprises the conductors, mandores
(overseers) and the field workers. The conductors and mandores are said
to be further differentiated from the laborers because of the formal and
informal powers they have over the latter in terms of task allocation and
work evaluation.1 2 This is also manifested in a larger proportion of the
former being paid on a monthly basis than the latter (Table 3.10).
These hierarchical occupational relationships appear to have
changes little over the years since independence. Among the laborers,
however, there has apparently been some changes in their wage-payment
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Table 3.9 Occupational structure of labor force in rubber and oil palm
estates, 1972
Rubber
% of laboraverage
force monthly
earnings($)
Oil Palm
% of lbor average
force monthly
earnings($)
Supervisory and
Administrative
Mandores/kepalas
Clerical
Factory workers
Skilled
Unskilled
Field Workers
Tappers/harvesters
Weeders
Arsenite sprayers
Transporters
Pruners
Other Workers
Source: Thoburn (1977):Table 9.3
Figure 3.2 Occupational Hierarchy in Rubber Estates
Hospital staff
and artisans
Senior Assist.
/
Field Conductors
Field Mandores
Field Labor
nager
Office-Clerical
Staff
Junior Assist.
Area I Area II
Tapping Conductors
Tapping Mandores
Tapping Labor
Source: Colletta (1976)
3
1
2
4
68
13
1
150
n.a.
134
95
108
68
107
n.a.
3
1
4
4
19
31
2
5
1
31
147
n.a.
168
97
130
68
106
114
91
n.a.8
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system. On the one hand, there has been a movement away from piece-rate
payment to daily payment (although piece-rate payment still remains the
dominant form of wage-employment for rubber tappers and oil palm
harvesters/transporters) (Table 3.10). On the other hand, there has also
been some changes in the use of contract-labor versus direct wage-
employment (Table 3.11).
The modus operandi of the contract labor system is for the
estate to engage a contractor to enter into an agreement making him
responsible for supplying labor for a certain wage consideration. The
estate makes payment only to the contractor, who in turn is.responsible
for paying the workers, presumably keeping a commission for himself.
The task of disciplining the labor and ensuring its supply is in this way
passed on to the contractor; moreover, labor employed through contractor
can be more easily terminated than directly-employed labor, thus
facilitating the adjustment of labor supply to demand conditions on the
part of the estate employers. It has also been alleged that some estates
resort to terminating the services of directly-employed workers and
passing them over to the control of some labor contractors (usually one of
their previous employees) as a counter-device when the regular workers
start organizing a union and demanding recognition by the estate employers. 1 3
As Table 3.11 'shows, the use of contract labor has declined
somewhat for rubber estates, but has increased for oil palm estates, so
that for the estate sector as a whole, the proportion of contract labor in
total employment has stayed more or less constant. It can also be seen
that the largest estates (greater than 2,000 acres in size) tend to
utilize more contract labor.14
c) Changes in the ethnic composition of the estate labor force
Associated with the above changes in the production structure and
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Table 3.10 Estate employment by methods of wage payment
Rubber Estates
Mandores/Kepalas
Tappers
Weeders
Arsenite sprayers
Factory workers-'
artisans
Others
Oil Palm Estates
Monthly
1960 1973
41
18
Daily
1960 1973
57 51
- 8
1 88
- 60
34 76
11
39
36
96
85
63
57
1967 1973 1967 1973
Piece-rate
1960 1965 1973
8
92
12
40
6
7
83
6
29
11
-I
4
64
3
15
3
32
1967 1973
Mandores/Kepalas 37 40 57
Harvesters - - 2
Weeders - - 68
Arsenite sprayers - - 48
Transporters 1 4 12
Pruners - - -
Factory workers- 15 35 85
artisans
Others ./ 15
Source: Ministry of Labor AR (v.y.)
Table 3.11 Contract labor as proportion of total estate employment (%)
Rubber Estates
Estate size (acres)
500
500-2,000
2,000+
All
Oil Palm Estates
Pineapple Estates
Coconut Estates
Tea Estates
All Estates
1957 1960 1965 1970 1973 1976
32.4
17.1
26.1
23.9
31 a
n .a.
n.a.
n.a.
n .a.
18.7
14.9
22.7
19.4
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
15.2
13.3
20.4
17.4
25
76
2
11
18
7.3
15.0
23.1
16.7
28b
79
2
5
17
11.8 n.a.
10.9 n.a.
19.5 n.a.
15.2 16.1
33
44
4
4
19
Sources: RSH (v.y.), Min. of Labor AR (v.y.), and ASB 1976
Notes: a - figure is for 1958; b - figure is for 1969.
57
5
95
41
27
24
60
81
6
98
32
52
87
100
3
95
5
59
69
76
5
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wage-employment system was a dramatic transformation of the ethnic
composition of the labor force. As Table 3.12 shows, Indian labor,
which was the predominant source of estate labor in the colonial period
(constituting as much as 80% of the rubber estate labor force in 1938),
has suffered a dramatic decline both relatively and in absolute numbers.
Between 1957-74, there was a loss of 62,000 Indian laborers from rubber
estates, which was less than compensated by the rise of 15,000 in oil palm
estates. On the other hand, Malay labor has increased both absolutely and
proportionally in both rubber and oil palm estates, the total absolute gain
between 1957-74 being 35,000. Proportionally, Malay labor now forms the
largest group in oil palm estates, and is only slightly less than the
Indians in rubber estates. Chinese labor registered a decline in its
share of total labor in both rubber and oil palm estates; although its
absolute number in oil palm estates has increased, in total it suffered a
loss of 31,000 between 1957-74.
How are these changes in the ethnic composition of the estate
labor force to be explained? Table 3.13 and Table 3.14, which present
breakdowns of the ethnic composition by wage-payment system and estate-size,
provide some partial clues. First, as Table 3.13 shows, in 1958 the
Chinese were the predominant group among contract labor (about 3/4) and
were negligible among the directly-employed. Since then, its share among
contract labor has dropped drastically (so that by 1974 it was no longer
the predominant group), while its share among the directly-employed has
actually increased. The behavior of the Indian share was completely the
reverse of that of the Chinese. On the other hand, Malay labor
has increased its share in both; indeed, by 1974 Malay labor constituted
the predominant group among contract labor. 1 5 The remarkable similarity
of the above trends for both rubber and oil palm estates suggest little
differentiation in the labor market mechanisms between the two.
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Table 3.12 Change in ethnic composition of estate labor force
a) Rubber Estates
Number ('000)
Year Total M C I
1938 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
1947 290.2 59.0 78.6 150.9
1957
1963
1970
1974
276.7
286.3
226.4
193.2
52.5
67.6
62.5
64.9
80.3
81.7
69.7
47.4
142.6
136.3
93.7
80.4
% distribution
M C I
2
20
19
24
28
34
17
27
29
28
31
24
80
53
52
48
41
42
b) Oil Palm Estates
1952 13.1 1.8 3.5 7.8
1957
1963
1969
1974
14.3
1746
38.3
54.4
2.5
3.7
10.5
25.1
3.9
3.3
6.0
6.3
14 26 60
7.7
10.5
21.6
23.0
c) All Estates
% distribution
M C I
20
23
24
32
36
29
29
28
22
22
Total ('000)
50
48
48
45
42
314.4
300.5
263.7
252.0
255.1
Sources: Data for 1957 onwards are from Min. of Labor AR (v.y);
data for before 1957 are from RSH (v.y.), Dept. of Labor
(as cited in Socioeconomic Survey of the Colony of Malaya
(1953)).
Note: M - Malay; C - Chinese; I - Indians.
18
21
27
46
27
19
16
12
54
59
57
42
1960
1965
1969
1972
1974
Table 3.13 Ethnic composition of estate employment by mode of employment
(a) Rubber Estate
Directly employed (
Year M C I
1958 20 15 65
1966 24 25 51
1974 33 23 44
(b) Oil Palm Estate
1958 15 6 77
1966 15 8 77
1974 40 9 51
Source: Ministry of Labor AR (v.y.)
Table 3.14
M C I
17 75 8
27 37 16
36 36 28
22 73- 5
37 49 14
59 18 23
Ethnic composition of employment in rubber estates
4500 500-1000
% dist. 19571973 1957 1973
22
53
41
31
1000-2000
1957 1973
15 33 18
29 25 22
33
20
25 27 55 42 59 48 54 47 52 42
41
-25
+46
+30
-50
3
-54
-43
Source: Computed from RSH, 1957 and 1973
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M
C
I
2000+
1957 1973
All
1957 1973
19
26
30
23
19
29
34
24
M
C
I
All
-6
-48
-46
-39
+22
-43
-43
-31
Employed through contractors (%)
by estate size, 1957-1973
% Change,. 1957-1973
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Second, as Table 3.14 shows, not only was the ethnic composition
of rubber estates different for estates of different sizes, but the pattern
of change over time has also been different. In particular, Indian labor
was more dominant in the larger estates and under-represented in the
smaller ones in 1957, but by 1973 this differential had been evened out
somewhat as Indian labor increased (both absolutely and relatively) in the
smallest estates but declined in the larger ones. For the Chinese, their
share in the labor force has declined for all estate sizes; in particular,
they have lost their predominance in the smallest estates. The behavior
of the Malay share was the complete reverse of the Chinese: they have
expanded in all of the estate sizes, but particularly so in the smallest
estates where they now constitute the largest group.
In summary, we can see that the decline of Chinese labor in
rubber estates has been due largely to a sharp decline in Chinese contract-
labor at all levels of estate sizes; the decline of Indian labor, on the
other hand, was due mainly to a sharp drop by those directly-employed in
the larger estates which was insufficiently compensated by their moderate
increase in the smallest estates (both directly-employed and contract)
and in contract-labor in the larger estates. Finally, the increase in
Malay labor, while occurring at every size level and among both contract-
and directly-employed labor, has been most concentrated in estates of the
smallest size. In oil palm estates, all three ethnic groups have shared in
the aggregate expansion of employment. Malays have expanded the most,
both among directly-employed and contract-labor. Indian expansion among
directly-employed has been slower than among contract labor, while for
Chinese, there has been an actual decline in contract labor.
These trends, taken together, lend support to the hypothesis
that, within an overall process of labor displacement from the estate
sector, the directly-employed Indians and Chinese contract labor have been
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disproportionately dislocated as a result of increasing substitution by
Malay labor. While the process of estate subdivision has definitely
contributed significantly to the dislocation of Indian labor in the past,
in the future the substitution process by Malays is likely to be more
important, in view of explicit Government policies to increase the Malay
share in estate employment. Already, new oil palm estates are employing
increasingly more Malays than Indians and Chinese, signifying a changing
preference for Malay labor.
One factor that might have contributed to this substitution of
Malay labor for directly-employed Indian labor was the relatively more
unionized nature of Indian estate labor. While the proportion of rubber
estate employment unionized has risen from 13% in 1954 to 59% in 1968
(35,700 to 137,100 in absolute numbers) (Nijhar, 1977: Table 9.1),
membership has been confined mainly to Indians. According to one
estimate,1 6 NUPW (National Union of Plantation Workers), the single
largest union of estate workers, has 73% of its membership being Indian
(which also constituted 94% of all Indian estate workers), whereas less
than 25% of all Chinese estate labor was organized by NUPW.17 Thus, an
attempt by employers to bypass union bargaining would lead to a tendency
to discriminate against Indian workers. The decline in Chinese contract
labor could, on the other hand, be due to increased competition by Malay
labor.
These and other factors affecting the estate employers'
decision concerning the ethnic composition of their labor force have been
succinctly expressed by one manager of a rubber estate:
"We have found this policy (of maintaining some sort of 'racial
balance' among the workforce) useful on other grounds, even if
not on efficiency considerations. For instance, the Indians
have become too unionized and we would like to dilute the union's
strength before it dilutes us; the Chinese are useful as anti-
union elements but when they are large in number they become too
demanding; and finally, it is considered good politics to employ
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a few Malays before we are actually forced to do so by the
Government." (cited in Nijhar (1976): 76)
Comparing this statement to one by another planter in the earlier
colonial period:
"(the advantage of a multi-ethnic labor force is that) you can
then always play one against the other...and in case of a strike,
you will never be left without labor, for the coolies of one
nationality will think twice before they make terms if they
know that you are in a position that you can do without them."
(cited in Jackson (1961))
One is struck by the remarkable similarity and continuity of this
"divide and rule" tactic of labor- control by the estate owners.
An additional factor that has contributed to the displacement
of Indians from estates was the problem of. the lack of proper citizenship
papers among many Indian estate laborers, who may thus be "legally"
discriminated against in terms of access to jobs.1 8
d) "Marginalization" of estate-resident labor
Traditionally, most of the labor employed in estates were housed
within the estates themselves. This was particularly the case with
Indians; being historically the predominant ethnic group in the estate
labor force, they also formed the largest bulk of the resident labor.
The 1931 and 1947 population census showed the proportion of Indian,
Chinese and Malay in the estate-resident population to be 72%, 20%, 7%
and 59%, 28%, 13% respectively; however, the Chinese share was likely
to have been over-estimated due to the presence of squatters within
estate land being counted in as "estate-resident labor."1 9 More recent
data on the ethnic composition of estate-resident populations are
unfortunately not available, 2 0 but the trend of decline of Indians and
increase in Malay is expected to have continued, in view of the increasing
penetration of Malay peasant labor into estate wage employment.21 Overall,
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however, an absolute decline in the estate-resident population is expected
as Indian labor is dislocated from estates and replaced by Malay peasant
labor, at least some of whom may be from kampongs nearby and thus have no
need to resort to living within the estates. That this is the case is
confirmed by Table 3.14, which shows a declining proportion of labor
being housed in estates. 2 2
Table 3.15 Proportion of labor force resident in housing provided by
estate employers
Estates 1957 1968 1971 1974
Rubber 79 78 66 69
Oil Palm n.a. 82 83 74
Coconut n.a. 97 87 88
Tea n.a. 92 98 91
Pineapples n.a. 93 75 86
Source: Ministry of Labor AR (v.y.)
This transition process from resident-labor to non-resident labor
represents, on the one hand, a process towards increasing use of "free"
wage-labor on the part of the employers. On the other hand, from the
perspective of the resident-labor being displaced, this transition represents
a double "marginalization" process, from his job as well as his home:
"...When the worker has lost his vitality he is discarded
with no more thought than given to an old worn-out shoe.
Unlike the rural smallholder, he does not even own the roof
that has covered his head through his productive years.
He loses his job and he loses his home."
(S. Gordon (1970))
This "marginalization" process not only affects those estate
labor who have reached the end of their productive age, but also the
younger generation who grow up within the estates but could not secure job
offers within the estates. While no comparable systematic nation-wide
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study of the problem of unemployment among the estate population over
time has been made, scattered evidence available suggests that the
problem is very serious. Thus, a large survey by MAPA (Malayan Agricultural
Producers' Association) in 1968 (covering more than 60% of the total
estate acreage of Malaya) found that 35% of the estate-resident labor
force over 12 years old were without jobs though they were willing, able
and trying to secure jobs either personally or through friends and
relatives. The survey also found that the majority of these people were
well within the working age of 15-54 and not those who had reached
retirement age (Nijhar, K.S., Sunday Mail 7/5/72). In another sample
survey reported by Nijhar (1976), it was found that, while in 1952-57 only
10% of the new job-seekers from estates were unemployed before getting
their first job, the proportion had increased to over 50% in 1962-67.
Moreover, the average duration of unemployment among those looking for
their first jobs had increased from seven months between 1952-57 to
fourteen months between 1963-67. A survey of three estates in 1974 by
NUPW also showed that a high proportion of the able-bodied estate-resident
population was unemployed. Finally, Selvaratnam et al. (1976), in a
sample survey of 108 household heads (age 15-34) in three estates in
North Sembilan Timor, 1975, found 9% unemployed and looking for work,
and 2% unemployed and not looking for work. Moreover, 55% of the unemployed
had been unemployed for more than one year, and it was noted by the
researcher that the unemployment rate would have been higher if it were
not for the fact that the survey took place at a time when a minor price
boom in rubber and palm oil occurred.
These magnitudes of unemployment among the estate-resident
population suggest the existence of considerable "surplus" labor within
the estates, although they may actually understate the true extent of
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labor displacement since some of the labor rendered surplus might have
migrated out. There has indeed been considerable migration of rural
Indian labor (who were mainly estate-resident) to the urban areas in the
post-colonial period, contributing to the rapid growth in urban Indian
unemployment. One researcher has also suggested that ther has been
considerable migration of Indians out of the country (presumably
expatriated back to India) between 1957-70 (Hirschman (1975):44).
Nevertheless, the relative historical and cultural isolation of the
Indian estate labor communities from other employment environments,
coupled with the barriers of language, have probably continued to be
immobilizing factors for the underemployed Indian estate laborers.
It has also been suggested that the access to housing is of importance in
determining mobility:
"The security of free housing on the estate is not the
least important factor that keeps a young estate worker
from accepting a lowly-paid semi-skilled or white-collar
job in town. On the other hand, a young man assured of
an accommodation in the house of a kinsman on the estate
will often take such a job in a nearby town."
(Jain (1970):432)
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3.2 The Public Land Development Sector
We have seen in the last section that the private plantation's
capacity to absorb rural labor has been limited in the post-colonial period,
and that it was in fact displacing labor at a significant rate. To what
extent has the new land development by the public sector been able-to
compensate for this failure of the private plantation sector to absorb
rural labor? And where is the labor so absorbed drawn from? And what are
the production organization characteristics of the public land development
sector that differentiate it from the private plantation and smallholding
sectors? These are the questions that we shall attempt to address in this
section.
The organization of this section is as follows. In 3.2.1 we first
give an overview of the public land development sector's pace of expansion
and production organization characteristics. In 3.2.2, we study the
settlement schemes organized by FELDA (Federal Land Development Authority),
the most important of the public land development authorities, in greater
detail. Finally, in Section 3.2.3, we shall examine the labor absorption
impact of the emerging policy shift towards public-estate development and
large-scale integrated regional land development.
3.2.1 Overall Pace of Public Sector Land Development
Since independence, new land development has become increasingly
important in the Public Sector's overall agricultural development effort.
As Table 3.16 shows, public land development expenditure as a proportion of
total public agricultural development expenditure has risen from 7% during
1956-60 to almost 57% during 1971-75.
A large number of Government agencies both at the State and Federal
levels have been created to administer the development of new agricultural
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Table 3.16 Public Expenditure for Agricultural Land Development in
Peninsular Malaysia, 1956-80 ($ million)
1956-60 1961-65 1966-70 1971-75 1976-801
a) Total Agricultural
develcpment
b) Total Land
Development
c) FELDA Land
Development
(b) as % of (a) ~
(c) as % of (b)
Sources :
Note : 1
Figure 3.3
227.5
16.7
7.2
43.1
411.1
129.8
99.3
31.6T
76.5
911.2 1747.0 3901.9
309.7
248.4
34.0
80.2
992.3 1603.7
645.1
56.8
65.0
FMP : 28-29, SMP : 14-5-6, TMP : 240-1
- planned allocation
Land development strategy in Peninsular Malaysia
985.0
41.1
61.4
MND DETMOPMDOT STRATMIS l VIAYSIA
Publio
Sector
TNvelopment
Federal Controlled
Projects
State Controlled
Projects
Private Sector
Development
Nucleus Joint Private
Estates Venture Estates
Schemes wi
Settlomen
-FELDA
Schemen
Plnnt- Svall Yo
th
t
Schomea without
Settlement
Schemes with
Settlement
Schemes without
Settlement
FZ LRA RISDA FIA FLCRA FoCOOP Public Smal- Joint Youth Controlled Fringe
Schemes Plant- Plant- Plnnt- Etates holdorn Venture Schemoo Alienation Alionation
- _ lation ation ation Typo
Schomea
uth Fringte L
ation Holding Schemen Schemosa
Type Type
Fringo Rohabilitation
Schemes Schemeo
source : Min. of Agriculture (1976)
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land. The land development strategies adopted by these different agencies
differ considerably. Figure 3.3 outlines the official categorization of the
different types of agencies involved in land development according to their
level of control (Federal or State) and whether settlement of labor is
involved. From the perspective of our conceptual framework, a more relevant
categorization would be according to the production organization and
employment characteristics of the land schemes administered by these different
agencies. Figure 3.4 is at attempt in this direction. There is a gradation
in the degree of control over land and labor by the development agency involved
in the different cases, ranging from the controlled alienation schemes
(the least) to public estates (the most). FELDA and youth schemes appear
to be "intermediate" forms in that a "transitional" stage (during which the
settlers are not bona fide landowners but are partly working to repay debts
owed to the land development agency in question) is involved.
The relative importance of these different types of schemes has
changed over the years. Table 3.17 documents the progress of land development
in the post-colonial period for the different public schemes as well as for
the private sector. It can be seen that the share of private sector land
development (private estates and controlled alienation) has declined from 46%
in the period 1961-65 to less than 16% in the period 1971-75; their allocation
for the period 1976-80 indicates a further decline to 14%. Among the public
land development schemes, FELDA schemes have emerged as by far the most
important--they account for more than half of the total land acreage developed
since 1965. The fringe alienation schemes, which were of almost equal
importance as FELDA in 1961-65, have however declined to less than 5% of the
total land development in 1971-75. Finally, the remaining schemes (consisting
of RISDA Block Planting, Joint-venture estates and State Programs) have
expanded significantly in importance also. The first two of these are
Table 3.17 Agricultural land development in Peninsular Malaysia, 1961-80
FELDA
FELCRA
Fringe Alienation Schemes1
Youth Schemes 1
Controlled Alienation2
Block Planting/RISDA
State Programmes 3
Joint-Venture Estates 4
Private Eststes
1961-65
'000 ac. %
119.3 22.1
115.6 21.4
108.2 20.0
34.8
21.8
140.1
6.4
4.0
26.0
1966-70
'OO -ac. %
179.0 54.3
11.7
5.3
42.0
15.3
30.3
46.0
3.5
1.6
12.7
4.6
9.2
14.0
1971-75
'OO -ac. %
412.4 51.6
58.3 7.3
(39.3) (4.9)
(19.0) (2.4)
47.3 5.9
151.1 18.9
130.6 16.3
1976-80 (Planned)
'000 ac. %
350 50.0
50 7.1
100
100
100
14. 3
14.3
14.3
539.8 100.0 329.6 100.0 799.6 100.0
Sources: Adapted from SMP: Table 9.2 for 1961-70, and from TMP: Table 16.2 and Text for 1971-80.
Note: The categories used for the 1961-70 periods were slightly different from that for the 1971-80
period in the original sources; the reconciliations made are noted below.
1 - Figures in parentheses are deduced from the TMP text.
2 - "Controlled alienation" development is assumed to be negligible since 1970. It is possible
that it might have been included under "State Programs" for 1971 onwards, but reading of
official publications suggest that its development has been discontinued since 1970.
3 - The category "State Schemes" for 1961-70 has been equated to "State Programs" for 1971-80.
4 - The category "SEDCs and others" for 1961-70 has been equated to "Joint-Venture Estates" for
1971-80.
Total 700 100.0
Characteristics of different types of Public Land Development Schemes
Types of Schemes
FELDA Schemes
Size of
holding(ac.)
6 - 14
Whether labor
settlement is
involved
yes
Development
agency
FELDA
Source of
settlers/ labor
landless & land-
poor rural popu-
lation
Production
organization
system
settler labor
under central-
ized management,
which takes a
cropshare as loan
recovery
Land ownership
system
eventual
land aliena-
tion to
settlers
after loan
repayment
Youth Schemes
Fringe Alienation Sch.
RISDA Block Planting
Public Estates
4 - 6 yes
3 -6
estate-size
estate-size
No
No
No
Formerly
State Govt;
now FELCRA
formerly
State Govt;
now FELCRA
RISDA
State Govt/
Public Corp. on
contract with
Private agencies
unemployed rural
youth
Smallholders
with uneconomic
holdings
wage-labor
wage-labor
same as above same as
above
unddr applicant's alienation to
control to applicants
supplement his
smallholding production
Estate production Replanting
system smallholders
given share-
ownership
estate production State Govt./
system Public Corp.
Controlled Alienation 4 - 10 No Private
individuals
Depends on the
private indi-
viduals who
develop the land
Alienation to
private indi-
viduals
Figum-r.r 3.4
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plantations, while the category "State Programs" is also dominated by
public estates. There is thus a distinct trend towards the adoption of the
plantation system as a form of public land development in the post-colonial
period.
With the exception of the FELDA schemes, official statistics are
unfortunately not available on the number of laborers absorbed in public
land schemes. However, rough estimates can be made using knowledge of their
typical land-labor ratios (Table 3.18). It appears that about 63,000
settler families and another 7,500 rural youths were absorbed in public land
settlement schemes (excluding joint-venture estates and most public estates)
between 1957-1975.
Table 3.18 Estimated number
schemes, 1957-75
of settler families in Public-sector land
Land
FELDA
Youth
State
Contr
Total
Scheme No. of settler families %
34,500 49
Schemes 7, 5 0 0a 10
Agencies 1 7,5 0 0b 25
olled Alienation 11,100 16
70,600 100
Source: FELDA : from FELDA AR; others are estimates by
MacAndrews and Yamamoto (1977)
Note: a - refers to individual settlers (youths) only
b - of which, KSLDA accounted for 7,600 (Ministry of Agriculture
(1976):193)
Because of FELDA's predominance in Peninsular Malaysia's public
land development program, we shall turn next to study its production
organization and labor absorption characteristics in greater depth.
3.2.2 Labor Absorption in FELDA Settlement Schemes
a) Overview of FELDA Land Development Strategy and Progress 23
FELDA was established in 1956 under the Land Development Ordinance to
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"promote and assist the investigation, formulation and carrying out of
projects for the development and settlement of land within the Federation."
From 1956 to 1960, FELDA functioned mainly as a 'loan board' to allocate
Federal funds to State agencies for approved land development schemes
(of which 14 were so financed in this period), although it also experimented
with one direct management scheme with some success. Because of the
difficulties of coordinating the many State agencies involved in land
development and the lack of administrative resources, the overall progress
of land development was slow in this period. Consequently, in 1960, a new
legislation (Land (Group Settlement Area) Act 1960) was enacted to give
FELDA more control over landand at the same time more technical and
administrative resources were allocated to FELDA to strengthen its
organization.24 Since then, FELDA has embarked on directly administered
land development schemes in a big way (Table 3.19). Thus, the land area
developed by FELDA in the 5-year period 1961-65 was eight times that in the
preceding 5-year period; subsequently, in the 1966-70 and 1971-75 periods
FELDA was responsible for more than half of the total agricultural land
developed. By early 1977, FELDA had developed 209 settlement schemes totalling
920,000 acres of agricultural land2 5 and had resettled nearly 4 0,000 families
(see Table 3.20).
b) FELDA Settlement Schemes and Agricultural Production
A FELDA scheme generally consists of 4 to 5 thousand acres of
agricultural land planted with a commercial export monocrop of either rubber
or oil palm, and a village site within or just outside the agricultural land
area providing housing, water supply, school and health center to the settlers
(about 400 families on the average) and management staff. In the early days,
FELDA schemes were developed individually and located in the more easily
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Table 3.19 FELDA land development as
development in Peninsular
FELDA land
development
('000 ac.)
(a)
Period
percentage of total new land
Malaysia
Total land
development
('000 ac.)
(b)
Average
FELDA land
development
(b) as % per year
of (a) ('000 ac.)
1956-60
1961-65
1966.-70
1971-75
Total 1961-75
1976-80 (target)
Source: SMP: 126; TMP: 302.
Table 3.20 FELDA development progress as of January 1977
Crop type No. of schemes
Acreage developed
('000) (%)
No. of families
settled ('000)
Oil palm
Rubber
Sugar cane
Cocoa
Coffee
All Crops
Village Land
Total Land Developed
119
86
2
1
1
209
589.5
311.0
13.5
5.2
0.5
64.1
33.8
1.5
0.6
0.1
919.7 100.0
56.4
976.1
Source: FELDA (1977) "FELDA and its activities": 1.
14.6
119.3
179.0
412.4
n. a.
539.8
329.6
799.7
1669.1
700.0
710.7
350.0
n. a.
22.1
54.3
51.6
42.6
50.0
2.9
23.8
35.8
82.5
47.4
70.0
19.9
19.9
39.8
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accessible lands; later schemes, which increasingly had to be located in
relatively underdeveloped regions, tended to be concentrated in a complex
of several schemes forming part of a larger integrated effort in regional and
'agropolitan' development programs. Due to the uneven availability of land,
FELDA schemes have been distributed very unevenly spatially (Figure 3.5).
Four-fifths of FELDA land developments were concentrated in only three
states (Pahang, Johore and N. Sembilan).
In its initial development phase up to 1963, FELDA concentrated
almost exclusively on rubber. Since then, there has been a definite shift
towards oil palm planting, so that by 1977, oil palm had become the more
dominant crop in terms of both number of schemes and acreage (Table 3.20).
More recently, FELDA has also been involved in several plantation schemes
involving the cultivation of newer crops like sugar cane, cocoa and coffee
where no land settlement is involved, and the labor utilized in these schemes
is provided by wage-labor instead.
c) FELDA Land Development, Land Assignment and Labor Utilization Strategy
FELDA development strategy has evolved over the years toward an
increasingly comprehensive "package" approach covering all aspects of land
development, housing construction, social infrastructure installation,
agricultural extension, processing and marketing.
The development of a FELDA scheme involves three phases: an initial
development phase when land is cleared, the main crop planted, settler houses
constructed and social infrastructure installed; a preparation phase involving
maintenance and land improvement work to nurture the planted crop through its
immature period; and finally a production phase when planted crops have
matured and crop production begins.
The basic development strategy of FELDA at present is to contract
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private developers to undertake all the work for the initial development
phase. The labor required for this work is provided by transient labor
brought in by the contractors themselves. All costs incurred in this phase
except the social infrastructure cost are charged to the settlers in the
form of a loan account. The settlers are only brought into the schemes
during the second phase (which usually begins two and a half years after
land clearing and one and a half years after crop planting) and they are
expected to progressively take over the maintenance task in this phase on a
piece-rate wage basis. During this non-production phase, the settlers can
supplement their wage-income with further loans from FELDA if necessary; any
such loan is charged to their accounts. Finally, in the third phase (when
production begins), 2 6 the settlers undertake all the production labor under
the supervision of FELDA-appointed managers and are required to sell their
output to FELDA, which then retains a share of the sale value as loan
repayment.
There is a difference between rubber and oil palm schemes in their
land assignment and labor utilization method. In rubber schemes, the settler
is assigned a specific plot of the land for which he is individually responsible
for tapping, and for which he would eventually be given a title (usually a
leasehold of not less than 99 years) after he has paid off his loan. In the
case of oil palm schemes, the settlers are not given individual plots, since
it is inefficient in palm oil production to have the individual settler
household perform all the tasks on their own plots. FELDA's practice is to
group settlers into teams of about 20 people, each team taking collective
responsibility in the maintenance and production tasks of a block of 200 to
280 acres. The individual within the block is not assigned a specific plot,
but instead receives a certificate indicating that he is the owner of a share
of the block. There is thus some resemblance to a cooperative-ownership
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structure, but it is strictly not so, since the settlers have neither control
over the selection of the FELDA managers nor their decisions with respect to
management and marketing policies. The shift from rubber to oil palm scheme
development thus represents a movement away from individual peasant household
production, in terms of both labor and land allocation.
There is a difference between FELDA settler land ownership and
ordinary private holding ownership which is important to note. In FELDA
schemes, after the settler receives his land right (whether in the form of
individual title or share of a block), he may transfer or sell it, but the
land cannot be subdivided or mortgaged, unlike the case of private land
holdings (Dixon (1977)). This restriction on FELDA land rights may have
important implications on the evolution of the size distribution structure
of rural land ownership in the future. Thus, to the extent that land cannot
be subdivided among the children of the present FELDA settlers, there may be
a tendency for the younger sons to migrate out of the scheme in the future.
In addition to settler-operated land, it is also standard FELDA
practice to reserve 10% of the planted acreage in every scheme for its own
development. The land so reserved is operated by wage-labor hired by FELDA
management. More recently, FELDA has begun the development of plantation
schemes (cultivating sugar cane, cocoa and coffee) that are operated entirely
by wage-labor under FELDA management, with no land allocation to the labor
involved at all.
d) Sources of settler-labor absorbed in FELDA schemes
A central objective of FELDA has been defined as the settling of
landless and land-poor persons on hitherto undeveloped land and providing
them with economic holdings of commercial cropland in such a way as to
ensure them an adequate income.
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The target group component of this objective is codified in an
official settler selection criteria system which gives priority to landless
young married persons having agricultural experience. In this system, FELDA
settler applicants are interviewed in their home districts throughout Malaysia
by a committee of representatives from FELDA, the District Office and the
State Government. Application is open only to Malaysian citizens who are
married, 18 to 35 years old (up to 40 for ex-servicemen), have no criminal
record, and own not more than 2 acres of rural land or one lot of urban land.
For those applicants who qualify, their suitability for selection is determined
during the interview by a 'point system' whereby the various socio-economic
characteristics of the applicants and their families are weighted. The
characteristics included in this scaling system and the weights attached to
them have varied over the years, but the system reported to be in operation
in 1976-77 is as shown in Appendix Table 3A. The final selection is made by
FELDA headquarters on the above point system, taking into account two
modifications. The first is that 50% of the places for settlers should be
reserved for applicants from the same state in which the scheme is to be
located; this is in recognition of the fact that it is the individual states
rather than the Federal Government which have legal control over land. The
second modification is that 20% of places in FELDA schemes must be made
available to ex-servicemen (police and security forces) possessing the
minimal qualifications. Apparently, as of 1977, those with less than 25
points (out of a maximum of 40) are rejected, while those who pass are put on
a waiting list for available spaces (Dixon (1977)).
In view of this official settler selection system, what is the
available evidence on the actual backgrounds of those who get absorbed into
FELDA schemes as settlers?
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i) Occupational backgrounds of FELDA settlers
There has been no official census data available concerning the
occupational backgrounds of FELDA settlers prior to their absorption in
FELDA schemes. However, enough survey data can be culled together from many
diverse sources to provide some inferences.
Table 3.21 summarizes information adapted from various surveys on
the occupational origins of FELDA settlers. The following observations can
be made. First, while the pattern of previous occupations varies with the
locality of the schemes, it is significant that the proportion of settlers
previously employed in agriculture has not been more than three-quarters
in all except one of the surveys; it was as low as 24% in one Johor scheme
and 37% in Trengganu as a whole. Moreover, the share of those who were estate
workers also appears to be low, suggesting little absorption of labor displaced
from estates. Second, the proportion of those who were previously fishermen
appears to be directly related to the proximity of the schemes to locations
of fishing communities with surplus labor; thus, Trengganu, the state with
the biggest surplus fishermen problem, has a high of 32% of settlers being
fishermen previously. Third, the proportion of ex-servicemen varies from 6%
to as high as 54%, with the overall average likely to be less than the 20%
reservation stipulated. Finally, the share of non-agricultural workers appears
to be surprisingly high overall, reaching as much as 43% in one survey.
Although the majority of these non-agricultural workers belong to the category
of laborers and semi-skilled workers, there was also a significant presence
of "businessmen/petty traders" in some schemes.
In summary, on the basis of the data given in Table 3.21, a likely
estimate of the overall occupational structure for all FELDA settlers can be
made as given in Table 3.22(a). If we assume that this distributional pattern
holds at the end of 1975, the approximate number of settlers absorbed in FELDA
Occupational Origins of FELDA Settlers
FELDA1
surve
(1 97M
5 sch-emes
Trengganu 2
(1968)
6 schemes
Kulai
(Oil
Palm)
Johore(1970)
Pasak KongKong
(Rubber) (Rubber)
Bukit
Besar
(Oil Palm)
It
Jengka II
(Pahang)
(1970)
S.Buaya
(Rawang,
Selangor)
(1975)
MacAndrews
survey of
4 schemes
(1975)
Agriculture
Estate workers
Rubber Small-
holders/tappers
Other Small-
holding agri.
Fishermen
Ex-servicemen
40
2
15
Businessmen/
Petty traders
Non-agri. semi-
skilled workers
(carpenters,
drivers, mechanics,
factory workers,
etc.)
Odd job laborers 32
Others
Total
Sample size
100
7 .
2
8
12
11
100
n.a. 1570
59
32
27
76
28
48
5
27,
1
4
4
100
>I
374
8
V6
10
100
24
24
10
54
8
48
42
6
6
62
16
71
7
67
46
10
n. a.
5
9
610
8
24 13
4
100 100
50 50 50
100
n.a.
100
12
100
n.a. 166
Hj
T able 3.2 1
sources 1 - compiled from Alladin Hashim(1971)
2 - compiled from Abdul Hamid bin Abd.(197 ), article in Ilmu Alam
3 - compiled from the South East Johor Project Felda Surveys reports in C.E.R.Abraham(ed)(n.d.)
4 - compiled from Pahang Tenggara Masterplanning Study, Sociology and Migration
5 - compiled from Nasir Hashim(1978) unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Cornell Univ.
6 - compiled from MacAndrews(1975); weighted average of his separately reported survey data
notes Due to the different classification of occupations used in the different sources, some
adaptation has been necessary in many cases.
* denote census
11
(7\
197
schemes according to their occupational origins can be calculated as given
in Table 3.22(b).
According to these estimates, not more than 5,200 estate workers and
3,500 fishermen had been resettled in FELDA schemes by the end of 1975. The
former account for less than 6% of the net labor displacement from rubber
estates between 1957-75, while the latter amounts to less than 20% of the
estimated number of "surplus" fishermen in 1971.27 The number of smallholding
peasant laborers absorbed as a proportion of "land-poor" peasants will be
estimated in Chapter 4.
ii) Other socioeconomic background characteristics of FELDA settlers
Empirical evidence on other socio-economic background characteristics of FELDA
settlers are much more scarce. Table 3.23 summarizes information on the
previous landownership pattern of settlers surveyed in four FELDA schemes in
Johor in 1970. The high incidence of landlessness found suggests consistency
with the official target group objective. From the same surveys, it was also
found that about 85% of the settler families had an income of less than $200/
month prior to joining FELDA. This is higher than the 65% incidence for all
rural households in Peninsular Malaysia in 1970 (78% in the case of rural
Malay households), which again suggests a poorer than average background for
FELDA settlers. In another survey of FELDA settlers, 72% wer found to have
average earnings of less than $100/month before joining FELDA (Lim Saw Ching
(1972)).
iii) Ethnic composition of FELDA settlers
Consideration of ethnic origins has not been stated as a factor
in the official settler selection criteria (Appendix Table 3A) nor in official
policy pronouncement. Nevertheless, as Table 3.24 shows, the share of
non-Malays among FELDA settlers has been disproportionately low in comparison
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Table 3.22
Occupational
background
Estimated pattern of occcupational backgrounds of FELDA
settlers at the end of 1975
Estimated
Distributional
pattern ()
(a)
Estimated
Numbers
Agriculture
- Estate workers
- Smallholder workers
Fishermen
Ex-servicemen
Non-agriculture workers
Total
60
10-15
45-50
5-10
10-15
20,700
3,500 - 5,200
15,500 - 17,300
1,700 - 3,500
3,500 - 5,200
20 5,200
100 34,500
Source (a) - estimated from Table 3.
(b) - derived from (a) and the figure for the total number
of settlers in FELDA schemes at the end of 1975
Landownership of settlers before
schemes in Johore, 1970
FELDA Scheme
joining FELDA in selected
Previous landownership pattern
Bukit Besar Scheme
Kong Kong Scheme
Kulai Scheme
Pasak Scheme
12 % owned land
60 % landless, 40 % owned less than 2 ac. each
92.5 % landless
26 % owned some land; 18 % less than 2 ac. each
Source : inferred from text and tables in C7.E.R. Abraham(n.d.)(ed.)
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Table 3.24 Ethnic Composition of FELDA Settlers
Number of Settler
1 2
1963 1970,
(Jan.) (May)
Families
3
1976
(Nov.)
% Distribution
1963 1970 1976
% distribution of rural
poor households in Penin-
sula Malaysia 1970
Malay 4105
Chinese 365
Indian
Other
All
91
4561
17975
599
516
33
19159
36035
746
621
33
37435
90 94.0 96.3
8 3,1 2.0
2
2.7
0.2
1.7
100 100 100
Sources: 1 - Ness(1967): 185
2 - Wikkramatileke(1972): Table II
3 - Dixon(1977): 243
4 - SMP Mid-term Review Table 1.1, 1.2
83.5
9.6
5.4
1.3
100
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with their share among rural households below the officially defined poverty
line. Moreover, the trend over time has been in the direction of even
greater under-representation of non-Malays: while their share was 10% in
1963, by 1976 it was less than 4%.
This imbalance in settler ethnic composition could have been due to:
i) a lack of application form the non-Malay rural poor
ii) a lower rate of successful application among non-Malay applicants
iii) a lower rate of selection from non-Malay successful applicants
However, evidence that we shall present below casts doubt on the importance of
factors (i) and (ii). First, according to FELDA records for 1973-4, out of a
total of 28,612 applicants in those years, Malays formed 77%, the remaining
being 12% Chinese and 11% Indians (MacAndrews (1975):Table C.9). A more
recent estimate by the Director of FELDA was that 25% of applicants were
non-Malay (Malaysian Business (July, 1977)). The proportion of non-Malay
among applicants is thus higher than that among settlers (6% in 1970, 4% in
1976). Second, out of some 14,600 successful applicants awaiting places on
new schemes in January 1977, 82.3% were Malays, with Chinese forming 7.4% and
Indians 10.3% (Dixon (1977):243); i.e., the proportion of non-Malay among
successful applicants is also higher than that among settlers. It thus seems
that the process of selecting settlers frcm among successful applicants has
been in favor of Malay.
In view of the fact that the majority of the labor displaced from
the private plantation sector were non-Malays, it can be concluded that the
matjority of these dislocated laborers did not get absorbed in FELDA schemes.
e) Social mobility impact of FELDA
While FELDA's labor absorption method appears on the whole to reach
the poorer rural sections of the population, its actual impact in terms of
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absorbing labor displaced from other sectors is dependent on its rate of
intake, which in turn is a function of not only the rate of land development,
but also the size of land allotment per settler. Unlike the case of
individual peasant smallholdings, the size of land holdings in FELDA schemes
is fixed by official FELDA policy, which has however undergone many changes
over time. Before 1960, the allocation was 6 acres per settler in rubber
schemes; this was successfully raised to 7 ac. in 1960, 8 ac. in 1961, then
10 ac., and finally 12 ac. in 1972. Similarly, for oil palm schemes, the
initial allotment size of 8 ac. per settler was progressively raised until
it became 14 ac. in 1972.
One rationale for this progressive increase in land allotment was
apparently to compensate for the declining price prospects for rubber and
palm oil in order to maintain an adequate income level for the settlers.
As shown by Table 3.25, this income-maintenance objective has so far been
relatively successful in terms of providing settlers with higher than average
rural income. This is not really surprising, since FELDA settlers' holding
sizes are much larger than most individual smallholders' (from Chapter 2.3,
62% of rubber smallholdings outside public land schemes were below 5 ac. and
89% below 10 ac.).
While this progressive increase in land allotment size per settler
may thus have a favorable impact on the income of those who get absorbed by
FELDA, it also means that the number of people who could have been absorbed
was correspondingly reduced. Table 3.27 shows that, although the rate of
intake has appreciably increased in the more recent years, the average intake
over the entire period 1956-77 was less than 2,100 families per year. As we
shall document in greater detail in Chapter 4, this rate of intake was highly
insufficient for absorbing the flow of labor dislocated from the traditional
peasant sectors and from the private plantations. Indeed, the demand for
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Table 3.25 Net average monthly income Sof FELDA settlers ($)
1971 1972 1973 1974 1 19763
a) Nation-wide surve
-rubber schemesall)2
-oil palm schemes
(9 ac. holdings only)
144
382
115
273
246
336
256
802
n.a. 331
n.a. 361
b) Johore survey
-rubber schemes
-oil palm schemes
n.a. 150
n.a. 320
283 300
390 854
sources : (a) - Economic Report 75/6
(b) - Jamaludin Lamin(1976): Table V
notes 1 - after deduction of loan repayment, operationg costs and
other charges
2 - unweighted average of holdings of 6, 7 and 6 ac.
3 - refer to average over all holding sizes; figures are
given in Malaysian Business(July/1977)
Table 3.26 Ownership of household items of FELDA settlers in
comparison with general rural households
Household items
% of FELDA settler
households owning item1
p of all rural households2
of P. M'sia owning item
Motor car
motor-cycle
bicycle
television
radio
5
62
78
17
77
3.6
9.9
68.5
2.9
41.7
sources 1 - survey of FELDA settlers in 51 schemes in 1974 by FELDA,
reported in Economic Report 1975/6 : 103
2 - calculated from 1967/8 SESS (Household Amenities & Conve-
niences) Appendix
293
469
n.a.
nea.
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Table 3.27 Progress in FELDA settler absorption,1956 -1977
Period
1956-60
1961-65
1966-70
1971-75
(a) Total 1956-75
1976-77
(b) Total 1956-77
(c) Total number of "poor"
agricultural households
in Peninsular Malaysia
in 1975
(d) = (a)/(c)
No. of settler
families absorbed
2772
6083
11863
13779
34499
11565
46064
576,500
6%
Average no. of settler
families absorbed per year
500
1220
2370
2760
1730
5780
2090
Sources: (a) - 1956-1975: FELDA AR (v.y.)
(b) - 1976-1977: Malaysia (March/1978)(Eng. Ed.): 7
(c) - TMP
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FELDA places far outstrips the rate of intake: during 1971-75 alone, about
53,000 applications were received by FELDA, out of which 34,750 were found
suitable and put on the waiting list. The number of applicants would actually
have been higher if it were not for the fact that applications were frozen in
1974 (except for residents in Pahang and N. Sembilan and for ex-servicemen).
At the end of 1975, the number of suitable applicants still awaiting places
was over 18,700 (Jamaluddin Lamin (1976)).
FELDA settlers are not wage laborers, but neither are they independent
household producers, as mentioned earlier. This "intermediate" nature of
FELDA settlers' mode of employment has resulted in conflicting interpretations
among different writers of their nature as a class of producers. The fact
that FELDA has chosen to increase the size allotment per settler against
taking in more settlers per scheme has led some people to argue that FELDA
is fostering the development of a class of rich and independent "yeoman"
peasants. This argument is consistent with the alleged aim of the Settler
Development Division set up by FELDA in 1969 to help "create modern and
progressive farmers playing a proper role in the commercial and social
fields" (cited in MacAndrews (1975)). Writers of this persuasion (e.g.,
MacAndrews (1975)) tend to emphasize the high income received by the
settlers, their more "modernized" attitudes compared to traditional peasants,
their exposure to middle-class consumption values (see Table 3.26), as well
as their readiness for political agitation to get what they want from the
Government.
Other writers, however, suggested the contrary. It is alleged,
instead, that the mode of FELDA production organization, with its highly
centralized form of management and control, has tended to treat the settlers
as wage labor and hence has led to the stifling of settler initiative.
To quote:
205
"...In its zest for achieving greater physical achievements, FELDA
has neglected until recently the settlers' development and
aspirations in the programme. They have been treated as mere
labourers, incapable of thinking or doing anything on their own,
but having to be closely controlled and supervised. This has
robbed the settlers of self-pride and the will to develop and
improve their positions by their own initiatives." (Wafa (1973))
and similarly:
"...the settlers are not even participants but are mere recipients
of the government projects...the settlers find that they can no
longer work as and when they feel they like to. Their time and
work are tied closely to the right programme arrangements by the
management. If their work is not up to standard, they will be
warned and even penalized..." (Mansor (1973), cited in Barlow
(1978):240))
or:
"FELDA has spent a lot of money, time and energy to make a success
of their schemes and settlers and it will not tolerate nonsense
from any settler. Life as a FELDA settler is regimented, with a
morning roll call thrown in every day except Friday, which is the
day off. FELDA argues that the minute there is relaxation there'll
be deviance and new rules and methods of control have to be imposed.
Thus, instead of slowly releasing the schemes to be managed by the
settlers for themselves, FELDA is caught deeper and tighter into
the management's web." (Rokiah Talib (1978):51)
The recent development of FELDA schemes using purely wage labor
may therefore be interpreted in this light as the logical conclusion of the
tendency for centralized management, although the writers quoted above were
more concerned with the development of settlers who had become used to
dependence on the Government in a kind of 'patron-client' relationship.
The fact that the settlers are saddled with a big debt to FELDA right from
the beginning, and could expect to pay off their debt completely only over
15-20 years, may strengthen this impression of dependency.28
Rather than try to accept one or the other of these conflicting
views, it is perhaps more correct to recognize the source of these
contradictory interpretations to be in the contradictory nature of the
settlers' mode of employment itself, which permits a variety of response-
behavior by the settlers.
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In view of the fact that it was only in 1977 that the first batch
of FELDA settlers "graduated" (i.e., fully repaid their loans and received
land titles) (Malaysian Business, July/1977), it may still be too early to
predict the future prospects of FELDA settlers. One important factor is the
future trend in world market prices for rubber and palm oil. Another is the
extent to which FELDA schemes can generate complementary employment
opportunities for the younger generations growing up within the schemes.2 9
f) The Development of FELDA as an Integrated Agribusiness Complex
Our discussion so far has focused only on the FELDA settlement
schemes. It is important to recognize, however, that FELDA settlement
schemes form only part of an integrated "agribusiness" complex that FELDA
as a production organization operates. Figure 3.6 outlines the structure
of the FELDA integrated complex and situates the position of the FELDA
settlement schemes within it as that of raw-material production at the
base, 'feeding' the rest of the complex. It is instructive to note that
the FELDA complex exLends to cover even the operation of a retail-store
chain among its settlement schemes. What is left out in Figure 3.5 (but
worth noting) is the introduction of a FELDA "Settler Development Division"
in 1968 to help 'modernize' the settlers through a variety of social
development projects.
The economic significance of the FELDA complex can be judged
from the fact that, in 1976, even though only 47% of its oil palm acreage
and 40% of its rubber acreage were in production, it was already producing
about 20% of Peninsular Malaysia's total palm oil output and 4% of the
rubber output.(Melaysian Business, July 1977:5). Since Peninsular Malaysia
is the world's largest palm oil and rubber producer, the position of FELDA
as primary commodity producer in the world market is significant by any
Agricultural Commodity
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.Sugar cane (2)
.Cocoa(l)
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Transporting Marketing
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factories latex mills bulking
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ins tallat ion
(1)
Palm oil
re f4 ne-r &.
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FIGURE 3.6 FELDA as an Integrated Agribusiness Complex
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measure. Indeed, with Malaysia accounting for about 70% of the world's
palm oil export supply in 1975 (Leong Keng Yuen (1976)), FELDA's share of
the world export market amounted to 14%. This makes FELDA easily the
world's single largest producer-marketer of palm oil.30
The evolution of FELDA over the years from a land development
loan board to such a highly sophisticated integrated agribusiness complex
parallels similar trends by other public-sector agencies (e.g., MAJUIKAN,
MARDEC) to move increasingly into the direct organization of production and
capital accumulation (as opposed to just providing the infrastructural/
regulatory conditions for that production-accumulation process). It is
also in this light that the tendency for increasing centralized management
over settler labor noted earlier can perhaps be understood.
3.2.3 Development of large-scale regional agri-complexes and public
estates
In addition to the consolidation of FELDA as a major form of
production organization, there have been two other trends of major
significance in the expansion of the public land development sector since
the late sixties. One is the growth of large-scale integrated regional
agri-complexes and associated development of new towns. The other is the
shift towards public plantation as a mode of production organization by
the public sector.
a) Development of large-scale regional agri-complexes and "agropolitanization"
While most of the initial public land development schemes were
carried out on a piecemeal, scheme-by-scheme basis and were located near
existing developed areas, the more recent policy was to undertake large-scale
agricultural development in hitherto relatively undeveloped areas and to
integrate such development with the establishment of other land-based
agri-production and processing industries within a comprehensive, coordinated
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plan. The consequence of this policy shift is the conception of integrated
regional agri-complexes. Four such complexes have been planned so far:
Jengka Triangle, Pahang Tenggara, Johor Tenggara and Trengganu Tengah
(Figure 3.7). These complexes together cover over 4.6 million acres,
of which more than 1.2 million ac. would be developed into cultivated
agricultural land (equivalent to one-sixth of the total existing cultivated
acreage of Peninsular Malaysia as a whole) and the rest into timber logging/
milling complexes, livestock ranching, tourist complexes, etc. The first
of these complexes, Jengka Triangle, was pioneered in the mid-sixties and
is now reaching completion, while the other more ambitious ones have begun
development only in the early seventies and are now in various stages of
implementation.
An integral part of this large-scale regional agri-complex
development plan is the creation of new towns in previously undeveloped
areas of the country. These new towns are to serve as the nuclei for
population settlement in the agri-complexes rather than the previously
conceived dispersed pattern of small FELDA settlement schemes. As Table 3.28(a)
shows, there has been an increasing trend for FELDA schemes to be larger in
size and in some cases "merged" to form a settlement complex (e.g., in
Jengka Triangle) to support the growth of new towns. The most ambitious of
such efforts in fostering urbanization within an agri-complex development
context is found in Pahang Tenggara, where 38 new towns ranging in size from
less than 5,000 to over 50,000 had been planned (Table 3.28(b)).
In addition to population resettlement, these towns had also been
conceived of as centers for agri-based processing industries, social services
provision (hospitals, schools, etc.) and public administration. The rationale
is apparently that the larger size of these urban centers, in contrast to
the smaller traditional rural kampong settlements, can provide a larger base
Figure 3.7 Large-scale Regional Agri-
complex development
Regional Development Area Size of Area
('000 ac.)
Pahang Tenggara 2,500
Johor Tenggara 750
Trengganu Tengah 1,100
Jengka - Phase III & III 250
Major Land Development activities :
Pahang Tenggara
- develop 550,000 ac. of agricultural land
by 1980
- establish 2 timber logging & milling complexes
on sustained yield over 300,000ac. of forest
- establish 38 towns to settle 500,000 people ,
Johor Tenggara
- develop 250,000 ac. of agricultural land
- establish a timber logging & milling complex
over 92,000 ac. of forest
- establish 30-40 new villages and towns
- establish a tourist complex
Trnngganu Tengah
- develop 287,000 ac. of agricultural land
- establish 8 towns
Johor - resettle 134,000 people
Tenggara
Jengka Triangle
- develop 100,000 ac. of agricultural land
- resettle 10,000 families in a complex of
23 FELDA settlement schemes
- establish a timber logging & milling complex
over 300,000 ac. of forest
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for a wider range of social amenities as well as agri-industrial employment
opportunities, and thus can better promote the "modernization" of the rural
population (particularly the rural Malays). In the terminology and framework
of Friedmann and Douglas (1976), therefore, these attempts at urbanization
may be termed agropolitan development, designed to bring "urbanization" to
the rural areas and to prevent rural outmigration to the large metropolitan
centers.
Due to their recent development and the scarcity of publicly
available information, it has not been possible to evaluate the impact of
such agri-complex development on labor absorption in any detail. Nevertheless,
three observations are pertinent here. First, given that these developments
are located in previously undeveloped areas, whereas the problem of labor
displacement is most concentrated in the already developed and long-settled
parts of the country, the reabsorption of this dislocated labor in the new
agri-complex developments would require large-scale labor migration. Second,
to the extent that the laborers involved in the initial phases of land-clearing
and infrastructure construction are different from the people who eventually
get absorbed as settlers, there would be the creation of a large group of
transient contract-wage labor. This has occurred in the past with FELDA
scheme development (where most of the contract labor in the initial development
phase was Chinese while the eventual settler labor mainly Malay), but the
much larger scale of these new agri-complexes would greatly magnify the
problem of transitional housing and social amenities provision for these
transient wage laborers, as well as problems for their subsequent reabsorption
into more permanent employment. Third, these agri-complex developments
have led to the creation of a whole host of public corporations and agencies
not only to supervise and coordinate their overall development (e.g., DARA
for Pahang Tenggara, KEJORA for Johor Tenggara and KETENGAH for Trengganu
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Table 3.28 Trend in FELDA settlement size and Agropolitan development
a) FELDA Setitlement
Project Area
No. of settlements
in the Project area
Average no. of settler-
families per settlement
Jengka I (1968) 7
Jengka II (1970) 7
Jengka III (1973) 9
Johore Land Settlement(1974) 8
Keratong Land Settlement(1976) 2
- Town 21
- Town 22 (Keratong Town)
b) Planned Settlement Size in Pahang Tenggara by 1990
Settlement size
2 - 5,000
5-10,000
10-15,000
15-20,000
20-50,000
50,000 +
No. of settlements
13
7
5
4
1
38
Sources a) - World Bank
b) - Pahang Tenggara Masterplanning Study
KEJORA
wholly-owned
subsidiaries
Johor Tenggara
Cattle Indus-
tries Sdn. Bhd.
(cattle ranching)
Johor
Tenggara
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Sdn. Bhd.
(oil palm
estate
development)
Joint-ventures
Johor Desaru
Tenggara Sdn Bhd.
Perumahan (tourist
Sdn Bhd. complex
(Housing development)
development)
Sindara Bhd.
4 (integrated logging
& timber complex)
Ternakan Parks
__ Sdn Bhd
(commercial poultry
farming)
Other joint-ventures
(commercial farming
of spices, fruits,
orchids, etc.)
Source: compiled from Malaysian Business ( May/1977)
Figure 3.8 Control structure of KEJORA, a public enterprise
395
435
440
550
817
2,556
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but also to engage in production activities directly. Figure 3.Z shows
just one example of this expansion of public enterprise into direct
production organization through the device of spawning subsidiaries and
joint-venture companies. These trends represent a definite shift by the
public sector towards organizing agricultural production on a commercial
enterprise basis. In particular, there has been a movement towards the
development of public plantations, which we will examine in greater detail
next.
b) The development of public plantations
There has apparently been a major policy shift by the Government
towards increasing use of public-sector owned plantations as a means for
land development and absorbing surplus labor from the peasant sector, as
opposed to alienating land to the individual settlers. Public estates are
operated and managed in exactly the same way as private estates (in fact,
the technical and management staff is often provided by a private
plantation agency on a contract basis), the only difference being that
the State Government or a Public Corporation has the legal ownership.
Labor is employed on a strictly wage or piece-rate basis, rather than given
ownerhsip of the land as in the case of FELDA and Fringe Alienation schemes.
A variation of this is the joint-venture estate. Joint-venture
estates can take many different forms, of which joint equity share-
ownership is only one. For example, the State Government of Trengganu
alienated 33,500 ac. (ultimately to be 50,000 ac.) to the Malayan Cooperative
Insurance Society for oil palm development. The Society paid the premium
on the land cleared as well as rent during the life of the project which
was fixed at 46 years. The Trengganu State Government's share was 1% of
the gross sales of the oil palm products. On the expiration of this period,
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the ownership of the project reverts to the Trengganu State Government
31
(Lee Hook -Lock (1974):634).
The rationale for this policy shift has been stated by one
Government Minister as follows:
"As land is a limited resource, the country cannot continue to
indefinitely allocate land to individuals. With this in view the RRIM
(Rubber Research Institute Malaysia) has set up an economic laboratory
to study the new approach to land development based on employment rather
than ownership of land. This approach can not only give a better revenue
to the farmer but has the advantage of ensuring the availability of land
in economically viable units for future generations." (Abdul Taib, 1974,
cited by Barlow (1977):241)
An equally important rationale appears to be that public plantations
provide better management and control of the labor process. Since the
laborers employed are wage workers, they are subject to the discipline
of the wage labor market, whereas FELDA settlers can be evicted only with
great difficulties even during the loan repayment period and almost impossibly
after ownership title to the land has been granted.
The first public sector estates were introduced in 1966 by three
State Governments (Trengganu, Kedah and Kelantan). Other public corporations
(e.g., KEJORA, DARA, KETENGAH and the Pilgrim Fund Board), however, have since
entered the picture, and the estate acreage under public agency control is
expected to rise rapidly in the future. Already, according to Table 3.29,
between 20-40% of the acreage allocated for agricultural development in the
three large-scale regional development projects (Pahang Tenggara, Johor
Tenggara and Trengganu Tengah) have been earmarked for public-sector and
joint-venture estates. Moreover, all these developments are in addition to
the increasing penetration of the public sector into equity share ownership of
existing private plantation companies, which has resulted in the public
agencies taking over the majority control position in some cases (e.g.,
Sime Darby by PERNAS).
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Table 3.27 Planned Agricultural Land Development in selected
Regional Development Projects
Distribution of Agricultural Land to be
developed by agencies (%)
Pahang
Tenggara
(1971-80)
Johor 2
Tenggara2
Trengggnu
Tengah
FELDA
Public Estates
Joint-Ventures Estates
Private Estates
Private Smallholdings
Unspecified/others
Total
Total Acreage( '000)
37
5
15
36
6
1
100
522
48
28
7
16
100
250
38
f38
25
100
158
Sources : 1 - computed from Pahang Tenggara Masterplanning Study,
"Summary and Recommendations", Table 5.2
2 - compiled from Malaysian Business(May/1977)
3-- compiled from Asian Research Bulletin 7(3),Pt.1:355-357.
Note: figures pertain to allocations as of 1977 only.
Appendix Table 3A
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FELDA Settler Selection System
Criterion HUSBAND Points WIFE Points
Health Very Healthy 6 Very Healthy 6
Average 5 Average 5
Less Healthy 2 Less Healthy 2
Physically Handi- Physically Handi-
capped - applica- capped 0
tion rejected
Maximum Points 6 Maximum Points 6
Educational Form 1 and above 4 Form 1 and above 4
Qualifications Standard 4-6 2 Standard 4-6 2
Others with Others with
ability to read ability to read
and write 1 and write 1
Maximum Points 4 Maximum Points 4
Special Skills Commerce 2 Commerce 1
Barber 2 Tailoring 1
Tailor 2 Embroidering 1
Handicrafts 2 Weaving (mat,
wicker, etc.) 1
Mechanic 2 Handicrafts 1
Carpenter 2
Rubber Cultiv. 2
Oil Palm Cultiv. 2
Maximum Points 6 Maximum Points 3
Occupational Farming, Fishing No points
Background Ex-Serviceman 8
Mining, Forestry 5
Laborer, Driver
Office-worker g
others 3
Maximum Points 8
Family Size 3 and above 3 No points
(No. of 2 2
children) 1 1
Maximum Points 3
TOTAL POINTS 27 TOTAL POINTS 13
Total Points for Both Husban and Wife - 40
J,'
Source: Jamaluddin Lamin (1976)
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Chapter 3
1. See Table 2.3Cin section 2.3, which shows the gradual transition of labor
utilization characteristics in rubber smallholdings as their size increases.
2. For the rubber plantation industry, see, for example, Drabble (1973) for a
historical account of the early growth of the rubber plantation; Bauer (1948)
and Courtnenay (1972) for analysis of the industry between the two World Wars;
and Parmer (1960) for analysis of colonial labor policies with respect to the
rubber plantation industry. Other studies include Fryer (1964), Lim Chong Yah
(1967), McHale (1966), Radhakrishnan (1977), Thoburn (1977a), and Barlow (1978).
The literature on oil palm estates has been much smaller due to their more
recent origins. See Khoo Siew Joo (1964), P.D. Turner (ed)(1968), Oil Palm
Development in Malaysia and Harcharan Singh (1976), Oil Palm Indus
Malaysia.
3. There was also a 36% decline in coconut estate land coupled with moderate
increase in other estate crop acreage combined; however, as these other crops
occupy an insignificant share of the total estate acreage (about 2% in 1973),
we shall confine our attention to rubber and oil palm only in what follows.
4. For greater details on the process of estate subdivision between 1950-61, see
Ungku Aziz (1961) (3 volumes) and the subsequent exchanges in Malayan Economic
Review Journal. There has been no detailed study of the subdivision problem
since 1961, but see "The problem of subdivision of estates" in Yeo B.P. (ed),
University of Malaya Seminar on Malaysian Socioeconomic Questions 1967, and
S. Gordon (1970).
5. "Capital may be diverted to Nigeria, where the prospects for rubber are good
and taxation low." (Sir J. Hay, Straits Times 9/1/1956). Fifteen rubber
companies with estates in Malaya invested $2 million in Nigeria alone "to
avoid having all our eggs in one basket" (a London spokesman, Straits Times
6/21/1957).
6. See Ungku Aziz (1961). Replanting grant was $600 per acre for smallholders
as compared with $400 per acre for estates.
7. The subject of ownership and control of the plantation sector of Malaya has
been investigated by many researchers, the pioneer work being done by
J.J. Puthucheary (1960), followed by Mamajiwalla (1965), Sumitro
Djojohodikusumo (1967), Thoburn (1970) and most recently Tan Tat Wai (1977).
See the last cited item for a detailed discussion of the post-colonial
pattern of change. The distinction between ownership and control, and the
different forms of control ("secretariat," "management," "interlocking
directorships," etc.) are also discussed in detail in these studies.
8. in 1955 there were 266 British sterling companies owning estates in Malaya.
By 1964, over 100 of these were absorbed by 27 of the existing British
companies, and another 60-odd sold off their estates through subdivision.
(Sumito Djojohadikusumo (1967):163)
9. Tan Tat Wai (1977):240. These groups and agency houses are: Harrison and
Crossfield, Sime Darby, Guthrie, Lee Lay Seng group, Boustead, Highland and
Lowland and Plantation Agency.
218
10. Note, however, that the plantation as a unit of production is not the same
as the unit of control or legal ownership. One company can own and control
many plantations, and this is the case with the larger plantation companies
and management agencies. In 1972, Harrison and Crossfield controlled 26
companies and 62 rubber plantations; Sime Darby, 20 companies and 53 rubber
estates; Guthrie 13 and 32, Borlow Boustead 31 and 55, and Plantation Agencies
26 and 47. It remains true, nevertheless, that the estates owned and controlled
by the larger companies/agencies tend also to be the larger in size.
11. We have so far left out of consideration the effect of rubber price changes
on estate employment. The long-run secular decline in the price of rubber
has been noted as partly responsible for the switch towards oil palm. This
may have also contributed towards the estate employers' decision to lower
the intensity of labor per acre. As far as the short-run price fluctuation is
concerned, other researchers have concluded that its effect is being absorbed
by fluctuation in the wage level rather than in employment (Ariff (1970)).
12. According to Colletta (1976), a great deal of corruption has revolved around
the uses and abuses of powers by these labor supervisors and by the staff.
In the estate that he studied, it was a common rumor that laborers had paid
part of their earnings or even offerred their wives to clerks, conductors,
hospital staff, etc., for a good tree or housing assignment, a favorable
weighing of latex, or a determination of sick leave with pay.
13. See D.P. Xavier, "Labor laws, trade unions and women workers," in Report on
Seminars for Women Trade Unionists (Penang, 1973/4): 32-33. According to
Xavier, "...While slavery is abolished under our Constitution, a different
but more vicious kind of slavery is practiced in the plantation industry
where contract workers are paid slave wages." (p. 32)
14. At least in the case of rubber estates; similar data breakdowns were not
available for oil palm estates.
15. In terms of absolute numbers, the changes in rubber estate employment between
1957-1974 were as follows:
directly employed contract labor
Indian -64,600 +2,000
Chinese +7,000 -39,000
Malay +12,600 --
(Source: Min. of Labor AR, 1957 and 1974)
16. S. Gordon (1970):55. For accounts of the NUPW and its bargaining history,
see C. Gamba (1964) for the early periods and Nijhar (1977) for more
up-to-date analysis.
17. A survey of one estate in Johor (conducted for the Johor Tenggara Masterplan
study) found 91% of Indian labor were union members of NUPW, but only 2% and
55% for Chinese and Malay respectively (Holmstrom (ed)(n.d.), "Estate A").
18. Indians accounted for most of the non-citizens (provided only with residence
permit) or "Red Identity Card" holders who are still awaiting action on their
citizenship application and in the meantime are subject to work permit
restriction or denials. Colletta (1976), in his study of one estate in Kedah,
has noted the importance of this factor in contributing to the exodus of
Indian labor from the estate in 1970.
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19. This is recognized in the 1947 Census Report, section on Estate population.
20. The 1967/8 SESS does provide survey data on the ethnic composition of
households residing in "estate or labor lines" in the rural areas. Using
these data as proxies for the ethnic composition of estate population, we
find that in 1967/8, the Indian share has declined to 57%, that of Chinese
declined to 20%, while that of Malay has increased significantly to 23%
(computed from SESS 1967/8 (Household Amenities and Conveniences), Appendix
Table 3.4 (c)).
21. This point has been noted by Colletta (1976) for Kedah, and Holmstrom (ed)
(n.d.) for Johor. "During the last 5 to 10 years, many Malay migrated into
the estate." (Holmstrom, "Estate B").
22. A similar tendency is also observed in the case of tin mines.
23. There is by now an extensive literature on FELDA. However, much of this
literature are either general descriptions and assessments of its development
policy, or tend to focus on its cost-benefit and project management aspects.
For the general description and assessment, see e.g. Ho (1965), Ness (1967),
Shamsul Bahrin (1968), MCDS (1971), Jamaludin Lamin (1976) and Malaysian Business
(July/1977). For literature on cost-benefit analysis of FELDA, see e.g.
Wafa (1972,1973), Lim Sow Ching (1972), Little and Tipping (1972), Dixon (1977)
and various project appraisal reports (e.g., Jengka Triangle Report, Pahang
Tenggara Masterplanning Study, etc.). Many of these also contain useful
descriptions and overall assessments. For studies of FELDA from the
sociological and political modernization perspectives, see Willramatileke
(1964, 1972), MacAndrews (1975) and Rokiah Talib (1978). Among foreign
development consultants and foreign-aid institutions, FELDA has often been
upheld as an example of successful Public land development program among LDCs
(e.g., Ness (1967), MacAndrews (1975)), although some local researchers were
more critical (e.g., Shamsul Bahrin (1968), Wafa (1973) and Rokiah Talib (1978)).
24. FELDA's share of total public land development expenditure rose from 43% in
1956-60 to 77% in 1961-65 and 80% in 1966-70. See Table 3. 16
25. In 1975, total agricultural land under cultivation in Peninsular Malaysia was
7,600,000 acres. Thus, FELDA accounted for about 12% of the total agricultural
land in Peninsular Malaysia in the mid-70's.
26. This is usually -the seventh year after planting for rubber and the fifth year
for oil palm.
27. Calculated using estimates given in Chapter 3.1 and Chapter 2.1.
28. A FELDA settler is typically indebted to the tune of $17,000 (Rokiah Talib (1978)).
The reason for such a large debt lies in the extremely high.cost of FELDA land
development itself (Wafa (1973), Rokiah Talib (1978)). Wafa (1973) estimated
that in 1973 FELDA required $1500 to open up one acre of land, compared to $430
for the Kelantan State Land Development Authority (KSLDA) schemes. Moreover,
FELDA incurs high administrative costs in its operation; the ratio of settlers
to administrative/management personnel was 7.2 for FELDA, compared to 87.9 for
KSLDA (Rokiah Talib (1978)).
29. One study found significant unemployment already emerging in FELDA schemes in
the early 1970's (Lim Sow Ching (1972)). Another writer made the following
prediction: "The creation of a solid body of middle peasants through FELDA
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will therefore, later in the century, be offset increasingly by growing
problems of landlessness and dependency, not only in the village sector
but in the FELDA sector also." (Brookfield, H. (1973): 8). Given the vol-
atility of the world oil/fat market and the large number of close sub-
stitutes (soybean, cotton, linseed, etc.) available, it is difficult to
predict what the future price prospects of palm oil are. A lot also
depends on how successful is the lobbying effort of certain sections
of the American agribusiness to get the U.S. Government to put an em-
bargo on palm oil import from Third World countries. For information on
the nature of the world palm oil market, see, e.g., Leong Keng Yuen (1976),
and L. Siegel (1976) "Asia's other oil", Pacific Research and World Empire
Telegram VII (5). The price prospects for rubber may improve in the
future, however, if the current state of "petroleum crisis" continues
making the production of synthetic rubber more costly. See Barlow (1978)
for a discussion of the nature of the world market.
30 - Finance for FELDA came from several sources. As of the end of 1974,
the situation was as follows:
Cumulative $ million %
Federal Government Grant 206.5 23.4
Federal Government Loan 575.2 65.1
World Bank Loan 53.3
ABD Loan 6.9 9.9
Overseas Econ. Cooperation Fund Loan 27.8
New Planting Grants 14.4 1.6
Total 884.0 100.0
Source: C. McAndrews (1975): Table 2.6.
In 1974, FELDA revenue from rubber and palm oil sales amounted to
$188 million (C. McAndrews (1975): Table 2.8).
31 - Another example of a joint venture estate is that of Gula Padang Terap
(GPT) Company, which operates an integrated complex of sugar plantation
and processing factories. It was incorporated in 1973 and was given
a concession of 30,000 acres of jungle land by the Kedah State govern-
ment. Its paid-up capital was subscribed by the Kedah SEDC, the FIMA
Group, and Perlis Plantations; its credit and loan capital came from
Bank Pentain, ASEAN bankers, Commonwealth Development Corporation (CDC)
as well as machinery suppliers from W. Germany and India; and its mana-
gerial personnel provided on contract by foreign firms (Malaysian Digest
28/2/1978).
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Chapter 4 Displacement and re-absorption of peasant labor
In the previous two chapters, we have examined in some detail
the process of change in the production organization structure and mode of
labor utilization in the peasant sector, the private plantation sector, and
the public land settlement sector separately. The aim of the present chapter
is to integrate and interpret the findings of these disaggregated sectoral
analyses within the broader context of the rural hinterland as a whole.
The focus of our concern here is to attempt to answer the following questions
that we posed at the beginning of Part One:
i) To what extent has there been a shift from own-labor mode of
operation to wage-labor mode of operation in the peasant sector? And to what
extent has this shift been accompanied by displacement of owner-operating
peasants and tenant peasants?
ii) How are these displaced peasant labor re-absorbed? Are they reab-
sorbed as hired labor within the peasant sector itself? Or in the plantation
sector? Or in the public land settlement schemes? Or has there been a massive
exodus to the urban areas?
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4.1 The increasing wage-labor operation thesis
To what extent has there been a shift from own-labor mode of opera-
tion to wage-labor operation in the peasant sector as a whole? As far as
the fishing peasantry is concerned, our analysis in Chapter 2.1 has shown
that a large-scale shift has indeed occurred. In padi farming, the available
evidence is less strong as yet (since the Green Revolution was introduced only
in the late 1960s), but it does point to the beginning of such a shift. In
rubber smallholding operation, wage-labor operation and share-cropping had
been widespread since colonial times, and the available evidence examined in
Chapter 2.3 does not suggest any decline since. Overall, therefore, it can
be concluded that the "increasing wage-labor operation" thesis is valid.
The emergence of wage-labor production units can come about in
several ways: it could be due to the penetration of outsiders who either
brought in new productive resources or took over possession of resources
previously controlled by own-labor producers; it could arise from within the
rank of the existing own-labor units themselves; or existing rentiers may
recall their productive assets to become direct organizers of wage-labor
production units themselves.
Our analysis in Chapter 2 shows that the process of shift towards
wage-labor operation is different for the different peasant sectors. In the
fishing sector, the shift was primarily the result of external penetration
of new production units (trawlers) that were commercially-oriented right from
the start, although subsequently some of the existing own-labor units might
have expanded to become wage-labor units also. In the case of padi farming,
however, the shift appears to be more the result of internal differentiation -
the emergence of commercially oriented units from within the ranks of the padi
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farmers themselves - although attempts by some of the more dynamic landlords
to recall their land to become direct production organizers themselves
(using wage-labor and large-scale mechanization) may have also contributed
(and may become more significant in the future). In the case of rubber
smallholding operation, a combination of external penetration (especially
in the case of estate-subdivided smallholdings) and internal differentiation
appears to have taken place, although no precise empirical evidence is avail-
able to document this point.
The sources of wage-labor supply can also be different: wage labor
can either be brought in from outside, or be drawn from among the existing
peasant community. The case of the fishing sector appears to have involved
a significant amount of wage-labor being brought in from outside. In the
case of padi farming, outside seasonal migrant labor has been of importance
in Muda, but it appears that a shift towards the use of permanent landless
labor from within the farming area or its vicinity may be occurring (see
Chapter 2.2). In other padi farming areas, outside seasonal migrant labor
was usually not significant, and hence the wage-labor was generally drawn
from within the farming community itself. In rubber smallholding, wage-labor
had been primarily drawn from village peasants, although in the case of the
Chinese, many semi-urban and small urban dwellers had been an important source
of supply of rubber-tapping wage-labor also. This is particularly the case
with many residents in the "New Villages" that were created in 1953-55 as a
result of the "Emergency".
To what extent has this shift towards wage-labor operation in the
peasant sector as a whole resulted in the displacement of owner-operators
and tenant-operators?:,
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The evidence from our analysis of the fishing sector is unambiguous:
as a result of escalated competition from trawlers, owner-operating fishermen
using traditional gear have been increasingly displaced from fishing by traw-
lers, while many who were working as tenant-operators were either similarly
displaced from fishing or were increasingly reduced to the status of wage-
laborers in trawlers.
The situation with respect to the land-based peasantry is much
more complex, and requires a detailed discussion of the overall historical
dynamics of change in the land ownership structure. This we shall attempt
to do in the next section.
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4.2 Displacement of land-based peasants: the process of land concen-
tration and increasing landlessness
The process of displacement of land-based peasants is a complex one,
and cannot be addressed apart from the overall dynamics of change in the
structure of landownership and land access. While the extent and causes of
displacement of peasant labor in Peninsular Malaysia have been the subject
of intense debates, many of these debates have been conducted in the absence
of sufficient empirical evidence. Moreover, much of the literature tends to
focus on the immediate causes of displacement, while the question of how the
peasantry responds to the situation over time is usually not systematically
addressed. False alternatives are sometimes posed, leading to false conclu-
sions. Thus, there are some who assume that, if there is a growth of rural
landlessness and poverty, then this would automatically lead to rural-urban
migration, and hence if rural-urban migration is observed to be not signifi-
cant, then the conclusion is drawn that the problem of rural landlessness
and poverty is not great either. Such an argument is faulty because other
possible responses by the impoverished peasantry are totally ignored.
In what follows, we shall first sketch out some of the theoretical
considerations involved in subsection 4.2.1. In later subsections, these
considerations will be elaborated, and empirical evidence will be brought to
bear.
4.2.1 Displacement and its responses: the theoretical possibilities
The process of displacement of owner-operating peasants can be
analytically separated into two components:
1) A demographic growth effect - If the family size of an owner-operat-
ing household increases over time without a commensurate expansion of the
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size of its land holding, then, intergenerationally, either a subdivision
of the original land holding into smaller-sized holdings has to occur, or
some younger members would have to leave the land. Otherwise, ownership
of the original land holding would have to be shared among the younger
generations in the form of co-ownerships or multiple joint-ownerships.
2) An additional decumulation effect - In addition to population
growth, an absolute decline in the original size of the holding of the
owner-operating household may occur - part of the land may be sold, or be
foreclosed by usurers, etc. Decumulation accentuates the demographic
growth effect; in fact, the household may lose its entire holding during
its lifetime, with nothing left to pass on (i.e., a case of complete land
dispossession).
Obviously, land decumulated from some is necessarily land accumu-
lated by others. Theoretically, this land transfer can take place within
the farming community itself, or be "leaked" to outsiders, who in turn
could be acquiring the land to become landlords or to organize production
themselves. Land transfer among existing farm producers can in principle
be neutral (no increase in the size distribution of land ownership among
farm producers occurs as a result of the transfer), deconcentrating (transfer
from large landowners to small ones) or concentrating (transfer from small
land-owners to large ones). Where the transfer is to outsiders, it could be
concentrated in the hands of a few landlords, or be dispersed among many
landlords each relatively small. Alternatively, where the new land-owners
choose to organize production themselves, they could either become owner-
operators or hire wage-labor.
The argument that displacement occurs over time boils down to essen-
tially a situation of land decumulation from the smaller peasants in addition
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to demographic growth, with the land so transferred either accumulated by
larger farm-producers or by outside landlords.
To the extent that the demographic growth effect and additional
decumulation effect do operate to a significant degree among the smaller
owner-operating peasant households, there remains the question of how these
peasant households respond to the situation.
Theoretically, the response to this trend of decline in land
resource per peasant household labor can take several possible forms:
(1) Rent in additional land, i.e., some members of the household
may become owner-tenant operators; for those who have completely lost their
land, they will have to become pure tenants.
(2) Involution on own land, i.e., resort to more intensive use of
labor on own land, or possible sharing out underemployment among available
household labor.
(3) Supplement work on own land with off-farm work, i.e., some
members may hire themselves out as casual or seasonal wage-workers on others'
farms or in non-agricultural jobs. Those who have lost land completely
could become permanent agricultural laborers on others' farms.
(4) Occupy land illegally to farm, i.e., squatting on land not
legally owned.
(5) Permanent out-migration from own farm. The destination could
be wage-work in plantations and other permanent hinterland jobs; absorption
as settlers in public land settlement schemes; or wage-work or self-employment
in urban areas.
The actual responses adopted by the peasant households involved are
of course a function of the options available to them, and their evaluation
of the advantage of those options that are available. The crux of the problem
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is in understanding what options are in fact available to whom, how these
options change over time, and how choices are made among available options.
It is important to recognize that the processes of demographic
growth, land decumulation and their induced responses take place over long
drawn-out periods, i.e., displacement of land-based peasants should be seen
as a historical process, not an event at a particular moment in time. As-
such, it is incorrect to locate the cause of displacement in the event that
immediately precedes (and precipitates) the loss of landownership or the
out-migration of labor. Instead, the displacement process should be char-
acterized as one of gradual decline in land owned per peasant labor over
time, i.e. as a growing trend of land poverty and landlessness.
In what follows, an attempt will be made to document the extent
of land poverty and landlessness among peasant producers, how they might
have changed over time, and what responses they have induced on the part of
the affected peasant producers.
As a start, it will be useful to have an overall picture of the
structure of landownership and the extent of land poverty and landlessness
at a particular point in time. In what follows, therefore, an attempt will
be made towards building up such a picture using supplementary data from
the 1970 Population Census. Before doing this, however, a methodological
discussion on how land-ownership inequality and land-poverty should be
measured is necessary, in view of the amount of confusion and loose thinking
prevalent in the use of such measurements in the popular literature and even
in official documents. As will be pointed out, this question of measurement
is far from being an academic matter.
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4.2.2 Methodological issues in measuring landownership inequality
and landlessness
In trying to measure empirically the incidence of landlessness
or the extent of inequality in the distribution of land ownership, one
has to be very careful in defining the base population, i.e., who are to
be included in the initial "universe" within which the incidence of land-
lessness and the distribution of land-ownership is to be measured? Figure
4.1 illustrates some of the complexities in defining who should be inclu-
ded in this base population.
A common form of empirical measurement encountered in the
literature is that of using land-register based data to tabulate the
distribution of landowning households/individuals by the size of their
landholding, i.e., the base population is taken to be all landowning house-
holds/individuals. It can be extremely misleading to use such data to
interpret the degree of inequality in landownership, since all those who
own no land at all are excluded, and one is given no knowledge of the number
of such excluded persons relative to landowner. There is no a priori
reason why a person who owns half an acre should be included, while those
who own none are not.
Another common procedure of measurement usually adopted by farm-
based surveys is to take as the base population all farm operating units
covered in a census or survey of a given farm area, and to measure the
distribution of land owned by these farm units. It can be misleading to use
such information to interpret the degree of inequality of landownership with-
in the farm area also, on two counts: first, those households/individuals
who are pure agricultural wage-laborers in the farm area have been auto-
matically excluded from the base population; second , non-farm operating
230
,Labo
in r
occu
Not
owni
Village-resident households Non-resident household
r employed Pure non-farming Farm-operators agricultural w
on-farming landlords laborers
pations
owners-operators owner- tenant- ab
cum-landlords operators operators la
land-
ng Landlords with
non-farming
occupations
smallholding farm land ownership structure.
age-
sentee-
ndlords
Smalholding farm land owners
Figure 4. 1
231
landlords are also excluded. The effect of these exclusions is to understate
the true extent of inequality in land ownership and of the incidence of land-
lessness. Thus, the proportion of pure tenants among cultivating households
in a farm area gives only an under-estimate of the proportion of households
in the farm area who are landless.
A third common measurement procedure, usually adopted by village-
based surveys, is to take the residents of a farm locality as the base popula-
tion. Such an approach, however, also may run into conceptual definition
problems. Should all households resident in the farm village under survey
be included in the base population, regardless of their occupation? If so,
this may increase the share of landless households, since many non-farming
households who are engaged in other occupations (e.g., sundry shop operators,
carpenters, government officials, etc.) may not own agricultural land. Unless
these non-farming households can be shown to have originally been farmers
but have since lost their land somehow, this can give rise to a seriously
mistaken impression of the incidence of landlessness among peasants, especi-
ally for the more urbanized villages that are able to sustain a higher pro-
portion of households with non-farming occupations. On the other hand, if
only households working in farm agriculture are included, then this will leave
out the non-farming landlords, who, while fewer in number, nevertheless may
be the most significant land owners in the villages.
A compromise is to include in the base population:(i) all landowners
(regardless of occupation), and (ii) all agricultural households working on the
land (regardless of land ownership). Such a base population shall be called
"smallholding agricultural households", while (ii) alone shall be called
"working households in smallholding agriculture". In principle, one would
like to include in the base population also those village residents working
232
on non-agricultural occupations who were previously displaced from agriculture,
but there is no way these people could be empirically distinguished from other
non-agricultural workers (short of actually documenting the employment history
of all non-agricultural employed residents). Moreover, even if this could
be done, it would still not have accounted for all individuals/households
who were previously bona-fide peasants, since some of the peasants who have
become landless may have migrated out. To push this line of thinking to the
extreme, it can be argued that all those non-farm resident (and even non-resi-
dent) individuals who are propertyless and want to cultivate land, but have been
denied access to any land at all historically, should also be counted in the
base population of any measure of farm land ownership distribution.
The point to emerge from this discussion is that the definition of
what constitutes the base population for measuring landownership ultimately
involves an implicit assumption about who should have the right of landowner-
ship. Depending on how these empirical measurements are used, it may have
tremendous political implications. Thus, any public policy analysis of
agrarian land redistribution depends crucially on who should be included
as potential land recipients, which in turn may hinge on who get counted in as
"landless" in the base population when landownership distribution is measured.
4.2.3 Structure of smallholding landownership in Peninsular Malaysia
The only source of nation-wide data on smallholding agricultural
landownership in Peninsular Malaysia is the 1970 Population. Census.1 There
was a nation-wide agricultural census in 1960, but this census curiously pro-
vides no information on landownership distribution; also, the land tenurial
categories used in this census are not comparable with those of the 1970
Population Census or those of the Ministry of Agriculture's series of farm-
based surveys. The latter information source also does not cover landownership
distribution.
235
As a first cut, Table 4.1 summarizes the land tenurial structure
of smallholding households in Peninsular Malaysia as estimated from'the 1970
Population Census. By smallholding households, we here include all those
who either work in the smallholding sector or own smallholding land. Accor-
ding to the Census, there were about 545,000 households (or 34.4% of all
households) in Peninsular Malaysia in 1970 who operated some smallholding
agricultural land, either as owner-operators (65%), owner-tenant operators
(12%), or pure tenants (23%). It also found a total of 86,700 households
who owned smallholding agricultural land, but did not operate the land them-
selves (about 17% of all households owning agricultural land). No figure,
however, was available on the number of agricultural laborers who worked in
the smallholding sector as wage-labor but did not own and operate any land
themselves. An attempt to estimate this has been made in Table 4.1; the
figure is about 112,000, or 17% of all households working in smallholding
agriculture. The TMP estimated a higher figure of 137,500 households in
"other agriculture" (p. 163) who were said to be largely agricultural wage
laborers in smallholdings although some of them also "rent or own small
pieces of land" (p. 166). It can therefore be assumed that the majority of
these households can be classified as landless. In the interest of not
over-estimating the number of landless agricultural laborers, however, the
lower estimate that we derived shall be used.
Turning next to the size distribution of landownership, Table 4.2
first summarizes information on the size distribution of landownership among
households owning land. From this, it is seen that the average acreage owned
among households owning land is 6.1 acres per household overall, lowest
among Malays, and highest among Chinese. Recalling the earlier discussion,
it must be emphasized that the estimates in this table are not a good indicator
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Table 4.1 Peninsular Malaysia, 1970 :
Differentiation of smallholding households
Number('000)
(1) Land-owning households 503.6
(a) absentee landlords 86.7
(b) owner-operators 353.4
(c) owner-tenant operators 63.5
(2) Landless households 240.3
(a) pure tenant operators 127.9
(b) agricultural laborers 112.4
(3) ALL ((1) + (2)) 743.9
(4) Households opearating
smallholdings
((lb)+(lc)+(2a))
(5) Households working on
smallholdings
((4) + (2b))
as % of
(3)2
67.7
11.7
47.5
8.5
32.3
17.1
15.2
as %C of
(4i)
64.9
11.6
23.5
as ' of
(5)
53.8
9.7
19.4
17.1
100.0
100.0
100.0
source compiled and estimated from Min. of Agri.(1976) and 1970 Pop. Census
(lb),(lc) & (2a) - from Table 2.7 in Min. of Agri. (1976)
(la) - from Table 2.11, ibid.
(2b) - estimated as follows :
total agricultural households = 852,900 (Table 1.3,ibid.)
minus fishermen & estate households =-186,800 ( " " " )
minus smallholding operating households
minus forestry & logging households
equal landless agri. households in
smallholding sector
661,100
=-544,800
121,300
- 8,900
112,400
(Table 2.7,ibid.)
( see .* below)
* from 1970 Pop. Census (Table 4.22):
total forestry & logging workers = 13,800
total agricultural workers = 1322,100
if we assume that the (no. of worker/no. of household)-ratio is the
same for forestry & logging workers as for all agricultural workers,
then :
852,000
no. of forestry & logging households = 13,800 x 1 32,000
= 8,900
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of actual size distribution of landownership in the smallholding peasant
sector, since landless individuals have been excluded. In particular, the
higher average acreage figure for Chinese and Indian may be misleading, since
the proportion of landless smallholding workers may be higher among Chinese
and Indian. Unfortunately, no estimate of the size distribution pattern for
all smallholding households is available from the Census itself. However,
using Table 4.1 and Table 4.2, such an estimate can be derived; Table 4.3
presents the result. It is seen that the average holding size of land owned
is down to only 4.1 acres. 10% of the households owned more than 10 acres
each, 30% owned between 3 and 10 acres, and a full 60% owned less than 3 acres.
It is unfortunate that no measure of inequality (e.g., Gini-coefficient) can
be calculated, since distribution of acreage owned by size categories is not'
available. Nevertheless, it is expected to be significant.
There is unfortunately no available data from an earlier date with
which to compare the information from the 1970 Population Census for indica-
tion of trend over time. The only other sources of information on farm
landownership are localized village-based or farm-area based surveys conducted
by various private researchers (anthropologists, economists, sociologists,
political analysts, etc.). The definitions of what constitutes the "base
population" are not always clear from their research reports; and where they
are clear, they may vary between researchers. Despite these limitations,
these information sources do throw considerable light on the extent of land-
poverty and landlessness among the peasantry. Along with the above estimate
from the 1970 Population Census, these localized survey data will now be used
to examine the extent of landlessness and land-poverty in the smallholding
sector.
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Table 4.2 Distribution of households owning smallholding agricultural
land by size of land holding, Peninsular Malaysia 1970
Size group of
land holding
(acres)
(1/2)
(1/2)-l
1-3
3-5
5-10
10-15
15-25
25-50
50+
Proportion of households owning land (%)
All
3.5
6.3
31.9
21.3
23.7
7.4
3.8
1.5
0.6
100All
(Average acreage
per household)
% of households
owning land
% of land acreage
owned
= (6.1)
- 100
- 100
Malay
3.5
7.1
35.4
22.1
22.3
6.1
2.7
0.7
0.1
100
(4.4)
81.8
58.6
Chinese
2.4
2.1
14.5
17.3
31.5
14.0
10.2
5.2
2.9
100
(14.5)
15.9
37.8
Indian
11.3
7.5
26.1
21.2
21.1
5.6
3.0
1.9
2.3
100
(10.7)
1.6
2.8
Source: Ministry of Agriculture (1976):
Table 4.3 Distribution of landownership
Table 2.9
among all smallholding households
(i.e. households working in smallholding agriculture & absentee
landlords)
Total Distribution of households by size of land owned
Smallholding (acres)
households None <3 3-5 5-10 10-25 25+
% share 100 32 28 14 16 9 1
Number
(1000) 240.3 209.3 106.9 118.9 56.5 10.7
Average acreage per household = 4.1
Source: Estimated from Table 4.1 and Table 4.2
Note: The proportion of households owning land among all smallholding ho
households was estimated to be 67.7% in Table 4.1. This figure is
used to adjust the percentage shares given in Table 4.2 to arrive
at the first row above. The estimated number of households in each
size category in the second row is calculated using the total fig-
ure of 743 900 derived from Table 4.i.
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4.2.4 Landlessness: the magnitude of the problem
As was shown in the last subsection, landless agricultural households
appear to have constituted 32% of the total number of households involved
in smallholding agriculture in Peninsular Malaysia in 1970 (it is slightly
higher (35%) if we exclude the non-cultivating landlords from the total
smallholding agricultural household figure). Moreover from Table 4.3 it
is seen that another 28% of the smallholding households owned some agricul-
tural land but of size less than 3 acres each. Thus, if we regard all
households working in smallholding agriculture who owned less than 3 acres
to be landless and land-poor, then a full 60% of smallholding agricultural
households in Peninsular Malaysia were landless and land-poor. In as much as
this figure pertains to smallholding households only and excludes estate-
workers, fishermen and forestry workers (most of whom owned no land), it
is somewhat of an underestimate. Moreover, some landless households pre-
viously working in smallholdings may have migrated out of the sector to work
in other sectors, and this may again have reduced the number of landless
households remaining in the smallholding sector.
Table 4.4, which summarizes more localized village-based survey
findings, further strengthens this impression of a high incidence of land-
lessness and land-poverty in the traditional smallholding peasant agriculture
sector. Although part of the variation in degree of landlessness and land-
poverty between these localized village studies may have been due to
differences in their base population definitions (i.e. who are to be included
in the universe within which the incidences of landlessness and land-poverty
is to be measured?), the overall impression of high incidence is unmistakable.
The above survey data pertain largely to the traditional village-
based peasantry who are predominantly Malay. 'There are also a large number
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Table 4.4 Proportion of households who were landless and land-poor
in various rural village surveys
location of survey
Johore
Parit A (1970)
Parit B (1970)
Bagan
Sungei Raya mukim
Kedah
Kangkong
Padang Lalang(1964)
Asam Riang
Muda area (1972/3)
Kelantan
Jelawat
Tanjong Pauh
3 villages(.Stan,
Demit,K.Kerian)
Pasir Pekan
Negri Sembilan
Jelebu
Jenderam Hilir
4 villages in Negri
Sembilan Timor
3 rural towns(<l,500)
in N.Sembilan Timor
Pahang
Kerdau
Perak
Changkat Lalang
Province Wellesley
Permatang Mogok
Selangor
Genting ialik
main farming
crop types
mainly rubber
mainly rubber
rubber & coconut
mainly rubber
padi
padi
padi
padi
mainly padi
mainly padi
padi & rubber
mainly rubber
rubber
rubber
mixed
mixed
rubber & padi
mainly rubber
padi
% of households
landless
7
13
12.8
27.9
33.3
44.1
30
44
34.3
17
19.6
2
46
18.5
n.a.
n.a.
7.8
28.5
57
% of households
owning : 3 acres
14
41
56.4
65.4
67.7
(<3.5) 69.6
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
(<2) 90
87.4
42
69
44.4
69.7
61.3
26.6
(< 2) 69.2
n a.
sample-sizE
42
46
149
136
90
135
94
n.a.
207
n.a.
280
50
35
108
201
315
128
123
51
rubber 42 n.a. n , a.
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sources :
holds 22,500 (b)+(d
= 44% of (a)
Jelawat - calculated from Kessler(1978)
Tanjong Fauh - c1culated from data cited in Kessler(1978)
Jelebu - calculated from Swift(1965)
Jenderam Hiir - calculated from P.J.Wilson(1967)
4 villages & 3 rural towns in N.Sembilan Timor - Selvaratnam et. al.(1976)
Permatang Logok - U.N.Bhati, cited in K.S.Jomo(1977):Table 5.19
Genting Malik - inferred from text in Fisk(1961)
Bagan,Kangkong,Changkat Lalang & Kerdau - Husin Ali(1975)
W.Stan,Demit,K.Kerian & Pasir Pekan - Husin Ali(1978)
Parit A,Parit B - Holmstrom(ed.)(1970)
S.Raya mukim - calculated from M.L.Rogers(1967); figures pertain to
Malay households only
Padang Lalang - Kuchiba & Tsubouchi(1967)
Asam Riang - R.Barnard(1970), cited in K.S.Jomo(1977)
huda area - estimated from text of FAO/World Lank 1972/3 kuda Study
as follows : all farming households = 51,000 (a)
landless agri.laborer-
households = $7,o(A= 4,300 (b)
land-operating house-
holds 46,700 (c)
pure-tenants = 39% of (c)=18,200 (d)
total landless house-
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of Chinese households living in rural or semi-rural areas who work in
smallholding agriculture; however, these households are generally concentra-
ted in "New Villages" which are compact settlements created during the
Emergency. Quantitative information on landlessness and land-poverty for
these New Village residents is scarce, although generally known to be very
high. The only available data on agricultural landownership in New Villages
are from a survey of 866 households in 17 New Villages in Perak and Malacca
in 1972 conducted by the Ministry of National UJnity; it found 77% of the
households surveyed to be without any (legally-owned) agricultural land,
another 75% owned less than 3 acres each, 7% owned between 3 and 5 acres,
and only 3% owned 7 acres or more. This high incidence of landlessness is
partly inflated by the inclusion in the survey of some New Villages which
are urban or semi-urban; however, even if only the most remote rural New
Villages are considered, land poverty is still higher than the national
average estimated in Table 4.3 earlier (31% landless, 39% less than 3 acres,
22% 3-5 acres, and 8% 5 acres or more for these villages,compared with the
corresponding figures of 32%, 28%, 14% and 26% for the nation as a whole).
If these survey data are in any way representative, they suggest that most
of the large Chinese land owners enumerated in Table 4.2 for the country
as a whole are not to be found in New Villages.
The immediate factor related to this widespread land-poverty and
landlessness in the smallholding sector is the inability of the land-hungry
peasants to expand the size of their holding through direct application for
new land alienation from the State Government.
Backlog in approval of individual smallholding land application
One indication of the great but unfulfilled demand for individual
smallholding agricultural land is the vast backlog of land applications
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pending approval in various state land offices. As early as 1958, an
official Land Administration Report showed that as many as 372,500 appli-
cations for land were outstanding pending actions in various land offices
of the country as of March 1957. This was about 30% of the total number
of land titles in existence at that point in time. The overwhelming majority
of these applications were for smallholding agricultural land, and as much
as 10% of the applications came from the New Villages.2
The situation has apparently grown worse in the post-colonial
period. At the end of 1973, the backlog of land title applications awaiting
survey alone was reported to be over 448,600 and increasing.3 A journalist
has reported in 1976 that the K. Kangsar District land office had only
finished its 1965 land application files in 1976 (Malaysia Business, August
1976: 83). Even these extremely high figures may underestimate the true
extent of backlog, as it is a known practice for part of the backlog of appli-
cations to be cut by simply rejecting them outright (Guyot (1971), citing
the case of Trengganu).
While the great and growing backlog of land title applications
outstanding had usually been blamed on the inefficiency of the whole public
land administration system (e.g., Esman (1972), Land Administration Report
1958, and DAU (1968)),4 some researchers have argued that official policy
considerations and even political factors are also involved.5 Thus, according
to Lee Hock Lock(1974), it has been apparently an official government policy
to stop granting smallholding agricultural land titles on a private individ-
ual application basis; instead, land was to be alienated or leased through
some public land development authorities (e.g. FELDA, State Economic Develop-
ment Corporations, etc.). This is corroborated by Guyot's (1971) study of
land alienation policies in two states (Johor and Trengganu) where she found
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that the land registers in the two states were closed to further individual
land applications in 1960 and 1961 respectively.
The freezing of individual smallholding land development thus
effectively restricted access to new agricultural land to the public land
development schemes, i.e., the pace of land development is no longer deter-
mined directly by the pace of expansion of land needs among the peasantry,
but indirectly through public policy. The implication of this will be
evident as we examine next the actual rate of agricultural land develop-
ment relative to population growth in the post-colonial period.
4.2.5 The effect of demographic growth and land decumulation
(a) The effect of demographic growth
To what extent has demographic growth in the post-colonial period
outstripped the pace of land development in general and smallholding land
expansion in particular?
Table 4.5 shows the pace of land development of the three agri-
cultural production organization sectors - plantations (including public-
sector plantations), public land settlement schemes, and individual peasant
smallholdings. Overall, a growth rate of 1.8% per annum was achieved
between 1957 and 1975 for all agricultural land. The pace of growth was,
however, highly uneven between sectors and in different periods. The plan-
tation sector has actually declined slightly between 1957-70 (as a result of
subdivision of rubber estates; see Chapter 3.1 for details), although it
has expanded at the national average rate in 1970-75 (due largely to expansion
of public estates and joint-venture estates). The individual smallholding
sector has registered an increase of about 700,000 acres between 1957 and
1975, but the bulk of this is due to subdivision of rubber estates (about
6
300,000 acres) and fringe alienation schemes (about 170,000 acres). Fringe
Table 4.5 Distribution of agricultural land by type of production organization
in Peninsular Malaysia, 1947-75
production organization
sector
1) plantation (private,
public & joint-venture)
2) public land settlement
schemes
- FELDA
3) individual smallholdings
4) all
total acreage cultivated
('000 ac.)
distribution by production organization(%)
1947 1957 1970 1973 1975
41 40 33 31 32
6 11 13
~4.5
average annual growth rate(s)
19577 1970-75 157-7
-0.2 2.1
* 19.1
0.4
*
(7.4) (9.5)
59 60 62 58 55
100 100 100 100
1.9
1.6100 2.2
1.2
1.8
5125 5548 6804 7141 7600
N,
sources 2 author's own estimates & reconciliation from various sources, including
Statistical Digest(v.y.), Min. of Agri.(1976), SMP & TMP, & MSB(v.i.)
note: growth rate for public land settlement schemes is not calculated for 1957-70 &
1957-75 because the base year (1957) acreage was negligibly small
individual smallholding acreage is calculated as a residual
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Alienation schemes have been of little significance since 1970, while subdi-
7
vision of rubber estates has also declined significantly in the 1970s. Both
these factors combined to make expansion of individual smallholding land
negligible since 1970. Public land settlement schemes expanded the most,
accounting for about one million acres of land development (or half of all
land developed between 1957-1975). The major bulk of this was due to
FELDA, as shown in Chapter 3.
How do these rates of land expansion compare with the rate of
population and labor force growth? Between 1957 and 1970, the rate of growth
of total population (2.6% per annum), working age population (2.4%), and
all employed labor force (2.1%) have all been higher than the rate of aggre-
gate expansion of agricultural land (1.6% p.a.). Although the pace of aggre-
gate land development has increased in 1970-75 (2.2% p.a.), so has that of
the total employed labor force (3.5% p.a.), while other demographic growth
rates had not decreased. Thus, throughout the entire period from 1957-75,
aggregate land development lagged behind aggregate demographic and total
employed labor force growth. The differential is even greater if we consider the
smallholding sector only, which expanded at rates lower than that for all
agricultural land. Since rural peasant population has even higher demogra-
phic growth rate (Malay population grew at 3.2% p.a. between 1957 and 1970,
and Malays constituted the bulk of rural peasant population), unless there
is a transfer of peasant labor from smallholding agriculture to other forms
of employment, the (agricultural land/land-based agricultural employment)
ratio would decline over the period 1957-75. The extent of such transferring
out of peasant labor will be examined later.
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b) Land decumulation by owner-operating peasants
In addition to the effect of demographic growth in the face of
fixed land resources available, there is the added problem of land decumula-
8
tion by the poorer peasants. This is manifested by the rapid pace of land
sales and land transfer in the peasantry sector.
Extent of land sales
There has been no nation-wide data available on the extent and fre-
quency of land sales within the peasant smallholding sector, although available
localized studies on the subject all seem to indicate an astonishingly high
rate of land transfer. Thus, Ho's (1970) study of Saiong mukim, Perak, found
that in every decade from 1900 to 1960, an average of two-thirds of all padi
lots and three-quarters of all kampong and rubber lots had changed hands
(Ho (1970: Table 3)). Similarly, P. K. Voon's study (1977) of 594 lots in
the Malay Reservation area of Semenyih and Ulu Semenyih mukim, Selangor,
found that only 16% of the lots which were initially alienated in 1916 had
never been sold by 1968; of the lots which had undergone transactions, 88%
were sold between one and five times, and 1.4% were sold ten times or more.
Another study by Voon (1972) in mukim Sabai Bentong (Pahang) in 1968 found
54% of the rubber lots had undergone transfer since initial alienation in the
1920s and 1930s; the number of sales amounted to 3.6 times the number of lots.
Other evidence can be adduced that is consistent with this picture
of a very rapid rate of land transfer within the peasant sector. Thus, in an
anthropological study of Kelantan, Manning Nash (1974) cited data that showed
that, in Pasir Mas District, Kelantan, in the five-year period between 1963
and 1968 alone, 24% of the lots underwent one transfer, 5% were sold twice,
and almost 2% were sold three times or more. Over the five-year period, the
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average number of transactions per year equals about 8% of the total number
9
of lots. The socio-economic surveys of padi farms conducted by the Ministry
of Agriculture provide yet another data source where suggestive evidence
on extent of land sales can be calculated. As shown in Table 4.6 below,
the proportion of owner-cultivated land which has been acquired through pur-
chase by the owner-cultivator varies from 27% to almost 50% in the five
farming areas where data were available. These figures were likely to have
underestimated the true extent of land sales in the padi farming sector,
as they apply to owner-cultivated land only, whereas it can be expected that
land operated by tenants was likely to have been leased out by larger
landowners who must have acquired more of their land through purchase.
A manifestation of this combined demographic growth and land
decumulation effect is the rapid rise of joint-ownership of smallholding
land. K. S. Jomo (1977) has summarized the available information and ana-
lyzed the nature of this phenomenon in detail.1 0
4.2.7 Land concentration: growth of absentee landlordism or large
commercial farmers?
If smaller owner-operating peasants had been systematically losing
land over time, who had been acquiring it? Is it the larger peasant producers
Table 4.6 Proportion of padi land owned by cultivating households which
were acquired through purchase
%
Malacca (1966) 29
Tanjong Karang (1966) 49
Province Wellesley (1968) 27
Kemubu (1968) 31
Sungai Manik (1971) 48
Source: Calculated from various Min. of Agri. farm surveys previouly cited.
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who were seeking to expand their farm size of cultivation more, or is it
a landlord class? And who are these landlords?
A brief discussion at this point regarding the nature of landlords
is necessary, in view of the fact that the landlords as a group are not
homogeneous, and it is extremely misleading to view them as such.
a) Characteristics of landlords
There are many ways to classify the different types of landlords,
and the one that we propose below represents no more than a preliminary
attempt at sorting out the complexity of the situation. There has been a
dearth of documented information on the subject, and we can do no more than
cite a few scattered pieces of evidence (in an Appendix) to throw light on
the analysis presented below.
As a first cut, a distinction needs to be made between (i) land-
lords who are currently also operating farm-land themselves or who have
retired from farming; and (ii) landlords of non-farming backgrounds.
The first type of landlords can in turn be further distinguished
into:
a) relatively young farmers who have inherited more land than they
can cultivate themselves presently, but who envisage increasing needs for
land as their family size grows. These farmers tend therefore to rent out
their extra land (rather than sell it) to tenants, so that they can later
recall the land to incorporate into their own farm as their households
expand.
b) relatively older farmers who are in process of retiring or who
have already retired from farming. Rather than sell the land that they can
no longer cultivate themselves, they tend to rent it out generally to their
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younger kin and relatives, thus in this way ensuring a steady and secure
11
source of old-age retirement income.
Lim Teck Ghee et al. (1974) have identified these two landlord
groups as being possible stages in the "life-cycle" transition process of
the farmers who manage to inherit, retain or otherwise accumulate land
through their life-time. The phenomenon of kinship-based renting tends to
be confined to these landlords, especially type (b). Moreover, these land-
lords tend to be small.
In contrast to these landlords with current or past farming back-
grounds, there are those landlords who do not originate from farming itself,
but who either:
(1) accumulated their wealth from elsewhere, and used it to buy
land as a form of investment. In general, these landlords may own other
wealth assets or are currently engaged in other economic activities (busi-
ness, etc.).
(2) possessed political influence and used it to get land alien-
ated to them on relatively good terms. 12
(3) are from aristocratic backgrounds. To the extent that the
British colonial authority might have alienated significant amounts of land
to many aristocrats during the colonial period, this land may have been
passed down to aristocrats of the present generation through inheritance.
These landlords from non-farming backgrounds tend on the whole to
own holdings of larger size. They also tend to rent out land based on
purely economic considerations, and their relationship to the tenants
therefore tends not to be kinship-based. By the nature of their other
economic pursuits or connections, many of them tend also to be absentee.
Indeed, this absenteeism on their part may have also given rise to a group
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of "landlord-functionary", i.e., intermediaries who perform the role of par-
celing out the large land tract owned by the absentee landlord to individual
tenants and collecting rents from them, etc. Although not strictly landlords
themselves, these intermediaries may be identified as such by the tenants,
since it is they who carry out the actual landlord functions, and it is they
that the tenants directly confront.
The boundaries between these different types of landlords are of
course by no means rigid nor clear-cut. For example, intergenerational accumu-
lation and inheritance of land can make even a young farmer so well off that
he decides to quit farming and become a pure landlord, or he may subsequently
branch out to other economic activities (rice-milling, etc.) and in the
process becomes an absentee-landlord.
A brief review of the empirical evidence on the above characteri-
zation of the landlords as a group is contained in Appendix 4
b) Emergence of large commercial farmers and displacement of tenants
and small owner-tenants
It has generally been alleged that a gradual process of transfer
of land ownership from the farmer-producers to landlords of non-farming
backgrounds has been taking place since the colonial period (after the British
introduced the Torrens system and made land a commodity), and that this has
contributed to the growing landlessness in peasant farming. The land owner-
ship transfer (and perhaps also concentration) process, however, did not
lead to displacement of peasants from farming, since the peasants who became
landless (either in their life-time or through intergenerational land sub-
division and de-cumulation) can still continue to be absorbed in farming as
tenants; the new landowners did not displace them as producers, but merely
extracted a rent from them. This argument is consistent with the observation
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documented earlier in Chapter 2 that the incidence of tenancy has grown over
time, at least until the 1960s.
This situation may be changing with the introduction of the Green
Revolution in padi farming. To the extent that the introduction of Green
Revolution technologies induces the larger farmers to expand their farm
size of operation, the transfer of land will be increasingly one of transfer
from small farmers to larger farmers (rather than one of between farmers and
non-farmers). Moreover, larger farmers are increasingly outbidding the
small farmers and pure tenant farmers in terms of land renting, thus contribut-
ing further to the displacement of the latter from tenant farming. The
process of land subdivision and decumulation among the smaller peasants will
therefore no longer lead to their conversion from owner-farmers to tenants,
but to their conversion to hired labor or else to their being displaced from
farming altogether.
In the shorter run, the increased labor input requirement per acre
due to double-cropping may outweigh the effect of mechanization, and thus
absorption as hired labor will be possible. In the longer run, however, as
population pressure builds up and mechanization becomes more advanced, dis-
placement from padi farming will be a distinct necessity for the landless
peasants.
In Chapter 2.2,it was shown (within the limit of data availability)
that displacement of pure-tenant farmers had indeed begun following the spread
of Green Revolution technologies, and that a dramatic trend of capital-labor
substitution by the larger farmers had indeed occurred. Thus the above argu-
ment appears valid, and it therefore suggests that the option of renting in
land by the landless and land-poor peasant in padi farming will become
increasingly unavailable.13
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From this, one cannot hastily conclude that large-scale exodus
of rural peasant labor to the urban areas would occur. As pointed out ear-
lier, there are many other options remaining for the land-poor and landless
peasants in addition to renting land and migrating to the cities. These
other options will be examined in greater detail next.
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4.3 Responses to landlessness and land poverty
a) Involution in own-farm and disguised employment
There has been no thorough study on the extent and nature of "invo-
lution", "disguised employment" and "shared underemployment" in Malayan
peasant production. In Chapter 2, it has been shown that smaller farms in
padi cultivation do tend to be more labor-intensive than larger farms, while
most available padi farm surveys (e.g., Purcel (1963), Fredericks et al. (1977))
also appear to indicate considerable underemployment. However, given the
methodology used to measure underemployment in these latter surveys (comparing
actual utilization of labor time with available labor time), underemployment
tends to be overstated. While some amount of involutionary response undoubt-
edly exists (leading to low return to labor), it is not likely to be as
significant as some earlier writers made it out to be (e.g., the zero margin-
ality productivity argument) (see, e.g., the recent critique by Ghash (1977));
similarly, underemployment is likely to be significant only in places where
no alternative off-farm work is available.
b) Extent of off-farm work
A more likely alternative resorted to by peasants with insufficient
land to work on is to seek off-farm work on a temporary, seasonal or even
regular basis within the vicinity of their farming area.
Table 4.7 (a) documents the extent of off-farm work engagement by
smallholding peasants according to the 1960 Agricultural Census, while Table
4.7 (b) shows the proportion of farm-household income derived from off-farm
work by farmers in padi, rubber and coconut as reported in various surveys
by the Ministry of Agriculture.
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Table 4.7 Extent of off-farm work in the smallholding sector
(a) Proportion of all economically-active farm household members (age
who work off-farm (%) according to 1960 Agricultural Census
Other farms and estates
Non-agricultural employ-
ment
(b) Proportion of farm-household income from
surveys by the Ministry of Agriculture
off-farm work, various farm
% of income
from off-farm work
Padi
Kemubu (1968)
Besut (1971)
Krian (1970)
S. Manik (1970)
P. Wellesley (1968)
C. Jong (1970)
T. Karang (1966)
Avg. (unweighted)
44
50
32
39
23
22
28
33
Rubber (1970)
Johor - Batu Pahat
Pontian
Muar
Avg.
Coconut (1964/5)
Kalantan
Pontian
Batu Pahat
Sabak Bernam
Kuala Selangor
Lower Perak
Avg.
41
44
37
41
56
47
63
32
59
28
49
Sources: (a)
(b)
1960 Agricultural Census, Vol. 11, various tables.
Various Ministry of Agriculture farm surveys cited in Chapter 3.
15+)
All farms enumerated Wet-padi Rubber
All <1 1-3 10-15 farms small-
ac. ac. ac. All Kelantan holdings
16 21 19 7 16 24 17
31 53 42 20 : 31 65 32
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Both these sources show that off-farm work is generally significant
irrespective of the crop-type (rubber, padi or coconut), thus indicating
that the seasonal character of some form of cultivation could not be the
sole reason for the need to resort to off-farm work. From the 1960 Agricul-
tural Census data, it can be seen that the proportion of off-farm work is,
as expected, inversely related to the size of farm operation.
In so far as off-farm work entails work outside smallholding agri-
culture itself, the transition from occasional off-farm work to regular and
permanent off-farm work constitutes a transfer of labor from smallholding
agriculture to employment outside smallholding agriculture; the difference
is only a matter of degrees. In the latter case, out-migration may or may
not be involved, depending on the location of non-smallholding agriculture
work.
In the case of smallholding Chinese in rural New Villages, consid-
erable transfer of labor to non-smallholding agricultural work in the form
of contract labor (e.g., in sawmill, logging, construction and land clearing
14
(for FELDA scheme development, etc.)) appears to exist. Much of this contract-
labor work involves out-migration, but due to their transient nature, the
out-migration tends not to be permanent, and a kind of "labor circulation"
involving periodic re-visits of the home village (where the migrant laborer's
family still remains) may occur.
In 4.2.5 (a), we have shown that if no transfer of labor from small-
holding agriculture occurs, demographic growth rate alone would cause land-labor
ratio in the smallholding sector to decline. Moreover, evidence presented in
4.2.5 (b) suggests that there was significant additional decumulation that
accentuates the problem for the poorer peasants. The question is thus: to
what extent has such a labor transfer occurred?
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To answer this question, it is useful to first examine the overall
magnitude' of transfer of labor from land-based agriculture to non-agricultural
activities. From Table 4.8, we see that the rate of growth of employed labor
force in land-based agricultural activities (excluding forestry and logging)
has been only around 1.0% p.a. for 1957-1970 and 1.4% for 1970-75, i.e.,
much less than the corresponding rates for all employed labor force. In fact,
the growth of employment in land-based agriculture has been so slow that it
actually lagged behind the pace of aggregate land development, i.e., the
aggregate (land/land-based agricultural employment) ratio has actually in-
creased between 1957 and 1975, as shown in Table 4.8.
However, the increase in land/labor ratio was not evenly distributed
across all the different agricultural production organization sectors; as
Table 4.8 shows, the land/labor ratio for the plantation sector increased
from around 7 acres per worker to about 9 acres per worker, while that for
individual smallholding and public settlement schemes combined increased
only slightly from 3.9 acres/employed to about 4.4 acres/employed. The further
breakdown of land/labor ratio changes for the individual smallholding sector
and the public settlement schemes sector depends on the assumption about the
number of employed labor absorbed in the public settlement schemes, since no
figure on this is available from the Population Census for from the TMP
estimates. In Chapter 3, an estimate of the number of households absorbed
into public settlement schemes between 1957 and 1975 has been made. Using
this, and if we assume between 2 to 3 employed worker per settler households
in FELDA, Controlled Alienation and State Schemes (but one employed person
per youth scheme settlement unit) in 1975, then the land/labor ratio for
public settlement schemes as a whole comes out to be between 5.3 and 7.5,
while that for the individual smallholding (calculated as a residual) would
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Table 4.8 Change in land-labor ratio in agriculture, 1947-75
a) total agricultural land
under cultivation ('000 ac.)
total plantation acreage
('000 ac.)
total smallholding & public
land settlement schemes
('000 ac.)
b) total agricultural employ-
ment ('000)
total plantation employment
('000)
total smallholding & public
settlement schme employment
('000)
c) land-labor ratio, all
(ac./employment)
land-labor ratio, plantation
land-labor ratio, smallhold-
ings & public land settle-
ment schemes
1947 l_95j7 126 1970 1975
5125 5548 6131 6804 7600
2103 2208 2180 2158 2400
3022 3340 3952 4646 5200
1167 1164 1215 1279 1442
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857
4.4
6.8
3.5
307
856
4.8
7.2
3.9
320 277 255
895 1002 1187
5.0
6.8
4.4
5.3
4.6
5.3
9.4
4.4
d) average annual growth rate (%)
all agricultural employment
all employment
all-agricultural land
1957-70 1970-75
0.7
2.1
1.6
2.4
3.5
2.2
sources author's own estimates & reconciliation from various
sources, including Statistical Digest(v.y.),MSB(v.i.),
Min. of Labor AR(v.y.), 1957 & 1970 Population Census,
1962 EUS & TMP
notes : (a) total smallholding & public land settlement scheme acreage
is derived as a residual by subtracting plantation acreage
from total land acreage
(b) total agricultural employment excludes fishing, forestry &
logging
estimates are subject to large margins of error partly due to
conflicting figures from the various sources used
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be between 3.9 and 4.2. In 1957, public settlement schemes were insignificant,
and thus the figure 3.9 calculated earlier applies to individual smallhold-
ings. Given the margin of error in these estimates, it can be concluded
that there has not been a significant change in the land/labor ratio for
the smallholding sector between 1957 and 1975.
In summary, we have found that the pace of aggregate land develop-
ment lagged behind total population and employment growth, but was ahead
of the growth of land-based agricultural employment, so that the aggregate
agricultural land/land-based agricultural employment ratio increased between
1957 and 1975. However, this latter increase was largely accounted for by
the plantation and public settlement schemes; land/labor ratio has apparently
not changed appreciably in the smallholding sector.
Thus, it appears that despite the higher demographic growth out-
stripping smallholding land expansion, out-transfer of labor from small-
holding agriculture employment has acted to keep the overall land/labor-
ratio in smallholding agriculture itself more or less constant.
But where could this out-transfer of labor from the smallholding
peasant sector be re-absorbed? The plantation and public land settlement
sectors are the first to come to mind, and these shall be examined first.
Two other possibilities which are usually ignored by most other
writers - rural land squatting and the armed forces - will be examined next.
It is only after all these possibilities have been accounted for that we
turn to the remaining possibility - rural-urban migration.
e) Absorption in the plantation sector
In Chapter 3.1, we have shown that there has actually been a drastic
decline in private estate employment since 1957, but that the laborers so
displaced were mainly Chinese and Indians; Malays registered a net gain of
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some 35,000 between 1957 and 1974. Most of these Malays were likely to have
come from the peasant smallholding sector. With the new expansion of
public plantations since the early 1970s (see Chapter 3.2), it is likely
that the number of Malays from the peasant sector who could be re-absorbed
as wage-labor in the plantation sector would further increase. While
absorption of Malays into existing private plantations in many cases may
involve only commuting from nearby villages and not permanent out-migration,
the new public estates (which would increasingly be located in large
regional land development schemes, as discussed in Chapter 3) would entail
permanent out-migration of the peasant-labor involved.
d) Absorption in public land settlement schemes
In Chapter 3, we have shown that the total number of households
absorbed into public land settlement schemes between 1957 and 1975 was only
about 70,000, of which FELDA accounted for almost half. Among the households
absorbed into FELDA, we have estimated that only about 16,000-17,000 were
from the smallholding sector itself. 1In Table 4.1 earlier, we had estimated
a total of about 450,000 landless and land-poor (less than 3 acres) small-
holding households in Peninsular Malaysia in 1970. Thus, FELDA has between
1957 and 1975 absorbed only about 4% of the equivalent of land-poor small-
holding households in 1970. For all the public land settlement schemes
altogether, the proportion could not have exceeded 11%.16 It is true that
FELDA also absorbed some numbers of estate workers, fishermen and non-agri-
cultural laborers, most of whom were also landless or land-poor. Even then,
however, the proportion of impoverished households in these other sectors
who got into FELDA had also been small (see Chapter 3.2).
The magnitude of absorption of smallholding peasant labor into
FELDA can be evaluated in another way. Assuming two to three working
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persons per FELDA household, the number of smallholding workers absorbed by
FELDA comes up to about 32,000-50,000 between 1957-1975. The lower estimate
is about the same as the net increase of Malay labor in the plantation
sector.
e) Illegal land squatting
Another way to overcome land poverty or landlessness is to occupy
land illegally, i.e., by "squatting". In principal there are two different
ways of becoming squatters - one by opening up virgin jungle land or other-
wise occupying hitherto uncultivated land, and the other by failure to
maintain or renew the legal status of the land that one cultivates (e.g.,
failure to renew on expired Temporary Occupational License (T.O.L.), termi-
nation of a land lease from the Government, or simply failure to have
proper title registration to land originally alienated in the first place).
It is known that many Chinese New Village agricultural households today are
illegal squatters of the second sort, while most Malay peasant squatters
are likely to be of the first category. 7
Extent of illegal rural land squatting: empirical evidence
By its illegal nature, rural land squatting tends to elude official
knowledge and its precise extent is therefore necessarily not well documented.
Whatever evidence discovered concerning its existence can therefore be regarded
as an under-estimate of the true extent, or the "tip of an iceberg".
There has been no comprehensive study of the problem of rural land
squatting known to the present researcher, although several fragmented
pieces of empirical evidence can be culled from diverse sources of published
literature. Before citing some of this more localized evidence, it is
useful to have a rough estimate of the order of magnitude of the problem for
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the country as a whole. While no direct official statement of the total amount
of rural land under illegal squatting in the country is available, we can
venture an estimate indirectly using two official sources.
Firstly, according to the official Land Capability Classification
Report for West Malaysia (Lee and Panton (1971)), over 600,000 acres of
agricultural land were being cultivated either under T.O.L. (Temporary Occu-
pation License) or illegally in 1966. What proportion was under T.0.L. and
what proportion under illegal occupation was not stated, but from the 1960
Agricultural Census we found less than 55,000 acres of farm land enumerated
as under T.O.L. Even after taking into account possible under-coverage by
the Census and further growth between 1960 and 1966, the total acreage under
T.O.L. in 1966 was not likely to be more than 200,000. This therefore sug-
gests conservatively that at least 400,000 acres of cultivated land in the
mid-1960s were being illegally occupied. This order of magnitude is aston-
ishing since it amounts to 6% of the total cultivated land in the country
in 1966 and almost one-third of the total legal land development both private
18
and public between 1957 and 1975.
With this overall order-of-magnitude estimate in mind, we shall
now cite some of the more localized evidence we have managed to cull from
the published literature. To begin with, in Johor, a study of the land
administration problems of the Johor state government in May 1969 found
11,532 cases of illegal occupation of state land covering some 38,300 acres
(Mhd. Yob bin Busu (1974): 38,43). This magnitude of squatting was discovered
in spite of the fact that, in the two years prior to the time of survey, the
Johor state government has engaged in an active program of demolition of
squatter land occupation to deter its growth. Subsequently, a survey of four
Malay kampongs in the state (conducted for the Johor Tenggara Masterplanning Study)
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found at least one of them to have significant illegal land squatting (19% of
households in that village ('Parit' A) has settled on government land ille-
gally) (Holmstrom (ed.) (n.d.).
Similarly, in Perak, the Assistant Director of the State's Department
of Land and Mines reported an estimate of at least 22,200 acres of land
under illegal cultivation in the state in the early 1970s (Radzi bin Manan
(1975)). The illegal land occupation involved not only individual cultiva-
ting small plots of land, but apparently also syndicates engaging in quick-
profit commercial exploitation (especially yam-farming) on a large scale.
Again, this state of extensive rural squatting has remained despite massive
actions by the state government to evict squatters in the preceeding years.
The situation has apparently not improved,if not worsen, in 1976, judging
from a journalist's report (Malaysian Business, August 1976: 83-5).
Turning to Trengganu, one researcher found in 1969 that over 23,400
acres of illegally occupied land were granted to over 7,200 squatters, and
estimated an additional 40,000 acres of illegally-cultivated land still
remaining (Dorothy Guyot (1971): 376). Rural land squatting was apparently
also endemic in Pahang as documented in the Pahang Tenggura Masterplanning Study
conducted in the early 1970s. Thus, it was noted that many village residents,
especially the youth in the Endau mukim, were illegally opening land "with
a total disregard of the legal consequences", while in another area (Kg.
Temai, Pekan District), as much as 30% of the households surveyed were found
possessing land illegally (Pahang Tenggara Masterplanning Study, Sociology and
Migration volume). Elsewhere, in Kedah, Barakbah (1971) has noted the serious-
ness of squatting in the rural-urban fringe areas, especially around the state
capital; a more recent survey of five rural villages in Sik, Kedah has also
noted widespread existence of illegal opening up of-virgin jungle land in
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the Forest Reservations near to the villages (Wan Ariffin (1977): Chap. 3).
Similar incidences of villagers clearing and settling on jungle land
illegally have also been reported by Husin Ali (1976) in his socio-economic
surveys of three villages (Bagan, Kerdau and Kangkong), although the extent
was not very sizable nor dramatic.
More sizable and more dramatic were the illegal land opening efforts
in Selangor, where, under the leadership of Hamid Tuah (an ex-auxilliary
police constable) several attempts at illegal rural land squatting of increas-
ing scale were made (50 squatters in S. Sireh in 1960, 400 in Telok Gong
in 1967, and 1,500 in Binjai Patah in 1969) (Husin Ali (1976): 16-7; also
Straits Times 19/12/68/29/3/69 and Malay Mail 5/8/69)). According to
Dorothy Guyot (1971), these cases were publicized widely not so much because
of their exceptional scale as because of the involvement of politicians
and students in the issue, and that other cases of similar scale probably
also existed though unpublicized. An example was cited by her of a Mhd.
Hitam who led 800 squatters from Kelantan to occupy land in Besut, Trengganu
but was simply jailed for nine months with no one coming to his defence
(Dorothy Guyot (1971): 377).
f) Absorption in the armed services
The role of the military in absorbing rural labor is a subject that
is little researched. This is partly due to the general lack of information
on the magnitude of "employment" in the armed forces. In Chapter 5, we have
derived estimates of employment in the armed forces over the post-colonial
period. These estimates show that, between 1957 and 1975, employment in
the armed forces grew from 12,000 to about 80,000. The majority of these
are Malay (78% according to the 1970 Population Census), and although no
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precise estimate is available, these Malay are predominantly drawn from
among rural, relatively undereducated youths. A rough estimate from the
above would be a minimum of 50,000 rural Malays being absorbed into the
armed forces between 1957 and 1975. This is not much less than the increase
19
of Malay employment as production workers between 1957 and 1975 (70,000),
and likely equals the number of smallholding peasant labor absorbed into
FELDA between 1957-75. The above estimate is actually a gross underesti-
mate, since employment in the military involved much circulation, i.e.,
older servicemen (as well as those injured in service) are continuously
being replaced by younger ones to prevent deterioration of quality of ser-
vice. This is evident in the large number of ex-servicemen being resettled
in FELDA schemes alone (about 5,000 between 1957 and 1975 from the estimate
in Chapter 3). Overall, therefore, if we include absorption of rural Malays
into the police force and other "protective" services, it is likely that
the number of rural Malay youths absorbed into the armed and protective
service sector between 1957 and 1975 equals that absorbed as production
wage-workers in the "secondary" sector. So far as we know, this observation,
let alone its possible implications, has escaped the attention of practi-
cally all previous analyses on the subject of rural Malay out-migration or
of Malay employment structure.
g) Rural-urban migration?
The dynamics of rural-urban migration in Peninsular Malaysia up
to 1970 has been the subject of study by several researchers (Soon (1975 a,b)
Narayanan (1975), Pryor (v.y.), Hirschman and Harbans Singh (1975) and Hawley
20
(1973)). The general conclusion arrived at by these researchers is that, con-
trary to prior expectation, the rate of rural-urban migration has been
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generally low up to the 1970s.21 Except for metropolitan Kuala Lumpur,
which received significant rural in-migration, most migration was of a
rural-to-rural or urban-to-urban (generally from smaller urban to larger
ones) nature. The rate of growth of population residing in areas of less-
than 10,000 people (referred to as "rural" in official terminology) between
1957 and 1970 was virtually the same as that for areas with more than
10,000 people (after controlling for boundary changes and using 1957 as
the base year). It is true that Malay has shown a higher migration rate
than Chinese or Indians and that the proportion of Malays in urban areas
has increased appreciably, but it remains true that overall rural-urban
-22
Malay migration has been secondary to rural-rural Malay migration.
Some writers (e.g. Soon (1975b)) have found this relatively low
rate of rural-urban drift by Malays between 1957 and 1970 "puzzling", and
it is then either assumed that the Government's rural land development
program must have successfully absorbed most of the would-be rural-urban
migrants, or that the general thrust of the Government rural modernization
programs in the various peasant sectors must have succeeded in reducing
rural poverty sufficiently to make migration to the urban areas "unnecessary".
It is our contention that the first factor has been over-emphasized, and
that the second conclusion is logically unwarranted even if the fact as
stated is correct (i.e., even if, indeed, rural poverty has declined) -
and it is mostl likely not, given our earlier analysis of the landlessness
problem, and if the conclusion of some recent studies on income distribution
in Peninsular Malaysia (Eddy Lee (1977), C. Hirschman (1973))are accepted.
The alternatives posed are simply false ones. Low rate of rural-
urban migration is consistent with increasing rural poverty in general and
rural landlessness and land poverty in particular, if other available
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alternatives - off-farm work, rural land squatting, absorption in plantation,
or absorption in the military - are found to be resorted to in significant
numbers. This we have found to be the case, although the estimates we
devised are in many cases rather imprecise. Absorption of rural Malays
into the military alone was of almost equal magnitude to absorption of
smallholding peasant laborers into FELDA, while absorption of Malays into
the plantation sector was not very far behind in terms of numbers. There
is no estimate possible for illegal squatters, but they should certainly
not be dismissed as insignificant compared to FELDA.?3 This is not to
discount the significance of FELDA and Government land settlement schemes
24
in inducing migration; what it does point out is the significant role
of other peasant labor absorption mechanisms previously ignored or assumed
insignificant by other researchers.
In the case of rural Chinese and Indian labor, it was shown in
Chapter 3.1 that a significant displacement from the plantation sector has
taken place in the post-colonial period, in addition to displacement from
the smallholding agricultural sector due to land poverty and landlessness.
It has already been pointed out that a large 'number of the displaced Indian
laborers may have been repatriated back to India, and that a large number
of displaced Chinese laborers were reabsorbed as transient rural contract-
laborers. Both these processes would have the effect of reducing the rate
of non-Malay rural-urban migration that otherwise might have occurred.
In addition, significant migration of Chinese labor to Singapore appears
to have occurred also,2 5 which contributed further to reducing migration
to urban areas within the country. The argument that post-colonial rural
development has little displacement effect on non-Malay rural labor is
thus untenable also.
266
Another point that needs emphasizing is that the above observation
of a relatively low rate of rural-urban migration applies only up to 1970;
in so far as some of the significant developments in the peasant sector
(e.g., "Green Revolution", large-scale trawling) only took place in the late
1960s or early 1970s, and in so far as there is some lag in response to
their impact, the displacement effect of these developments would not be
manifested in full force until after the mid-1970s. The conclusion that
the rural development program in the post-colonial period had little labor
displacement effect is thus rather premature. By all impressionistic ac-
counts, rural-urban migration has accelerated since 1970, although there
26is no precise nation-wide data to document this point. Migration to
Singapore has apparently also accelerated, with an increasingly large
number of Malay workers (especially from Kelantan) now partaking in the
process in addition to Chinese. 27
Finally, it is to be noted that the process of displacement of
peasant-labor would increasingly be affecting the younger generations,
in so far as they are the ones who would be short of land to inherit or
are unable to rent in land as their parents might have been able to in
the past. The problem of underemployment and land hunger, and the pro-
pensityfor transferring out of smallholding agriculture or for out-migrating
would therefore tend to be concentrated among the young. Indeed, scattered
evidence available suggests that a large number of rural youths are losing
interest (or hope?) in making a living as farmers. Thus, the Johor Tenggara
survey of rural youths in Johor in 1970/71 found that only the sons of
FELDA settlers felt hopeful enough about rural life to tell the survey
researchers that they wanted to pursue careers as farmers (cited in Snodgrass
(forthcoming)). Another survey of rural youth unemployment problems in a
village (in mukim Sri Menanti, N. Sembilan) found that of youths between
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age 15-25 surveyed, only 5.4% cited farming as their occupational aspira-
tion; 28.6% wanted urban jobs; 12.5% military; 39% others, and 14.3% "don't
know". In particular, among those with 10 years or more of education
(i.e., LCE and above) or with religious education, none wanted farming at
all (Abd Rahman b. Mhd Noor et al. (1972)). The 1967/8 SESS also indicates
that the proportion of first-time unemployed who were looking for work
in the agricultural sector was one-tenth the actual proportion of labor
force employed in agriculture.
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Appendix 4.1 Evidence on extent of landlordism and its characteristics
a) The overall magnitude of landlordism
According to the 1970 Population Census, there were 86,725
landlords who were owning agricultural land but not operating these lands.
Table 4A shows the distribution by ethnic group of these landlords in
rural and urban areas. It is seen that the majority of these non-cultivating
landlords were rural-resident (83%) and Malay (79%). Assuming one landlord
per household-, the total number of non-cultivating landlords thus constituted
5.5% of all households in Peninsular Malaysia in 1970. The proportion was
highest for Malays (7.6%), next for Chinese (3.1%) and lowest for Indians
(1.6%). The ratio of non-cultivating landlords to households operating
smallholding agricultural land was 15.9% overall, 15.4% for Malay, 18.3%
for Chinese, and 21.8% for Indians. Kelantan state had the largest numbers
of such landlords (18,157, or 20.6%) as well as the highest incidence
relative to smallholding operating households (22.6%).
Table 4A Non-cultivating landlords by ethnic group resident in rural
and urban areas
Total Urban Rural
No. % No. % No. %
Ethnic Group ('000) ('000) ('000)
Malay 68.5 79.0 9.3 63.9 59.2 82.1
Chinese 15.3 17.7 4.6 31.5 10.7 14.9
Indian 2.5 2.9 0.6 4.2 1.9 2.6
Others 0.3 0.4 0.1 0.4 0.3 0.4
All 86.7 100.0 14.6 100.0 72.2 100.0
(100) (16.7) (83.3)
Source: Min. of Agri. (1976): Table 2.11.
Note: The source refers to these landlords as "absentee" landlords.
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Unfortunately,
no information on the extent and size distribution of landowner-
ship by these non-cultivating landlords is available. However, a rough
estimate of the total number of large owners of smallholding land (regard-
less of whether they were cultivating the land or not) can be made from
Table 4.2. If we consider all owners of over 25 acres as "large" owners
then there were about 10,700 such "large" owners in 1970; the number was
3,000 if ownership of over 50 acres is used as the criterion.
b) Incidence of large landlords in various local village studies
Most local farm/village studies have noted the existence of "large"
landlords, although the sampling procedure used may not be "rigorous".
Table 4B summarizes some of the local village findings. While these find-
ings should in no way be construed as representative, they at least
suggest the impression that "large" landlords do exist in many rural
farming areas, and thus a program of land redistribution from these "large"
landowners, were it to be carried out, would contribute significantly to
alleviate land-poverty problems in these villages.
c) Absentee and non-cultivating landlords
Most, if not all, landlords of aristocratic origins can be assumed
to be non-cultivating landlords. It is generally known that large land-
lords of aristocratic backgrounds exist in the northern Malayan states
of Kedah, Kelantan and Trengganu, although their numbers have not been well-
documented. Abu Hassan (1979) cited the existence of significant aristo-
cratic landownership in the coastal parts of the Kedah padi plain without
giving exact figures, while Kessler (1978) and Husin Ali (1978) have noted
the same in Kelantan. A survey by Mlhd Nor bin Mhd (1974) of 848 acres of
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Appendix Table 4B Evidence on the existence of large landlords from selected
village studies
Village/Farm Area
(a) Locality D-II (Muda area)
- 1973
(b) Padang Lalang village (Muda
area) - 1964
(c) Kg. Kawah (Pahang) - 1973/4
(d) "Parit B" village (Johore)
- 1970
(e) "Parit A" village (Johore)
- 1970
(f)
(g)
(h)
(i)
(j)
Kang Kong
Kerdau
Bagan
Chang Kat Lalang
P. Pekan
2 Malay absentee landlords owned over 100
acres each
One Malay absentee landlord leased out
44 acres of padi land to 8 tenants
4 landlords owning a total of 130 acres (or
33 acres each on average), in contrast with
41 other farming households owning on average
1.9 acres per household
5 ."hajis" owned most of the land in the
village
2 Chinese absentee landlords each owned
about 300 acres out of a total of 3,000
acres in the village area, remaining land
owned by 330 households
Top 6% of landowners owned on avg. 23.4 ac. each
Top 6% of landowners owned on avg. 29.6 ac. each
Top 8% of landowners owned on avg. 50.1 ac. each
Top 3% of landowners owned on avg. 20.3 ac. each
Top 4% of landowners owned on avg. 73.3 ac. each
Sources: (a) - Lim Teck Ghee et al. (1974)
(b) - Kuchiba and Tsubouchi (1967)
(c) - Hassan Hj. Ali (1973/4)
(d),(e) - Holmstrom (ed.)(n.d.)
(f)-(j) - S. Husin Ali (v.y.)
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agricultural land in mukim Gunong, Bachok, Kelantan showed that 37% were
owned by the Sultan and other royal families. Husin Ali (1978), in his
study of land hunger in Kelantan, found that a total of 1520 square miles
(or 973,000 acres) of land in that state were alienated to four individ-
uals of aristocratic status alone at the turn of the century (p. 58).
For absentee landlords in general, a village study in the Muda
Area by Horii (1972) found that 80% of rented padi land farmed by house-
holds in the village were owned by people living outside the village.
Kuchiba and Tsobouchi (1967) found in another village in Muda (Podang
Lalang) that more than 70% of the landlords who were unrelated to the
tenants lived outside the village. For the Muda area as a whole, the FAO
World Bank Study in 1972/3 found that while less than 7% of the padi land
controlled by the sampled farmers was leased out, 45% was rented in - sugges-
ting the existence of a substantial rentier class who own but do not culti-
vate padi land.
Elsewhere, the mukim Gunong, Kelantan study cited earlier found
38% of the land owned by non-resident landlords. This was in addition to the
37% of land owned by the royalties noted earlier, leaving only 26% of the
land belonging to the local residents. Fisk (1961) found between 20-25%
of rubber land in Kg. Genting Malik, Selangor (a Malay Reservation Area)
to be owned by absentee landlords.
Nagata (1974) has noted the existence of many Malay dwellers in
Alor Star (Kedah) who owned agricultural land in the hinterland. These
people "remain as permanent" absentee landlords, "never cultivating, but
retaining a deep interest in the land, and will often use their urban-derived
information and wealth to invest money for innovative new plansand products
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for their land, cultivated by kin. These urban landlords...although for
the most part physically in the city, are a significant economic and social
force in the countryside." (p. 319)
Not all village-resident landlords can be assumed to be cultivating
landlords either. A study of a non-random sample of 255 resident landlords
in District D-II area of Muda in 1973 found that only 60% were engaged in
farming; 27% were "pure" landlords, 5% in "business", and 1% Government
civil servants. 54% of these landlords obtained their land through inheri-
tance, 38% through purchase, and 2% through jungle clearing (Lim Teck Ghee
et al. (1974)).
d) "Kinship-based" renting
Kinship-based landlordism is known to be common in Kedah and Kelantan.
For example, in Kedah padi farming areas, the proportion of tenants who
were renting from kin were found to be 52% in Muda D-II area (Lim Teck
Ghee et al. (1974), 78% in Kg. Sungei Bujor (Horii (1972)), 65% in a survey
by Kuchiba and Tsubouchi (1967) and 74% (owner-tenant) and 83% (pure-tenant)
in a survey by Afifuddin (1973). In Kelantan, Tsubouchi's (1972) study of
a village in Galok found 50% of village-resident tenants in padi and 58%
in rubber rented from kin. Evidence on the degree of kinship-based tenancy
for other farming areas is not available, but is generally known to be less
than for Kedah and Kelantan; even in these two areas, kinship-based tenancy
is observed to be declining, especially with the introduction of double-
cropping (Horii (1972), Afifuddin (1973)).
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Chapter 4
Footnotes
1 - The information on landownership from the 1970 Population Census was
not included in the official Census report, but has been made avail-
able in an official report by the Ministry of Agriculture (Min. Of
Agriculture (1976)). Information used in this section refers to
data as given in the latter publication. A copy of the census ques-
tionnaire pertaining to landownership was reproduced in Lee Chay-
Joo (1977). The 1974/5 Economic Report published by the Treasury
also presented some information from the Census on smallholding
landownership.
2 - The figures presented in this paragraph are compiled and computed
from the Land Administration Report 1958, Appendix I, and the text
of the minute of dissent by Mr. Chandra in the report.
3 - Malaysian Expenditure Budget 1975: 627, citing Ministry of Land and
Mines as the original source. The number of backlog at the beginning
of 1973 was 442,700, and thus there was a net increase of new work
received over work completed in the year.
4 - The DAU (1968) study has found, for example, that an application for
state land took an average of 564 days for complete processing and
an application for change of conditions on existing title took 301
days (DAU (1968): 17).
5 - In addition to the influence of official policy, Guyot (1971) has
also documented the pervasive influence of politicians over the land
alienation policies in the statesof Trengganu and Johor. For example,
she found that the pace of processing of land applications in Trengganu
appeared to be tied to the election cycle for the period 1956-69;
a high rate of approval of applications was evident in the election
years. Overall, she concluded that "... land is distributed to build
political support"(p. 381) and "... smallholders who want land can
only get it...for a fixed political allegiance" (p. 380).
6 - Fringe alienation schemes are in fact public-sector organized land
development schemes, but they have been included in individual small-
holdings since these schemes involved alienation to private individuals
without settlement and are generally located near to existing villages.
7 - See Table 3.2 and Table 3.17. Fringe alienation schemes constituted
less than 5% of agricultural land developed during 1971-75.
8 - K. S. Jomo (1977), among others, has analyzed in detail the causes and
mechanisms for this land decumulation process among the peasantry.
9 - Calculated from the source cited. The figures pertain to land trans-
fers, not necessarily all of which were land sales; some could have
been inheritance transfer.
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10 - As another manifestation of the seriousness of land hunger, there has
apparently been many cases of peasants who, in their desperate hunger
for land, became cheated by crooks claiming to be able to help them
apply for land for a fee and subsequently disappearing with the money.
Thus, in the socioeconomic survey of villages and estates conducted
for the Johor Tengganu Masterplanning Study, it was found in one
village ("Parit A") that as many as 17% of the households were tricked
in this way, some even more than once. A similar case was reported in
another estste "Estate B") surveyed (Holmstrom (ed.) (1970): Vol. 1).
A different variation has happened in Perak, where a case has been
reported of 300 Malays from Kedah being deceived into migrating to
the Trans-Perak area near Kg. Gajah to settle on state land illegally
for a fee to some tricksters, while another 200 Malays from Sabak
Bernam and K. Kangsar were similarly lured into Lower Perak by other
tricksters; all of them were subsequently evicted by the state govern-
ment (Malaysian Business, Aug./1976: 83-85).
11 - A third type of cultivating landlords can arise in a somewhat paradoxi-
cal way. It is possible that some peasants' landboldings have become
too small in size or too fragmented in location for them to cultivate
all or part of their holdings economically. Part or all of these
small parcels of land may therefore be rented out.
12 - See discussion in Husin Ali (1975).
13 - In the case of rubber smallholding, this argument does not seem to
apply. Instead, concentration of land by larger owners would appear
to increase both tenant-sharecropping andwage-labor operation, since
large owners tend to be non-operators. It is expected that share-
cropping tenancy would be increasingly replaced by fixed-wage labor
utilization, but the available evidence as examined in Chapter 2.3
is not good enough to provide any indication of trend over time.
14 - See S. H. Khoo and P. K. Voon (1975) for a study of outmigration from
a New Village in Pahang.
15 - See Table 3.22.
16 - This figure is arrived at assuming at most 70% of all settlers in
public land settlement schemes were from land-poor smallholding
householders.
17 - When the New Villages were created during the Emergency in the early
1950s, many of the household resettled in these New Villages were
given agricultural land under leaseholds of between 15 and 30 years.
(A. Short (1975)). These leaseholds would therefore be expiring
between the 1960s and early 1980s, but there have since been few
official Government policy statements on whether these expired leases
would be renewed.
18 - It is not clear how many of the illegal squatters have in fact been
enumerated in the Population Census as "smallholding agricultural
households", and neither is it clear how much of the land illegally
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occupied has been included in the official estimates of the total
cultivated land acreage in the country; information regarding
illegal land occupation is simply not included in official statis-
tical records. These unanswerable questions in turn raise some
doubts about the reliability of conclusions drawn from examining
official data (Population Census, etc.)). Illegal land occupants
are not likely to report themselves as such, certainly not to
someone "collecting information for the government" (e.g., Census
interviewers).
19 - Figure is derived from 1957 Pop. Census and TMP estimate. As this
figure includes females, it is likely that the increase in Malay
male production workers may actually have been less than the increase
in military employment.
20 - All of these studies, with the exception of Pryor (v.y.), were based
on the 1970 Population Census.
21 - It is unfortunate that the 1970 Population Census questionnaire was
faulted in such a way that no reliable information on the origins
of migrants (rural or urban) can be derived. The closest thing
one can get is the district that the migrants come from. The conclu-
sion of low rural-urban migration is thus inferred indirectly from
comparing population growth in various urban sizes between 1957 and
1970, rather than drawn directly. The Census does show directly that
most migrants had rural destinations. Among inter-state life-time
migrants, 61.9% had as their destination areas of less than 10,000
people, while among intra-state migrants, the proportion was 78.4%.
Overall, the figure was 72.4%.
22 - Part of this could be due, however, to a Census misclassification of
population in the periphery of large metropolitan towns as "rural",
thus over-stating the proportion of rural-rural migrants and under-
stating the proportion of rural-urban migrants. C. Hirschman (1976)
has attempted to correct for this"classification effect" by separating
out rural population living in the same district as a metropolitan
town (town with over 75,000 persons) from other rural population;
he found that the former ("metropolitan" rural areas) registered a
rate of population growth almost twice that of the latter (5.2% p.a.
vs. 2.7% p.a.)), thus suggesting that rural-urban migration was indeed
somewhat understated.
23 - Indeed, many of the recent "urban" squatters occupying land in the
periphery of large towns like Kuala Lumpur probably got counted by
the Census as rural-to-rural migrants, in so far as they are located
outside the municipal boundary.
24 - MacAndrews et al. (1976) had estimated that FELDA-induced migration
accounted for about 8% of all migrants in Peninsular Malaysia between
1957-1970. His estimate includes FELDA officials and other personnel
besides the settlers, however.
276
25 - According to the Singapore 1970 Population Census, a total of 92,300
Malaysian citizens were enumerated in Singapore (Cheng Siok Hwa,
"The non-citizen population of Singapore, 1970 1, Review of South
East Asian Studies IV (3 & 4): 38-57). H. D. Evers (1975: 778) cited
a figure of 70,000 Malaysian workers in Singapore in 1970, while ano-
ther writer estimated that net migration of Malaysian workers to
Singapore totalled 40,000 in -1971 alone (Snodgrass (1974: 52)).
Impressionistic knowledge also suggests that transient migration of
Chinese labor to Indonesia, East Malaysia and other neighboring
countries as contract laborers occurs in fairly large numbers.
26 - A significant development in this regard is the large-scale migration
of rural female Malay youths to the urban centers to become factory
workers, especially in the electronic assembly industry. See Linda
Lein(1978b) and Jamilah Ariffin (1978) for some information on this
new development.
27 - According to a publication by the Selangor Graduate Society (1978),
"Plight of the Malaysian workers in Singapore", there was an estimated
100,000 Malaysian workers in Singapore in 1973, and this has increased
to 120,000 in 1978. While most of the Malaysian workers in Singapore
remained to be Chinese, many Malays, especially Kelantanese, were
also reported to be employed there. This report also alleged that
"Malaysian workers do the heaviest, dirtiest and most dangerous jobs
in Singapore" and that many of these workers were contract laborers
hired on a daily or "project" basis and working up to 7 days a week
and 10-12 hours a day. This contract labor system was said to be
particularly significant in construction (about 70% of Singaporean
construction workforce were estimated to be non-Singaporean citizens).
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Part II Labor absorption in urban areas
In the previous three chapters (Chapters 2 to 4) we have attempted
to analyze the impact of changes in production organization structure in
the rural hinterland sectors on the structure of employment there. In this
second part (Part II) of the dissertation, we shall take up the study of
the labour absorption process in the urban sectors in the post-colonial
period.
The organization of this Part of the dissertation is as follows,
In Chapter 5, we shall attempt to do two things: first, to empirically
characterize the structure of urban production organization in Peninsular
Malaysia and its change over time in the post-colonial period; second, to
analyze how this production organization structure determines the structure
of employment positions (i.e., the division of labor into different produc-
tion organization sectors, occupations and employment modes). In Chapter 6,
we shall take up the study of the process whereby the urban labor force
is channeled and distributed within the employment structure so generated.
The first half of this Chapter will study the extent of employment access
stratification based on educational attainment and family asset-ownership
differentiation. The second half of the Chapter then empirically examines
the question of whether further labor market segmentation (over and above
the basic employment access stratification process documented in the first
part) exists in the form of a "formal" versus "informal" labor market duali-
zation as is often alleged in the popular literature. In particular, the
blue-collar "labor aristocracy" hypothesis is critically examined and an
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alternative "white-collar aristocracy" hypothesis is proposed. Finally,
in Chapter 7, we turn to study the question of employment segmentation
between ethnic groups: to what extent has there been a desegmentation
of employment between ethnic groups in urban Peninsular Malaysia in the
post-colonial period? And what are the determinants of this de-segmenta-
tion process?
279
Chapter 5 Structure of urban production organization and employment
in the post-colonial period
5.1 Overview of the pattern of sectoral shift in urban employment in the
post-colonial period.
Post-colonial economic development in most LDCs has usually
been characterized by a significant shift of labor from 'primary'
(agricultural and mining) activities to non-primary activities. In
the early economic development literature, it is generally assumed
(or hoped) that this shift would be accompanied by a rapid expansion
of the "secondary" sector (mainly manufacturing). In many LDCs,
however, this rapid "industrialization" has not been realized;
instead, "tertiarization" (expansion of the commerce and service
sector) has been more significant.
Table 5.1 summarizes estimates of the sectoral pattern of
employment in Peninsular Malaysia over time from 1947 to 1975. It
is seen that the share of employment in the 'primary' sectors has
declined steadily from almost 70% in 1947 to less than 50% in 1975.
The dynamics of this shift away from primary activities has been
analyzed in some detail in Part I of this dissertation. The question
of interest to us at this point is how the consequent increased
share of non-agricultural employment is distributed among the
"secondary" and "tertiary" sectors.
Table 5.2 summarizes the changes in percentage share of the
different non-agricultural sectors over various subperiods between
Distribution of Employment by broad sectors of economic activities in Peninsular Malaysia,
1947 to 1975 ()
Sector of economic
activity
agriculture, fishing
& forestry
mining & quarrying
Manufacturing
Construction
Utilities
Transport, storage
& communication
Commerce
Services
Others
Total
1947
66.2
2.5
6.7
0.7
0.2
3.5
9.2
10.6
0.4
100
1957
58.5
2.8
6.4
3.2
0.5
3.5
9.2
15.0
0.9
100
1962
54.7
2.0
6.8
2.0
0.4
3.4
13.5
17.1
0.1
100
1965
52.1
2.5
8.4
3.5
0.6
3.9
11.1
17.9
1967/8 1970
51.5
3.0
9.0
3.3
1.3
3.6
10.8
17.4
50.3
3.0
9.4
2.8
0.6
4.3
12.6
17.0
0.1
100 100 100
1947 " 1957 are unadjusted Population Census figures ; 1970 is adjusted Population
Census figures as given in '1P : 187; 1975 figures are estimates given in _TF : 187;
1965 figures are estimates given in SMIP : 98 ; 1962 figures are from 1962 EUS (unadjusted);
1967/8 figures are from 1967/8 SESS (unarIjusted); and 1974 figures are from 1974 Labor
Force Survey as reported in Khoo Teik Huat et. al.(1976)
Table 5.1
1974
45.6
1.5
13.7
4.2
1.1
1975
46.2
2.5
10.9
2.9
0.7
3.8
sources :
13.0
17.1
13.9
18.0
100 100
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Table 5.2 Change in percentage-share of various non-agricultural
sectors, 1947-1975
1947-5? 1957-70 1970-75 1957-75 1947-75
manufacturing -0.3 +3.0 +1.5 +4.5 +4.2
construction, utilities,
transport & communication +2.8 +0.5 +0.8 +1.3 +4.1
commerce & services +4.4 +5.4 +2.3 +7.7 +12.1
source : Table 5.1
1947 and 1975. It can be seen that the combined "commerce and service"
sector has registered a higher increase in employment share than
the "manufacturing" sector in every sub-period from 1947 to 1975,
although the differential had narrowed over time. Even if we include
the "infrastructure" sectors (construction, utilities, transport
and communication) in the "secondary" sector along with manufacturing,
it is still true that the "tertiary" sector of commerce and service
accounted for a larger part of the increase in non-agricultural
employment over the post-colonial period 1957-75.
The above observation pertains to the economy as a whole.
Of course, the sectoral structure of employment varies greatly
with the degree of urbanization. Table 5.3 shows the differences
between the sectoral structure of employment in areas of different
population size in 1970. In the rural areas, about three quarters
of the employed labor force was engaged in primary actitivites,
whereas in the eight largest urban centers with population of over
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Table 5.3 Employment distribution by sectors & urban size, 1970 (%)
Small Urban
(1,000 - 10,000)
Urban
(10,000 - 75,000)
Metropolitan
(75,000 + )
agriculture,
forestry &
fishing
mining
manufacturing
construction
utilities
transport &
communication
commerce
services
others
all
source calculated from
Table 4.22
1970 Population Census (Vol. II):
Rural
(41,000)
70.4
72.7
41.5
2.6
44.1
15.5
1.3
16.8
2.8
1.2
4.0
16.4
4.6
20.4
4.4
4.8
1.1
0.4
1.8
4.8
9.0
5.4
100
1.3
9.3
2.3
0.7
3.9
13.5
21.2
4.9
100
1.5
6.2
18.6
31.0
5.1
8.1
20.7
35.5
5.4
100 100
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75,000, only 4% was so engaged. In these largest urban centers
('metropolitan' towns), the commerce and service sectors together
accounted for more than 56% of the total employment, with manufacturing
accounting for another one-fifth. In general, the larger the urban
size, the smaller is the differential between "commerce and service"
and "manufacturing" employment share (the ratio was 3.7 for "small
urban", 3.0 for "urban' and 2.8 for "metropolitan").
5.2 Conceptual typology of production organization characteristics of
urban production units.
The starting point of any analysis of the structure of production
organization of an urban economy must be a conceptual typology or
categorization of the different types of production units in operation
and their organizational characteristics. In the conceptual formu-
lation part of this dissertation (Chapter 1.3), the theoretical
basis for defining and differentiating the organization characteristics
of production units has been discussed. To recapitulate briefly,
we have argued that the production relationships between organizer,
labor and external control agents (rentiers, etc.), as well as the
orientation of production are of fundamental importance in defining
the organization characteristics of production units.
In our analysis of the rural hinterland sectors, we have
used this conceptual framework to distinguish between the family-
labor operated units (the 'peasant' sector), the capitalist wage-
labor units (the 'plantation' sector) and the public-sector
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organized units. To a large extent, this basic typology is also
valid for the urban economy, but there is a need in this case to
further differentiate those wage-labor operated units that are orga-
nized in the form of joint-stock companies from those that are unincor-
porated.
Figure 5.1(a) summarizes our typology of urban production
units based on the above considerations. Four production organization
sectors are distinguished in this typology:
(1) a public-service sector, consisting of the various government
administrative bureaucracies and other public statutory bodies
which have largely a public-service orientation.
(2) a corporate enterprise sector, consisting of the private
corporate enterprises as well as the public corporations operated
by government agencies on a commercial basis.
(3) a small capitalist enterprise sector, consisting of those
unincorporated enterprises (sole proprietorship or partnerships)
that operate largely on wage-labor. Enterprises in this sector
are differentiated from those in (2) in that they are largely
family enterprises based on owner-entrepreneur control.
They are differentiated from enterprises in (4) by their higher
degree of reliance on wage-labor and by their having a primarily
commercial production oreintation.
(4) a petty enterprise sector, consisting of those unincorporated
enterprises that operate largely on family labor and have
labor-income as their primary production orientation. Individual
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Figure 5.1 Typology of urban production organization sectors
PUBLIC SECTOR PRIVATE SECTOR
adminis- public private unincorporated individual
trative corporations corporate enterprises labor
bureaucracy enter- (sole proprie- services
& public prises torships &
service partnerships)
agencies
public
service corporate sector
sector
small petty
capitalist sector
s~ector
a) defining
characteristic
ownership
organizer/
management
labor
orientation
of production
b) associated
characteristics
scale of
operation
source of m
capital g
finance b
(besides a
internal
accumulation)
internal
labor
differentiation
nature of s
activities i
t
a
r
public authority private
share-
holders
families/individuals
salaried managerial functionaries mainly entirely
owner- owner-
entrepreneur entrepreneur
control,with control
some salaried
functionaries
entirely wage/salary mostly wage- mostly or
labor labor,with entirely
Isome family family labor
labor
public commercial mostly Imostly or
services orientation commercially entirely labor-
oriented oriented
4 increasing scale of operation(in terms of output,
ainly
overnment
udget
llocation
employment or capital asset size)
government
grant,loan
or equity
shareholding
shareholders'
fundformal
external
capital
markets
mainly family
savings &
borrowing
from relatives
& informal
capital marketi
entirely
family savings
& borrowing
from relatives
& informal
capital market
increasing internal occupational & functional role
differentiation
ocial & all sectors of activities
nfrastruc- producing for market
ural faci- sales
ities;public
dmins. &
egulatory
ervices
incl. police
mainly consump-
tion services,
trading & handi-
craft work; work
on contract
s
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labor service units are included in this sector.
Figure 5.1(b) further summarizes some of the hypothesized
economic characteristics associated with the different production
organization sectors identified in Fig. 5.1(a).
The first and most fundamental hypotheis pertains to the
relationship between the size of production units and their
producation organization characteristics. It is argued that petty-
sector units tend to be smallest in size, and that an increase in
wage-labor use and commercial orientation is associated with an
increase in size of production. For firms employing entirely
wage-labor, partnerships are hypothesized to be generally larger than
sole proprietorships, private limited companies larger than
partnerships, and public limited companies larger than private
limited companies.
We have not yet defined what we mean by the size of a
production unit. Conceptually, the size of a production unit can
be measured in three ways: employment per unit, capital asset owned
per unit, and output value generated per unit. These criteria are
not equivalent, and there are real difficulties in trying to
compare the size of production units that are involved in acti-
vities with very different factor-input proportions and technological
characteristics; one firm may be larger than another on one criterion
but smaller on another. However, these difficulties generally do
not arise if we confine ourselves to comparing firms within the same
sector of activity. In any case, the various measures of size in
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practice are found to be highly correlated (see. eg., Hoffman
and Tan (1977) for documentation of this observation in the case of
manufacturing in Peninsular Malaysia).
Table 5.4 documents the validity of this hypothesis in all
the major production sectors of the urban economy of Peninsular
Malaysia. All three measures of size are used wherever data
exist; the stratification of production organization sectors by
firm size appears to hold generally regardless of the measures used.
It is likely that the estimates given in Table 5.4 overstate
the size of the individual proprietorship and partnership enterprises.
This is because the estimates in Table 5.4 are derived from official
censuses or surveys for the respective industries, and in many cases these
censuses/surveys tend to miss out a considerable number of the
very small firms, which invariably tend to be firms unincorporated,
unregistered and using mainly family labor. For example, the 1968
Census of Manufacturing covered less than 68% of the total manufac-
turing employment as estimated from the 1967/8 SESS.
Another way to show this correlation of firm size with
mode of production organization is to tabulate the share of wage
employees in total employment by firm size. Table 5.5 provides such
a tabulation for the urban distributive.trades. These sectors are
chosen for examination because the presence of non-wage labor (i.e.
proprietors and family helpers) is expected to be significant, and
this allows the stratification by firm size (if it exists) to be
brought out more clearly. Similar conclusions can be reached using
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TableJ Average size of production units by mode of production
organization in various sectors of activities, Peninsular
Malaysia
employmenta
per firm
fixed assetb
per firm ($'000)
annual
output value
per firm ($'000)
1) Manufacturing Sector 1968
a) individual proprietorship 5.1
b) partnership 15.7
c) private Ltd. Co. 76.7
d) public Ltd. Co. 181.3
e) government enterprises 104.1
2) Construction Sector 1973
a) individual proprietorship 15.3
b) partnership 37.0
c) private Ltd. Co. 106.6
d) public Ltd. Co. 119.4
3) Distributive trades 1966 average
a)
b)
c)
wholesale
individual proprietorship 234.4
partnership 668.7
private & public Ltd. Co. 2295.9
6.3
26.8
532.8
4856.6
235.2
(39.3)c
(59.1)
(127.0)
(119.4)
45.6
230.1
2078.8
9222.6
767.5
130.9
403.0
1365.0
2022.4
annual turnover Der firm ($'000)
retail
28.4
136.7
326.2
catering
13
58
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4) Selected urban services 1971 average annual turnover per firm ($'000)
laundry and barber and photographic catering
laundry beauty studios
services shops
a) individual proprietorship 5.1 4.6 16.7 16.6
b) partnership 11.9 69.8
c) private Ltd. Co. 158.0 11.8 36.4 315.7
d) public Ltd. Co. 519.7
5) Taxi, 1973 employment
per firm
a) individual proprietorship 5.1
b) partnership 4.4
c) private Ltd. Co. 17.3
d) public Ltd. Co. 5.7
fixed asset gross revenue
per firm ($'000)b per firm ($'000)
20.9 30.8
20.9 28.3
41.0 100.1
48.0 63.3
6) Road Haulage 1973
a) individual proprietorship 11.1
b) partnership
c) private Ltd. Co.
d) public Ltd. Co.
and Cooperatives
13.9
35.3
93.7
39.8
41.7
137.1
740.9
162.1
167.9
521.0
1133.0
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7) Finance 1973 employment
per firm
a) individual proprietorship 4.2
b) partnership 5.7
c) private Ltd. Co. 7.9
d) public Ltd. Co. 10.0
fixed assets
per firm ($00)b
46.8
18.6
99.2
96.0
gross revenue
per firm ($'000)
240.1
345..5
882.3
788.2
8) Cinemas 1973
a) individual proprietorship
b) partnership
c) private Ltd. Co.
d) public Ltd. Co.
8.0
11.7
19.9
19.7
22.3
30.6
65.0
25.5
72.1
159.3
490.7
412.8
Sources: calculated from: 1) 1968 Census of Manufacturing Industries
2) 1973 Survey of Construction Industries
3) 1966 Census of Distributive Trades
4) Census of Selected Urban Services
5) to 8) 1973 Census of Selected Industries, Vol. I & II
Notes: a) parttime employees counted as equivalent to half full-time employment
b) Fixed capital asset size is used instead of total capital size
because the latter is not available. The former may not be a good
proxy for the latter in those activities where mobile capital asset
is significant.
c) Figures pertain to firms with output value $100,000 only, as figures
for smaller firms are not available. This tends to overestimate
the figures for unincorporated firms.
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Table 5.5 Proportion of wage-employees in total employment by firm
size, urboun distributive trades, Peninsular Malaysia 1970 (%)
Employment size Retail Catering Wholesale
5 17.8 10.0 47
5-9 62.8 38.6 74
10-19 89.5 76.2 90
20-49 97.1 94.0 98
50-99 100.0 99.2 100
100+ 100.0 100.0 100
Source: calculated from Census of Wholesale and retail trades in
urban areas 1970.
the manufacturing census.
Once this overall correlation between mode of production
organization and size of production is accepted, it becomes necessary
to introduce a qualifying remark. Obviously, there is in reality
a continuum of change in the production organization characteristics
of production units, and any attempt at segmenting these units
into separate groups is bound to run into some problems with
"borderline" cases. Thus, not all unincorporated enterprises are
smaller in size than corporate firms, and some of the larger of
these should be considered as having the characteristics of corporate
firms. Similarly, some of the smaller corporate firms should in
fact be put into the "small capitalist" sector, since they are in
reality largely owner-entrepreneur operated units.
The above qualifications notwithstanding, the close corres-
pondence between size of production units and its production
organization characteristics makes it reasonable to use the size
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of production as an empirical proxy for differentiating firms
into different production organization sectors as well as for
examining the internal differentiation within a production organization
sector. In general, though not always, the number of wage-workers
employed by an enterprise will be used as an empirical proxy for
measuring the size of the production unit. In particular, enterprises
utilizing less than five full-time wage-workers can be considered to
be in the "petty" sector, while firms utilizing less than 20-30
full-time employees can be generally assumed to be in the "small
capitalist" sector, although the actual choice of cut-off should
vary somewhat between sectors to take into consideration the diffe-
rences in factor input intensities.
The advantage of using employment as a measure of firm size
is that it allows one to compare trend over time easily, whereas other
measures (output value, fixed asset, total asset, etc.) involve money
valuation which needs to be adjusted for inflation over time,
differences in valuation and depreciation method, etc. Moreover,
knowledge of the employment size distribution of production units
is of intrinsic interest, given our focus on employment structure in
this dissertation.
In addition to this significant correlation of size of pro-
duction with the mode of production organization, other important
characteristics like the structure of internal labor differentiation,
the sources of capital finance, the degree of control over input
factor markets and output product markets, and the nature of
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production activities are expected to be significantly related to
the production organization structure also (see Fig. 5.1 (b)).
How the structure of internal labor differentiation varies with the
production organization sectors will be examined in Section 5.4, while
the extent and implications of the other hypothesized relationships
will be examined in Section 5.5 when we deal with the dynamics
of change in the overall production organization structure of the
urban economy over time. At this juncture, it is more appropriate
for us to turn to examine how urban production and employment is
distributed among the different production organization sectors.
5.3 Distribution of production and employment by production
organization sectors: the structure of concentration of
production control.
What are the relative sizes of these different production
organization sectors (in terms of number of production units,
amount of labor absorbed, and value of output produced)? And how
have these relative sizes changed over time?
There are no comprehensive data on the distribution of all
firms in Peninsular Malaysia by mode of production organization for
any single point in time, let alone across time. Data from various
official industry censuses/surveys are available (generally from the
sixties onwards), but systematic trend analyses using these sources
are difficult due to changes in the scope of coverage of these surveys/
censuses over time, and impossible for some industries where
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survey/census data are available at one point in time only. In the
face of these data limitations, the following methodological
approach will be adopted. First, an attempt is made to pull
together the information from the various industry surveys/censuses
to build up an impression for the whole economy around the late
60's to early 70's period. A hypothesis concerning the pattern
of change over time is then postulated, and various aspects of this
hypothesis are documented (within the limit of data availability)
to substantiate its plausibility. Next, various theoretical
arguments regarding the factors that affect the dynamics of change
in production organization over time are examined. The extent to
which these factors actually operate in the case of Peninsular
Malaysia are then empirically documented. In combination, these
various partial approaches would hopefully suggest a sufficiently
plausible view of the direction of change in the production organi-
zation structure over time. Finally, the impact of this change
on the structure of urban employment over time is analyzed.
In terms of this approach, this section will concentrate
on the first task. In Section 5.4, an attempt will be made to
analyze in greater detail how the structure of production organization
affects the employment structure. The task of analyzing the dynamics
of change over time will be left to Section 5.5, while Section 5.6
will examine the corresponding changes in employment structure.
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5.3.1 Overall Distribution of urban employment by public and private
sectors
As a first cut, it is useful to have an initial rough order-of-
magnitude estimate of the breakdown of employment by private and public
sector in the urban economy. Table 5.6 is an attempt to do this by
adapting data from the 1967/8 SESS. It is seen that, for Peninsular
Malaysia as a whole, 13% of the total employment is in the public sector,
about 34% are in non-agriculture private enterprises, while another 3%
are in "domestic and other personal services" which presumably means largely
individual labor service units in the petty sector. More significantly, the
proportion varies greatly with the degree of urbanization:in the metropolitan
areas, as much as a quarter of all employment is accounted for by the public
sector, while the non-agricultural private enterprises and petty service
units account for 64% and 7% respectively.
In the above estimates, the non-agricultural private enterprise
category lumps together the corporate and small capitalist sectors as well
as part of the petty sector. Table 5.7 represents an attempt at further
breaking down the non-agricultural employment into employment modes. If
we assume that employers and wage-employees in the non-agricultural private-
sector together constitute roughly employment in the corporate and small
capitalist sectors combined, while own-account workers and unpaid family
2helpers together approximate employment in the petty sector, then table 5.7
shows that in 1967/8, public-sector wage employees accounted for 26%,
corporate and small capitalist sector combined 49%, and the petty sector
25% respectively of the total non-agricultural employment in the country.
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Table 5.6 Distribution of employment in Peninsular Malaysia by
type of production organization 1967/1968
% of employed labor force
all metropolitan urban rural
area area area
(a) Agricultural Sector: _.4 212
Employment in plant-
ations 13.2 0.4 3.7 18.3
Employment in small-
holding and other 36.5 3.0 17.5 48.6
agriculture
{b) Non- agricultural 96.633.1
Sectors:
Employees .in Gover- 13.1 2 22.9 9.0
ment departments
and statuory bodies
Employment in private
companies, individual 34.2 64.o 51.3 23.4
proprietorships (exc-
luding agriculture)
(1) - proprietors,
employers and 30.4 60.0 44.5 20.0
employees
(ii)- unpaid family 3.8 4.0 6.8 3.4
helpers
Employment in domestic
and other personal 2.8 6.6 4.2 1.5
services
Others 0.3 0.5 0.4 0.2
Source: estimated and adapted from 1967 -68 SESS
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With this rough order of magnitude estimate in mind, we can now turn
to examine the structure of production organization in the private sector
in greater detail.
5.3.2 Concentration of production control in the private sectors
A fundamental characteristic of the urban economy of Peninsular
Malaysia is the proliferation of many small enterprises in most sectors
alongside the existence of a few very large corporate firms. However, the
former (i.e., enterprises in the petty and small capitalist sectors)3 while
numerous in number, actually account for only a relatively small share of
total production, and control over production tends to be highly concen-
trated in the corporate sector in general and the very large corporate
firms in particular.
a) Proliferation of small enterprises
There is no estimate available on the number of production units
in urban Peninsular Malaysia (an impossible empirical task, in any case).
However, utilizing information on company registration as well as registration
of unincorporated businesses, it is possible to arrive at some estimates of
the number of registered production units, which can be taken as roughly
approximating the corporate and small capitalist sectors, with part of the
petty sector possibly counted in also. Appendix Table 5A summarises the relevant
information between 1954 and 1976. An analysis of the differential trend
over time between the unincorporated and incorporated enterprises will be
given later (see Section 5.4); for our present purpose, we shall only note
that the majority of registered enterprises were unincorporated. Thus, in
1970, out of a total of 162,271 firms registered, 121,297 (75%) were sole
proprietorships, 32,061 (20%) were partnerships, and only 8913 (5%) were
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limited companies.
No breakdown by production activities is given in the sources
from which Table 5A was derived. To get some ideas of such sectoral
breakdown, we need to turn to the individual industry censuses or
surveys conducted by the Department of Statistics; Table 5.8 summarizes
the relevant information from these sources. Unfortunately, the
coverage of these data bases is not complete in most cases, even in
the case of census. The enterprises that are missed are in most
cases the smallest units; hence, use of this information again tends
to understate the true extent of proliferation small units.
From Table 5.8, it is seen that most urban activities are
indeed dominated by individual proprietorships and partnerships. In
particular, the retail, catering and urban services are almost
completely unincorporated. It is in the transport and financial
sectors that the share in number of corporate firms is significant.
Table 5.7 Non-agricultural employment distribution by production
orSk&ation sectors, 1967/8 ( % )
public-sector wage-employees 26
private-sector
-employers 4
-wage-employees 45
-own-account workers 18
-unpaid family helpers 7
all non-agricultural employment 100
source : estimated from Table 5.6 and 1967/8 SESS
Table 5.8 Distribution of establishments by mode of production organization sectors
Total
Number
Manufacturing(1968) 9013
Mining(1968) 1505
Construction(1973) 3798
Distributive trades:
Wholesale(1966) 7443
Retail(1966) 55073
Catering(1966) 16780
Urban Services(1970):
Hotel & lodging 814
Laundry & laundry services 575
Barber & beauty shops 2930
Photographic studios 399
aatering 12309
Transport(1973):
Road haulage 326
Bus transport 128
Taxi transport 66
Tourist & Travel agencies 164
Housing developers(1973) 385
Real estate agencies(1973) 55
Finance(1973) 373
Cinemas(1973) 333
Distribution of enterprises ()
individual partnership limited company Government All
proprietor- private public enterprises
ship & others
64.2 21.6 8.8 0.9 4.5 100
16.4 45.3 38.3 - 100
77.5 14.7 7.5 0.3 - 100
58.4 30.0 11.6 - 100
91.8 7.1 1.1 - 100
92.8 4.7 2.5 - 100
93.1 6.9 - 100
99.1 0.9 - 100
100 - - 100
99.8 0.2 -. 100
94.4 5.2 0.2 0.2 100
24.5 27.3 46.0 2.1 2.1. 100
3.1 3.1 71.9 25.0 - 100
15.2 34.8 39.4 4.5 6.1 100
26.2 27.4 44-5 1.8 - 100
3.1 6.2 87.3 3.4 3.4 100
67.3 14.5 12.7 5.5 5.5 100
5.1 8.8 44.2 40.8 1.1 100
35.7 26.7 35.7 1.8 - 100
Sources: various industry censuses & surveys cited earlier
299
Another way to show the relative distribution of employment
by production organization sectors is to examine information on the
distribution of employment mode in different activities (i.e. the
distribution of employment into "employers", "own-account workers",
"family helpers" or "wage-employees"). Such information is available
from official population censuses or employment surveys. From their
defining characteristics, the petty sector involves mostly own-
account workers or unpaid family workers with perhaps a small share
of wage-workers; the small capitalist sector involves mostly
employer-entrepreneurs, wage-employees and a small share of unpaid
family workers; while the corporate sector and public-sector involves
almost exclusively wage-employees. From these observations, therefore,
it appears that the employment size of the petty sector can be
approximated by the share of own-account workers and unpaid family
helpers, while that of the "public-sector", "corporate" and "small
capitalist" sectors combined can be represented by the share of
employers and wage-employees. These proxy measures are very
rough, since some unpaid family workers are employed in the "small
capitalist" sector, while some employers and wage-workers are
employed in the "petty" sector; the saving grace is that these
misclassification errors work in opposite direction, and thus tend
to partly wash out.
No breakdown of the share of employment by public, corporate
and small capitalist sectors is possible from the information
on employment mode distribution, but if we make the reasonable
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assumption that the larger the proportion of "employer" in a
production activity, the larger is the relative size of the small
capitalist sector in that activity, then data on the proportion of
"employer" by production activity can be used to compare the relative
dominance of small capitalist production units across production
activities.
Table 5.9 shows the distribution by employment modes in
various sectors of activities according to the 1967/8 SESS and also
provides estimates of the relative size of the "petty" sector as
measured by the procedure outlined above. It can be seen that the
retail and manufacturing sectors have the highest incidence of
employment as own-account and family workers, i.e. employment in
petty production units. The "personal service" sector is expected
to have a high concentration of employment in petty production
units also, although no separate breakdown is available from the
1967/8 SESS. On the other hand, utilities, banking and finance,
communication, community and educational services are almost entirely
dominated by wage-labor operated units. If we take the share of
"employer" as an indication of the size of the "small capitalist"
sector, then "small capitalist" production units appear to be most
significant in manufacturing, construction, and wholesale and
retail trades. Overall, these observations are consistent with the
earlier findings from industry-based survey/census. To make a
further check on this consistency, Table 5.10 documents the propor-
tion of proprietors and family workers in the retail and urban service
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Table 5.9 Employment mode distribution by sectors of activity,1967/8
employment mode distribution(%)
employer own-account
worker
Mining &
Quarrying
Manufacturing
Construction
Utilities
Commerce
-wholesale
-retail
-banking & finance
Transport .
Communication
-transport
-communication
Services
-government &
community
-educational
-business,
recreation &
personal
1..5
4.7
5.7
0.1
7.5
(10.4)
( 7-5)
( 2.2)
1.4
((
1.6)
0.3)
2.5
( 0.5)
( 0.2)
( 5.3)
5.4
22.5
9.2
0.2
36.3
(14.4)
(43.4)
( 4.1)
19.0
(21.7)
( - )
10.0
(1.6)
(1.3)
(21.1)
unpaid wage-
family employ-
worker ees
0.6 92.4 100
8.2 64.6 100
1.8 83.2 100
- 99.6 100
14.4
( 3.7)
(17.8)( - )
41.9
(71.5)(31.5)
(93.7)
100
(100)
(100)
(100)
0.3 79.3 100
( 0.4)
( - )
4.6
( 0.5)
(76.3)
(99.7)
82.9
(97.5)
( 0.1) (98.4)
(10.2) (63.4)
approximate
All share of employment
in "petty"
sector(% )a
6
31
11
51
(18)
(61)
( 4)
19
(22)
( -)
15( 2)
( 1)
(31)
(100)
(100)
100
(100)
(100)
(100)
Source: calculated from 1967/8 SESS
note: a- sum of "own-account" worker & unpaid family helper
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Table 5.10 Proprietors & family workers as proportion of total
employment in retail & service trades
Retail (1966 Census) 80.0
(1968 Survey) 79.4
(1970-urban census) 60.0
Catering (1966 Census) 76.0
(1970-urban census) 72.3
Barber & beauty shops (1971-urban census) 57.5
Photographic studios (1971-urban census) 48.3
Laundry & laundry services (1971-urban census) 32.2
Hotel & lodging services (1971-urban census) 19.9
Sources: various Department of Statistics industry censuses/surveys cited
earlier.
sectors according to the industry-based surveys/censuses. The -general
correspondence between Table 5.9 and Table 5.10 is reassuring.
To further confirm the predominance of small-sized firms,
distribution of firms by firm size can be examined. This will be done
shortly when we turn to contrast the concentration of production
control with the proliferation of small firms. First, however,
a brief discussion of the concept of production control concentration
is necessary.
b) Concentration of production control
Conceptually, concentration of production control in an
economy can be analytically distinguished into the following levels:
1) domination of all major sectors of production activities by a few
large enterprises, i.e., enterprises in the corporate sector in
general and the very large corporate firms in particular. This is
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manifested in the concentration of output market share, i.e.
large production units have near monopolistic control over output
market.
(2) concentration of financial control within the corporate sector
itself by a few large conglomerates. This is manifested firstly
in the extensive development of vertical hierarchical inter-firm
control, whereby one large corporation controls a whole pyramid
of subsidiaries and branch companies, and secondly in the develop-
ment of horizontal interlocking corporate control, whereby
several corporations of more or less equal size implicitly
merge as a cohesive group through interlocking share ownership
and interlocking directorship (as well as other arrangements
such as sharing of common management, secretarial agencies, etc.).
The formation of conglomerates facilitates the joining of
different circuits of capital (banking, commercial and industrial)
as well as the development of vertical integration (i.e. the
extension of control over production activities that are either
"downstream" or "upstream" of the corporation's initial activity)
and horizontal monopolization (i.e. the expansion of control
over a sector of production as well as its potential competing
substitutes).
3) concentration of share capital ownership within these large
conglomerates themselves by a few individuals/groups, who
ultimately control the operation of these large corporate
conglomerates (and thereby their subsidiaries).
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In so far as concentration at the levels (2) and (3) is
significant, establishment-based information on level (1) will
greatly understate the true extent of production concentration by
large firms - many separately enumerated establishments or production
units in an establishment-based survey/census may in fact be owned
and controlled by one large conglomerate firm or individual/group.
A growing body of empirical literature has by now accumulated
on each of these aspects of production control concentration in Penin-
sular Malaysia, although much remains to be done. In what follows, we
shall do no more than briefly summarize the major conclusions that can
be drawn from this body of empirical literature and supplement them with
new evidence where appropriate.
i) domination of production by large firms:
This aspect is most easily documented and has been noted by
many writers in the case of manufacturing, wholesale, plantations and
mining. Thus Hirschman (1972), among others, has noted from the 1968
Manufacturing Census that large firms in general and foreign firms in
particular accounted for a disproportionate share of capital assets,
employment and production output; this observation remains valid
according to the latest (1973) Manufacturing Census (Table 5.11).
We have also compiled the relevant size distribution data from the
1973 Construction Survey and 1973 Census of selected industries (see
Table 5.12 and Table 5.13). These new data confirm the picture
of relative concentration of output market share by large firms in
those sectors that hitherto have been little analyzed.
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Table 5.11 Distribution of Manufacturing enterprises and
employment by firm size,1973
Paid full-time
employment size
<5
5-9
10-19
20-49
subtotal 5-49
50-99
100-199
200-499
500+
subtotal 50+
All
/v of enterprises
58.0
12.2
9.8
10.4
90.4
4.5
2.6
1.7
0.7
9.6
10.0
; of employment
4.3
3.5
5.7
13.6
22.8
12.7
14.4
20.7
25.1
72.9
10.0
Source: 1973 Manufacturing Census,cited in Chee Peng Lim(1978):Table 1
Table 5.12 Distribution of construction enterprises by employment
and output size,1973
Employment
size -
1-9
10-20
20-50
50-99
100-249
250+
All
(n=)
% of
firms
66.6
9.7
12.9
6.1
3.3
1.4
100
(97,519)
% of
employment
17.9
5.3
15.7
16.1
19.1
25.9
100
(3798)
Output
size($'000)
<50
50-100
< 100
100-500
500-1,000
1,000-2,000,
2, 000+
> 100
All
c of
firms
49.6
16.2
65.8
23.1
5.9
2.9
2.3
34.2
100
of
output value
3.6
4.4
8.0
20.8
15.5
15.4
40.3
92.0
100
Source: estimated from 1973 Census Construction Industries. The
Census Report main tabulation excludes all firms with
less than $100,000 output value,which amount to 2499
firms. From the appendix in the Report, these small firms
have an average employment of only 7.1 persons. We have
therefore arbitrarily put all these firms in the "less
than 10 employment" category,except for 50 limited
companies which are placed in the "10-20" categories.
The distribution of firms with less than $100,000 output
by output size is given in the appendix of the Report.
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Table 5.13 Distribution of road haulage and bus establishments by
firm size, 1973
(a) Distribution of road haulage enterprises,employment
and fixed asset by firm size,1973
Employment size % of firms % of employment % of fixed asset value
<5 17.5 2.2 2.0
5-9 20.9 5.7 5.2
10-19 27.0 15.3 13.2
20-49 22.1 28.6 26.9
50-99 9-5 27.4 21.2
100+ 3.1 20.7 31.4
All 100 100 100
(n) (326)
(b)
<10
10-19
20-50
50-99
100-200
200+
All
(n)
Distribution of bus transport enterprises,employment
and fixed asset by firm size,1973
3.9 0.2 0.2
7.0 0.9 0.7
25.0 7.9 7.6
32.0 20.4 22.2
19.5 24.8 18.6
12.5 45.8 50-6
100 100 100
(128)
1973
Source: calculated fromCensus of Selected Industries: Road
Haulage and Bus Transport Sections
Note : the coverage of road haulage was restricted.
Along with this concentration of production in large establishments is
the concentration of employment in large establishments. As much as 7'f of
road haulage and construction employment and almost 99o of employment in
bus companies were in establishments with over 20 employed persons. In
comparison, only 35.2% of employment in urban wholesale, 9.2% in urban retail
and 7.7% in urban catering were in establishments wirh over 20 employed
persons.
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ii) Concentration of financial control within the corporate sector
While earlier studies of more limited scope (e.g. J. J.
Puthucheary (1960), Jojohadikusomo (1967) on agency houses, mining and
plantation companies and Lindenberg (1973) on "pioneer industry" firms)
had shown this aspect of concentration of production control to be
significant, the most thorough and up-to-date investigation on the
structure of inter-firm control has been made by Tan Tat Wai (1977),
who has comprehensively charted the pyramidal and horizontal interlocking
structure of just about all the major conglomerates in the country in
the early 1970's. From this study, the degree of financial control
centralization by large conglomerates over the corporate sector as
a whole is documented beyond doubt to be staggering, although no
precise quantitative measures (e.g. in terms of total number of
3
companies and capital assets controlled) are available. Lim Mah Hui
(1978) has also documented the significant extent of inter-corporate
firm control among the top 98 corporations themselves.
iii) Concentration of share-ownership in the largest corporations
The most comprehensive study of this aspect of economic
concentration is Lim Mah Hui (1978)'s doctoral dissertation. He
found that 0.8% of the stockholders in the 62 largest corporations
in Peninsular Malaysia held 69% of all the stocks in these corporations;
moreover, even among these large stockholders the distribution is
extremely skewed, with a Gini coefficient of 0.847.
A more recent study by Sieh Mei Ling (1977) which focuses more
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narrowly on the share-ownership structure of the top 98 manufacturing
companies in Peninsular Malaysia, has come to essentially the same
conclusion regarding the skewedness of share-capital ownership.
The extent of foreign domination over the urban economy has
so far not been discussed. In practice, foreign control is exerted
through their domination in the corporate sector. Although the
strong presence of foreign ownership of share-capital is the aspect
usually emphasized by most writers (62.1% of all corporate equity-share
capital in Peninsular Malaysia in 1970 were in foreign hands (SMP)),
it is the controlling position they occupy in many of the large
conglomerates that is more crucial. Indeed, it is by alliance with
these large foreign multinational corporations that some of the local
corporations have risen to positions of prominence. In many instances,
it is the foreign firms that control the technology and marketing
channels abroad, while the local partners often supply the equity
capitals and provide the local marketing networks. Some of these
aspects of foreign control have been analyzed by Tan Tat Wai (1977) and
Lim Mah Hui (1978).
In summary, production control in the urban economy is shown to
be highly concentrated at all the three levels previously identified.
The picture is one of a multitude of small firms dominated by a small
number of large corporate conglamerates, which in turn are controlled
by a small number of individuals/groups. The preponderance of small
unincorporated enterprises in some sectors like retail and catering
previously noted should therefore be interpreted in this wider context -
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to the extent that these small enterprises are in fact the bottom
reaches of a pyramidal hierarchy of marketing chains, the apex of
which is dominated by a few large wholesale/financial/industrial
conglomerates, it is the overall structure of concentration within
the entire hierarchy that is salient, not the concentration pattern
4
within the retail or catering activities themselves.
5.4 Effect of production organization structure on employment
structure
The labor absorbed in a production unit can be characterized
along two dimensions:
(1) the mode of employment within the unit, i.e. whether as
employer, own-labor organizer, family helper or wage-
employee; this aspect has already been examined.
(2) his occupational role within the unit.
The transition from petty sector to the corporate sector
involves not only changes in the mode of employment, but also'changes
in the occupational structure. This observation has two aspects.
Firstly, in so far as different production activities require
labor to perform different occupational tasks, the fact that different
production organization sectors predominate in different activities
implies that, overall, different production organization sectors may
have different occupational structures.
Secondly, within the same production activity, firms with
different modes of production organization may have different occupa-
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tional structure. Basically, the transition from petty production
to corporate production involves an increase in the degree of internal
functional role differentiation. For the individual labor unit, no
internal differentiation of roles is involved, and the occupation of
the labor is determined directly by the production actitivity he
engages in. On the other hand, a large corporate firm involving in the
same activity may have a highly differentiated internal functional
role structure. In particular, a three-tier role differentiation
can be usefully distinguished: (1) the overall organizer role of the
unit, generally performed by a managerial and administrative stratum;
(2) the supervisory, information processing and higher technical
tasks, generally performed by a middle "white collar" stratum; and
(3) the actual production tasks (be they the production of physical
commodities ("production" tasks proper), of services, or of market
realization), usually performed by a "blue-collar" wage-worker stratum.
In the large corporate enterprises, all these three strata tend
to be performed by wage-employees (with the possible exception of
those salaried managerial executives who also own a large amount of
stock in the company they head; these executives should properly be
called "owner-managers"). The small capitalist enterprise is somewhat
of an intermediate case; the managerial stratum is largely occupied
by the proprietor-employers themselves, the "white-collar" stratum
tends to be much smaller or non-existent, while the "blue-collar"
stratum may be partly filled by family workers.
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Although this functional role differentiation within a large
production unit corresponds fairly closely to the classification of
labor by occupational categories usually adopted in official censuses
surveys of employment, the two concepts are analytically distinct. The
latter classification does not distinguish between the mode of employ-
ment of the occupation involved; thus, knowing that a person is a
"sales" worker does not tell us the functional role he performs in
the production unit, since he could be either self-employed (in which
case he can be said to be combining the organizer role and actual sales
tasks in one) or be a "blue-collar" wage-laborer working under the
supervision and control of others.
Figure 5.2 is an attempt to summarize the relationship between
the occupational classification of the employed labor force, their
functional roles and their modes of employment in different production
organization sectors. From this characterization, and earlier
documentation of the uneven dominance of different production orga-
nization sectors in different activities, the following pattern of
employment mode distribution by occupations is expected;
."Managerial and administrative" workers are largely salariats
or employer-entrepreneurs; few are own-account workers or unpaid
family workers.
."Professional and technical" workers and "clerical" workers are
almost entirely salariats, with the possible exception of a small
proportion of "independent professionals" who work as own-account
workers or employer-entrepreneurs.
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Occupational
categories
managerial,
administrati,
& executive
professional
& technical
clerical &
supervisory
sales &
services;
transport
prod.
&
:5
J
Production Organization Sectors
Public- corporate small Petty
services sector capitalist sector
sector sector
owner- head of
managerial manager employer- family individual
. .enter- labor
& administrative proprietor ente lo
salariatprise self-
employment
"white-collar" salariat
blue collar" wage-worker unpaid
family
helpers
Figure 5.2 Occupational & Employment mode structure in different
production organization sectors
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."Sales" and "service" workers are generally distributed across all
modes of employment, except for "protective" service workers
(police, firemen, armed forces,etc.) who are entirely wage-workers.
."Tranpsort" and "production" workers and "general laborers" are
mainly wage-workers, with perhaps a small share of own-account
and family workers.
Table 5.14 which summarizes information on employment mode
distribution by occupation from the 1967/8 SESS, largely confirms
these expectations.
In addition to the differences in occupational structure between
the petty sector and the wage-employment sectors as identified above,
it is hypothesized that differences in occupational structure exist
within the latter. In particular, from the earlier discussion, the
following propositions are expected to hold:
(i) Corporate firms employ a larger proportion of white-collar workers
than small capitalist firms in the same production activity; more
generally, large firms employ a greater share of white-collar workers.
This proposition can be substantiated in several ways. First,
some of the industry-based surveys conducted by the Department of
Statistics give breakdowns of occupational structure by the type of
production organization of firms. Table 5.15 summarizes information on
occupational structure by type of firms drawn from the 1972 Survey of
Manufacturing Industries. Taking the "technical and supervisory" and
"clerical" occupations as "white-collar" occupations, we find that the
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Table 5.14 Employment mode distribution by type of occupation,
Peninsular Malaysia, 1967 8
Employment node distribution (%)
own
employer account
workerOccupation
unpaid
family
worker
wage/
salary
employees
approx.
share of
employ-
All ment in
petty a
sector %
administrative & managerial
professional & technical
clerical
sales
service
(protective service)
(other service)
production, transport,
mining & general
labor
(production & general
(mining9
(transport & communication)
42.4
1.1
:0.4
8.4
3.3
(4.2)
1.0
(1.1)
(0.3)
(0.5)
14.7
3.8
1.2
45.7
13.6
(0.1)
(17.1)
13.2
(11.9)
(16.3)
(19.0)
1.2
0.5
0.8
19.6
6.3
(7.9)
3.6
(4.4)
(1.6)
(0.5)
41.7
94.6
97.6
26.3
76.8
(99.9)
(70.8)
82.8
(82.6)
(81.8)
(80.0)
100
100
100
100
100
(100)
(100)
100 17
(100)
(100)
(100)
All non-agricultural 4.0 18.4 6.6 71.0 100
agricultural 0.9 33.9 23.6 41.6 100
All 2.4 25.6 15.0 57.0 100
Source: calculated from 1967/8 SESS
note: a - sum of "own-account worker" and "unpaid family helper"
16
4
2
65
20
(-)
(25)
(16)
(18)
(20)
25
58
41
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Table 5.15 Occupational structure of manufacturing firms by type
of legal organization,1972 (%)
Occupation
Sole Partner-
proprietorship ship
Private
Ltd. Co.
Public
Ltd. Co.
Government
enterprise
Owner/family
worker
working proprietors
&partners
unpaid family workers
Full-time paid
employees
Managerial
a) professional
b) non-professional
Technical &
Supervising
Clerical
General( transport,
maintenence,etc.)
Factory Workers
a)directly employed
skilled
b)directly employed
unskilled
c)employed through
contractors
All Full-time
employed
5.6
5.3
1.3( 0.7)( 0.6)
1.5
5.1
5.5
75.7
(29.6)
(27.9)
(18.2)
100
8.8
0.9
1.2( 0.6)( 0.6)
2.0
5.6
6.2
85.0
(31.2)
2.5
( 1.5)( 1.0)
4.9
7.0
6.7
78.9
(30.2)
(33.2) (38.9)
(20.6) ( 9.8)
100
4.3Part-time employees as 5.8
% of Full-time employed
100
0.9
1972 Survey of Manufacturin Industries
3.3( 2.9)( 0.4)
6.8
8.8
6.6
74.3
(36.9)
(35.5)
( 1.9)
100
1.0
1.9( 1.6)( 0.3)
9.4
8.1
12.9
67.6
(24.7)
(34.9)
( 8.0)
100
2.2
Source: calculated from
share of white-collar employment increases from 6,6% for sole pro-
prietorships to 7.6% for partnerships, 11.9% for private limited
companies, 15.6% for public limited companies, and 17.5% for government
5
enterprises.
A second way to test this proposition is to examine the breakdown
of occupational structure by size of firms. Such a breakdown is not
available from the Department of Statistics surveys, but is reported by
Chee Peng Lim (1974), in his survey of manufacturing firms in 1973.
Table 5.16 reproduces his findings. The share of clerical workers is
seen to rise from 2.2% for the smallest firms to over 11% for firms
with over 50 full-time employees.
A third source of information that can be cited is the World
Bank 1973 Employment Survey of Kuala Lumpur and two East Coast towns.
Table 5.17 summarizes the relevant information. The definition of
"white collar" employment in this source unfortunately includes also
managerial occupations, and this has the effect of inflating white-
collar share among small enterprises (where owner-proprietors are
counted in). Nevertheless, for firms employing wage-labor, the
hypothesized correlation between firm size and white-collar share does
hold.
(ii) Public-sector employs a larger share of white-collar salariats than
the private sector
Table 5.18 compares the occupational structure of the public
sector and that of the private and public sector combined. The contrast
between the share of white-collar salariats in the two cases is obvious:
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Table 5.16 Occupational structure of manufacturing firms by size
of firm,1973
Paid Mana-
full-time gerial
employment
size group
0-4
5-9
10-19
20-49
50+
Total
4.5
3.5
4.7
5.4
4.9
4.9
Occupational distribution (%)
Clerical Factory workers Contract
skilled unskilled workers
2.2
2.9
8.0
11.0
11.4
10.5
.58
49.7
48.7
41.2
33.7
37.7
34.4
40.1
30.4
32.6
32.7
32.8
1.3
5.3
6.7
16.7
12.8
Home Total N
workers
0.8
2.3
2.6
3.1
0.1
1.0
100
100
100
100
100
100
174
511
1017
2354
7299
11355
Source: computed from Chee Peng Lim (1974)
Table 5.17 Occupational structure by employment size of firms,
Kuala Lumpur(Kota Baru & Kuantan) 1973 (%)
White collar Skilled
(include managerial) blue collar
Unskilled All
Own/family
enterprises
.10 employees
10-99 "f
100 "t
Total
45.8(46.8)
21.1(17.2)
32.6(34.4)
45.4 40.1)
38.9 36.8)
28.9(18.2)
52.6(54.2)
46.8(39.6)
3).4(W4. 0)
38.6(35.2)
25.3(35.0) 100(100) 356(406)
26.3(28.6) 100(100) 232(203)
20.6(26.1) 100(100) 485(326)
21.2(16.9) 100(100) 703(207)
22.6(28.0) 100(100) 1786(1142)
Source: Mazumdar (1977): Table3.6
Note : figures pertain to males only.
N
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Table 5.18 Occupational structure of public-sector employment,
1973, and all employment, 1975
(a)
Public sector
(1973)
(b)
All Peninsular Malaysia
(1975)
administrative & managerial
professional & technical
clerical
(subtotal)
sales
services
production & general
laborers
agriculture
All
(n=)
1.7
32.9
15.4
1.0
5.2
5.4
(50.0) (11.6)
9.6
9.5
34.7
39.5
1.0 44.1
100.0
(359,156)
100.0
Sources: (a) - 1973 Manpower Survey data, cited in Robless (1976)
(b) - TIP estimates
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while half of the public-sector employees can be consider white collar,
the proportion was only 12% for the country as a whole. The dominance
of the public-sector as an employer of "professional and technical"
workers is particularly outstanding. These conclusions remain valid
even if we exclude agricultural occupations from the base population.
5.5 Transformation of production organization and employment structure
over time: the "polarized growth hypothesis.
In Sections 5.2 and 5.3, we have attempted to describe the
structure of urban production organization in Peninsular Malaysia around
the late 60's and early 70's, while in Section 5.4, the relationship
between mode of production organization and employment structure has
been analyzed. With these as background, we are now in a position
to examine the question of central interest in this chapter: How has
the production organization structure changed over the post-colonial
period? In particular, how have the relative sizes of the different
production organization sectors changed? And what has been the change
in employment structure associated with it?
In spite of the importance of these questions, there has been
virtually no empirical study on Peninsular Malaysia that attempts
to address them. In what follows, therefore, we shall attempt to
advance a tentative hypothesis regarding the pattern of change, and
shall make a preliminary attempt at documenting its empirical validity.
The implications of the hypothesis will be discussed in a later section.
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5.5.1 The "polarized growth" hypothesis
The hypothesis that we advance is that a "polarized" growth
pattern has taken place in the non-agricultural economy of Peninsular
Malaysia during the post-colonial period. The content of this
hypothesis is best illustrated with a diagram (Figure 5.3). Basically,
the argument is that the public sector and the corporate sector have
both expanded disproportionately in terms of their share of produc-
tion and labor absorbed, while the small capitalist sector has
declined relatively both in terms of production and labor absorbed.
The petty sector, on the other hand, has declined in share of
productive resources controlled but has increased in labor absorbed.
Thus, in terms of employment distribution, labor absorption expanded
in the corporate and public sectors at one end and the petty sector
at the other, with the small capitalist sector losing ground in between.
Figure_5.' Hypothesized "polarized" growth pattern in the urban economy.
Public Public Private Small Petty
service corporate corporate capitalist sector
sector sector sector sector
Change in:
Share of production
resources controlled + +- -
or output produced. J
Share of labor absorbed.) + + - +
LEGEND: +'= increased
- = decreased
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Hence the descriptive term "polarized" growth for the hypothesized
pattern of change,.
Because of data limitation, we will not be able to test this
hypothesis rigorously. What we intend to do is to develop a series of
five propositions of more limited scope which we can empirically
document and which collectively are consistentwith the above hypothesis.
In a later section, the theoretical reasons for this hypothesized
pattern of change are discussed, and the extent to which these factors
actually operated in the urban economy of Peninsular Malaysia is
empirically documented where possible,
Proposition 1: Relative expansion of the public sector.
The validity of this hypothesis is examined through the following:
a) share of productive resources controlled by the public sector over
time.
b) share of employment in the public-sector over time.
a) Share of productive resources controlled by the public sector over
time
Table 5.19 summarizes some of the relevant information for
assessing the increasing control by the Government over resources
generated by the economy. Whether measured in terms of investment,
consumption or share-capital ownership of corporate sector, the
public sector has evidently increased its share vis-a-vis the private
sector. This increased role of the public sector on the "expenditure"
side is paralleled by its increased rate of appropriation on the
financing side: not only has the tax revenue as a share of GNP increased
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Table 5.19 Public Sector's Role in the economy of Malaysia over time.
a) Public investment as % of gross capital formation.
1960 23 .5A
1965 41.3%
1970 28.1%
1975 49.1%
b) Public consumption as % o
1960
1965
1970
1975
c) Public-sector ownership of share
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
f total consumption expenditure.
17.2
20.8
21.1
25.4
capital in limited companies (Peninsular
Malaysia onl
0.8%
1.6%
2.3%
3.2%
4.5%
5.-571,
d) Tax revenue as % of GNP.
1965 14%
1970 17%
1975 24%
e) External public debt as % of GNP.
1967 0.8%
1973 9.3%
1975 15.0%
1977 14.3%
a--TMP: 15; FP: 25. Note: figures for 1960-65 applies to
Peninsular Malays ia only.
b--TMP: Table 2.2; SMP: Table 2.6; FMP
c-- TMP: Table 9.9
d--Vreeland (1977):289
e--Business Asia 8/25/78
Note: Unless otherwise stated, figures pertain to Malaysia as a whole.
Sources:
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over time, but a rapid rise in external debt-financing has also
occurred. Overall, Malaysia has by the mid-1970's one of the world's
largest public sectors relative to the size of its economy (Meerman
(1977)), with as much as 40% of the GNP accounted for by public
expenditure,
The expansion of the public sector was particularly rapid after
1969 with the formulation of the New Economic Policy (NEP). One major
prong of this new policy is to help promote the growth of a modern
industrial-commercial Malay community, and the chief means to achieve
this is the development of public-sector owned and controlled corporate
enterprises.
Technically, there are two different types of public enterprises,
one being enterprises that are registered as statutory authorities,
the other being enterprises that are registered as bona fide corpora-
tions under the Company Registration Act. Although these two types
of enterprises are in principle subject to different regulations
(e.g. statutory bodies are in priniciple subject to direct Parliament
control while public companies are not), in practice there may be
very little difference in terms of their commercial orientation and
production organization. Thus, a statutory body like the Urban
Development Authority (UDA) is enabled by legislative act to own
holding companies and subsidiaries and to borrow from private
financial institutions or to issue bonds and debentures just like
bona fide public companies.
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The growth of public enterprises
Public enterprises, in the form of statutory bodies like
the Railways, National Electricity Board, Port Authorities, and other
public utilities, had existed in Peninsular Malaysia even during
colonial times. However, these older public enterprises were not
commercially oriented, and their main functions were to provide
essential infrastructural services to the general public, and parti-
cularly to facilitate the growth of those private industries (tin-
mines, rubber plantations, etc.) where colonial private investment
was substantial.
The new public enterprises being developed with the promulgation
of the NEP are however unlike these older enterprises in that they are
essentially operated with a commercial orientation and are organized
along similar lines to private corporations. In Chapters 2 and 3,
we have already charted the rapid growth of some of these public
corporations in the agricultural sector (MAJUIKAN, FELDA, etc.). The
development of public corporations in the industrial, commercial,
banking and property spheres were in many ways even more dramatic.
Table 5.20 lists the major public corporations in existence today that
have a significant commercial orientation; they cover virtually all
activities of any importance in the economy. According to one
estimate (Affandi (1976)), at the end of 1974, there were 82 public
enterprises with 65 wholly-owned subsidiaries and 185 joint ventures,
The number has grown considerably since.
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Table 5.20 Statutory Authorities and Public Corporations with significant
commercial orientation.
a) Agriculture.
FELDA (Federal Land Development Authority)
DA RA (National Fisheries Industry Development Authority)
KEJORA (Johor Tenggara Development Authority)
KETENGAH (Trengganu Tengah Development Authority)
Jengka Development Corporation, Pahang.
MAJUIKAN (National Fisheries Industry Development Authority)
MAJUTERNAK (National Livestock Industry Development Authority)
MARDEC (Malaysian Rubber Development Corporation)
Industry, Commerce, Transport, Mining and Property.
PERNAS
MMIA
UDA
FInlA
MISC
MAS
PETRONAS
(National Corporation)
(Majlis Amanah Rakyat)
(Urban Development Authority)
(Food Industries of Malaysia)
(Malaysian International Shipping Corporation)
(Malaysian Airline Syttem)
(National Petroleum Corporation)
c) Finance
Bank Negara
Bank Bumiputra
Bank Pertanian
Bank Rakyat
Bank Pembangunan
d) State Governmet-controlled enterprises
13 SEDCs (State Economic Development Corporations)
4 SADCs (State Agricultural Development Corporations (Johore, Pahang,
Perak, Selangor)).
b)
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Public enterprises can be financed in several ways: Through
equity investment by the Government, through Government loans, or
through outright grants by the Government. In addition, some public
enterprises are allowed to borrow from international financial
institutions with Federal Government guarantees (e.g. FELDA borrowed
substantially from the World Bank, while MAS borrowed almost twice its
paid-up capital value from City Bank of New York and US Export-Import
Bank) and some are enabled to borrow domestically through issuing
bonds and debentures. According to M. Puthucheary (1977), Federal
Government equity investment in companies and corporations totalled
$972 million. In the same year, Federal Government loans to public
authorities, companies and state government outstanding amounted to
$6,167 million; a large bulk of this goes to commercially-oriented
public enterprises. In another article, the same writer estimated
that the total amount of grants, outstanding loans and equity capital
paid by the Federal Government to public enterprises in 1974
represented 37% of the total Federal Government Budget in 1970 and
56% in 1974 (M.C. Puthucheary (1976): 434).6
Besides increasing the public sector's direct control over
production activities, the proliferation of public corporations has
increased the degree of production control concentration by large
corporate firms. All the major public corporations are big conglo-
merates in their own right, through the device of pyramiding subsidia-
ries, joint-venturing with large foreign and local capitalists, and
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Table 5.21 Number of companies wholly or partially controlled
by selected public enterprises, 1977
Name of Public
enterprises
NARA
UDA
PER NA S
SEDCs
Total
number of
companies
wholly-owned
15
2
12
23
52
number of number of com- total
companies with panies with less number of
50% or more equity than 50% equity companies
13 6 34
50 25 77
20 14 46
72 39 134
155 84 291
source : M.C.Puthucheary(1977): Table 2
note the total paid-up capital of these companies was estimated to be
$733.6 million, of which the public enterprises' share was 60.4
(I.C.Puthucheary(1977): Table 3)
acquiring controlling share ownership of existing corporations.
Table 5.21 shows the extent of pyramiding by three of the major
public enterprises as well as by the thirteen State Economic Develop-
ment Corporations. Tan Tat Wai (1977), among others, have
charted the growth of conglomeration by the major public enterprises.
b) Share of employment in public sector over time
Despite the obvious importance of the subject, there has been
surprisingly no officially published estimates of the rate of growth
of public sector employment over the entire post-colonial period for
Peninsular Malaysia. Estimates of "Government and quasi-Government"
employment for the period up to 1967 were given in the Ministry of Labor
Annual Reports, but the series has since been terminated. The official
annual Economic Reports by the Treasury/Ministry of Finance renews
the series in 1970, but this time for the whole of Malaysia, with no
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separate breakdown for Peninsular Malaysia. Moreover, both these
estimates cover civilian employees only (i.e. military personnel are
excluded) and hence are incomplete as estimates for all public sector
employment.
Using the above sources in combination with various other
primary and secondary sources, we have derived a consistent trend
estimate for all public-sector employment over the period 1957 to
1975. Table 5.22 summarizes the result for civilian public-sector
employment only, while Table 5.23 summarizes the result for employ-
ment in armed forces and police. Table 5.24 shows this combined
civilian and military employment estimates in absolute numbers and
as proportion of total employment in the economy over the period
8
1957 to 1975.
The conclusion that emerges from an examination of these
estimates is that both the civilian and armed forces components of
Government employment have increased proportionally faster than
overall employment in the country between 1957 to 1975. Overall,
total Government employment has increased from being less than 10% of
total employment in 1957 to over 14% in 1975. This amounts to an
average annual growth rate of 4.8%, higher than that for the growth of
9
all employment (2.2%) or of all non-agricultural employment (3.4%).
Proposition 2: Corporate enterprises expanded proportionately more than
unincorporated enterprises in terms of number, and also
in terms of productive assets owned and controlled.
The first part of this proposition can be confirmed on the.basis
of the data on company and unincorporated enterprises registration
Estimates of civilian employment in government sector,
1957-1977
Estimate(a) ('000)
Government Community Infrastructure
services services services
1957
1960
1962
1965
1967
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1875
1976
1977
86
122
233
144
n.a.
76
109
233
141
n.a.
31
29
38
43
n.a.
Total
193
260
271
328
359
Estimate(b) ('000)
Government &
Quasi-government
189
191
234
244
267
312
327
343
359
375
394
410
435
Sources & Notes : (a) 1957-70 estimates based on 1957, 1970 Population Census,
1962 EUS, 1967/8 SESS. The tabulation in these
sources do not provide breakdown by government
employment, but the following industry breakdowns
are assumed to be mostly employment in government
bodies:
1. Federal, State, Local & Municipal Administrative
Services (including police)
2. health, education, religion,
3. railway, pastal services, telecommunication.
The estimates so derived are likely to slightly under-
estimate government employment since other sectors are
ignored. As a cross-check, the 1967/8 SESS provides
an independent estimate (from the raw data) of 309,100
government employees, which is about 12% larger than
our estimates.
1973 estimate based on the 1973 Manpower Survey as
given in Robless(1976)
(b) Estimates based on Min. of Labor AR(v.y.) & Economic
Report(v.y.)
1957-1967: compiled from Min. of Labor AR(v.y.).
Figures pertain to employment in "Government & Quasi-
government" and exclude Railway services. The series
has been stopped after 1967.,
1970-1977: estimated from employment figures for
"Government & Quasi-government" as given in Economic
Report(v.y.). The figures given in the report pertain
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Table 5.22
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(Table 5.22
Cntd) :
to the whole of Malaysia (including East Malaysia), and no
separate breakdown for Peninsula Malaysia is given. Using
the 1973 Manpower Survey estimate for 1973, the ratio of
(public sector employment in Peninsula Malaysia)/(public
sector employment for all of Malaysia) is obtained, and this
ratio is then assumed to apply to all other years 1970-1977
Government employment as a proportion of
1957-1975
Civilian Government
Employment ()
1957
1962
1967
1970
1973
1975
9.1
11.3
11.5
11.8
11.4
11.8
Armed
Forces (%)
0.6
0.6
1.7
2.1
2.2
2.3
Total
9.7
11.9
13.2
13.9
13.6
14.1
total employment,
Total Number
(Q'00)_
201
274
311
386
429
470
average annual rate of growth 1957-75 = 4.8% (for total government employment)
source: Calculated from Table 5.22 and Table 5.23
note: (1) The total employment figures used as base population are
taken from the sources given in Appendix 5.1. TMP estimates
were used for 1970 & 1975.
(2) Estimates(a) from Table 5.22 were used except for 1975, when
(b) was used.
(3) The lower estimates from Table 5.23 were used for 1973 &
1975.
Table 5.24
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Table 5.23 Estimates of
1957-1976
(a)
Armed forces
employment in the armed forces and police,
(b)
Police ('000)('000)
12
n.a.
14
32
37
35
40
46
46
58
62
69
70 (85)
n.a. (84)
76 (88)
n.a. (86)
52.6
23.7
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
37.9
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
47.1
49.3
n.a.
50.4
Sources: (a)- 1957 Population Census. Figure excludes
34,100 "non-Malayan Government" armed dorces
- 1963-1973: U.S. Arms Control & Disarmament
Agency (1974),World Military Expenditures &
Arms Trade 1963-1973 (Washington D.C.:
U.S. Department of State) : 45
- 1975 : International Institute for Stragetic
Studies(1975),The Military Balance 1975-1976
(London): 57
- 1973-1976(in parentheses): calculated from
Government Expenditure Budget(1975); 223 & (1976)P
267. Figures pertain to defence personnel.
(b) 1957 Pop. Census. Figure includes home-guards
1960,1967- Ministry of Labor AR(v.y.). Figures
pertain to employment in police departments
1973-1976: calculated from Government Expenditure
Budget,ibid.
Note: 1- figures for armed forces exclude reserves. In 1975,
the reserves forces were estimated to be 26,400
( IISS(1975),ibid)
2 - the police force is expected to expand to 70,400 by
1980, according to Malaysia Bulletin 3/78 : 29
1957
1960
1963
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
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given in Appendix Table 5A. Table 5.25 below shows the average growth
rate of the different types of registered enterprises calculated
from these data for various sub-periods between 1954-1976. It can be
seen that in every sub-period except between 1957-65 the number of
companies increased at a faster rate than that for unincorporated
enterprises. If we focus on locally-registered enterprises only,
then in every sub-period between 1954-1976, corporate enterprises
increased in number faster than partnerships, and partnerships
increased faster than sole proprieterships; in short, the larger
enterprises increased in number faster than the smaller enterprises.
In terms of proportions, the share of sole proprietorships declined
from 84% to 67% between 1957 and 1976, that of partnerships
increased from 13% to 22%, while that of limited companies rose from
3% to 11%.
There is no direct empirical evidence on which to test the
validity of the second part of this proposition. The previously
cited sources on company and unincorporated enterprise registration
provide information on the value of nominal capital owned by the
registered companies, but not on unincorporated enterprises. However,
if the assumption is valid that the differential in average asset
size between firms in corporate sector and unincorporated sector has
not declined significantly, then the faster pace of increase in the
number of corporate firms previously noted would constitute proof
of this proposition.
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Table 5.25 Average annual growth rate of registered enterprises,
1954-1976(%)
Share ()
1954-57 1957-65 1965-70 1970-76 1957 1976
Unincorporated enterprises 4 4_.3 4 7._2 96.8 89.1
Sale proprietorship n.a. 3-5 3.6 6.4 84.2 67.3
Partnership n.a. 8.5 7.6 10.0 12.6 21.8
Limited Companies 4.6 9.0 21.4 ..2 10.9
Locally-registered 5.5 12.5 10.4 23.2 2.1 10.5
Foreign-companies 2.9 0.2 1.4 1.6 1.1 0.4
Source: Appendix Table 5A
How plausible is this latter assumption? From the trend data
on the value of nominal capital owned by registered companies, the
average capital value per firm has not declined much over time.
Thus, for the differential in average asset size of firms between the
corporate and unincorporated sectors to narrow sufficiently over time,
the average capital size of the unincorporated firms need to have
increased fairly significantly. There is no evidence that this has
happened.
Proposition 3: Unincorporated firms have higher turnover rates
than corporate firms; moreover, the turnover rate for
unincorporated enterprises increased over time, while
that for corporate firms declined over time.
Table 5.26 documents the rate of turnover of unincorporated and
corporate enterprise registration over the post-colonial period. The
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rate of turnover is measured in two ways: de-registered enterprises as
a proportion of newly-registered enterprises and de-registered enter-
prises as a proportion of total cumulative number of registered enter-
prises. It can be seen that, regardless of the measures used,
registered unincorporated enterprises had a significantly higher
turnover rate than corporate enterprises; moreover, the turnover rate
for unincorporated enterprises increased over time, while that for
corporate firms declined over time. While it cannot be assumed that
all de-registered enterprises have "gone under" due to bankruptcy
and failure (some could have been elevated from unincorporated
enterprises to limited companies while some others could have just
temporarily de-registered when business was bad only to revive when
the business upturn occurs), it is nevertheless expected that large
numbers of those unincorporated enterprises that had de-registered did
so because of failure. If this interpretation is correct then the
high rate of turnover observed among the unincorporated enterprises -
in the '70's, one firm de-registered for every two firms registered -
would suggest that an extremely insecure condition of existence for
many small firms prevailed.
Indirect information from various industry surveys and censuses
appear to substantiate this impression of a high rate of attrition of
smaller firms. Thus the 1968 Manufacturing Census Report stated that
about 2,500 establishments operating in 1963 were found to have become
defunct by 1969 - this amounts to 28% of the firms censused in 1963.
Similarly, the 1968 Survey of Construction Industries Report found
Table 5.26 Turnover rate of registered unincorporated
over time, 1958 - 1976
and corporate enterprises
i) Unincorporated Enterprises
1958
a) No. of 7,
enterprises
newly regis-
tered
b) No. of 2,
enterprises
cancelled
c) Total No. 93,
of enter-
prises re-
gistered at
end of year
(b) as % of (a)
(b) as % of (c)
1959
233
194
8,812
2,737
1960
12,898
6,923
1964
9.761
6,034
1965 1966
10,890 10,532
8,396 7,159
1970
17,085
7,812
1971
18,107
11,596
966 100,041 106,016 121,476 124,070 127,443 153,358 159,869 171,195
Average 1958-60
41
3.8
Average 1964-66
69
5.8
Average 1970-72
53
6.2
1972
22,148
10,822
ii) Corporate enterprises
1958 1
a) No. of companies 210
newly registered
959 1960 1964 1965 1966
318 381 502 639 444
1969 1970 1971
784 954 1134
1974 1975 1976
4519 4230 4965
b) No. of companies
cancelled
27 35 20 78 80 62 44 23 20 187 125
c) Total no. of
companies
registered
at end of
year
(b) as % of (a)
(b) as % of (c)
2085 2306 2637
average 1958-60
9. Y"
4200 4759 5141
average 1964-66
13.-9% b
1.6%
6882 7813 8927
average 1969-71
3. 0
0.4%
18362 22467 27349
average 1974-76
2.9%
0.6%
Source: (1) Inland Revenue Registry AR (v.y.)
(2) Registry of Company, cited in MSB (v.i.)
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Table 5.27 Average annual growth rate of manufacturing establishments
by employment size ( % per annum)
paid full-time
employment size 1959-63 1963-68 1968-73 1959-73
5 - 9 2.9 2.0 7.2 4.3
10 - 19 2.5 0.9 7.9 3.8
20 - 49 6.6 4.3 9.7 6.8
5 - 49 4.0 2.3 8.2 4.8
50 - 99 8.5 8.2 13.0 10.0
100 -499 14.2 10.8 17.9 14-3
500 + 21.8 12.7 30.6 21.5
50 + 10.9 9.4 16.0 12.2
all 5 + 4.8 3.3 9.7 6.0
source : 1959,1963,1968 & 1973 Manufacturing Censuses
note coverage for firms with less than 5 paid full-time employees
is incomplete and likely to vary over the years. The growth
rate of firms in this category is therefore not computed.
that 29% of the construction firms in its initial sampling frame for
that year to be not operational. Most of these defunct firms were small
enterprises.
Proposition 4: In the manufacturing sector, production and employment
have become increasingly concentrated in larger enter-
prises in general and in the corporate sector in parti-
cular.
This proposition can be tested using the series of manufacturing
censuses (1959, 1963, 1968, and 1973) conducted by the Department of
Statistics. Table 5.27 shows the average annual growth rate of manu-
facturing enterprises in different employment size categories between
1959 and 1973. It can be seen that (except for firms in the 10-19
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employment size category) the larger the firm size category, the faster
10is the rate of growth in the number of enterprises.
In terms of the rate of growth of employment by employment size,
the differential between small and large firms is even more marked
(calculation not reported here); that is, larger firms increased
their employment size more than smaller firms.
Insofar as small firms (mostly firms with less than 5 full-
time paid employees) may not be covered fully by the census, the
variation in their number over the years may partly reflect changes
in coverage, and so the growth rate of firms with less than 5 full-
time paid employees are not calculated in Table 5.27. In order to
assess the changes in employment share by employment size in the whole
manufacturing sector, the information from the industry census needs
to be supplemented by data from the Population Census and Employment
surveys. This is done in Table 5.28. If we make the reasonable
assumption that the overwhelming majority of firms not covered by the
Census were those with less than 5 full-time paid employees (so that
most firms with over 5 full-time paid employees were covered), then
Table 5.28 shows that the proportion of total employment in firms with
over 5 full-time paid employees had increased two-fold from less than
40% in 1959 to over 80% in 1973, while firms with over 50 full-time
paid employees had increased even more, from 18% to 64%. These obser-
vations thus confirm the earlier findings from the manufacturing census
alone that employment becomes more concentrated in larger firms over time.
Growth in Manufacturing employment in Peninsular Malaysia,1957-1975 ('000)
1957 1962 1968 1970 1973 1975 1957-62 1962-68 1968-75
1) All Manufac;-
turing
employment
2) Employment in
pioneer firms
only
3) Employment in
manufacturing
firms enumerated
in manufacturing
census
(i)all firms
ii)firms with
5+ employees
(iii)firms with
50+ employees
144 167 226 252 318 363
5 23 37 88 105
(1959) (1963)
62 101 146
55 86 126
26
(2) as % of (1)
(3)(11) as % of (1)38%
(3)(iii) as
of (1) 18%
n.a. 77
n.a. 293
nea. 266
n.a. 203
23
5
n.a. na.
n.a. n.a.
n.a. n.a.
3% 10% 15% 28% 29 /
51% 60%
n.a. 34%
n.a.
n.a. 640
22%
n.a. n.a.
n.a. n.a.
59 137
18
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
31%
n.a.
n.a.
82
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
60%
n.a.
n.a.
Sources: 1957 Population Census,1962 EUS,1967/8 SESS & TMP
(2 1959 1963,1968,1973 Census of Manufacturing industries
(3)MSB v.i.)
Table 5.28
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Notes: (1)- 1957-1968: figures refer to Census/Survey report
figures adjusted by addition of estimated
off-estate processing employment derived
from the sources in (2).
- 1970,1975: these are TIP estimates
- 1973: linear estimation from 1970 & 1975 figures
(2)- Ecept 1959,figures refer to all employment (including
unpaid workers & part-time workers) not just paid full-
time employees. Part-time workers are counted as equivalent
to full-time workers here since that is a procedure
adopted by the sources in (1).
(3)- Figures include employment in firms whose pioneer
status has expired.
This differential trend of growth between small and large
employment size can be seen in another way. Figure 5.29(a) shows the
trend in average employment per firm for the different types of enter-
prises (sole proprietorship, partnership, etc.). While the unincor-
porated enterprises had shown little increase in average employment
size, the private limited companies had almost doubled their average
employment size between 1959 and 1972, and the public limited companies
more than tripled.
A major component of this trend of development is accounted for
by the concentration of manufacturing growth in pioneer industry firms,
that is, firms initially set up under a government tax-relief incentive
scheme to promote the growth of investment in manufacturing by local
11
and foreign capitalists. As shown in Table 5.28, pioneer industry firms
accounted for 22% of the increase in manufacturing employment between
1957-1962, 31% between 1962-1968, and as much as 60% between 1968-1975.
Table 5.29(b) documents the growth of pioneer industry firms in greater
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Table 5.29 Average employment per firm in Manufacturing Sector,1969-73
1) All enumerated firms
No. of firms
enumerated(Yr) All
Average no. of employment per
Sale. proprie Partner Private
-tarship -ship. Ltd Co.
firma
Public
Ltd Co.
Govt.
enterprises
5004(1959)
8856(1963)
9013(1968
* (1973)
11061(1973)
11.9
10.9
15.5
*
26.5
4.5
3.1
3.4
*
n.a.
12.8
11.8
13.9
*
n.a. n.a.
2) Pioneer industry firms only
Cummulative
no. of firmsc
32
85
101
146
210
306
420
443
Number of
paid employment
2240
7171
12149
23115
36877
59020
105174
129320
Average employment
per firm
70.0
84.4
120.3
158.3
175.6
192.9
250.4
291.9
Sources: (1)- 1959,1963,1968 Census of Manufacturing Industries;
1972 survey of manufacturing industries;ASB 1976
figures pertain to preliminary 1973-Census~ of
Manufacturing Industries data; a full report of
the 1973 Census is as yet unpublished
(2)- MSB (vi)
Notes a-
b-
c-
part-time. workers assumed equal to half of full-time
workers
survey coverage very incomplete for small firms
include firms whose pioneer status has expired
52
63
79
95
73
101
184
238
n.a.
100
154
104
131
n.a.
1960
1963
1965
1968
1970
1972
1975
1976
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detail. It is seen that the average employment size of pioneer industry
firms had increased more than four-fold between 1960 and 1976.
Proposition 5: Petty-sector dominated activities registered-higher
employment growth rates than the average growth
rate of all non-agricultural activities.
Table 5.30 documents the growth rates of those occupations that
predominantly take place within the petty-sector and compares them
with -the average growth rate for all non-agricultural employment
12
combined. For both sales and personal services occupations at the
aggregate level, the growth rate was 4.3% per annum between 1957 and
1970, higher than the 3.4% rate for all non-agricultural employment
and 2.1% for all employment (inclusive of agricultural employment).
At a more disaggregated level, occupations classified as "hawkers" 13
14
and "housemaids" - the two most commonly identified petty-sector
occupations - had even higher rates (4.6% and 5.4% respectively). In
addition, two other occupations classified as other than sales and
services but known to be largely petty-sector occupations - "tailors"
and "gardeners" - also registered above average growth rates. (A
third petty-sector occupation - trishaw pedlars - had below average
growth rate but this is due largely to government policy to phase out
trishaw pedaling in urban areas.) However, the rate for hawkers was
calculated for the period 1957-67 only, no figures being available for
1970 due to an apparent change in the definition of "hawkers" that
resulted in a ridiculously low number in the new definition.
In view of the ambiguity in the definition of "hawkers" in the
1970 Population Census, it will be useful to have alternative estimates
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Table 5.30 Rate of increase of employment in petty-sector
occupation,1957-70
Occupation 1957('000),
All sales
-hawkersb
-managers & proprietors
of distributive trades
-salesman & shop
assistants
All personal servicesc
-house-maids &
related housekeeping
Tailors & dressmakers
Gardeners & grass-
cuttersd
Trishaw peddlers
All non-agricultural
occupations
182.3
54.9
58.5
67.4
84.6
23.0
16.3
15.1
9.0
926.6
1970('000)
3 1 6 . 0 a
86.1(1967)
93.6
90.5
146.5
45.7
27.5
27.1(1967)
9.6(1967)
1429.2 e
Average annual growth
rate 1957-70 (%)
4.3
4.6(1957-67)
3.7
2.3
4.3
5.4
4.1
4.6(1957-67)
0.6(1957-67)
3.4
Sources: 1957 & 1970 Population Census,1967/8 SlSS,& TIP.
Estimates from 1967/8 SESS are used where they are not
available from the 1970 Population Census.
Notes : a- TMP estimate. This is higher than figure .given in
the 1979 Population Censuss Report to adjust for'
under-enumeration & incomplete classification.
b- include "stall holders" & a small residual item
"selling occupations not enumerated completely"
c- All service occupation workers except "protective
service" & "recreation" occupations
d- excludes "market gardeners"
e- TMP estimate. This is slightly higher than figure
given in the 1970 Population Census Report to adjust
for under-enumeration.
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of employment in hawker units so as to confirm the trend of increase
indicated in Table 5.30 beyond 1967. No such estimates are possible
for the whole country but enough data can be culled from various
sources to provide such estimates for Kuala Lumpur, the capital city.
Table 5.31 sets forth the result. While admittedly crude, the
estimates suggest a growth rate of hawking units much higher than that
for 1957-67, and is in accordance with the writer's impressionistic
knowledge of the situations in the major urban areas of the country.
In addition to the above activities, there is one other major
form of petty-sector employment that needs to be considered - those of
"illegal" occupations like prostitution, burglary, robbery, etc.5 It
is recognized that much of criminal activity may in fact not be the
pursuit of "small-time" individual units but are instead largely
conducted by "big-time" underworld organizations that operate with
an extensive network of secret society cadres, etc. Labor employed
in these organized crimes are therefore more like hired workers in
these organizations (with perhaps some form of profit-sharing within
them), Similarly, occupations like prostitution are often under the
control of underworld organizations, and often are more akin to
indentured or bonded labor than to free service-labor. Nevertheless,
it remains true that illegal occupations do provide a channel for
employment to many individuals who work alone or in small groups, and
it is useful to have some estimate of their numbers and their changes
over time.
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Table 5.31 Estimated number of hawker unit &
Lumpur,1956-77
Year Number of hawker
licences issueda
('000)
Estimated number of
hawker units (licenced
& unlicenced)b
employment in Kuala
Estimated total
employment in hawker
units ( ' 000)C
1956 4.3 -
1970 5.2 6.4
1972 7.6 -
1974 8.7 10.7
1976 11.0 13.5
1977(June) 12.0 -
Average annual growth rate 1970-76 = 13.3%
13.4
22.5
28.3
Sources & Notes: a-:- 1956- Lam Thim Fook(n.d.) "hawkers & street
stalls",paper presented in Seminar on
"Keep Malaysia Beautiful"(mimeo.)
1970 - Malaysian Business( Jan/1978),citing
data from Kuala Lumper City Hall
registration of hawker licences.
b: from the 1973 survey of Kuala Lumpur &
Petaling Jaya,18.5% of the hawker units was
found to be unlicenced. The above estimates
were derived assuming this proportion holds
constant between 1970 & 1977(Lam Thim Fook)
c: from the 1973 ,hawker survey of Kuala Lumpur
& Petaling Jaya,an average of 2.1 employed
persons per hawker unit was found(Lam Thim
Fook). The above estimate were derived
assuming this figure holds constant between
1970 & 1977. Note: the 2.1 persons per
hawker unit estimate does NOT include
possible additional persons working at home
(cooking etc.)& hence is a gross underestimate.
Table 5.32 Total number
('000)
of reported offences against proper ty,1964-76
Year
1964
1968
1972
1974
1976
Average annual rate of growth 1964-76 = 5.9%
Source; NISB (v.i.)
Note: total excludes "arson"
Number
27.5
36.7
30.4
45.1
55.0
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Because of the illegal status of these activities, it is of
course impossible for any official Population Census or employment
survey to detect their very existence, let alone measure their extent -
those engaged in such activities would not be so foolish as to report on
themselves! Despite this inherent limitation on information with
regard to employment in such activities, a rough indication of trends
can be obtained from examining police records of reported criminal cases.
Table 5.32 summarizes the relevant data on reported offences against
property only. (Our assumption behind this choice is that such
offences come closest to being economically motivated, and hence can
be used to indicate invlovement in such activities as regular occupations.)
Obviously, many offences may not have been reported, and thus these
figures are rather poor indicators of trends over time. This limitation
notwithstanding, a growth rate of 5.9% in the number of reported
offences is observed between 1964 and 1976. If we make the untestable
but a priori reasonable assumption that the number of persons engaged
in such criminal activities is more or less proportional to the
number of offences reported, then the above observed trend is
consistent with the view that employment in such illegal activities
had grown at a faster rate than that of total non-agricultural employ-
ment (which was 3.4% between 1957 and 1970).
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The implications of the above propositions for the "polarized
growth" hypothesis will now be briefly discussed. The first proposition
supports the hypothesis that the public sector (public service plus
public corporate sector) has expanded its share of production and employ-
ment relatively. If we take the registered unincorporated enterprises
as roughly approximating the small capitalist sector plus part of the
petty sector, then proposition 2 suggests that the small capitalist
sector and part of the petty sector has declined in production resources
owned relative to the corporate sector. Proposition 3 lends support
to this impression by showing that unincorporated firms suffered high
marginalization rate and are moreover increasingly insecure. No conclusion
about the share of employment over time between the corporate and
unincorporated sectors can be drawn from these propositions, however,
since it is possible for the (capital/labor)-ratio in the corporate
sector to increase, and in the unincorporated sector to decrease, in
such a way that their employment shares remain constant or even shift
in favor of the latter. To resolve the issue, one needs to examine
the actual changes in different production activities. Proposition 4 shows
that, for the manufacturing sector (which constitutes the largest
component of the "secondary" sector), employment share has shifted
in favor of the larger firms in general and firms in the corporate
sector in particular. Changes in the other components of the "secon-
dary" sector - transport and construction - cannot be documented since
trend data do not exist, but are likely to have moved in the same
direction from theoretical considerations (see later section). The
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To establish this "polarized growth" hypothesis on an even firmer
basis, we shall next examine the theoretical arguments as to why such
a hypothesized growth pattern is to be expected.
Theoretically there are several inter-related ways by which large
corporate firms can expand its production share vis-a-vis the small
capitalist firms. Firstly, larger firms may have better access to
external credit/finance sources, and hence can raise new capital for
expansion at a faster and cheaper rate than smaller firms ("capital
market" bias argument). Secondly, larger firms may have better access
to (perhaps even monopoly control over) input factors in general and
technology in particular; the latter may be especially important where
foreign large multinational corporations are concerned ("input factor"
bias argument). Thirdly, in so far as economy of scale exists and
technological innovations involve "lumpy" investments, large firms
may be at a better position to reap these technological benefits
(economy of scale argument). Fourthly, large firms, to the extent that
they can already exert considerable market control power, may be able
to manipulate prices and pursue other monopolistic policies (that
sought explicitly either to raise profits, to prevent entry or drive
out small firms) (monopolistic market bias argument). All of the above
factors would contribute to higher profit rates for the larger firms
and hence possible higher capital re-investment and expansion rates,
and hence even greater advantage on each of the above factors over time.
Additionally, there may be systematic Government regulation and subsi-
dization policies in favor of large firms (which operate either indepen-
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dently or add to the advantage of large firms in each of the above
factors) (Government policy-bias argument).
In combination or singly, all the above factors may allow the larger
firms to either expand production faster, to acquire control over smaller
units through purchase, to merge among themselves to become even larger
conglomerates, or to eliminate existing smaller firms through unequal
market competition.
There are indications that each of these factors operates to a sig-
nificant degree in Peninsular Malaysia. In what follows, we shall do
no more than briefly summarize some of the more salient evidence
that can be adduced from the available empirical literature on Peninsular
Malaysia.
(a) Correlation of capital access with size of enterprise.
A significant correlation between the size of the enterprise and its
source of capital finance exists. Firstly, limited companies can utilize the
equity-capital market for financing, a mechanism unavailable to unincorporated
firms. Secondly, in terms of access to institutional loan/credit facilities
(banks, finance companies, ets), large firms tend to be more favored. Some
evidence on this can be cited. Lee Sheng Yi's study of bank loans in Malaya
and Singapore shows that commercial banks concetrate on large customers and
do not provide adequate facilities to the medium and small-sized firms:
large customers (about 3,000 accounts of value from $0.1 to $5 million each)
obtained more than 70% of the total bank loans in 1965, while the numerous
medium and small customers (over 46,000 accounts) obtained the remaining 30%
(Lee Sheng Yi (1973):146). Similarly, Chee Peng Lim's study of small-scale
manufacturing industries in P. Malaysia has found that smaller firms obtained
much less medium and long term loans from commercial banks than larger ones:
among the smallest firms (less than 5 full-time paid employees), only 8% of
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the firms obtained such loans in 1971-73, and the value of these loans
averaged only $6,200 per receiving firm; among the large firms (more than 50
full-time paid employees), 25% of the firms obtained loans, and these loans
averaged over $165,000 per receiving firm (Chee Peng Lim (1974)). A public
corporation, MIDFL (Malaysian Industrial Development Finance Ltd.), was set up
by the government in 1960 to provide credit facilities to help promote industrial
development, but it too was found to favor the rge producers: out of a total
cumulative loan of $209 million it distributed as of March, 1971, only 5% of
the loan value went to b rrowers of size less than $100,000, whereas 40%
went to arge borowers (of size over $2 million each) (Lee Hock Lock (1974):776).
Moreover, there was a tendency for loan approval to be given to repeated
borrowers (i.e. those who borrowed before), and the amount of these repeated
loan approvals to become larger over time.6
(b) Differential impacts of public policies.
The general bias of government policies in favor of larger enterprises
and against small enterprises in Peninsular Malaysia has been well documented.
Thus, Wheelwright (1965), David Lim (1973), Lindenberg (1973), Karunaratne
et. al. (1978) and Lall and Streeten (1977) had all argued that "overly gene-
rous" tax relief incentives had been accorded to large corporate firms in
general and foreign firms in particular 7 C. B. Edwards (1975) came to
the same conclusion in his study of tariff protection policies 18 Chee
Peng Lim (1974) also pointed out that access to government-subsidized
industrial estates facilities was largely confined to larger firms. The
bias of Government industrial credit-provision facilities (MIDF loans)
has already been noted. Finally, the argument that government labor pro-
tection legislation might have operated against large firms but exempted
small firms does not appear to hold (see Chapter 6).
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c) Economy of scale
Hoffman and Tan (1977) have analyzed the production characteristics
of the manufacturing sector of Peninsular Malaysia, and on the basis of the
production function parameter estimates they derived, they concluded that the
majority of the manufacturing industries in Peninsular Malaysia operated under
increasing return to scale, and that those industries that showed higher
return to scale also tended to be more capital-intensive and to be more domi-
nated by larger firms.
d) Market concentrations and profitability
The concentration of market control by large conglomerates in
Peninsular Malaysia has already been noted. Gan Wee Beng (1978) has examined
the relationship between market concentration and profitability (as measured
by price-cost margin) in the manufacturing sector of Peninsular Malaysia
using data from the manufacturing surveys/censes (1968-71), and concluded
that a significant correlation existed.
(e) Firm size and profitability
That larger firms tend to have higher profit return rate can be seen
from Chee Peng Lim's (1974) survey of the manufacturing firms: the pre-tax
return to capital was 18% for firms with less than 5 employees, 22% for firms
with 5-49 employees, and 41% for firms with 50 employees.
(f) Firm size and rate of expansion
That larger firms on the whole do have a higher re-investment rate
(as measured by the proxy (net capital expenditure/gross operating surplus))
can be documented using the manufacturing surveys (Table 5.33(a)). A qualifi-
cation is necessary here, however. It is known that there is a big differ-
ential between the behavior of locally-controlled firms and foreign-controlled
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firms: the latter tend to re-invest at a much smaller rate (Lindenberg
(1975), C. Hirschman (1972)) and to repatriate their profits out of the
country instead. We have therefore separated out the corporate firms
into locally-controlled and foreign-controlled ones in Table 5.31(b). It
can be seen that foreign firms re-invest at an average rate close to that
of the unincorporated firms, whereas local corporate firms re-invest at a
significantly higher rate. Note also that the public enterprises were
expanding even faster.
The differential access to input factors and technology is less
well documented in the literature, but is generally known to be significant
especially with respect to technology control by large foreign multinational
firms. (See e.g., Thoburn (1977) on tin mining, Linda Lim (1978) on the
electronic assembly industry, and C. B. Edwards (1975) on the pract'ice of
transfer pricing by large foreign firms which in fact control the input
factors they ostensibly purchased.)
In summary, the above brief review of the empirical evidence on
the causal factors of change supports the expectation that an increasing
concentration of production control by large corporate firms has occurred
in Peninsular Malaysia in the post-colonial period.
55
Table 5.33 Re-investment rate by firm size and legal status in the
manufacturing sector 1972
(Net capital
expenditure
Gross
operating surplus)
a) By firm size (No. of paid
full-time employees)
None
1-4
5-19
20-49
50-99
100-499
500+
b) By legal status
Unincorporated
- sole proprietorship
- partnership
Incorporated
- locally-controlled
- foreign-controlled
- government enterprises
21.6
18.3
45.5
19.2
186.4
Source: Calculated from 1972 Manufacturing Survey.
Note: Net capital expenditure = (capital expenditure) - (fixed asset sold)
Gross operating surplus = (value added) - (wages and salaries)
16.0
16.7
20.2
21.3
28.6
28.4
29.7
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5.6: Changes in employment structure over time.
In Section 5.4, the relationship between production organization and
employment structure has been documented in some detail. In the light of
the "polarized growth" pattern shown in Section 5.5, the following changes
in the employment structure over the post-colonial period can be deduced:
1) the share of white-collar occupations in total urban employment has
increased over time (due to expansion of the corporate and public
sectors);
2) the share of wage-employment has increased among manual or "blue-collar"
workers in the "secondary" sector; in particular, workers in the secon-
dary sector are increasingly concentrated in large firms;
3) the share of petty-sector self-employment, on the other hand, has in-
creased in the "tertiary" sector (distributive trades, catering and per-
sonal services).
(1) Expansion of white-collar occupations.
Table 5.34 shows the trend in occupational structure over time. It
can be seen that the share of "white-collar" (professional/technical and
clerical) workers in total employment has indeed increased over time (from
6.0% in 1957 to 10.6% in 1975).
The expansion of white-collar employment was not distributed evenly
across all urban sizes, however. As Table 5.35 shows, the proportion of
white-collar workers in employment was higher the larger the urban size:
it was 4.3% in rural areas, 9.6% in small urban areas, 17.5% in medium ur-
ban areas, and 23.3% in metropolitan areas. In metropolitan Selangor, the
largest conurbation of the country, the share was even higher (26.7%),
while in Petaling Jaya, a "middle-class" suburb of the capital city of
Kuala Lumpur, it was as high as 38%. This concentration of white-collar
workers in the large urban centers is due to the concentration of the
large corporate firms as well as public enterprises/bureaucracies there.
The implications of this expansion of a white salariat in the large
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Table 5.34 Trend in employment by major occupational groups, Peninsular
Malaysia 1957-75
1957 162 1967/8 1970 1973 1975Occupational groups
Administrative &
Managerial
Professional & technical
Clerical
Sales workers
Service workers
Production workers,
transport equipment
operators, miners &
general laborers
1.2
3.1
2.9
1.8
4.4
3.5
8.6 11.6
8.6 6.8
18.9 19.1
1.6
5.0
4.1
1.1
4.6
4.7
9.4 11.3
7.3 8.1
1.0
4.8
5.0
9.3
8.3
22.9 21.3 26.0
Agricultural, livestock, 56.4
forestry workers &
fishermen
Total
n = (1000)
100
52.8
100
49.7 48.8 45.5 44.1
loo 100 100 100
2126.2 2305.7 2365.4 2793.7 3151.7 3317.1
Source: 1957 Population Census, 1962EU, 1967/8 SESS & TMP & 1973 Man
power Survey (cited in Robless (1976) )
Note: The definition of occupational categories has changed slightly
for 1970 onwards, Government executive officials previously
classified as "administrative & managerial" workers were incl-
uded in "clerical" workers instead since 1970, as were some cat-
egories of communication & transport workers. These changes
thus slightly inflate the share of clerical workers in later
years, but the effect is small. The category "administrative &
managerial" excludes managers of commerce, catering, locging &
agriculture.
5.2
1.0
5.4
9.6
34.7
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Table 5.35 Employment distribution by occupation and urban size, 1970
P.J. Rural
town (<1,000)
Small urban Medium urban
(1-10,000) (10-75,000)
Admin. and
Managerial
Profess. and
Technical
Clerical
Sales
Service
Production
Agriculture
Inadequately
described
All
7
19
19
13
18
22
1
100
0.3
2.5
1.8
4.3
4.2
13.2
68.7
5.1
100.0
0.7
5.8
3.8
12.6
9.9
22.6
40.4
4.3
100.0
1.3
9.3
8.2
16.7
13.8
32.3
14.3
4.1
100.0
2.0
9.0
14.3
16.2
18.0
2.7
3.6
100.0
Source: Calculated from 1970 Pop. Census, Vol. II and 1970 Pop. Census
Report for Selangor State; the figures for Petaling JQya were
calculated from Saw Swee Hock (1966), Survey of Petaling Jaya,
and pertain to 1966.
Metrop.
(75,000+)
Metropol.
Selangor
only
2.4
9.5
17.2
13.9
19.3
32.5
1.7
0.4
100.0
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corporate and public sectors in terms of creating a privileged "middle-
class" will be analyzed in Chapter 6, while in Chapter 7 the role of
white-collar occupational expansion providing upward mobility for educated
Malays will be studied.
(2) Development of a "free-wage" industrial working class.
The increase in the share of wage-workers among "blue-collars" in
the secondary sector and the growing concentration of these wage-workers
in large enterprises suggest the growth of a "free-wage" industrial wor-
king class (as opposed to the more fragmented handicraft/artisan laborers
working independently or the apprentice-workers in small workshops who
predominated in the colonial period). To what extent this had led to the
emergence of a "labor aristocracy" among blue-collar workers will be ana-
lyzed in Chapter 6.
(3) "Sub-proletariat" expansion in the "tertiary sector".
The phenomenon of "subproletariat" expansion (Hart: 1973) - that is,
the growth of a group of laborers who are not wage-workers but who work
mainly as the provider of labor "services" in the consumption activities
(domestic work, catering, retail service, prostitution, etc.) - is charac-
teristic of most LDC metropolitan centers. In the popular development
literature, it is usually assumed that this "subproletariat" expansion
(or "involutionary growth" of the "informal sector") is caused by the
existence of a blue-collar "labor aristocracy" which, by raising wages
artificially and restricting employment access through union protection,
thereby reduces the number of jobs available. The extent to which this is
true in urban Peninsular Malaysia will be studied in the next chapter.
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Appendix 5.1 Notes on major employment data sources used in this
dissertation
a) Major sources used and their citation format
1) Population Census: 1947, 1957 and 1970
The 1947 Census was published as a one-volume report and is
listed in the bibliography under Del Tufe (1949). The 1957 Census was
released in 14 volumes, volume 14 being the final report presenting tabu-
lations for Malaya as a whole. Unless otherwise stated, reference in the
text to the 1957 Census always means reference to this final 14th volume.
The 1970 Census is also published in multi-volume form, there being one
for each individual state, altogether with a two-volume final general
report which presents tabulations for the country as a whole. Unless
otherwise stated, reference in the text to the 1970 Census always means
reference to this general report.
2) Department of Statistics' Employment Survey
(i) 1962 Employment and Unemployment Survey, referred to in
text as 1962 EUS.
(ii) 1965 Metropolitan Town Employment and Unemployment Survey,
referred to in text as 1965 MEUS.
(iii) 1967/68 Socio-economic Sample Survey, Part 1 - Employment
and Unemployment Survey (in two volumes); Part 2 - Household Amenities and
Conveniences Survey. Reference to Part 1 will be cited simply as 1967/68
SESS. Reference to Part 2 will include citation of title of Part 2.
These data sources were published as reports by the Department
of Statistics, Malaysia and are listed in the bibliography under the
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heading of Department of Statistics. Unless otherwise stated, all references
in the text to these sources are to the actual reports.
3) Labor Force Surveys. These are conducted yearly by the
Department of Statistics since the late 1960s but were never officially
published. References to data from these surveys are therefore always to
secondary sources that cite them.
4) 1973 Manpower Survey. This was an establishment-based survey
conducted by the EPU in collaboration with the Department of Statistics,
but no officially published report has been released as yet. All refer-
ences to data in this source are to secondary literature that citesthem.
5) Third Malaysia Plan, referred to in text as TMP. This docu-
ment gives the "official" employment estimates by the Government's Economic
Planning Unit (EPU). The Third Malaysia Plan gives tabulations of data
from the 1970 Population Census that are somewhat different from those
given in the official Census report (presumably to adjust for under-
enumeration and mis-classification). Where the Third Malaysia Plan is
used as the source, it will always be explicitly stated.
6) Ministry of Labor annual survey of employment and wages.
Results of these surveys are published in the Annual Report of the Ministry;
references to these in the text will be cited as Min. of Labor AR. A less
detailed version of these data presentations is given in MSB (v.i.) and in
the Annual Handbook of Labor Statistics; breakdown by ethnic group is
always omitted in the latter two cases.
7) Department of Statistics' series of surveys/censuses of
various industries. A detailed listing of all the industry surveys/censuses
published by the Dept. of Statistics that we have used in this dissertation
is given in the bibliography under "Dept. of Statistics". As noted in
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various places in the text, the coverage of these surveys/censuses is
uneven (some sectors get covered more frequently than others) and their
scope changes over time for the same sector. Moreover, there is usually
a big delay of up to five years between the time when the survey/census
is taken and the time when the report is published (e.g., the 1973 Manu-
facturing Census was not published as a report until late 1978; as such,
only those data from this source which have been given in other publications
(e.g., MSB (v.i.)) are available to the present writer at the time of
research). Because the year of publication does not coincide with the
year of survey/census, our reference to a survey/census report is always
to the year the survey/census is taken, and not to the year of publication.
b) Definition of working age population adopted in various
population-based survey/census
1974 Population Census - all "gainfully-employed", regardless
of age
1957, 1970 Census - age 10+
1962 EUS and 1965 MEUS - age 10-70; excludes non-civilian
institutional population
1967/68 SESS - age 15-64; excludes non-civilian institutional
population
Labor force survey - age 15-65; excludes non-civilian insti-
tutional population
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Appendix Table 5A
Growth in the number of registered enterprises in
Peninsular Malaysia, 1954-76
a) Unincorporated
enterprises
Year Sole
Proprie-
torship
Partner-
ship All
b) Limited
companies
Locally
regis-
tered
Foreign
regis-
tered
1949 n.a. n.a. n.a. 1,060 943 2,003 n.a.
1954 n.a. n.a. 77,905 1,648 925 2,573 79,673
1957 77,331 11,596 88,927 1,935 1,007 2,942 91,869
1960 n.a. n.a. 106,016 2,637 1,092 3,729 109,745
1963 99,013 18,736 117,749 3,776 996 4,772 122,521
1965 101,842 22,228 124,070 4,759 1,027 5,786 129,856
1968 109,363 26,902 136,271 6,142 1,070 7,212 143,483
1970 121,297 32,061 153,358 7,813 1,100 8,913 162,271
1972 134,182 37,013 171,195 10,658 1,144 11,802 182,997
1974 n.a. n.a. n.a. 18,362 1,187 19,549 n.a.
1976 175,565 56,869 232,432 27,349 1,209 28,558 260,990
Sources and notes: (a) - 1954: Registrar of Business,
Joon Hai (1962)
as cited in Goh
-1957 - 1972:
Department of Inland Revenue AR (v.y.).
Since 1972, the report no longer provides
data on unincorporated enterprise regis-
tration.
- 1976: ARB Vol. 7, no. 6, part 1: 389
(b) - 1954 - 1960:
MSB (Oct., 1965)
- 1963 - 1976:
MSB (v.i., 1973-1977). note: the data for
1963 onwards reported in DjSB had been
amended over time. Figures used here
therefore may not agree with figures given
in earlier issues of MSB.
All
All
enter-
prises
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Appendix Table 5B: Female Employment
Occupational Category
1959
working proprietors &
active business partners
n.a.
unpaid family helpers
full-time paid employee
1) management staff
2)
3)
technical & supervisory
clerical & related
in Manufacturing Industries, 1959-76
Proportion of female (%)
1963 1968 1972 1976
4.1 5.1 11.1
14.8
38.2 47.3 53.0
4.8
4.3
4.3 6.7
19.8
7.4
31.9
7.1
15.5
43.8
4) general workers (office
messengers, watchman,
drivers, etc.)
5) factory workers 23.0
a) directly employed, skilled 248
b) ,, ,, , unskilled
c) employed through 13.3
contractors
TOTAL 18.8
7.9
24.8
27.7
11.4
n.a.
27.5
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
24.2
10.6 15.1
36.4
38.8
40.6
15.3
55.4
56.0
56.5
37.7
32.5 48.4
Sources: 1959, 1963 & 1968 - Census of Manufacturing Industries
1972 - Survey of Manufacturing Industries
1976 - Monthly Statistical Bulletin, West Malaysia (March 1977):
Table 5.3. Figures pertain to June, 1976
363
Chapter 5
Footnotes
1 - In terms of rate of growth, however, the manufacturing sector registered
a higher rate (since it started from a smaller base). The table below
shows the average annual rate of growth for various sectors:
Employment growth rate (% p.a.)
1957-70 1970-75
Agriculture 0.9 1.8
Mining 2.9 -0.4
Manufacturing 5.3 6.6
Construction 1.0 4.7
Utilities 2.9 5.2
Transport 3.7 6.2
Commerce 4.6 5.6
Service 3.1 4.7
All 2.1 3.5
Sources: TMP
2 - See later discussion for the justification of this assumption.
3 - In a survey of 7,009 limited companies in Peninsular Malaysia in 1972
by the Dept. of Statistics, the 49 largest companies (0.7%) accounted
for 11% of the total asset, 15% of the fixed asset and 20% of the
net profit of all the limited companies surveyed (Lein Mah Hui (1978):
Table 4.5). In as much as these data treat all the companies sepa-
rately and do not take into account inter-company c ontrol, however,
they greatly understate the true extent of control concentration
within the corporate sector.
4 - See Tan Tat Wai (1977) for a discussion of the role of the middlemen
within such a pyramidal hierarchy of marketing chains.
5 - A similar conclusion can be reached using the 1973 Survey of Construc-
tion Industries.
6 - The orientation of Federal Government loans to public authorities
had also shifted dramatically since the NEP, as shown below:
1966(%) 1975(%)
a) Infrastructure and Social 55 23
Services (NEB, Railway, Port
Authorities, City and Town
Councils, Cooperative Societies,
etc.)
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b) State Governments 25 28
c) Commercially-oriented 20 50
public enterprises
Source: Estimated from Econ. Report 1976-77: Appendix Table 5.9.
7 - See e.g., Chopra (1977) on PERNAS, and Puspaniaga (May/1978) on Kedah
SEDC. The Malaysian Business journal runs articles on various public
enterprises from time to time. Even political parties appear to be
moving into direct corporate ownership. Thus, MCA has recently launched
a Multi-purpose Holdings company with authorized capital of one billion
dollars, while UMNO had launched a Koperatif Bersatu, and MIC had
acquired ownership of 17 estates.
8 - Since police are already counted in the civilian employment estimates
of Table 5.22, the total public sector employment estimates are
derived by adding the armed forces estimates to the estimates in
Table 5.22.
9 - An important component of this expansion of public-sector employment
is that of teachers. The number of teachers (in primary, secondary,
and tertiary public/assisted schools combined) increased from 14,000
in 1957 to 35,700 in 1957, 66,800 in 1970, and 84,400 in 1976; the
average annual growth rate from 1957 to 1976 was 4.6%. The growth
rate for secondary and tertiary teachers only was even higher (11.3%
p.a. between 1960-76)(calculated from MSB (v.i.)). In 1970, teachers
constituted 2.4% of the employed population and about 50% of the
"professional and technical" workers (calculated using figure for
1970 above and TMP estimates for 1970 employment).
10 - This inference can be substantiated more directly by Chee Peng Lim's
(1974) survey of manufacturing firms. He found that the proportion
of firms in a given employment size category which reported an increase
in employment between 1968 and 1973 was correlated with the employment
size category, i.e., a larger proportion of large firms reported
employment increase than small firms (Chee Peng Lein (1974): Table III-
13).
11 - For a discussion of the development of pioneer industry firms and
industrial investment incentives, see, e.g., Lindenberg (1973),
Wheelwright (1965) and David Lim (1973).
12 - It is important to recognize that the true extent of many types of
petty-sector employment may be difficult to enumerate in practice.
That official population census is unreliable as a source of infor-
mation on many petty-sector occupations is aptly summarized by
Friedmann and Sullivan (1975: 481):
"A large number of the 'informal sector' employed are officially
invisible, and only the most imperfect and unreliable records are
kept of their actual number. Most job classification simply breaks
down when confronted with the great diversity of job experiences;
the temporary, uncertain nature of the jobs themselves and the
horizontal movement among jobs of individuals."
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13 - According to the 1967/8 SESS, among hawkers, 4% was classified as
"employer", 71% "own-account", 13% "unpaid family helpers" and
12% "wage-employee" (calculated from 1967/8 SESS). A 1973 survey
of hawkers in Kuala Lumpur and Malacca found that 41.1% of hawking
units in Kuala Lumpur were individual operations, 47.6% were family
operations and only 11.1% utilized wage-labor. The corresponding
figures for Malacca were 56.7%, 35.0%, and 8.2% (McGee and Young
(1977): Table 13). The importance of hawking as a form of self-
employment in urban areas is testified by the fact that a full 29%
of self-employed in central Georgetown (Penang) in 1966 were working
as hawkers (McTaggart (1966)); the proportion was 15% in Kuala
Lumpur and 10% for Kuantan and Kata Baru in 1973 (Mazumdar (1977): 2.2).
14 - "Housemaids" are classified in the Census as "wage-employees", but
they are in our conceptualization really independent service-labor,
the payment they receive being a payment for their service, and not
a wage in the proper sense. This difference arises because the
"employer" of a housemaid does not employ her labor to make a profit
within a commercial unit; rather, he pays for her service (as he
would pay for, say, a taxi-cab service) as a consumption expense
(as opposed to a production cost).
15 - To further quote Friedmann and Sullivan (1975: 481):
"one of the most incredible facts of city life in the developing
societies is that a large proportion of the urban labor force has
no legal existence at all. Workers living in squatter settlements
are frequently considered illegal and excluded from official city
maps. Some may live on the street. When they operate without the
necessary license, they are hunted down by the police. "Under-
ground' occupations (e.g., prostitution, burglary gang), of course,
are by their very nature 'invisible' and may be found only on police
records. Where work permits are required for residence (e.g.,
Djakarta) their very presence in the city may be illegal."
There is hardly any body of empirical literature on "illegal" occu-
pations in Peninsular Malaysia to speak of, but see: Mak Lau Fong's
(1977) doctoral dissertation on secret societies in Ipoh town;
Abdul Hadi bin Zakaria's (1975) unpublished M.A. thesis (University
Malaya) on high-class prostitution in Kuala Lumpur and Petaling Jaya;
Chan Lean Heng's (1973) unpublished M.A. thesis (USM) on beggars in
Penang.
16 - Repeated applications approved formed 21% of all approved applications
in 1969 and 26% in 1973. In terms of average value per loan, that
of repeated applications approved increased from $123,000 to $481,000
between 1969 and 1973, while that of new applications declined from
$583,000 to $382,000 (calculated from MIDF reports).
17 - Even an incentive scheme like labor utilization relief (LUR), which
ostensibly is to encourage greater labor-intensity of production,
tends in practice to discriminate against the smaller and more labor
intensive firms. The LUR requires a firm to employ over 50 full-time
workers before it qualifies for the minimum 2-year tax holiday, but
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according to the 1968 Manufacturing Census, 94% of all firms employed
less than 50 full-time employees. In terms of capital asset per
worker, firms employing 50 or more full-time employees were more
capital-intensive according to the 1968 Manufacturing Census; the
LUR therefore biases against labor intensive firms.
18 - B. Horton (1972) has also noted that the tariff protection policies
of Peninsular Malaysia have allowed some foreign firms to penetrate
(or retain control over) the local market, resulting in many cases
of negative net social benefits).
19 - A significant characteristics of this industrial working class is
the increasing share of female in it. Appendix Table 5B documents
this trend of increase in female participation in the industrial
workforce.
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Chapter 6 Occupational stratification and labor market segmentation in
the urban economy
In the previous chapter, an attempt was made to characterize
the production organization structure of the urban sectors of Peninsular
Malaysia and to analyze how it shapes the structure of employment. The
aim of the present chapter is to analyze the process whereby the urban
labor force is absorbed into and distributed within the employment
structure so generated.
Conceptually, every entrant to the urban labor force is con-
fronted with a choice among the different employment possibilities as
shown in Figure 6.1. How these choices are made depend not only on the
wishes of the individual involved, but more importantly, on the conditions
of access to different employment options and his possessing the necessary
attributes to gain access. Certain options may be available to some but
not to others.
The focus of our analysis in this chapter concerns how
differences in conditions of access to different employment positions
result in differential ability of employment seekers possessing different
attributes to gain access to them. The crux of the problem is defining
what is meant by different employment positions,. Standard economic theory
assumes that, from the viewpoint of the employment seekers, the greatest
importance is attached to the earnings accruing from a particular occupa-
tion, while standard sociological theory assumes that individuals seek
to maximize their social status through the occupation they hold. To the
extent that high occupational income generally implies high social status,
the two assumptions complement each other, and the question of relevance
then is how different occupations are ranked according to their earning
power.
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An argument that is increasingly gaining popularity in the
economic development literature is that the urban labor market of LDCs
is segmented into two submarkets, a "formal" and an "informal" sector,
where entry to the first is restricted while entry to the second is rela-
tively free. A central aspect of this argument is the notion that occu-
pations of more or less equivalent skill requirements provide differential
earnings, employment security and mobility in the two submarkets.
To the extent that such an argument holds, it implies that
not only are employment positions differentiated according to their
location in the occupational hierarchy, but they are also differentiated,
at the same occupational level, by the production organization sector
they are in.
In this Chapter, an attempt will be made to examine this combined
process of differentiation of employment access vertically along the occu-
pational hierarchy as well as horizontally by production organization
sectors.
The organization of this Chapter is as follows. In Section 6.1,
we first examine the broad pattern of occupational stratification by
earnings. Then, in Section 6.2, we shall focus on the impact of educa-
tional attainment and family asset ownership in differentiating access to
different wage-and-self-employment occupations. The hypothesis that there
is a strong correlation between socio-economic origins and educational
attainment, and the hypothesis that there has been a trend of educational
"credential degradation" (with respect to gaining access to white-collar
occupations) are next examined, and their implication for intergenerational
occupational mobility is discussed. The question of possible segmentation
of the urban labor market of Peninsula Malaysia into a "formal" and an
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"informal" sector is taken up in Section 6.3. Hypotheses regarding the
existence of differentials between the two sectors, their causes, and
their consequences are formulated and their validity empirically examined.
In particular, the concept of a blue-collar "labor aristocracy" is criti-
cally scrutinized. Drawing on the empirical findings of this sector,
the concept of a "formal-informal" sector dualization is criticized in
the concluding part of this Chapter (Section 6.4), and an alternative
"white-collar aristocracy" hypothesis is proposed.
new entrant to
labor force
wage/salary self-employment unemployment
employment
"white collar" "blue collar" employer own-account family
salariats wage-workers worker worker
Public Corporate Small Petty
sector sector capitalist enterprise
sector sector
Figure 6.1 Channeling of labor force into employment positions and
production organization sectors.
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6.1 Occupational Stratification by earnings
In this section, an attempt will be made to identify the pattern
of stratification of occupations according to the earnings
accruing to the occupation-holders. There are of course many factors
that affect the incomes of individuals, but our concern here is only
with incomes that individuals derive from the occupation that they hold.
Even within a given occupation category, variation in the occupation
holders' personal attributes (age, sex, education, skill, etc.) may
lead to a dispersion of income. In addition, for many self-employed
occupations, part of the earnings accruing to the occupation holders
may represent a return to non-labor productive assets; uneven distribution
of productive assets among the self-employed in a given occupation
would therefore result in a wide dispersion of return to assets,
and hence of earnings.
In spite of these qualifications, the argument remains that a
fairly strong correlation between occupations and earnings can be
identified, the crux of the problem being one of finding out the
appropriate occupational categories to use. In an analysis of income
distribution using the 1970 PES data, Anand (1978) has shown that the
between-occupation contribution to overall income inequality in Peninsular
Malaysia is greater than that of any other single variable he testedl
i.e. the distribution of income among income recipient is more closely
related to their distribution among major categories of occupation
than of any other variable. It is expected that the correlation
should be stronger for wage-occupation than for self-employed occupation
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labor hiring in various sectors of the economy. Although not comprehensive,
these data do suggest relatively high incidence of contract-labor, which
moreover does not appear to have declined over the post-colonial period.
These more precise quantitative estimates also confirm the prevalent
view that contract-labor utilization is extensive in construction,
saw-milling, rice-milling and tin mining. While these data do not give
breakdowns of contract labor utilization by size of firms, it is never-
theless known that the use of contract labor is not confined to small
25
enterprises, although the smaller enterprises may resort to it more.
iii) Direct evidence on wage-employment insecurity
While the conclusions from (i) and (ii) provide rather strong
indirect evidence on the general insecurity of wage-employment among manual
workers, skeptics may want to argue that the potential for easy firing does
not necessarily imply job insecurity, if in practice, little firing is
actually resorted to by employers. It would therefore be useful if more
direct evidence on the actual conditions of employment security is avai-
lable. Unfortunately, all official censuses/surveys of production sectors
in Peninsular Malaysia do not collect information on the extent of labor
26
turnover or retrenchment, and no systematic studies on the topic has
been reported in the secondary literatures known to the present writer.
From various journalistic accounts, however, the occurrence of retrench-
ment does seem to be significant, especially in the key export-oriented
27
manufacturing industries (electronic assembly, textiles, rubber products,
28
etc.) which are dominated by large foreign firms. Linda Lim (1978) has
analyzed in detail the employment policies of the multinational firms in the
electronic assembly industry in Peninsular Malaysia and documented the
extreme insecurity of wage employment there.
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(from what has been said as well as from other considerations that
we shall go into later), and thus an attempt should be made to distinguish
occupations by their employment mode also. Unfortunately, data
limitations often do not allow this to be done at a disaggregated
enough level, In other cases, wage-employment earnings are more
readily available, but self-employment earnings are not. In addition,
it may be important to distinguish occupations according to the type
of production organization they operate in; indeed, a central aspect
of "formal" vs. "informal" labor market dualization theory is that
occupations in the "formal" sector provide higher earnings than
occupations with equivalent skill requirements in the "informal"
sector. The significance or otherwise of this occupational segmentation
effect will be the subject of investigation in a later section;
for the time being, we shall only focus on the broad pattern of occupa-
tional stratification, abstracted away from possible segmentation
effects.
As a first cut, Table 6.1 shows the correlation of average
monthly earnings by broad occupation categories at the 1-digit level
from three separate sources. Although the definition of income and
the nature of the sample population vary somewhat between the three
sources, a remarkably consistent stratification of earnings by occu-
pation at the 1-digit level is demonstrated. Managerial/adminis-
trative occupations provide the highest average earnings, followed
by"white-collars", sales, service and production workers,
One cannot read too much into the above observation, however,
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Table 6.1 Average monthly earnings by occupation (at the 1-digit level)
1970 PES
1966/7 1967/8 SESS (all income
West Malaysia (cash income of earner)
Family Survey of principal Av. Mnth. Gini
(married men only) earner of household) Earnings. Coeff.
Managerial/admin. 527 669 0.5291
357
Professional/tech. 388 424 0.4176
Clerical 309 312 272 0.3742
Sales 217 206 220 0.5277
Service 208 193 169 0.4590
Production & related n.a. n.a. 160 0.3979
- production & crafts. (179) (n.a.)
(151)
- gen. laborer (108) (n.a.)
- transport & commun. (152) (183) (n.a.)
Agricultural worker 67 83 n.a.
- farmer (n.a.) (n.a.) (101) (0.4234)
- farm laborer (n.a.) (n.a.) (87) (0.3339)
Source: 1966/7 - Hirschman (1975): Table 3.2
1967/8 - Table 6.2.
1970 - Anand (1978): Table 6.6.
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for the reason that only average earnings are compared, which could
be misleading since they could be the result of widely divergent
patterns of earnings distribution . The 1970 PES data shown in Table
6.1 do suggest significant income spread within each occupational group
(as measured by their within-group Gini coefficients). Managerial/
administrative and sales occupations have the highest dispersion,
followed by services, professional and technical, and production.
Clerical has the lowest dispersion. The high dispersion for the first
two groups (and to a lesser extent, the service occupations) are
expected given that a significant number of those classified in
them are employers and proprietors, whose earnings partly reflect
return to capital assets owned. The smaller dispersion of the others
are due to their beingmostly wage-workers(especially the clericals).
These differential patterns of earning dispersion are further
confirmed by examining the actual earning distributions from the
1967/8 SESS data (Table 6.2 ). Except for the managerial and clerical
occupations, all the other occupations also display a unimodal distri-
bution of earnings.
Because of the existence of dispersion within each occupational
group, it may be more useful to think of the occupational stratification
pattern as consisting of a series of partially overlapping bands. A
rough attempt to do this is made in Table 6.2 .
Two shortcomings remain in the attempt at stratifying occupation
by income so far: (1) failure to distinguish between wage-employment
and self-employment; (2) the occupational categories used are too
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Table 6.2 Monthly cash income distribution by occupation, 1967/8 (%)
Occupation of principal earners of household
Monthly cash
income range
($)
(a) (b) (c) (d) (e) (f) (g)
1 - 49
50- 99
100 - 199
200 - 299
300 - 499
500 - 749
1.5
3.5
15.1
21.5
16.5
750+
Not known
2.
0.3
1.1
4.8
0.5 10.8 7.8
5.0
3.8 2.7 7.4
20.0 '18-5' 5 '13.4 2
"19.0 8
21.8
1L7
11.0
10.5,
0.1
23.3
27.9
2.4
17.0 23.0/ 17.9
12.1 5.2 5.7
3.2 1.9
2.6 2.6
0.4 0.1
19.9,
2.9
0.8 0.8
1.5 1.0
11.3,
3.3
0.8
0.4
- - 0.1
All
Average ($)
100
527
100
388
100
312
100
206
Source: 1967/8 SESS, Part II (Household Amenities
Table 22.1(b). The average income figures
100 100 100
193 183 176
100
151
& Conveniences) : Appendix
were not given in the source,
but were calculated by taking mid-points of income ranges.
Note: (a)
(b)
(c)(d)
(e)
f9
h
=
=
Administrative and managerial
Professional and technical
Clerical
Sales
Services
Transport and communication
Mining
Production worker and general laborer
1. underlined figures are peaks of each distribution
2. agricultural workers are excluded from the table since cash
incomes are not representative of their total income from
agriculture.
(h)
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broad. Both of these factors are undoubtedly responsible for part of
the earning dispersion observed.
To examine the matter more closely, we can try to disaggregate
the occupational categories further or to separate out the self-
employed from the wage employees. Both of these will now be attempted
within the limit of data availability. First, a special tabulation of
income distribution by occupation for full-time wage-employees
only is available for the manufacturing sector using data from the
1970 Manufacturing Survey (Table 6.3). This shows that, except for
the managerial and professional employees, the other occupational
categories all show smaller dispersion. Roughly the same band
stratification pattern is observed, however. Despite the separating
out of "skilled" workers as a subcategory of production workers, the
majority of these "higher" production workers still earn substantially
less than the white-collars. Next, a breakdown of the 1970 PES data into
more disaggregated occupational categories at the 2-digit level can be
examined (Appendix Table 6A); a measure of earning dispersion is also
available in addition to average earnings. A greater variation of ave-
rage earnings by occupation can now be seen, but if we separate out the
supervisory, managerial, proprietory and technical occupational cate-
gories from the sales, service and production occupational groups,
and compare the average earnings of the remaining occupational
categories (which can properly be called "blue collar" or manual
occupations), then it can be seen that, with minor exceptions, they
all fall within the $100-$200/month band. The only significant
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Table 6.3
Yearly Managerial
Annual &
Income Profess-
(1000's) ional
1
1 - 1.5
1.5- 2
2 - 2.5
2.5- 3
3 -4
4 -5
5- 6
6- 7
7- 8
8- 9
9 - 10
10 - 15
15+
Total
1.3
0.7
1.2
5.8
10.4
3.5
16.8
16.5
10 4
100
Income Distribution of Manufacturing Employment
by occupations, 1970
Technical Clerical General Skilled
Super-
visory
0.6
35..1
27.0
0.9
100
0.4
7.8
47*6
,13.8
100
7.7
25.
9.2
100
5-0
'28.9
31.3
,29.6-
2.5
2.4
100
Un- Con-
skilled tract
Labor
17.0
12.8
1.2
-00
'37.4
48.2
11.0-
3.0
0.4
100
1.23 2.24 2.21
Source: Tan Tat Wai (1977): Table 4.1; Average
1970 Manufacturing Survey
income figure from the
Note: underlined figures denote the peak of each distribution
All
14.5
28.2
21.1
16.1
9--4
5.5
2.7
1.4
0.5
0.3
0.1
0.4
0.4
100
Av.
($1000)
12.96 4.9 3.16 1.91 1.86
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exception is "protective" service occupations, whose average earning
is close to the average for clerical workers. Moreover, the more
detailed clerical and supervisory occupations, with minor exceptions
(which are really misclassifications), all have average earnings
above this "blue collar" band, and professional/technical occupations
generally much more so. So are the managerial/administrative occupa-
tions, inclusive of those classified in the sales and service groups.
The conclusion that emerges from these more disaggregated data
therefore further strengthen the impression of a general stratifi-
cation of earnings between "managerial" and "white-collar" occupations
(inclusive of supervisory occupations) on the one hand and "blue collar"
manual workers on the other. The case of working proprietors in
distributive trades and services is not covered by the above categories,
however. The average earnings of these occupations are between the
"Tupper white-collars" (most professional/technical occupations and the
higher clericals) and "lower white collars" (most clericals), but
since their income dispersions are very high (in fact sales proprietors
have the highest dispersion of all occupational categories in Table 6 A),
they should perhaps be seen as straddling across the two. Finally,
the case of "protective" service workers should perhaps be seen
as intermediate between most clericals and most blue collars.
So far, no distinction has been made between blue-collars who are
self-employed (own-account or family workers) and those who are wage-
employees. The auestion of a possible differentiation between the
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two in terms of earnings will be taken up more systematically in Section
6.3, when the "formal" vs. "informal" labor market segmentation argument
is examined.
6.2 Occupational access stratification
Given the rough pattern of occupational stratification by income
as identified in the previous section, the question that needs to be
addressed next is: what are the conditions of access to these different
occupational strata?
In the conceptual formulation part of Chapter One (Section 1.3)
it was pointed out that the conditions of access to wage-employment and
self-employment are fundamentally different. In the case of "free"
wage-employment, access is determined through competition in the wage-
labor market. In contrast, access to self-employment depends on one
being either a member of a family that already controls a production
unit of its own, or able to start a production unit of one's own; in
either case, the question of relevance is how the production unit can
be inserted into the economy, and once inserted, how it can reproduce
itself.
In the general economic literature, it is generally assumed that
educational qualification is an important determinant in differentiating
access to different wage-occupations. The question of access to self-
employment is less well studied, but it can be generally assumed to
depend significantly on family asset ownership. In the remainder of
this section, we shall briefly review the theoretical basis for these
assumptions, followed by an examination of their empirical validity in
the case of urban Peninsular Malaysia.
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(a) Stratification of wage-employment access by educational attainment
There are three possible reasons for expecting a strong correlation
of wage-employment access with educational attainment from the demand
side:
(i) educational attainment is used by the employers as a proxy for
skills and other capabilities contributing to the productivity of
labor. This is the aspect most emphasized by the human capital
theorists .
(ii) educational attainment is used by the employers as a proxy measure
for ability to take discipline and to function within a hierarchy.
This socialization aspect is emphasized by writers like Bowles
and Gintis (1975).
(iii) educational attainment differential is one device used by the
employers to legitimize the differentiation of functional roles
and authorities within a hierarchy. Most writers who emphasize
the internal wage-contour structure5 of the public sector and of
large corporate firms tend to acknowledge this aspect, although
some may put more weight on other devices (seniority rule, etc.)
Both (i) and (ii) are consistent with the argument that education
is used as a "screening" device for selecting employees, the screening
criteria being other than (or in addition to) productivity considerations.
There is a fourth reason for the correlation between educational
attainment and access to certain occupations which is due not so much
to employer requirement as to institutional regulations. This is the
case with many professional occupations (e.g. phy.sicians, lawyers,
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accountants, architects, etc.) whose entry is regulated by institutional
rules stipulating the necessary educational credentials (university
degree in the relevant field, graduation from certain specialized
institutions, etc.). Although part of this credential requirement
is undoubtedly related to the need to ensure "professional standards",
it is to some extent also the result of the already educationally-
privileged attempting to defend their self-interest and status through
control over future supply.
Each of these reasons for differentiating occupational access
according to educational attainment would induce corresponding responses
by the labor on the supply side to acquire more education. Moreover,
the access stratification pattern at any one time may induce among the
and preference
wage-employment seekers certain expectations of jobs based on their
educational attainment. These expectations may in turn constrain
future changes in the access stratification pattern itself.
These different interpretations for wage-occupational access
stratification by education need not be mutually exclusive. In particular,
it can be argued that the different interpretations may be more relevant
for different levels of the occupational hierarchy. For most manual
occupations, the necessary skills can only be acquired through on-the-
job training/apprenticeship, and formal education is not likely to
contribute much to the productivity of labor. It is possible that
formal education may confer a basic ability in a language familiar
to the management (e.g. English), and thus facilitate their work and
job-traning process within the plant, but this has more to do with the
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socialization aspect (ability to function ina hierarchy depends on
ability to understand instruction), For most "white collar" clerical
jobs, however , some amount of proficiency in the written language
and mathematics may be necessary, and for the more technical jobs
a minimal general training in science and subsequent specialized
technical education are definitely required. Thus, the productivity-
enhancing theory is more relevant for the higher professional/technical
occupations, and much less so for the lower occupations, where the
socialization interpretation may be more correct (particularly so
since it is those who occupy the lower positions who have to be subject
to more discipline).
The third interpretation must be understood within the historical
context of the wage and employment policies of the colonial government
6(as well as of the foreign corporate sector). A rigid and strictly
hierarchical system of wage stratification was instituted during
colonial times, with the colonial administrators occupying the top
positions and paid inordinately high salaries to maintain (and further
reinforce) their privileged status and power over those employees
recruited from among the local population. Among the latter, strict
rules of wage and occupational stratification along educational
qualifications were imposed (with the possible exception of special
admissions for members of the local aristocrats) to legitimize the
hierarchical authority structure of the bureaucracy itself, i.e. the
need for a hierarchy of authority-control relations within the bureau-
cratic organization was first translated into an internal wage-contour
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structure corresponding to that hierarchy, which in turn was translated
into a stratification of occupational access based on education.
Over time, the idea that persons with higher educational paper
qualifications should occupy positions with higher authority and higher
income than those less qualified becomes entrenched in peoples'
expectations. Moreover, with the coming of political independence
and the increasing replacement of high colonial administrators by local
bureaucrats, the self-interests of these bureaucrats may ensure the
perpetuation of this colonial employment and wage system instead of
its dismantling. Thus, even though this stratification
structure may have been adjusted somewhat in response to private-sector
wage-labor market pressure, in the post colonial era the change was likely to
be slow and "lumpy" (salary scales, entry qualification specification
and promotional ladder structures are usually revised through Govern-
ment Commissions once every few years, with no "fine tuning" possible
in between), and may be greatly affected by political factors in
addition to economic ones.
To summarize, the factors governing the process of occupational
access stratification by education are complex, and any attempt to
restrict analysis using only one interpretation throughout is bound
to remain partial. Nevertheless, from the above discussion, it does
appear that high educational attainment is only of importance for
access to the white-collar occupations (professional, technical,
clerical) or to managerial/administrative salariat positions in the
public-sector and in relatively large firms; for most manual occupations,
384
only minimal educational training is needed, although workers with more
education may be preferred if it incurs no wage increase. What is "high"
educational attainment is of course a relative thing, at least in the
"screening" theory, and depends on the relative distribution of educational
qualifications among the employment-seekers. Indeed, part of the defining
characteristics of a "screening" criterion is that the criterion is adjus-
ted in proportion to changes in the attributes of those to be screened.
To the extent that educational attainment is used as a screening device,
therefore, one can expect that, as the labor force becomes progressively
more educated, the screening threshhold will also be progressively raised.
The effect is that the "value" of a given level of educational attainment
will decline over time, i.e., a credential degradation trend (with respect
to occupational access) is expected over time. The validity of this
inference will be examined later.
An attempt will now be made to document the extent of correlation
between educational attainment and occupational access in the case of
Peninsular Malaysia. Ideally, in doing this, we would like to separate out
the occupational categories to correspond to those identified in defining
the income strata. Unfortunately the data necessary to make such a break-
down do not exist. We are thus forced to rely on the use of the 1-digit
level occupational categories in what follows. This limitation is not
very serious, however, as our primary purpose here is to document the
polarization of educational attainment between two broad groups - "white-
collars" and "blue-collars" - and thus the presence among the sales and
service categories of some who are in fact managerial, supervisory and
technical workers does not change this picture very much.
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As a first cut at examining the extent of occupational access
stratification by educational qualification, the average educational attain-
ment (in terms of number of years of schooling) for wage-employees holding
different occupations can be compared. This is done in Table 6.4 (a) for
all urban wage-earners in 1970. A polarization of educational attainment
level between the "white-collar" and managerial salariats on the one hand
and the "blue-collar" wage-workers is evident from Table 6.4 (a); moreover,
it also appears that the polarization affect is stronger in the case of
females. Table 6.4 (b) provides similar information for males in general
(including self-employed).from a 1966/67 survey; the correspondence is
quite close. The only exception is the combined professional/technical/
managerial/administrative category, which can be explained by the fact that
7
self-employed managerial workers have much lower educational attainment,
and their inclusion in the category would bring down the average.
To examine the matter more closely, a breakdown of the distribu-
tion of educational attainment among members of each of the given occupa-
tional groups can be made. Two data sources are available for this
purpose: the 1967/8 SESS and the 1973 Manpower Survey. Table 6.5 summarizes
the relevant information. Unfortunately, for both, the self-employed work-
ers cannot be separated out from the wage-employees. This is not a serious
limitation, however (except for the managerial category), given the close
correspendence observed above.
Examining first the 1967/8 SESS data, we see that blue-collar
workers were mainly concentrated in the "primary education only" band,
whereas clerical workers straddled from the Lower Certificate of Education
(LCE) level to the School Certificate (SC/MCE) and Higher School Certificate
(HSC) level. Professional and technical workers were higher up the ladder.
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Table 6.4 Mean Educational Attainment (average number of years of schooling)
of Urban Wage Employees (1970) & All Employed Men (1966-67) by
Occupation
Occupation
Admins. & managerial
Professional &
technical
Clerical
(a) 1970 Urban employee
Male
10.9
12.8
9.8
Female
9.5
13.7
12.1
(b) 1966-67, all employed
Male
}8.2
9.0
Sales 6.5 7.3 5.3
Service 5.9 3.1 5.9
Production 5.4 4.4 4.7
Farm laborers 4.6 2.2 (all agri.) 3.2
All 7.3 6.6 4.4
Source: (a) PES 1970 data, compiled from Anand(1978): Table 7.1 &
Appendix Table 7.1.
(b) 1966/67 Family Survey data, compiled from Hirschman(1975)
Note: Figures refer to husbands of married female surveyed.
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Table 6.5
a)
All Employed,
1967/8 SESS
Adminis. and
managerial
Professional
and tech.
Clerical
Sales
Service
Production
Transport
Mining
Laborers
Agricultural
TOTAL
Educational qualification distribution of the employed
labor force in given occupations, 1967/8 and 1973
<LCE with SC to
lower LCE, HSC tech.
No formal Primary Relig. second. <SC post or
educat. ed. & other ed. upper second. teach.Univ.
sec. ed.ed. coll.
61.0
33.1
43.0
92.1
95.4
94.7
93.2
99.0
98.7
99.0
7.5
1.3
0.8
19.8
22.8
16.7
12.3
25.4
21.6
38.1
26.8
42.3
18.1
20.3
59.6
63.5
66.7
71.5
69.8
71.8
57.6
57.1
0.2
2.7
0.1
0.3
0.3
0.3
0.4
0.2
0.2
0.8
0.7
11.0 12.8
11.0
21.8
12.4
8.8
10.9
9.0
3.6
5.0
2.4
6.6
12.8
28.9
5.7
2.9
3.9
4.9
0.4
1.1
0.7
4.1
All
16.8 1.7 7.6 100.
18.5
27.1
2.0
1.6
1.4
1.7
0.6
0.2
0.3
3.0
22.3
0.2
0.1
0.2
1.2
7.9
0.8
0.2
0.2
0.1
0.6
100.
100.
100.
100.
100.
100.
100.
100.
100.
100.
b)
1973 Manpower Survey
Adminis. and
managerial
Professional
and tech.
Clerical
Sales
Service
Production,
transport, etc.
Other laborers
Agriculture
TOTAL
35.4 11.3
13.8 20.3
16.8
70.0
77.7
72.4
92.0
92.8
77.8
30.3
18.0
15.1
19.5
7.0
4.0
11.1
32.4
50.9
51.1
11.5
7.2
7.9
1.0
3.1
9.9
5.6 15.3 100.
5.1 9.8 100.
1.2
0.3
0.2
0.6
0.2
100.
100.
100.
100.
-- -- 100.
-- -- 100.
0.4 0.7 100.
Sources: 1967/8 SESS and 1973 Manpower Survey
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A large proportion of "administrative and managerial" workers had only
primary education; this undoubtedly includes mainly the self-employed.
Except for the "professional/technical" and "administrative/managerial"
occupations, tertiary qualification (university degree) holders were
insignificant.
The same pattern of polarization of educational attainment
is observed from the 1973 Manpower Survey data, with one important excep-
tion: a dramatic shift upward in the level of educational attainment
has occurred. The differential impact of this shift at different occupa-
tional levels will be examined in greater detail in a later section; it
suffices to note here that the shift has been greater for the "white-collar"
workers than for the "blue-collar" workers, as shown by comparing the
changes in the educational attainment profiles between the two periods
for clerical works and for all employed workers:
with with With college diploma
Less than LCE LCE SC/HSC or university degree
Clerical -26.2 +1.4 +24.0 +0.8
All -13.4 +7.0 +6.9 -0.7
By the mid-1970s, the majority of white collar salariats had
completed SC/HSC or above (65.8% for "professional/technical" workers,
52.9% for clerical workers). Among the "blue-collar" occupations, however,
over 90% were still without SC/HSC qualifications.
b) Self-employment access stratification by family asset ownership
In contrast to wage-employment, access to self-employment is
through the insertion of a production unit of one's own (or one's family's)
into the economy and reproducing its existence. In Chapter 1.3, we have
already pointed out some of the general factors affecting this insertion
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process: possession of the required capital inputs (or ability to rent the
use of them), ability to gain access to the necessary production locations
or marketing channels, as well as possession of the necessary labor-skills
oneself, or the technical know-how and entrepreneur skills to organize and
manage the labor skills of others. Obviously, how important each of these
factors is depends very much on the activity in question. The more capital-
intensive and capital "lumpy" the activity, the more important would be
the access to productive resources, while possession of the requisite
labor skills is more important for the more labor-skill dependent activi-
ties (through family tradition, apprenticeship, etc.). At one level, how-
ever, all these considerations can be subsumed under the single consideration
of possessing sufficient money capital, for through it, most other factors
can be purchased - the needed labor skills can be purchased through the
wage-labor market, access to marketing channel can be obtained through the
necessary rent-payment, and government regulations may be circumvented
through bribery, the use of fictitious intermediaries (e.g., "Ali-Baba"
business, where Chinese financiers make use of Malay "sleeping partners"
to circumvent ethnic quota on licenses, etc.) and other devices. Even
the possession of dynamic entrepreneur skills - the essential hallmarks of
pioneer-capitalists - may be obviated by the very wealthy nowadays through
hiring the suitably-trained managerial staffs. It is therefore at the
low asset-ownership end that other factors (e.g., experience, skills) may
have more important differentiating impacts.
A very rough idea of the average capital asset requirements for
entering different types of production activities can be gleaned from
examining the average fixed asset size of sole proprietorships as given
in Table 5.4 in the previous chapter. Table 6.6 below provides further
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Table 6.6
Average investment for urban commercial
Type of establishment
provision shops
bicycles and parts
furniture
books ,stationery
hardware ,China
footwear
chemist goods
motorcycles
electrical goods
clothing,textiles
jewelry,watches
used cars
new cars
source: Census of Wholesale and Retail Trades
of Peninsular Malaysia(1970)
retail establishments,1970
10,400
12,000
15,000
18,800
20,700
21,100
22,500
31,000
36,600
45,300
58,600
60,000
300,000
in the Urban Areas
Value of daily stock of hawker units in three urban areas.
1973
(a) Hawker units in markets
distribution of units ()
$20 $20-250 1
Kuala Lumpur
P.J.
Malacca
2.0
21.9
1.0
61.0
65.6
67.4
37.0
12.5.
31.6
(b) Hawker units outside markets
distribution of units ()
_2_ $20-250 $251+
21.2
9.1
30.1
58.9
76.0
58.0
19.8
1409
11.9
source: Lam Thim Fook(1977): Table 8
Table 6.7
Town
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information on the average capital investment size of different retail,
catering and service enterprises in the 48 largest towns of Peninsular
Malaysia. Assuming that these enterprises reflect the average asset size
of the typical proprietors in the small capitalist sector, it can be seen
that they are beyond the means of most "blue-collar" wage-workers, given
the low average level of income of the latter. To rise from the rank of
the typical unskilled "blue-collar" wage-worker to the status of shop
proprietor would likely require many generations of patient cumulative
savings; indeed, it is probably true that many of the present generation
of shop proprietors attained their status through family inheritance,
rather than on their own industry alone?
The capital inquirements for entering many hawker activities
are expected to be lower, although it is quite meaningless to talk of an
average capital requirement here, given the tremendous spread of capital
size possible in such activities. Table 6.7 gives a rough indication of
the operating capital size among hawkers surveyed in three major cities
10
in Peninsular Malaysia in 1973. These figures do suggest that hawking
11is more within the means of blue-collar wage-workers.
Having reviewed the theoretical arguments and empirical evidence
in support of the expectation of employment stratification based on
education (for wage-employment) and family asset ownership (for self-
employment), we shall now consider how these two factors operate to
channel and distribute a given labor force into different employee posi-
tions.
At any one time, individuals among the entrants to the labor
force are unevenly distributed in terms of educational attainment and
family asset endowment. Those who are low on family asset but high on
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educational attainment can still achieve high income status by getting
a high managerial or white-collar salariat job or by becoming an indepen-
dent professional; conversely, those who are low on educational attainment
but high on family asset endowment can achieve high income status by
becoming an employer (entrepreneur if he is dynamic, rentier if he is
passive). Those who are low on either, however, have the least choice -
they have to either become "blue-collar" wage-workers or seek petty-sector
self-employment; those who are members of families owning petty-sector
enterprises can work as family workers sharing the low-income from the
enterprise.
However, the possession of high educational attainment and
family assets are not independent intertemporally, if those who come from
higher family social background also have a better chance of achieving
higher educational attainment. Moreover, since higher wage-occupation
and self-employment positions lead to higher income, these differentials
in income can lead to differential assets accumulation and socio-economic
advantage bias over time, which in turn shape the possibility of educational
attainment and family asset endowment of the new generation of labor
force.
What we have just described is of course none other than a par-
ticular version of the usual socio-economic life-cycle model of social
stratification posited by sociologists (Blau and Duncan (1967), C. Hirschman
(1975)). Figure 6.2 summarizes the model in a simplified form to high-
light the basic dynamics involved.
What is the available evidence on the influence of socio-economic
origins on educational attainment in Peninsular Malaysia?
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Employment positions
large employers (entreneural
Familyassetabsentee) & rentiers1'amily asset
endowment high managerial &
administrative salariats
high high white collar salariats
& independent professionals
medium
low
middle white collar
salariats
small capitalist sector
employers/proprietors
Educational
attainment
f amily
labor socio- petty self-employed &
force economic high service labor
entrant status
medium blue collar wage workers
low unpaid family workers
income
earnings
high 4
medium
low 4I
Figure 6.2 Social stratification dynamics : a stylized model.
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c) Stratification of educational attainment by socio-economic
background of family
That the level of educational attainment of an individual is
strongly influenced by the socio-economic background of the individual's
family is a generally well-established phenomenon in most LDCs (see, e.g.,
Elliot (1975): 246-262 for a summary of evidence from ten African coun-
tries and three Asian countries). The evidence we shall present below
shows that Peninsular Malaysia is no exception. Although the definition
of "socio-economic" backgrounds varied and in some cases was vague and
unsatisfactory in the data to be cited, collectively they so point
unambiguously to the presence of significant stratification.
The first piece of evidence comes from a World Bank survey in
1974 (Table 6.8), which shows breakdown of school enrollment rate of
children by the level of household per capita income (HPCI) of the family.
The data show that, while differences are small at the level of primary
school, they begin to widen at the secondary school level, and become
most accentuated at the post-secondary level, where children from families
belonging to the highest income quintile have 8 times as much chance of
being enrolled as those from the lowest quintile.
A second source of evidence is a large-scale empirical study
conducted by the Ministry of Education in 1972 to investigate the extent
and determinants of drop-out from schooling. Table 6.9 summarizes the
relevant evidence from the Drop-out study report. The definition of
socio-economic status used in the data presentation was not very clearly
defined in the published report itself, but apparently was based largely
on some occupational ranking. This vagueness notwithstanding, a trend
of increasing differential in enrollment rate between children from low
12
and high family status was evident with movement up the educational ladder.
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Table 6.8 Enrollment rate in public/assisted schools by household
per capita income (HCPI) of family in Peninsular Malaysia
1974 (5).
Quintile of HPCI
(lowest) 1
2
3
(highest)
4
5
all
85
86
93
99
90
90
Secondary
33
33
40
44
48
40
Post-secondary
0.7
1.2
2.3
2.6
5-5
3.1
Source: Meerman (1977): Table 2
Table 6.9 School Enr'ollmenot Rate of youths by socio-economic status
of head of household, 1970 (5).
A hge-chort of children (years_)
Socioeconomic status
high
medium
low
lowest
(n= )
13+
98.6
97.2
94.6
92.2
(8857)
80.9
68.4
53.0
48.4
(13497)
58
33
26
(4492)
Source: Dropout Study: 7,114
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A third source of information comes from the 1966/7 Family
Survey. Hirschman (1975) has analyzed the data from the survey and found
that the mean years of schooling of males (the husbands of women surveyed)
was strongly correlated with their social background (occupation of father),
after controlling for ethnic factors (Hirschman (1975): Table 5.2).
At the level of primary schooling (and to some extent lower
secondary also), the differentiation of drop-out rates by socio-economic
backgrounds historically appears to be correlated with the medium of
language instruction for the school attended, in that (1) children from
lower socio-economic backgrounds were more likely to enroll in vernacular
(non-English medium) schools, and (2) higher dropout rates occur for vernac-
ular schools than for English medium schools. Empirical support for state-
ment (1) can be adduced from the Drop-out study (see Table 6.10) and from
Y. K. Yew (1976: 98), who found from a sample survey of Chinese students
enrolled in urban secondary schools (Form A level) that those who attended
English medium schools have a higher proportion of fathers with high
occupations than those who attended Chinese medium ones. As for statement
(2), S. Gordon (1970: 75) has calculated that, of those pupils who entered
primary school in standard one in 1964 , the drop-out rate by 1969 (stand-
ard six) was 35% for Tamil medium schools, 18% for Chinese medium schools,
16% for Malay medium schools, and only 5% for English schools. The Drop-out
study further confirms this finding in greater detail; for example, among
Malay youths in the age 15 cohort in 1972 who were enrolled in school up to
at least primary six, only 2.6% of those who went to English medium school
fail to enter secondary school, in contrast with 34.7% of those who were
in Malay medium ones.
39?
Table 6.10 Differentiation of socio-economic background of children
attending vernacular and English medium primary schools
in 1970 (%)
"Vernacular" schoola English medium school
Socioeconomic status
of head of household
High
Medium
Low
M C I Total M C I Total
15 25 9 18 58 45 31 48
53 52 36 52 35 44 35 39
31 23 55 30 7 11 34 13
Source: Drop-out study: Table 28.
Note: a - Malay, Chinese or Tamil medium schools
M - Malay
C - Chinese
I - Indian
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Of greater interest from the standpoint of upward mobility to
"high" occupation through education is the evidence on the extent of
stratification of enrollment into "elite" secondary schools and tertiary
institutions. The picture that emerges again confirms the unfavorable
positions of those who come from lower socio-economic backgrounds. Thus,
Siti Zaharah Sulaiman (1975) has shown that the selection criteria for
placement into the MARA Junior Science Colleges (MJSC) (a special elite
class of secondary schools with superior provisions.of facilities for
science education intended to improve quality of science education for
Malays) tended to actually screen out students from the lower socio-economic
backgrounds in the rural areas. Turning to enrollment in universities, an
early study in 1962/3 found 60% of the students enrolled in Universiti
Malaya to have parents with professional, civil servant or clerical
occupations, and only 5% were from farming households (UNESCO, "Higher
Education and Development in South East Asia": 327). To what extent has
this glaring stratification been narrowed since? Table 6.5 summarizes
data on father's occupational background of students enrolled in Universiti
Malaya (as well as students in secondary schools) adapted from a survey in
1968/9 (Takei et al. (1973)), and compares them with the occupational dis-
tribution of the working population as a whole around that time (adapted
from the 1967/8 SESS). Although the definition of occupations in the two
sources being compared do not exactly correspond, the much higher tendency
for the university students to come from higher occupational background
(especially the female students) is evident. This suggests that a substan-
tial gap exists between those who come from lower socio-economic backgrounds
and those from higher socio-economic backgrounds in terms of access to
tertiary education.
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Table 6.11 Selectivity of enrollment in Secondary and University
education by father's occupation, 1968-69.
(d)Father's occupation
(a)
University
students
(_)
(b)
Secondary school
students
(%)
(c)
All employed
in Peninsular
Malaysia 1967/8
(N )
male female
High (Professional,
technical,
managerial &
executive
Medium (petty
merchants &
clerical
51 65
)
17 20
)
Low, non-agricultural
(skilled manual,
semi-skilled or
unskilled workers)
Low, agricultural
(farmers, fishermen,
rubber tappers )
14 8
18 7
1258 489
19
21
30.2
49.7
6250
Source: (a), (b)--calculated from figures by ethnic groups given in Takei,
et al (1973) : Table 6,7
(c)--adapted from SESS 1967/8 as follows:
1.- Professional & technical, managerial & administrative.
2.- Clerical & sales
3.- Service, production, mining, transport & general laborers.
4.- Agricultural
(d)-- +he description of the occupational categories in parentheses
were as given in Takei et al (1973) :22. The categories
were called "high", "medium high", "low medium" & "low"
in the original source.
44 6.6
16 13.5
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d) Credential degradation over time?
Since political independence in 1957, a great expansion of
educational enrollment, particularly at the secondary education level,
has occurred (Table 6.12). Whereas in 1957 only 20.7% of the population
aged 15-19 has lower secondary education and above, by 1970 the share had
grown to 47.2%. The corresponding change for those with upper secondary
education was from 6% to 17.2%. This steady raising of the level of
educational attainment, however, was not distributed proportionately across
all occupational levels. In Section 6.2 (a), the faster pace of increase
in educational qualification for clerical occupations than for the overall
employed labor force has been alluded to. This suggests that the "screening
criterion" for access to white-collar occupations has been raised signifi-
cantly, with the implication that a degrading of the "value" of educational
credentials has occurred. The precise extent of this credential degradation
effect will now be examined more closely.
A tabulation of the occupational distribution pattern for each
level of educational attainment has been made in Appendix 6B for the 1967/8
SESS and the 1973 Manpower Survey separately. From this, Table 6.13 is
formed, which compares the differential in the proportion of workers with
different educational attainment who have entered "white-collar" and
"managerial/administrative" occupations. Two points emerge from examining
Table 6.13:
1) Except for university degree holders, holders of all other
levels of educational qualification had declined in their share of "white
collar and up" occupations.
2) The differential between those whose highest qualification
was LCE and those who were below LCE had decreased, while the differential
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Table 6.12 Distribution of population by educational attainment and
age-group, Peninsular Malaysia, 1957-70.
Educational
attainment
No schooling
(0 yr.)
Primary
(1-6 yr.)
Lower secondary 4.5
(7-9 yr.)
Upper secondary 1.8
(10-11 yr.)
Post secondary 0.8
(12+ yr)
All ages Age 15-19 Age 20-24
1957 1970 1225 1970 1957 1270
55.6 40.6 25.7 8.6 37.9 12.7
37.1 44.6 53.6 44.2 48.1 56.7
9.3 14.7 56.0
4.7
0.8
5.1 15.6
0.9 1.6
7.6 13.5
4.4 13.9
2.0 3.1
Age 25-29
122
44.8
44.7
5.8
2.7
1.8
12Z0
20.5
57.9
9.2
10.2
2.2
tource: 1970 jopulation Census Vol. 1 : Table 4.15
Table 6.13 Difference in percentage share of white-collar & managerial/
administrative occupation between employed persons with different
educational attainment level, 1967/8 and 1973.
(a) less than LCE
(b) with LCE, less
than MCE
(c) with MCE/HSC
(d) with universit
degree
(b) - (a)
(c)-- (b)
(d) - (c)
Source: Appendix Table 6B
4.7
56.0
77.0
88.9
+51.3
+21.0
+11.9
2.4
24.4
55.7
95.9
+22.0
+31.3
+40.2
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between those holding LCE and those holding SC/HSC, as well as that
between those holding SC/HSC and those holding university degrees, had
increased.
The same conclusions would hold if we had excluded the "manageri-
al/administrative" occupations, and considered "white-collar" occupations
only.
If the proportion of workers with given occupational qualifica-
tions holding "white-collar" occupations can be used as a rough proxy
measure for the probability of a worker with those qualifications gaining
13
a "white-collar" job, then the following conclusions can be drawn:
(1) with the exception of university graduates, everyone else's chances
have decreased; (2) the advantage of an LCE credential over the lack of
one has become less, while the advantage of an SC/HSC credential over
LCE has increased, as has a university degree over SC/HSC.
e) Implications for intergenerational occupational mobility
Given the rapid pace of expansion of educational enrollment, it
can be expected that those from lower socio-economic backgrounds today
on the whole stand a better chance to achieve higher educational attain-
ment than their parents (A. B. Wilson (1977)). However, to the extent
that credential degradation reduces the worth of a given educational quali-
fication today as compared with before, there is a decline in occupational
attainment with given educational attainment. Whether intergenerational
upward mobility is achieved (in terms of occupational attainment) by those
from lower socioeconomic backgrounds therefore depends crucially on the
interaction of these two processes: rapid expansion of the former may be
nullified by rapid development of the latter, and the net effect may be a
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mere credential "inflation" (with increased cost to everybody, but the
burden proportionately more on the poor) without mobility, R. Dare
(1975) has aptly termed this the "diploma disease".
f) Growing gap between white-collar job openings and expectations:
the problem of educated unemployment
A consequence of this educational credential degradation trend
is the growing gap between the number of white-collar (especially cleri-
cal) job openings and expectations on the part of the employment seekers
who hold credentials which previously would have landed them such jobs
easily but now are insufficient to pass the higher "screening" threshold.
Mazumdar (1977) has noted the existence of this gap from his analysis of
the 1973 World Bank School Leaver Survey data (which covered holders of
LCE and MCE certificates). Two other sources of information can be
utilized to provide further documentation. The first is the 1967/8 SESS:
Table 6.14 summarizes the relevant data. The proportion of first-time
employed seeking clerical work was 6 times as much as the actual propor-
tion of clerical workers employed, while the corresponding ratio for
agricultural jobs was as low as one-tenth. The second source is the
unemployment registration offices. The proportion of registrants seeking
clerical jobs has risen from 15% in the early 1960s to over 20% in the
early 1970s; these proportions are about 4 times the proportion of actual
clerical employment.
It is true that a gap has not existed as yet for professional
and technical occupations as a whole, according to the above information
sources, which suggests that credential degradation has not yet set in
for many of these occupations. Since many of these occupations require
degree qualifications (e.g., doctors, lawyers, architects, and (more
Pattern of occupations sought by unemployed & actual
occupational pattern of employed in 1967/8
% of occupations sought by
first time unemployed, but
unemployed previous employed
(a) (b)
Admins. & Manag.
Prof. & tech.
Clerical
13.9
0.1
23.4
3.3
0.9
9.6
actual occupations
among
empl oyed (%)
(c)
5.0
1.6
4.1
Sales 2.2 5.9 9.4 0.2
Services 14.2 14.5 7.3 1.9
Production, transport 38.8 51.3 23.0 1.7
mining & general
laboure
Agricultural 6.2 13.8 49.7 0.12
Any type of job 1.2 0.8 -*
All 100 100 100
source : calculated from 1967/8 SESS
Table 6.15
Educational
attainment
none
primary
lower secondary
upper secondary
post secondary
Unemployment rate (as % of labor force)
and educational attainment, 1967/8
age-group
all(l5-64) 15-19 20-24,
2.4
6.0
17.6
19.7
11.9
9.9
16.0
36.6
55.1
45.5
5.1
7.8
18.5
27.9
19.4
by age-group
25-64
1.9
2.6
4.3
5.0
2.0
source : calculated from 1967/8 SESS
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Table 6.14
(a)
2.8
0.06
5.7
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recently) permanent secondary school teaching positions), the number of
such degree holders may still be restricted in the short run by limited
spaces in local universities. With the recent great expansion of local
university outputs and the swelling of the number of students going
overseas, however, this situation is not likely to last long for most
professional and technical occupations.
Directly related to this growing gap between white-collar job
aspiration and actual job availability is the dramatic growth of educa-
ted unemployment. Table 6.15 documents the unemployment rate (as % of
labor force) by educational attainment and age-group. Not only did those
with lower and upper-secondary education have the highest unemployment
rate, but the rate increases with the younger age-cohort: for those
age 15-19, as much as 37% of those with lower-secondary education and 55%
of those with upper-secondary education were unemployed, as compared with
4% and 5% respectively for those aged 25-64.
The implication of this trend of credential degradation and high
incidence of educated unemployment will be examined in Section 6.4.
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6.3 Labor market segmentation: "formal"-"informal" dualization and
the blue collar "labor aristocracy" hypothesis
In the previous sections, an attempt to identify the stratification
of employment positions by broad occupational groups and their differential
access conditions has been made. The possibility that there exists further
differentiation by the production organization characteristics of the
enterprise in which the employment positions are located has been alluded
to but not investigated. This question concerning the existence of hori-
zontal labor market segmentation will now be examined systematically in
this section.
6.3.1 The concept of horizontal labor market segmentation
Any theory of "horizontal"labor market segmentation has to show
three things:
(1) the existence of a differential between "equivalent" occupa-
tions in different sectors
(2) the causes of the differential
(3) the consequences of the differential
The crux of the problem is in defining what constitutes equivalent
occupations. Conceptually, one can identify occupations with the same
skill requirement to be equivalent, but in practice, such a conceptuali-
zation is difficult to operationalize: how does one measure skill require-
ments? Many writers have used educational attainment as a proxy measure,
but from our discussion earlier, education is a rather poor proxy measure
for the skill contents of most occupations except for the professional
and technical ones. At the production levels, most skills are either
acquired through on-the-job training or through family traditions (e.g.,
handicraft skills, which in reality is also a form of on-the-job learning),
and formal education has little or no relevance.
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An alternative view is that the productivity of workers should
be the criterion for ranking the skill content of the occupation that
they hold, but this view is also problematic, since the productivity of
labor cannot be defined apart from the non-labor input factors that he
has to work with; the same person can dig a hole in 10 minutes or 10 hours
depending on whether he works with an excavator or with a simple changkul.
Moreover, for many occupations in the tertiary sector, there is simply
no direct measure of productivity possible except for the level of wages
paid for them or the earnings that they generate: how is the productivity
of a hawker, a salesman, a waitress, a watchman, a policeman, or an
office messenger boy to be measured?
These conceptual and empirical measurement problems notwith-
standing, the general argument can be made that, for most manual occupations,
the amount of skills needed to perform the tasks defined by these occupa-
tions can be required by most workers with relatively small differences in
training cost, and thus in reality, most manual occupations can be regarded
as equivalent to each other. The point is that differences between manual
occupations are not due so much to the personal characteristics of the
individuals holding such occupations (at least at the initial point of
entry) as to the institutional characteristics of the production units
involved.
Indeed, the major thrust of the labor market segmentation argu-
ment is focused on manual or blue-collar occupations, and not on the more
17skilled, technical and professionalized occupations. As originally made,
the argument applies to wage-workers only (as the concept of wage-earnings
(and hence of labor market) does not really apply to the self-employed)
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but it can be extended to cover the relatively "unskilled" self-employed
occupations, on the assumption that individuals who are trying to choose
between wage-employment and self-employment would consider the earnings
from the latter as a form of "imputed" wage-rate. The basic argument is
that manual workers in some enterprises are better-off than equivalent
manual workers in other enterprises in terms of earnings, job security
and upward mobility prospects (income-and social status-wise).
That such a differentiation exists to a significant degree is
the fundamental starting point of the "formal-informal" dualization
18
approach which has been gaining much popularity in recent years. From
the perspective of our framework, the formal-informal dualization approach
basically collapses the differentials between production organization
sectors (and their corresponding labor markets) into a single one:
that between a relatively "protected" formal sector and a relatively
free-entry informal sector.
Different writers have identified the formal and informal sector
in different ways. For some, the distinction turns on the difference
between wage-employment and self-employment. For some others, it is
the distinction between employment in the secondary sectors and those in
the tertiary sectors which is crucial. For still others, it is the differ-
ential between large enterprises and small firms. Obviously, these
different definitions overlap to a large extent, although by no means
completely. Some writers abstract away the government sector in their
formulation, but most would include it as constituting part of the formal
sector.
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Causes of differential
Why is there such a differential? Two possible sets of factors
have been advanced in the theoretical literature:
(1) Differential imposition of Government protective labor legis-
lation (e.g. minimum wage law, whereby the formal sector is covered but
not the informal sector) and strong unionization in the formal sector.
Both these factors are said to protect the earning power and job security
of the workers in the formal sector in a manner that workers in the informal
sector are not able to. Instead, entry to the latter is assumed to be
relatively free, so that wages -or earnings return to self-employment are
bid down by market competition.
(2) Differential "wage-productivity" considerations of different
19
types of production enterprises. To the extent that an increase in the
wage-level actually increases productivity more than proportionately to
the wage increase, there will be an incentive on the part of the manage-
ment to increase wages even under free competitive labor market considera-
tions. The argument boils down to the assumption that this "wage-produc-
tivity" relationship applies more to firms in the formal sector. Due to
the generally higher proportion of capital and technological inputs used
by these firms, there may be a greater need for stability of workforce
to ensure their smooth and maximum rate of utilization, i.e., increased
wage-cost at the margin may be less important than the cost of under-
utilization occasioned by high labor turnover and work stoppages.
Consequences of differential
A whole host of inter-related consequences are said to follow from
the maintenance of a differential between the formal and informal sector,
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although different writers may emphasize different ones. At one level,
the "artificial" institutional protection given to workers in the formal
sector is said to generate the growth of a privileged class of blue-
,20collar workers, or a "labor aristocracy", who enjoy higher income and
social status than their fellow blue-collar workers elsewhere. Simultane-
ously, this is said to raise labor cost, thus discouraging the use of
labor-intensive techniques on the part of the formal sector employers,
and induce capital-labor substitution in such a way as to reduce the number
of jobs created. Alternatively, would-be investors (especially foreign ones)
might be discouraged, and hence reduce job creation even more. Thus, the
"privileges" of the labor aristocracy are at the expense of more jobs for
their fellow manual workers elsewhere. But this is not all. The "arti-
ficially" high wages in the formal sector is said to induce a high rate
21
of rural-urban migration. In the standard "Todaro" school of thought,
migrants are prepared to move to the city (and once arrived, to remain search-
ing for an extended period) even though the probability of getting a formal
sector job is low, because the high benefit accruing from "hitting the
jackpot" pushes up the expected earnings. This massive influx of migrants
is said to result in high urban unemployment, or to crowding in the "free-
entry" informal sector, thereby pushing down wages and earnings in the
latter sector even more. The result is a rapid involutionary growth of
"subproletariats"22 who aspire to move into the rank of the "labor aristoc-
racy", but few succeed because expansion of the latter is restricted.
Moreover, this polarization is said to fragment the manual laborers politi-
cally, since the interests of the two groups are opposed to each other.
The "labor aristocracy" is said to be conservative politically; since it owes
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its good fortune to the firms that employ it and to the government that
protects it, it is not about to "rock the boat" too much. The "subprole-
tariats", on the other hand, are said to be more prepared to "rock the
boat", since they presumably have nothing to lose.
How relevant is this chain of arguments to the urban labor market
of Peninsular Malaysia? In what follows, an attempt will be made to examine
the empirical validity of some of the major propositions central to this
framework of approach for post-colonial Malaysia.
The question that has to be confronted first, before empirical
analysis can begin, is: How do we define the formal and informal sectors?
To avoid pre-judging the issue by making an arbitrary choice, an attempt
will be made in what follows to cover as many different dimensions of
possible differentiation as data availability allows. In particular, we
shall examine the validity of the following hypotheses:
(1) A systematic differential in wage-earnings and job security
exists between blue-collar wage-workers in large firms (or in the corporate
sector) and those in small firms (or firms in the small capitalist sector)
in the "secondary" sectors (manufacturing, construction, transport).
(2) This differential is due to government legislative protection
or strong union protection, or both.
(3) A systematic differential in earnings exists between blue-
collar wage-workers in the secondary sectors and blue-collar wage-workers
and self-employed workers in the tertiary sectors ("lower sales" and "lower
service" workers).
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6.3.1 Differential in wage earnings between large and small firms
Four sources of data will be utilized in examining the (possible)
differential in earnings between employees at the same occupational level
in large and small firms. The first is the series of manufacturing surveys/
censuses published by the Department of Statistics. Average wage earnings
by occupation (at the aggregate 1-digit level) and legal status of the firm
can be calculated from the "employment and payroll" section of these reports.
The definition of wage earnings in these reports is very comprehensive and
includes wage payment in kind, bonuses, overtime, etc. The 1968 Census and
the Surveys for 1969, 1970, and 1972 have been chosen, since earlier surveys/
censuses did not provide the relevant breakdown of employment and payroll by
separate occupations and legal status of firm, and data later than 1972 was
not available at the time of writing. The second source is Chee Peng Lim's
(1974) survey of manufacturing firms, which provides a breakdown of earnings
by occupation and employment size of firm. Being an independent survey,
this provides a useful complementary check on the findings from the first
data source. The third source of data is the 1973 Survey of Construction
Industries, also published by the Department of Statistics. The data format
for this source is identical to that of the first source, but there is one
difference in terms of coverage: the employment and payroll data for the
construction industries exclude firms with output value less than $100,000
a year. The last data source we shall use is the 1968 Census of Mining
Industries published by the Department of Statistics; this would provide
information on wage differentials in another production activity as an
independent check.
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Tables 6.16 to 6.19 summarize the relevant information on
earning differentials computed from these data sources. To facilitate
comprehension, we have indexed the wage earning level for a given occupation
across different types of firms being compared, the index for the largest
firms being 100 in each case.
Examining first the case of manufacturing firms (Table 6.16),
the following points emerge:
1) Wage earnings are higher in public limited companies than
private limited companies, partnerships, and sole proprietorships, in that
order. The only exception is contract labor, which does not have any
consistent pattern in the four years examined. The hypothesis that a
systematic average wage-earning differential exists between firms of
different modes of production organization is therefore a valid one,
with the exception of contract labor.
2) The differential is, however, of different degrees
the different occupations. In particular, the differential is most extreme
for managerial occupations (particularly managerial occupations with
professional qualifications), "technical and supervisory" occupations
come second, "clerical" third, and the "blue-collar" occupations ("general"
workers transport, maintenance, etc.] , skilled and unskilled factory
workers) last. Differences among the blue-collar occupations themselves
do not appear to have a consistent pattern, being more extreme for factory
workers in 1968 and 1970, but for "general" workers in 1972.
3) The wage earnings differential among firms appears to have
narrowed over time for all occupational levels. For example, the average
earnings of directly employed factory workers for sole proprietorships was
52.6% of that for public limited companies in 1968, but had since increased
Index of average monthly earnings by legal status of firms for different
occupations in the manufacturing industry, 1968-2 (public limited co. = 100)
1968
a. b. C. d.
managerial
-professional
-non-professional
technical &
supervisory
100 59.6 23.3 23.1
a. b.
100 63.4
100 87.0
1969
c. d.
1970
a. b. c.
1972
d. a. b. c. d.
n.a. 18.9 100 60.1 17.9 18.1 100 65.9
100 72.3
100 75.1
n.a. 46.3 100 70.0 46.0 41.3 100
22.0
21.2
32.0
68.3 48.3
22.4
22.3
31.6
48.8
100 83.4 44.7 46.1 100 83.7 n.a. 47.8 100 83.2 52.0 48.6 100 84-3 56.0 52.4
general workers
directly employed
factory workers
-skilled
-unskilled
factory workers
employed through
contractors
100 80.5 59.5 54.1 100 80.1
100 65.8 57.9 52.6 100 n.a.
100 63.8
100 69.9
100 122.8 129.3 108.7
n.a. 56.8
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
54.1
60.2
100 120.2 n.a. 112.4
100 779 44.0 60.0 100 79.6 70.1 63.7
100 72.7
100 59.5
100 82.1
100
68.8
60.8
68.6
83.2 72.2 67.7 100 91.7 102.0 100.0
source : 1968 Census of Manufacturing industries; 1969,1970,1972 Survey of Manufacturing industries
notes : a. - public limited company g b. - private limited company ;
c. - partnership ; d. - sole proprietorship
for 1968, aggregation of 'managerial' and 'technical/supervisory' was made since no
breakdown was given in the source itself; for 1969, items with n.a. were actually
available in the source, but was not calculated due to oversight
clerical
64.0
53.1
64.2
100
100
100
75.5
80.8
74.2
74.5
83.1
65.4
71.1
76.9
62.9
HP
Table 6.16
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to 71.1% in 1972. The corresponding change for partnerships was from
57.9% to 74.5%, and for private limited companies from 65.8% to 75.5%.
Turning to Table 6.17, which summarizes results from Chee Peng
Lim's (1974) survey, we see that there is a rather strong positive
correlation between the level of wage earnings and the employment size
of firms for all occupations. Moreover, a gradation of differential is
again observed, i.e., the differential between firm size is again most
extreme for managerial 'occupations, next for clerical, and least for
factory workers (unskilled factory workers appear to have a higher
differential than skilled factory workers, although the difference is
not large). Both these observations therefore confirm findings (1) and (2)
from Table 6.17.
The above conclusions pertain to the manufacturing sector only.
Table 6.18 presents the case for construction firms. The same pattern of
a systematic differential across firms and a gradation of differential
among occupations can be observed, thus suggesting that the hypothesis of
systematic wage differentials between large and small firms is valid for
the "secondary" sector (manufacturing and construction combined) as a
whole. However, there are two differences between this case and that of
the manufacturing sector that need to be clarified.
First, the wage differentials for the construction industries
as shown in Table 6.18 appear to be much less than those for the manufacturing
sector as shown in Table 6.17. Does this imply that wage differentials
are less among construction firms than among manufacturing firms? Not
necessarily, for recall that only those construction firms with an annual
output value over $100,000 are covered in Table 6.18, whereas Table 6.16
covered all enumerated manufacturing firms. Since almost all the small
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Table 6.17 Index of average monthly wage by firm size for different
occupations, 1973 Small-scale Manufacturing Survey
Occupation of paid
full-time employee
Managerial
Clerical
Factory workers, skilled
Factory workers, unskilled
Contract workers
All
Paid full-time employment size of firm
0-4 - 10-19 20-29 30-49 5
38.9 43.6 57.7 79.3 80.4 100
56.8 56.9 67.7 72.8 74.8 100
78.7 87.2 89.9 105.6 87.6 100
63.1 86.7 85.1 91.2 82.6 100
* 56.0 94.0 88.1 41.0 100
62.0 54.3 64.8 81.5 68.6 100
source : Chee Peng Lim (1976) : Table II. 16
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Table 6.18 Index of average monthly wage-earnings by legal status of
firms for different occupations, Construction Industry 1973
occupation of paid
full-time employee
Public
LTD Co.
Private
LTD Co. Partnership
Individual
Proprietorship
Managerial
-professional
-non-professional
Technical & Supervisory
Clerical
General
Directly employed
Production workers
-skilled
-unskilled
Prod. workers employed
through contractors
-skilled
-unskilled
All
1973 Survey of Construction Industries
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
100
80.5
96.8
55.7
87.2
90.1
80.6
8701
72.4
101.1
90.0
11100
84.8
44.5
49.8
46.0
60.5
91.1
73.7
77.0
65.9
93.8
78.5
101.4
73.1
48.9
47.1
51.5
61.6
91.7
76.1
76.7
72.4
98.
76.8
105.6
73.7
source : calculated from
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firms (with less than $100,000 annual output value) excluded from
Table 6.18 were unincorporated firms, this would have the effect of
reducing the true differential between corporate and unincorporated
firms. There is no way to know whether this under-coverage effect
might fully account for the lower differentials observed between
Table 6.16 and Table 6.18.
Second, in the case of unincorporated construction firms
covered in Table 6.18, it appears that average earnings in sole
proprietorships are actually higher than in partnerships. Again,
whether this is due entirely to the artifact of under-coverage of
small individual proprietorships (which comprised most of the excluded
small firms) cannot be determined.
Finally, turning to the mining sector (Table 6.19), the same
systematic wage-earning differential can be observed (whether according
to mode of production organization or output size of firm). However,
in this case, the occupational grouping is extremely broad, lumping all
managerial and white-collar workers in one and all "blue-collar" workers
in the other. The same gradation of differential between white-collars
and blue-collars is observed, though.
Before we draw firm conclusions from these observations, several
issues concerning the validity of the proxy measures used should be discussed.
First, the observed differentials pertain to average wage earnings,
not wage rates. If there are systematic variations in number of hours worked
by employees in different types of firms, then this would account for part
of the earnings differentials observed. There is unfortunately no information
available on hours worked to check this possibility.
Second, since females are generally paid lower wages than males,
it is conceivable that the earning differentials could be largely accounted for
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by systematic differences in the proportion of females employed between
different types of firms. There is no separate breakdown of earnings by sex
to check this directly, but the proportion of females in each occupation by
different firm types can be calculated, and there appears to be no significant
differences between firm types, as illustrated by the following findings from
the 1972 Manufacturing survey:
Sole Private Public
% of females in proprietorship Partnership Ltd. Co. Ltd. Co.
Clerical 32.5 30.8 32.9 30.4
Skilled factory work 23.6 25.4 46.0 37.8
Unskilled " " 31.4 35.5 45.7 34.2
It can therefore be concluded that differences in the proportion of
females -employed could not have accounted for much of the wage differential
trend observed.
Third, given that the occupational categories used in the data sources
are rather broad, part of the variations in wage earnings could simply be due
to differences in the composition of more detailed occupational mix within the
given broad occupational categories. For example, "technical" workers in public
limited companies may be involved in much more skilled and qualified jobs than
those in sole proprietorships who nevertheless get classified in the same occu-
pational category. While this is undoubtedly an important factor for the
managerial and white-collar occupations, its effect is likely to be much less
in the case of "blue-collar" occupations.
Fourth, as far as production workers are concerned, there is the
possibility that the same occupational category may in fact involve jobs of
different risks, health hazards or labor strains in different types of firms,
and part of the wage differentials observed could be due to differential com-
pensation for these differences in work conditions. There is, again, no data
to check this possibility, however.
Given the rather systematic and consistent pattern of wage-earning
differentials observed, however, these possible qualifications are not likely
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Table 6.19 Index of average annual wage earnings by firm type and
firm size for different occupations in the mining
industry,196 8
Occupation of paid
full-time employees
Managerial,supervisory,
technical'& clerical
Other wage
worker
a) By Legal Status
Individual
proprietorship
Partnership
Private Ltd
Public Ltd
b) By output size ($'000)
<50
50-100
100-200
200-500
500-1000
1000-2000
2000-5000
5000+
Source: calculated from 1968 Mining Cenaus,various tables
to revise much the picture of a systematic earning differential between more
or less equivalent occupations in different production organization sectors.
2768
2737
5002
8681
1943
2901
2966
3030
4860
7213
8568
7814
Index
31.9
31.5
37.6
100.0
24.9
37.1
38.0
38.8
62.2
92.3
109.6
100
1723
1790
2132
2490
1286
1611
1743
1840
2265
2298
2353
2983
Index
69.2
71.9
85.6
100
43.1
54.0
58.4
61.7
75.9
77.0
78.9
100
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dLA-3. Differential in security of wage-employment between large and
small firms
i) Evidence on method of wage payment
One way to assess the security of a wage-job is to examine the
method of wage payment, on the assumption that the length of the payment
period varies proportionately with the degree of job security, that is,
that the monthly payment method indicates the most secure while the
piece-rate method indicates the least. If one is paid by the day,
often one can be fired with only a day's notice being given (David
Lim (1976):72).
Three sources of information are available on the methods of wage
payment among urban workers. The first is the 1971 Occupational
Wage Survey conducted by the Department of Statistics, which covers
wage-employees in 13 manufacturing indistries. Table 6.20 summarizes
the relevant information calculated from the raw data given in the
Survey Report. It can be seen that the clerical and supervisory workers
were almost entirely paid on a monthly salary basis, whereas the pro-
duction operatives and general laborers were mostly paid by the day.
The general maintenance and transport workers appear to occupy an
intermediate position in terms of payment period. In view of the fact
that the employees covered by this survey were all employed in firms
with over 50 and over 100 full-time employees (and hence can be con-
23
sidered as employees in large firms) , the relative high incidence of
of daily wage-payment among them suggests that the security of employment
for "blue collar" wage workers in these large firms cannot be much better
than for the industry as a whole.
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Table 6.20
Method of wage payment in Manufacturing Industries, 1971
(Occupational Wage Sure
% distribution of full-time paid employees by
method of wage payment
2
monthly daily hourly incentive
rated rated rated scheme
a) Clerical workers, male 100
female
b) Office boy, male 100 - -
c) Product Supervisors &
General Foreman
male 93.9 6.1 -
female 100 - -
d) General maintenance &
material movement
workers
male 67.4 22.9 9.7 -
e) Production workers male 13.7 51.6 16.1 18.6
f) General Laborers male 13.8 67.2 9.0 -
female 14.9 80.1 5.0 -
Source: calculated from 1971 Occupational wage survey, Table 1 to 13,
Table 14.2
Note: 1 . Plant maintenance mechanics, general carpenters, lorry driver
and attendant, van driver and watchman.
2. The category "incentive scheme" is not well-defined in the
report, but appears to be similar to piece-rate.
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This impression is further confirmed by a second data source.
David Lim (1976) has documented the method of wage payment among production
workers in his sample survey of 350 establishments in 28 manufacturing
industry groups in 1972. He found 38.9% of the establishments paid their
production workers monthly, 0.9% weekly, 44.9% daily, 14.6% hourly, and 0,9%
piece-rate.
A third source of information is the annual survey of wages in
the transport sector (road haulage and bus companies) by the Ministry of
Labor (Table 6.21). The predominance of short-duration wage-payment
among manual wage-workers is again confirmed. Since the firms covered
24by the survey are generally medium to large, this suggests the job
security for manual wage-workers is not very high among larger enterpri-
ses in the transport sector either.
In summary, it can be concluded that wage-payment period is
generally short for most manual workers in the secondary sectors, even
those in medium to large firms.
ii) The use of contract labor
Another indication of the degree of employment security among
Table 6.21 Proportion of workers on daily and piece-rate wage payment
in the transport sector, 1974 (%)
(a) Road haulage (b) Bus companies
Lorry drivers 55 Bus drivers 88
Lorry attendants 48 Bus conductors - male 89
Workshop staff - skilled 39 - female 73
- semi-skilled 61 Workshop - skilled 69
General laborers - male 47 - semi-skilled 76
Apprentices 82 General laborers - male 54
Ticket inspectors 62
Apprentices 51
Source: Ministry of Labor AR (1974)
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manual workers is the extent of hiring through labor contractors.
Contract labor tends to be insecure as a form of employemnt in so far
as the worker is hired only for the duration specified by the labor
contractors, which in turn depends on the size of the task assigned
by the employers to the contractors. Kusuda (1971) has argued that
contract-labor can be viewed as a system of hiring labor that is resorted
to by employers where a fully universalized free wage labor market
has yet been developed, and that the role of the labor contractors
can be seen as one of performing the task of recruiting, organizing
and disciplining the labor for the employers. A variety of labor
contracting systems exist. Some labor contractors specialize in the
supply of certain occupations, while others provide teams or gangs
of inter-related workers. Sometimes labor contractors act simply
as agents for their clients in return for a stipulated commission
calculated on the value of output produced by the workers supplied.
Often, however, labor contractors work on their own account, entering
into contracts with a variety of clients to supply prescribed quantities
of labor for an agreed sum, and hiring workers and paying wages directly.
In all cases, albor contracting tends to be organized on a racial or
even subethnic, clannish and kinship lines (Mahmet (1972):282-3).
Personal relationship between the contractor and his labor team is often
emphasized; rules within the team regarding seniority, wages, conditions
of work and discipline may be imposed according to traditional or
customary codes.
Table 6.22 presents available evidence on the extent of contract-
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Table 6.22 Extent of contract-labor employment in selected industries
Sector of activity
(a) Construction
-1966
-1968
-1970
-1972
-1973
(b) Manufacturing - all
-1968
-1970
-1972
(c) Saw-milling
-1958
-1967
-1972
(d) Rice-milling
-1958
-1967
-1972
(e) Rubber milling
-1958
-1967
(f) Tin-mining
-1966 (Asian-owned-mines)
(European owned mines)
-1970
-1973.-
*ources :
Notes :
Contract labor as
of all employed
38.3
63.8
70.1
70.6
71.3
10.6
11.8
10.4
38.7
25.2
45.9
32.7
26.4
32.8
34.5
39.2
6.4
21.6
18.0
13.3
(a) - Survey of Construction Industries (v.y.);
(b) - Survey of Manufacturing Industries (1970, 1972);
Census of Manufacturing Industries (1968)
(c),(d),(e) - Mn. of Labor AR (1958, 1967); Survey of
Manufacturing Industries (1972)
(f) Mining Census (v.y.)
(1) Figures refer to reported contract labor only. Many
establishments may not have been able to report the
number of contract labor employed fully.
(2) For data on the incidence of contract labor in the
plantation sector, see Table 3. in chapter 3.
(3) Contract-labor hiring is overwhelmingly concentrated
among manual workers. Since the above data are presented
in the form of incidence among all employed, they
understate the true extent of incidence among manual
workers.
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Table 6.23 Average fluctuation in employment & wages in FIDA-approved
firms, 1976.
Distribution of firms with
employment wages/salary
Size of firm increase same decrease increase same decrease
(no. of full-time % %
paid employees. )
50-99 31 54 15 53 35 12
100-200 37 51 12 65 31 4
200+ 42 48 10 61 34 5
Source: calculated from survey data by FIDA reported in FIDA Annual
Report 1976, Appendix V ; 258,259.
note: an unweighted average over the three survey periods (4an.-April,
May-August, & September-December) is used in each case.
In 1976, the Federal Industrial Development Authority (FIDA)
conducted 3 rounds of surveys on the production conditicns of firms
that it approved under various incentive schemes. These firms
were all medium to large corporate enterprises, and represented the
most modernized segment of the manufacturing sector. Table 6.23
summarizes the relevant information of employment and wage changes
in the firms surveyed. On average, 10-15% of the firms were found to
have reduced their workforce over the year, and 5-12% their wage/salary
rate. As 1976 was a relatively favorable year for industrial activity,
with significant expansion of production (FIDA AR: 148), the above
estimates of retrenchment incidence could be considered lower than average
for the 1970's.
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In summary, the following conclusion can be drawn from the
empirical findings in 6.3.2 and 6.3.3. Systematic wage differential
does appear to exist to some extent between large firms and small
firms for all occupations in the manufacturing, construction and mining
sector. The differential is higher for managerial and white-collar
occupations than for blue collar occupations. Among the latter,
average wage-earnings in the unincoporated sector were about 60%
to 8% that prevailing in the largest corporate firms. In terms
of average wage earnings alone, therefore, there appears to be some
objective basis for the emergence of a blue-collar "labor aristocracy".
In terms of job security, however, the evidence appears rather weak:
blue collar employees in the larger firms do not appear significantly
more secure than their counterparts in smaller firms, and in any case,
no across-the-board generalizations can be made, since the security
of jobs partly depend on the nature of the production activities
in question - jobs in firms engaging in volatile export markets
(electronics assembly, textiles, etc.) were extremely insecure, even
though the firms involved are large corporate enterprises.
Assuming that the observed wage-earnings differential does
have some objective significance, the question that needs to be
addressed next isi to what extent is this wage-earnings differential
(as well as whatever job security differentials) the result of
V E
government protective labor legislation and/or strong union bargaining
power?
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6.3.4 The protective effect of Government labor legislation and
unionization
a) Effect of Government labor legislation
As far as the protective effect of Government labor legislation
is concerned, the answer is essentially negative. Edwards (1975:
Appendix 4) has documented in detail the consistently restrictive
nature of Government labor legislative developments throughout the
post-War period. Kasper (1974), in an analysis that extols Malaysia as
a model for 'successful development', concluded:
".....On the whole, it has been the official policy not to
encourage unionism. In addition, in the late 1960's,
when unemployment became a visible problem, policy decisions
were to keep labor costs low." (p. 25-6)
At the end of 1970, only 172,500 workers were subject to
minimum wage regulations, all of them in urban service industries
(shop assistants, catering, hotel and cinema workers and certain
workers in ports)(Kasper (1974):25), whereas the more crucial manufactur.ig
transport and construction sectors were exempted. This situation
has continued to date. With its stress on encouraging foreign
investment in the key sectors of manufacturing, keeping labor cost
low becomes a central aspect of Malaysian Government industrial
development promotional drive as it competes with other neighbouring
LDC's (Thailand, Indonesia, Philippines) who pursue the same policy.29
b) Protective effect of unionization
To what extent has the alleged protection effect of unionization
operated in Peninsular Malaysia's urban labor market, particularly in
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the large corporate sector? Despite the importance of the subject,
there has been hardly any empirical study by previous researchers. The
brief attempt at empirical documentation below should therefore be
seen as preliminary, but the evidences do appear sufficiently suggestive
for the tentative conclusion that trade union protection has generally
been weak overall, and that the situation with large corporate firms
are not that different.
i) The extent of unionization
The overall extent of unionization among wage-labor in Peninsular
Malaysia has been low by international standards, apart from the
plantation sector (Kasper(1974): 25). It is estimated that, in 1965,
only 24, of all Peninsular Malaysia's wage earners were unionized
(compiled from Trade Union Registry AR 1965). By 1971, the proportion
has actually declined to 21% as a result of the declaration of
"Emergency" in 1969, although it has subsequently risen to over
28 in 1976 (Economic Report 1977/8: 160).
Even such relatively low estimates give a misleadingly high
impression )for the degree of unionization is very uneven in different
sector with the plantation sector and the public sector accounting for
a large proportion of the unionized wage-labor force (see Table 6.2 )
For example, in 1976, the Government and statutory bodies' employees
comprised 44% of all unionized workers, with the plantation sector
accounting for another 30. Thus, all the other sectors (manufac-
turing, construction, transport, etc.) accounted for less than one-
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Table 6.24 The Largest Unions in Peninsular Malaysia
1968 & 1975
Membership (1000's)
1) National Union of Plantation
Workers (NUPW)
2) National Union of Teachers
(Peninsular Malaysia)
3) National Union of Commercial
Workers
4) Amalgamated National Union of
Local Authorities Employees
5) Railwaymen's Union of Malaya
6) National Mining Workers' Union
of Malaya
1975
117.7
12.9
11.5
10.5
9.1
9.0
Source: Trade Union Registry, AR 1968,1975
Table 6.25 Distribution of Trade Unions by Sector, Peninsular
Malaysia, 1970 & 1976
1970
No. of Membership
Unions (1000's)
1976
No. of Membership
Unions (1000's)
Government and Quasi-
Government
Plantation and Agriculture
Manufacturing
Transport and Communication
Banking and Commerce
Services (incl. public
sector unions)
Construction
Mining and Quarrying
Total
Total Estimated Wage
Labor Force
Source: Economic Report 1977/8: Table 10.1
95.2
7.9
9.1
5.1
10.9
12.3
Sector
157
16
28
26
20
141
3
3
251
141.7
106.3
22.0
32.3
9.7
125.8
0.9
11.9
322.6
166
23
36
27
27
141
4
4
277
212.3
145.2
63.2
47.1
11.3
175.4
1.1
9.8
482.3
16921474
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Table 6.26 Growth of Trade Unions in Peninsula Malaysia
1950-1976
Total Private Sector
no. of member- no. of member-
unions ship
(1000's)
unions ship
(1000's)
Government and
Local Authority and
Statutory Bodies
no. of member-
unions ship
(1000's)
118 54.6 84 n.a. 84 n.a.
235 145-7 98 n.a. 137 n.a.
266 238 87 161.0 179 47.0
286 327 126 230. 160 96.9
251 322.6 94 180.9 157 141.7
277 482.3 111 270.0 166 212.3
Source: Trade Union Registry AR (v.y.)
Table 6.27
Membership
Size
< 100
100 - 200
200 - 500
500 - 1000
1000 - 2000
2000 - 5000
5000 -10,000
> 10000
All
Total (n)
Distribution of Trade Unions
1968 & 1975
No. of unions
1968
72
41
42
31
31
18
4
3
242
1975
60
29
55
34
32
30
8
4
by Membership Size,
Membership (f)
1968
1.1
2.0
4.7
7.2
15.6
22.0
8.8
38.3
252
27
0.7
1.0
4.1
5.8
10.6
22.0
12.9
42.8
100 100
(300,200) (425,400)
Source: Trade Union Registry AR: 1968 & 1975
1950
1955
1961
1965
1970
1976
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quarter of all the unionized workers in 1976; a rough estimate would
indicate that the unionized workers in these sectors constituted not
more than 12% of the total wage-employment in these sectors (which com-
prised over 60% of the total wage-labor force of Peninsular Malaysia).30
The public sector's share of unionized workers has apparently been increas-
ing over time; back in 1961 and 1965, they accounted for only 30% of all
unionized labor (Table 6.26). Moreover, besides such differentials in
the degree of unionization, most of the unions outside the Government and
plantation sectors were very small in membership size and fragmented in
31
their jurisdiction. This is obvious from Table 6.27, which shows that over
70% of the unions in Peninsular Malaysia were less than 1,000 members in
size. The average size of unions in manufacturing was less than 1,800 in
1976, that in construction was less than 300, and that in transport and
communication less than 1,700 (Table 6.25). From Table 6.24, it can be
further seen that, of the 6 largest unions in the country in 1975, three
were in the public sector, one in plantation, one in commerce, and one
in mining; none in manufacturing was represented.
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ii) Unionization in large corporate firms
There is unfortunately no available data on the extent of unioni-
zation by size of enterprise for the country as a whole. A survey of
manufacturing industries by Chee Peng Lim (1974) did find that the
proportion of firms with unionized workers increases with the employ ment
size category of the firm (Table 6.28 ). However, no information
is given on the extent of union coverage for those firms that did have
some unionized workers. A different source of information on unionization
of workers in the manufacturing industries is the 1971 Occupational
Wage Survey (conducted by the Department of Statistics). Table 6.30
summarizes the relevant information. The firms covered in this survey
were all over 100 employees in size (except firms in two subsectors,
which were over 50 employees only) and hence can be taken as belonging
to the large corporate sector . Yet the data reveal a tremendous
variation in the extent of unionization among the employees, ranging
from none in four sub-sectors to 85% in rubber latex processing. These
observations caution us not to assume that unionization is uniformly
high among large firms, even if unionization is higher on average for
32
large firms than small ones. A final source of information on unioni-
zation comes from the 1973 World Bank Survey of Kuala Lumpur and two
East Coast towns reported by Mazumdqr (1978) and is reproduced here as
Table 6.29 . This shows that, for both regions, public enterprises
and foreign firms (both tend to be larger in size) did have higher
incidence of unionization than local firms, and among local firms,
Malay-owned firms had higher incidence than Chinese-owned ones.
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Table 6.28 Proportion of manufacturing establishments with unionized
workers by employment size, 1973.
Paid full-time employment
size of establishment.
0-4
5-9
10-19
20-29
30-49
50+
Total
% of establishments with
unionized workers.
2 %
9 %
10%
11 %
35%
10 %
Source : Chee Peng Lim
Table 6.29
(1976) : Table 111-15
Extent of unionization by type of firms in KL and East
Coast (Kuantan & Kota Baru), 1973. (%)
Employer type No union <3/4 unionized >3/4 unionized % of firms
with 100 employees.
K.L. East K*l. East
Coast Coast
K.L. East
Coast
Govornm=ent,
Foreign private
Malay private
Chinese private
57.9 74.1 10.3 6.8 30.3 18.7
Source: Mazumdar (1978): Table 3.3 (a) & (b)
25.8
33.8
62.8
84.3
K.L.
34.7
60.0
88.9
94.1
All
21.9
7.7
5.1
5.5
East
Coast
14.9
5.0
2.8
3.8
52.3
56.5
30.8
8.8
49.6
30.0
8.2
1.7
61.3
42.2
41.0
16.2
41.9
20.0
10.3
9.8
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Table 6.30 Proportion of
Manufacturing sub-sector
employees unionized in manufacturing firms, 1971.
Employment size of
establishments.
% employees unionized
Large rice milling
Saw-milling
Motor vehicles and parts
Biscuit manufacturing
Rubber remilling
Rubber products
Plywood & Particle Boards
Textiles
Industrial machinery & Parts
Printing & Publishing
Chemical products
Tobacco Products
Rubber Latex Processing
(off estate)
Source: Occupational Wage Survey 197.
50+
100+
100+
50+
100+
100+
100+
100+
50+
100+
100+
100+
100+
0
0
0
0
4.4
9.5
10.0
16.2
3?.4
38.7
53.0
77.6
84.9
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Further breakdown by firm size were not available, but these differences
in unionization rate by employer type were positively correlated with
the proportion of large firms by employer type (Table 6.29
In summaryfrom the sketchy- evidence given in (i) and (ii), it
appears that, with the possible exception of the public sector, unioniza-
tion in the urban wage sectors are firstly generally low; secondly, unions
mre- typically small; and thirdly, unionization in the larger firms
are not much higher on average nor uniformly so.
iii) Effectiveness of unions in raising wages and providing job security
Despite its long history of militancy (see e.g. Stenson (1970),
Gamba (1962) and Rudner (1973) ), the extent of industrial strikes
has been apparently much subdued since the late 60's (see Fig. 6.3
Edwards (1975) had analyzed the role of Government restrictive legis-
lations in suppressing industrial strikes, while D. Ayadurai (1975) has
detailed some of the finer points in existing legislations that make
strikes illegal. Whether the result of legislative restriction or the
increasing formation of "responsible" unions (that were in fact
"sponsored" to serve management interests), there is no evidence of
strong union bargaining power in the early seventies. Kasper was able
to comment in 1974 that "labor unions have as a general rule not been
aggressive....." (Kasper (1974): 25) while an official report claimed
that "industrial harmony and cooperation among employers, trade unions
and workers prevail trhough most segments of the economy" (Economic
Report 1973/4: 65). The number of collective wage agreements signed
has apparently been on the increase; but it is doubtful that these
700 -
Figure 6-3
Number of Mondays lost due to labor strikes, 1947 - 1976
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represent strong gains by the workers involved (see e.g. FEER (July 16,
1976): "labor: doubts on Malaysian wage pact").
To examine more closely the extent to which unionization might
affect the wage rate of blue-collar workers, a simple regression of
(average wage-rate) vs. (proportion of employees unionized) was run
using the 1971 Manufacturing Occupational Wage Survey, the observation
points being the avearages for each of the 13 manufacturing industries
surveyed. Four choices of wage-rate were tried: daily wage-rates of
a) male "general laborers" and (b) female "general laborers";and
monthly wage rates of (c) male "office clerks" and (d) male "production
supervisors". The category of "general laborers" has been separated
out in the survey from all other detail categories of production workers
and hence can be assumed to be highly homogeneous in terms of their work
tasks. By comparing wage rates for this category of workers, there-
fore, we avoid the problem of different skill mix in different indus-
tries confounding the average wage rate. The choices of supervisors
and office clerks are to check if unionization affects the "white
collar" workers more than the unskilled "blue collars".
The regression results show that the correlatioh between wage-
rate and unuionization is only weakly significant for all cases
tried (even though the different cases were themselves not very
much rank-correlated), the "white collar" cases being worse than
34
those for "blue-collar" workers. While admittedly crude, this exercise
suggests little unionization effect on wage-rates.
A similar regression was tried using the proportion of production
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workers being paid on a monthly basis as the dependent variable and
the degree of unionization (as before) as the independent variable;
35
the result is again not significant. If unionization had helped
raise the degree of job security, it had not been detectable in terms of
increasing the proportion of workers being paid monthly.
There are two other pieces of evidences that can be cited on
the relative lack of influence of unionization on wage earnings. The
first one pertains to Mazumdar (1977)'s multivariate analysis of the
determinants of earnings using data from the 1973 World Bank survey
of K.L. and two East Coast Towns. His methodology was to first
regress earnings on a set of "institutional" variables, including
degree of unionization, and then Sroceed to add "human capital" variables
step-wise. His argument is that if any institutional variables found
significant in the first stage remianed significant in the second
stage, then such a variable can be taken as exerting an influence on
earnings independent of the *human capital" variables. As it turned out,
his initial equations in the first stage (before the introduction of
human capital variables) actually showed negative coefficients for
his unionization proxy variable; moreover, in his final equations
after the introduction of human capital variables, the unionization
variable dropped out. On the basis of these observations, iazumdar
(1977) concluded that unionization was not significant in affecting
wage earnings in the urban labor markets surveyed.
The second piece of evidence was a study by David Lim (1977)
on the determinants of wage-rates of production workers in a sample ot
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manufacturing firms he surveyed. He did several multivariate step-
wise regressions of the wage-rate on a number of variables including
a proxy variable for unionization, but found this proxy variable not
significant in most of his final regression equations.
The results of these more refined statistical analyses are
thus consistent with our simple regression findings. There are also
evidences from other LDC countries which point to similar results.
Thus, House and Rempel (1976) concluded from their statistical analysis
on data from Kenya that the evidence on the impact of trade unions on
wage-level in that country was slight, despite much appeal to "trade
unions" pulling up urban wage-level as the cause for rural-urban
migration in that country by other writers who used Todaro's model.
To summarize: there is little evidence that government
protective legislation and/or unionization has been much of a cause
in raising wage-rates or job security for "blue-collar" production
workers in large firms in Peninsular Malaysia. 36To the extent that the
wage earning differential between large and small firms observed
previously has any objective significance, therefore, its cause has to
lie somewhere else.
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6.3.5 Differential between "secondary" sector blue-collar wage-workers
and "tertiary" sector blue-collar workers
So far, the only differential between wage-workers in the "secondary"
sector has been examined. We now turn to compare earnings in the "secondary"
sector and those in the "tertiary" sector. By the "tertiary" sector, we
shall mean primarily sales and personal services here. Our focus of concern
is with the "lower sales" and "lower service" workers at the 2-digit level,
since the "higher sacle" and "high service" occupational categories (mana-
gers and proprietors, supervisors and technical salesmen) have already
been shown to have higher average earnings than production workers (Section
6.1).
Our task of analysis is facilitated by the existence of a previous
work (Mazumdar (1975)) that examined the question of earnings differential
among blue-collar workers using the 1970 PES. We shall therefore begin
by summarizing its findings. Information from other sources will be
considered after that.
The following observations were made by Mazumdar (1975) from the
1970 PES tabulation on earnings distribution of production workers, "lower
sales" and "lower service" workers
(1) "Production" workers as a whole do not have higher earnings than
"lower sales" and "lower service" workers. Male production
workers have slightly higher earnings than male lower sales
workers, but the reverse is true for females. Lower service
workers have almost identical earning profile with production
workers for males; for females, the former is slightly higher.
(2) Self-employed "lower sales" workers have higher earnings than
production wage workers for both male and female. (For males,
self-employed "lower-sales" workers also have higher earnings
than lower-sales wage-workers, and self-employed production
workers have higher earnings than production wage-workers.
In the case of females, the self-employed in both the lower
sales and production categories have significantly higher
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earning dispersion than the corresponding wage workers,
i.e., the self-employed are found in higher proportion in
the low earning end as well as in the high earning end than
the corresponding wage-workers. )
On the basis of these observations, Mazumdar (1975) concluded
that "there is no evidence in Malaysia that the tertiary sector provides
a special reservoir of low earning groups" (p. 40).
One shortcoming of the 1970 PES data examined above is that they
do not give a sufficiently detailed breakdown of the occupational categories
involved (e.g., production workers are not broken down into skilled and
unskilled categories, and "lower sales" lumps together hawkers and shop
assistants). In addition, the earning distributions of the production
workers is actually slightly inflated at the high end by the presence of
production supervisors and foremen (which should have been separated out,
but were not). Finally, it should be recalled that the 1970 PES income
data do not actually refer to earnings from the principal occupation that
individuals get classified into, but to all income received by the individuals
involved.
It would therefore be useful to have other data sources that provide
finer occupational breakdown as well as to give information on earnings
that accrue directly from the occupation only. In this regard, wage-earning
data from the Dept. of Statistics' series of industry surveys/censes
and the Ministry of Labor's annual occupational wage surveys are particularly
relevant, as these data are industry-specific and moreover refer to earnings
from the occupations covered only. Table 6.31 summarizes data pertaining
to the lower-earning occupations from these two sources.
Two observations emerge from examining 6.31:
(1) The wage-earnings of "skilled"production workers (skilled fac-
tory workers in manufacturing and construction; drivers and
attendants in transport; carpenters and mechanics) are
generally higher than those in service and sales activities
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Table 6.31 Average monthly wage earnings of selected wage-occupations ($)
1) Full-time paid employees in distributive trades 1966
wholesale 258
retail 144
catering 109
2) Full-time paid employees in urban services 1971
Average <100 100-199 200-399 400+
photo studios 139 25 63 11 1
hotel and lodging 135 29 61 8 2
barber and
beautician 105 39 56 5 -
laundry services 95 48 38 13 1
catering 141 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
3) Full-time paid employees in cinemas 1973
ushers and ticket sellers - male 125
- female 119
4) Full-time paid employees in taxi transport 1973
drivers and attendants (male) 133
5) Paid employees in transport 1973
road haulage - lorry drivers 280
- lorry attendants 192
- general laborers
(male) 112
- apprentice learn-
ers (all trades) 89
bus companies - bus drivers 225
- bus conductors
- male 208
- female 116
- gen. laborers
(male) 139
- apprentice
learners (all
trades) 116
6) Full-time paid employees in:
Manufacturing Construction Mining
1970 1972 1970 1973 1970
General workers 159 163 156 173 161
Skilled factory workers 155 157 192 226 185
Unskilled factory workers 103 102 114 138 138
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Table 6.31 (Cont.)
7) Full-time paid employees in large manufacturing firms in 13 industrial
groupsa 1971
Range
Average 2nd and 9th decile
production supervisor and foreman - male 460 402-486
- female 246 213-260
plant maintenance mechanic (male) 355 333-370
general carpenter (male) 231 207-245
lorry driver (male) 229 221-236
van driver (male) 182 173-189
lorry attendant (male) 147 137-155
watchman (male) 157 150-161
general laborer - male 127 120-133
- female 93 86-99
office boy (male) 135 134-144
Note: a - Firms in 11 of the 13 groups were of over 100 paid employees in
size; firms in the other two groups were over 50 paid employees
in size.
Sources: (1) - Census of distributive trades 1966
(2) - Census of selected urban services 1971
(3),(4) - Census of selected industries 1973
(5) Min. of Labor AR 1973
(6) Survey of manufacturing industries, construction industries
and mining industries
(7) Occupational wage survey 1971
Table 6.32 Daily net earnings of hawker units, 1973
(a) (b)
Avg. no. Hawker units in markets Hawker units outside markets
workers distribution of units (%) distribution of units (5)
Town /unit <$5 $5-10 $10-20 $20+ <$5 $5-10 $10-20 $20+
Kuala Lumpur 2.1 7.0 25.3 42.4 25.3 27.3 37.2 27.2 8.3
Petaling Joya 2.1 16.7 33.3 36.5 13.5 13.6 35.6 34.4 16.2
Malacca 1.8 1.0 14.3 35.7 49.0 29.1 31.4 30.9 8.5
Penang n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. 47.0 53.0
Source: Lam Thim Fook (1977): Table 10 and Hara (1975), cited in Tan Tat
Wai (1977).
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(retail, catering, laundry services, barber and beauty shops,
cinema ushers and ticket sellers, etc.).
(2) However, the average wage-earnings of the latter are generally
not much lower than those of the "unskilled" production workers
(even those in the large firms); in some cases they are actu-
ally higher.
These observations are thus consistent with the earlier conclusion
from the 1970 PES. 37
The above comparison pertains of course to wage-earnings only, as
both the industry surveys/censes and Ministry of Labor surveys do not cover
self-employed earnings. An attempt will now be made to compare the wage-
earning levels of "secondary" sector blue-collar wage-workers with the
income of an important self-employment occupational group - the hawkers.
Table 6.32 summarizes information on the distribution of net
earnings among hawker units surveyed in four major cities of Peninsular
Malaysia, while Table 6.33 summarizes data on the daily rates of selected
"blue-collar" occupations in the manufacturing and transport sector. Before
making a comparison of the two, it is necessary to introduce three qualifi-
cations. First, there is more than one worker per hawker unit on average
(the number is close to two), and hence the actual earning per worker in
hawking is reduced correspondingly; second, part of the earnings from hawking
may represent a return to non-labor capital inputs; third, hawkers on average
work longer hours than wage-workers, 38 and thus the net returns to labor time
for hawkers are again smaller than aggregate net daily earnings would indi-
cate. All these three qualifications would adjust the earnings per hawker
downward considerably; nevertheless, it would still appear that workers
in these hawking units earning over $20 a day should remain better off than
the average skilled production wage-workers in the "secondary" sector.
Tentatively, therefore, we can conclude that at least 10-20% of the hawkers
are doing better than the average skilled production wage-workers.
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Table 6.33 Daily wage rates in selected "blue-collar" occupations
(1) Manufacturing sector (1971)
Plant maintenance mechanic (male)
General carpenter (male)
Lorry driver (male)
Van driver (male)
Lorry attendant (male)
Watchman (male)
General laborer (male)
(female)
Production workers (male)
(female)
Aggregate
7.60
6.31
6.06
7.69
4.09
3.63
4.03
2.83
mostly between
mostly between
Range
(2nd and 9th decile)
7.25 - 7.85
5.98 - 6.76
5.43 - 6.37
7.65 - 8.04
3.81 - 4.29
3.52 - 3.69
3.79 - 4.19
2.65 - 2.92
3.00-4.50
2.00-3.50
(2) Bus transport (1973)
Bus driver (male)
Bus conductor (male)
(female)
General laborer
Apprentice
(3) Road haulage (1973)
Lorry driver (male)
Lorry attendant (male)
General laborer
Apprentice
6.55
5.90
4.20
4.45
3.30
7.30
4..80
3.60
3.40
Sources: (1) - 1971 Occupational Wage Survey; pertains to wage-employees
in firms of over 50 and over 100 full-time paid employees
only
(2), (3) - Ministry of Labor AR (1973)
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This by no means suggests that hawkers as a group are uniformly
better off; indeed, workers in hawking units at the low-earning end are
probably much worse off than even the average unskilled production wage-
workers. The point is that there is a wide dispersion of earnings among
hawkers, making a comparison of averages misleading.
There is another independent source we can use to confirm the
high dispersion of earnings among hawkers, that of the World Bank Survey
of Kuala Lumpur and two East Coast towns (Kuantan and Kata Baru) as given
in Mazumdar (1977). Table 6.34 reproduces the survey data. It is seen
that over 29% of the hawkers in Kuala Lumpur and 14% in East Coast towns
had monthly earnings of over $300/month, or over $10/day.
The last group of self-employed that deserves a closer exami-
nation is the proprietors of business and employers in the small capitalist
sectors. In Section 6.1, we have already noted (i) the generally higher
earning level and (ii) high dispersion of earnings of this group. The
World Bank survey cited above throws further light on the earnings of this
group. From Table 6.34, the "shop-owners" are seen to have indeed high
earning dispersion and generally higher earning levels than most blue-collar
workers. In Kuala Lumpur, 57% of shopowners earned over $300/month; the
39
proportion was only slightly lower (52%) in the two East Coast towns.
The higher average earning of proprietors of unincorporated
enterprises than blue-collar wage-workers can be further confirmed by
examining the following rough estimates of average monthly earnings of
proprietors (calculated from the 1973 Census of Selected Industries):
cinema $370, taxi transport $260, road haulage $590, housing developers
$630.
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Table 6.34 Earnings Distribution of Shop-owners & Hawkers in Three Towns, 1973
Monthly
Earnings($)
75
76-100
101-150
151-200
201-300
301-450
451-650
651-1000
1000+
All
Kuala Lumpur
Shop-
owners Hawk
10.5
2.1
5.3
14.7
10.5
31.6
14.7
4.0
6.6
100.0
Kuantan & Kota Baru
Shop-
owners Hawkersers
8.1
12.9
9.7
25.8
14.5
25.8
3.2
100.0
4.0
5.9
12.9
23.8
2.0
20.8
17.8
9.0
3.9
100.0
16.3
22.4
26.7
16.3
4.1
10.2
2.0
2.0
100.0
Source: Mazumdar(1977): Table 2.4
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The most important point to emerge from the above more detailed
comparisons is the high dispersion of earnings among the self-employed
in the tertiary sector. Mazumdar (1977) has found this "puzzling", and
was unsuccessful in trying to explain the variance in earning in terms
of age and education variables. In our opinion, the high earning disper-
sion is to be expected given the nature of the self-employment. The
fact that big disparity in ownership of non-labor productive assets causes a
similarly big disparity in return to capital investment has already been
noted as an important factor in inducing a wide earning spread. Several
other factors can also be noted here:
(1) wide variation in the number of hours worked among the self-
employed
(2) highly fragmented nature of many consumption demand markets
and highly differentiated quality of human services supplied combine to
create great product differentiation. As pointed out in the conceptual
formulation part of Chapter 1, for many tertiary activities, access to
marketing channels and service locations are crucial factors in determining
the volume of transaction, but these channels and locations, being limited
in number, are subject to monopolistic control.4 0 The differentiation of
service quality is mos-t obvious in the catering and personal services.
(3) large fluctuation in consumer demands for many of the goods
produced or services supplied.
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6.4 Critique of "formal-informal" dualization model and alternative
"white-collar aristocracy" hypothesis
What conclusions can be drawn from the body of empirical data
examined so far?
First, in terms of the alleged existence of a differential in
earnings and job security, the conclusion is that a systematic differential
in average earnings does appear to exist between large and small firms in
the secondary sector, but the differential in terms of job security appears
to be much weaker, if it exists at all. No systematic differential appears
to exist between "secondary" sector blue-collar workers and "tertiary"
sector blue-collar workers; if anything, a significant proportion of
self-employed tertiary blue-collar workers seem to earn higher income
than the production wage-workers, even those in large firms. From these,
we can therefore tentatively conclude that the blue-collar "labor aristocracy"
thesis has at best a weak objective basis in the case of Peninsular
Malaysia. Such a privileged class might emerge in the future, but it
has so far been of little significance.
Second, in terms of the causes of the differential, we have
shown fairly conclusively that government protective legislation and
strong union protection could not have been factors of much significance.
This suggests that the wage-productivity argument is more relevant,
although we have not investigated this. A finding we shall cite later
(that labor cost is not a very important consideration in the choice of
technology by large firms) is consistent with this latter argument.
This second conclusion further weakens the whole blue-collar
labor aristocracy thesis. To the extent that adequate government
protective legislation and union protection have not been generally
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available to the blue-collar wage workers, they might be prepared to
go to some lengths to agitate for these rights.
That the assumed dualization of urban employment into a
formal and informal sector (however defined) is in fact not very strong,
and that the assumed cause of that dualization is in fact weak, cause
us to have serious doubts about the validity of some of the consequences
drawn from these assumptions also. It is beyond the scope of this
dissertation to pursue the matter systematically, but in the interest of
lending further support to the argument developed so far, evidence on
some of the assumed consequences will be briefly reviewed.
(i) High labor costs inducing capital-intensive choice of techniques?
The argument that high labor cost was the main factor in
encouraging the use of capital-intensive techniques appears to be
contradicted by the findings of Hoffman and Tan's (1977) survey of medium
to large manufacturing firms. All the firms surveyed had 20 or more
full-time paid employees. They found that, among the firms interviewed
concerning the factors affecting their choice of technology, the factors
cited as "very important" by the most number of firms was the "quality
of the product" (66%) followed next by "volume of annual production" (57%),
"raw material costs" (43%), and "price of the machines" (40%) in that
order; "labor cost"only came in as the fifth item: only 31% of the firms
cited it. Significantly, among larger firms, labor cost was of even
lesser significance (Hoffman and Tan (1977):Table IV.8).
The above findings suggest that, among larger firms, it is
the choice of technology (based on other criteria) that determines the
amount and intensity of labor use, and not vice versa. There would still
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be a desire to minimize labor costs, but this would be done after
the technology is chosen.
As far as the attraction of foreign investment is concerned,
the importance of low labor costs remains true; but then other factors
like the overall political stability of the country (or even the region
the country is in) are probably of much greater significance.
(ii) Crowding of new migrants into the informal sector?
To what extent is it true that migrants get crowded into the
tertiary self-employed sector? One source of information on this is
Narayanan (1975), which presented a breakdown of occupational distribution
of the employed labor force in metropolitan Selangor in 1970 by
locally-born residents and recent migrants (i.e., those migrating into
the city within the last 11 years). The proportion of sales workers
among recent migrants was found to be less than the proportion among
locally-born residents (10.6% vs. 14.7%). (Narayanana (1975):Table V.12).
It is true that the proportion of service workers among migrants was
higher than among natives (26.1% vs. 13.2%), but the major bulk of this
was accounted for by "protective" services (especially among the Malays).
There is thus no strong evidence of a crowding into self-employed tertiary
activities by migrants, even in the case of the largest metropolitan
center of the country.
Evidences from two other data sources can be adduced to support
the above conclusion. The 1973 survey of hawkers in Kuala Lumpur found
46% of the hawkers to be born in the city itself, and another 27% having
lived in the city for more than 11 years. The corresponding proportions
for the whole population in metropolitan Selangor age 15 and over in 1970
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was 46% and 16%. Thus, the proportion of "new migrants" (less than 11 years
residency in the city) among hawkers was less than the proportion among
the whole population (26% vs. 38%). Moreover, only about 5% of the hawkers
surveyed had previous occupations in agriculture or fishing. The argument
that hawking provides a refuge for new migrants therefore does not appear
to hold.
More directly, Mazumdar (1977) has tested the hypothesis that
migrants enter the urban labor market primarily through the "informal
sector" (which he defines to be self-employment or wage- employment in
small firms) using the 1973 World Bank Survey, and concluded in the
negative: a substantially smaller proportion of adult migrants as compared
to the natives in the towns surveyed had their first job in the "informal"
sector.
(iii) Crowding of new migrants into unemployment?
This argument is again refuted in the case of metropolitan
Selangor, the largest metropolitan conurbation of the country. The open
unemployment rate among recent migrants (those who migrated to the city within
the last 11 years at the time of census) in the area in 1970 was lower than
that among the locally-born population, even after controlling for age,
sex, ethnic group and educational attainment (Narayanan (1975)).
(iv) Formal-sector wage employment the aspiration of the self-employed?
What of the argument that movement from the "informal sector"
to wage jobs in the formal sector represents the direction of upward
mobility aspired to by most "informal sector" workers? Data from the 1973
World Bank Survey as given in Mazumdar (1977) appears to refute it, at least
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Table 6.35 Movement of labor between production units of
different sizes, Kuala Lumpur and
East Coast towns
a) Kuala Lumpur
Sector of first job
Own/family
1-9 employee
10-99 employees
100+
(n)
Sector of current job (%)
Own/family 1 - 9 10 - 99 100+ All (n)
2j. 11.7 20.0 30.0 1001 (60)
33.2 17.9 21.3 25.5 10% (235)
19.1 7.7 39_. 32.0 100% (272)
12.4 4.3 19.7 62.4 1001 (234)
(182) (80) (215) (311)
b) East Coast towns (Kuantan and Kota Baru)
Sector of first job
Own/family
1 - 9 employee
10-99
100 +
(n)
Sector of current job (%)
Own/family 1 - 9 10 - 99 100+ All
42.6
39.7
28.8
23.2
(213)
15.4
22.4
9.1
12.2
(96)
24.1
25.6
29.3
(171)
(n)
16.0 100 (162)
11.4 IDO (219)
20.5 100 (132)
100 ( 82)
(I'
c) Net movement between sectors (current sector distribution % - first job
sector %)
Own/family
Kuala Lumpur
East Coast
1 - 9 10 - 99 100+
+15.2 -13.3 -7.2 +9.6
+8.6 -20.7 +6.5 +3.7
Source: Mazumdar, (1977): Table 6.5 & pp. 6.15
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in the form it is stated (Table 6.35 ). As can be seen from Table 6.35,
there was indeed a significant net movement into large enterprises (firms
with over 100 employees) from other sectors where the first job was held,
but it is the own/family-enterprise sector that registered the highest
gain (in terms of net movement from the sector of the first job to the
sector of the current job). It is the small wage-enterprise sector
(1-9 employees per form) that experienced net out-transfer. It thus appears
that the direction of upward mobility desired is both towards own/family
enterprises and large enterprises, with the former being more significant
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than the latter.
The above evidence in Peninsular Malaysia is consistent with
comparative research evidence from other LDC's which are increasingly
building up in direct refutation of the assumptions that self-employment
is the refuge of new migrants and that the direction of upward mobility
aspired to was a wage-job in the "formal" sector, however defined.
To quote a few examples:
"...many of these (small retail market sellers in Bogota] do not
automatically aspire to employment in the wage sector. With
their experience in this type of employment as well as the known
insecurities of the unskilled wage sector, it is to more lucrative
areas of self-employment, such as shop ownership and wholesale
marketing, that their ambitions extend." (C. Moser (1977):485)
"...despite the higher pay, approximately 80% of factory workers
interviewed [in Kano City, Nigeria] aspired to become independent
traders, citing the insecurity, harsh treatment by supervisors,
and rigid discipline of the factory as reason for preferring to
return to trading in the informal sector. From the perspective
of the Luneducatedl migrant, as well as the urban worker, factory
labor is a closed mobility system..." (Lubeck (1977))
"..more than one-third of hawkers surveyed in Hong Kong were
previously employed in the formal sector...many felt the social
and personal advantages [of hawking) were more favorable than
wage employment, even though the informal sector income was
generally lower..." (McGee (1975))
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Similar evidence of upward mobility aspirations in the direction
of better self-employment--or self-employment in the form of proprietors
and employers in the small capitalist sector--has been cited by L. Peattie
(1975) in her study of market sellers and street vendors in Bogota,
Colombia, and Bala et al. (1973) in their study of Monterrey, Mexico.
With so many of the assumed causes and consequences postulated
by this "formal-informal" dualization framework contradicted by empirical
evidence, the relevance of the very framework itself should be called into
question, its popularity notwithstanding.
The fundamental conceptual weakness of the formal-informal
dualization approach, we believe, stems from its having a too simplistic
and superficial view of the production organization structure of the urban
economy. By ignoring the heterogeneity of what it lumps together as the
"informal" sector, it ends up obscuring a fundamental aspect of the urban
labor absorption dynamics: the attempt to achieve upward mobility through
accumulation in the petty sector to rise up to the rank of the small
capitalist enterprise sector. It is true that many will in fact not
make it, but the prospect was there for many to keep on trying. The picture
is one of a small number of workers who are more opportunely placed in terms
of capital resources and skills being able to accumulate and move up, while
the majority are suffering from downward mobility and increasing poverty.
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The "white-collar aristocracy" thesis?
The hypothesis that we want to advance in place of the "blue-
collar labor aristocracy" is that there is a "white-collar aristocracy"
- in fact, all the arguments that were alleged to apply to support the
case of blue-collar aristocracy (but found invalid) appear to apply
precisely to the white-collars. A brief attempt at substantiating this
alternative hypothesis will be made in what follows.
(i) Differential in earnings and job security between large and
small firms
Recall that a fundamental observation made in examining earning
differential between large and small firms in Section 6.3.2 was that the
differential between the white-collars was greater than the differential
between the blue-collar workers. The differential between managerial
salariats was greatest, followed by technical and supervisory, and then
by the clericals. The magnitude of the differentials - managerial salariats
in large firms earn about 5 times as much as those in small firms, while
for the clerical, it was smaller but still large (about twice) - suggests
a real differentiation of great objective significance.
As far as job security is concerned, most professional, technical,
supervisory and clerical employees are paid monthly (see Table 6.20 earlier)
and hence are more secure than most blue-collar workers. A differential
is expected between large and small firms, however, since large firms,
with their hierarchical internal labor market structure, have greater need
for stability of their white-collar functionary strata than small firms,
where the white-collar staff often consists of only one or a few members.
White collar occupations in large firms are usually structured in such a
way that the more junior members will in time be promoted to take over the
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more senior positions, i.e., a ladder of jobs is usually held in store
for the white-collar employees (presumably after some suitable probation
period).
This is even truer of many white-collar occupations in the
public sector in general and the government bureaucracy in particular.
In the government civil service, a white-collar salariat
job is essentially a career. Promotion along the occupational ladder
more or less follows automatically with length of service, and income
increments can be expected more or less at regular intervals according
to some pre-set schedule. Only those who are exceptionally incompetent or
lacking discipline will lose their job once they are in the civil service.
Similarly, in terms of job mobility, the large-size firms permit
the prospect of internal promotion. For those who work in large foreign
multinational enterprises, there is even the prospect of promotional
transfer to other branches elsewhere or to the parent plants. Various
forms of technical and management training are also open to the ambitious
and royal white-collar employees. For the individual who works in a
small firm which has little white-collar staff needs, his/her position
might be the only white-collar position in the unit - there is thus no
prospect for promotion unless the firm expands rapidly, or that he is
asked to join the proprietor as partner. Given our argument in Chapter 5
that the small capitalist sector is in fact losing ground relative to the
corporate sector, the first alternative is not available to most who are
stuck with firms which have little growth prospects. As far as the second
alternative is concerned, only those with specialized knowledge or entre-
preneur skills are likely to stand a chance. This contrasts with the
steady (practically guaranteed) income and job mobility of the white-collars
in the public-sector civil service as mentioned earlier.
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(ii) Institutional protection?
The case of the "higher" professional occupations involves the
real existence of "institutional" protection that we have searched for, largely
in vain, for the blue-collar workers. In many professions, one cannot
"practice" without getting the appropriate approval of the relevant pro-
fessional institution (institute of architects, institute of engineers
(specialized by various fields), "chartered" accountancy association,
medical association, bar-council (for lawyers) etc.). It is the closest
thing to being an "aristocracy", since the criteria for entry are deter-
mined by those already in it.42
As far as other white-collars are concerned, there is also
evidence that union organization is often resorted to - in fact, probably
more so than the blue-collars. One of the largest unions in the country
is the National Union of Teachers (NUT) (see Table 6.24 earlier). Practi-
cally all the white-collar civil servants in the public sector are also
unionized, and many of these have amalgamated to form an umbrella organi-
zation (CUEPEC) which, in terms of the number of members it covers, ranks
number one in the country.
(iii) Job seekers exceed positions available?
This "white-collar aristocracy" thesis is also consistent with
the phenomenon of credential degradation, growing white-collar job aspira-
tion gap and educated unemployment documented earlier. The condition of a
rapidly growing supply of educated persons in the face of a limited number
of white-collar openings and leading to not a downward pressure on salaries,
but an upward raising of the (credential) screening threshold - is indeed
the perfect description originally postulated for the formal-informal
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labor market dualization model. Moreover, the crowding of relatively
educated persons into unemployment (as documented earlier, urban unemploy-
ment in Peninsular Malaysia is primarily an educated unemployment problem)
while searching for a white-collar job also fits the scenario originally
ascribed to blue-collar unskilled workers. While the relatively uneducated
from poor backgrounds generally cannot afford (and have no reason) to stay
unemployed for extended periods, the case is different for the relatively
educated. Because the attainment of a white-collar occupation represents
genuine (and significant) upward mobility transition for those from low
socio-economic backgrounds, tremendous amount of sacrifice is often made by
these people to invest in equipping their children with a good education
against all odds (see the discussion in Section 6.213 'It is therefore
natural that, with all the sacrifice made, the expectation is on those
youths who did manage to get a good education to settle for nothing less
than a white-collar job. Hence the preparedness of these relatively well-
educated youths from even poor backgrounds to stay unemployed for extended
periods while searching. For the educated youths from well-to-do back-
grounds, their families could well afford the waiting, and hence there is
again a tendency to keep searching.
Another alternative to this job search scenario is for the educa-
ted but unemployed youths whose families could afford it to go on studying
for a higher qualification. From the perspective of the society as a
whole, this is in reality a form of disguised unemployment; from the perspec-
tive of the individual, however, it is a way to beat the screening system.
Unfortunately, the result of such a response is to help raise the screening
threshold even higher in the long run.
461
Finally, the fact that a significant proportion of urban immi-
grants are relatively well-educated (proportionately more so than locally-
44
born residents) suggests that the rural-urban pull originally ascribed
to unskilled laborers is again more operative for the white-collar job
seekers.
iv) Political attitude of the priviliged white-collars?
The alleged conservative attitude of the "blue-collar aristocracy"
mentioned earlier also fits the white-collar salariats in the large enter-
prises and in the government civil service better. With their existing
privileged position and prospect for steady promotion and income mobility
dependent on the continued good fortune of the company or government bureau-
cracy involved, they would indeed be the least likely to disturb the stability
of the system. This does not mean that they will not try to bargain for
further consolidation of their interest; what they will not do is to
agitate so much as to undermine their current privileged positions. Indeed,
being more educated, literate and exposed to the Westernized concept of
parliamentary and political lobbying, the white-collars are the ones who
are most self-conscious of the power they can wield through the political
agitation process to bargain with other interest groups. It is indeed no
surprise that certain sections of white-collars are perhaps the most politi-
cally vocal group in the country today.
It is important to recognize, of course, that white-collar salariats
are not homogeneous, and a simple dualization between white-collar salariats
who are in the corporate/public sector (including the "protected" profes-
sional jobs) and those who are outside may be too gross a distinction to
capture the complexity of the situation. 45Nevertheless, it does appear
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from the above that the "white-collar aristocracy" hypothesis has more
empirical validity than the corresponding "blue-collar aristocracy"
hypothesis in present-day urban Peninsular Malaysia.
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Appendix Table 6A Average monthly income by occupation at the 2-digit level
(1970 PES data)
mean monthly standard deviation
income () mean
Administrative & managerial
-government administrators &
legislative officials 1268 1.38
-managers 898 1.22
Professional and technical
-teachers 365 0.70
-medical doctorsdentists,etc. 821 1.34
-architects and engineers 1337 0.53
-accountants 970 0.62
-jurists 1431 0.46
-religious-workers 173 1.14
-physical scientists & technicians 465 1.04
-engineering assistants & draughtsman etc. 409 0.64
-life scientists &'technicians 608 1.13
-nurses & midwives 260 0.68
-authors & journalists 519 0.60
commercial artists & photographers 197 0.88
Clerical
-clerical supervisors 723 0.55
-government executive officials 513 0.87
-transport & communncation supervisors 471 0.46
-stenographers , typists & card punch operators 343 1.03
-bookkeepers & cashiers 342 0.87
-computing machine operators 258 0.52
-transport conductors 181 0.49
-mail distribution clerks 151 0.47
-telephone & telegraph operators 233 0.45
-clerical & related n.e.c. 258 0.69
Sales
-managers of wholesale & retail trade 700 1.04
-working proprietors of wholesale & retail 390 1.85
-technical salesman & commercial travelers 384 0.74
-insurance & real-estate salesmen 357 1.34
-salesmen & shop assistants 131 0.85
-sales workers n.e.c. 134 1.51
Services
-managers of catering & lodging services 343 0.65
-working proprietors of catering & lodging 375 1.21
-housekeeping supervisors 166 0.75
-protective service workers 250 0.83
-cooks,waiters & bartenders 116 0.33
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-maids & housekeeping service workers 77 0.73
-building caretakers & cleaners 126 0.65
-launderers & dry-cleaners 161 1.06
-barbers & beauticians 173 0.94
-se~rve -workers n.e.c. 148 0.51
Production & related .
-production supervisors & general foremen 322 0.68
-bricklayers & other construction workers 149 0.66
-stationery engine operators 179 0.40
-dockers & freight landlers 170 0.68
-transport equipment operators 188 0.59
-miners & quarrymen 180 2.70
-other categories of production workers :
4 categories had mean income less than
$00, 15 had mean income between $100-
200, and 4 had mean income over $200
A gricultural workers
-farm managers & supervisors 301 1.41
-forestry workers 184 0.80
-farmers 101 1.07
-agricultural & livestock workers 83 0.64
-fishermen 107 0.78
source : PES 1970 data, as given in Anand(1978): Appendix Table 6.1
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Appendix Table 6B Occupational distribution of employment by educational
attainment, 1967/8 and 1973 (%)
1967/8
Administrative and
managerial
Professional, technical
and clerical
Sales and service
Production, etc.
Agricultural
1973
Administrative and
managerial
Professional, technical
and clerical
Sales and service
Production, etc.
Agricultural
All with
less than
LCE
1.1
3.6
17.2
24.2
54.0
0.4
2.0
17.1
26.3
54.1
With Completed
LCE MCE/HSC
4.9
51.1
18.2
17.2
8.5
1.0
23.4
27.2
32.0
16.3
8.9
68.1
10.4
8.3
4.2
3.2
52.5
17.5
12.5
14.3
Completed
College
Diploma
2.3
95.7
0.5
0.8
0.7
12.1
70.7
7.1
10.0
Completed
University
Degree
19.4
69.5
4.8
2.0
4.2
21.3
74.6
2.9
0.4
0.7
Source: Calculated from 1967/8 SESS and 1973 Manpower Survey
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Appendix Table 6C Government employees salary scales (prior to 1977)
A. Unskilled employees
B. Semiskilled employees
C. Skilled employees
D. Subordinate office workers
(office boys)
$130-150
$160-190
$140-160
$345-375
$140-160
$400-500
$115-160
$110-210
for the lowest grade
for the highest grade
for the lowest grade
for the highest grade
for the lowest grade
for the highest grade
(Suffian scheme)
("Harun" scheme)
Source: ARB (April 30, 1977, Part.1), "Malaysia: salary revision for
civil servants".
"IMG" scales
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Chapter 6
Footnotes
1 - See Anand (1978): Chapter 7 for details.
2 - Note that the average income figures for the different occupational groups
are actually not the income derived solely from the occupations; they
pertain to all income that the occupation-holders obtained, part of
which could be from outside the principal occupations (transfer income,
income from secondary jobs, etc.).
3 - Note that the presence of managerial, supervisory, technical workers
and proprietors in the "sales" and "service" groups is what is respon-
sible for pushing up the average earnings of these groups as a whole
above those of production workers. With these separated out and consid-
ering the manual or "blue-collar" workers ("lower sales", "lower ser-
vice" workers) in these groups only, not much differentiation can be
found between them and the "blue-collar" production workers in the
secondary (manufacturing, construction and transport) sectors. A more
detailed discussion of this point will be made in Section 6.4.
4 - The classic work is of course that of Becker.
5 - For expositions on the concept of "wage-contour structure,"see, e.g.,
Dunlop (1972), Doeringer and Piore (1971) and Tsuda (1972), "Wage
and salary structure in Asian context, Part 2," Hitotsubashi J. of
Social Studies 6 (Nov.): 10-20.
6 - See Baribanti, R. (ed.) (1966) Asian bureaucratic systems emergent from
the British imperial tradition, Weeks (1971c) and Godfrey (1975), "The
international market for skills and the transmission of inequality",
Dev. and Change 6(4) for discussion of the wage and employment poli-
cies in the government bureaucracy of LDCs.
7 - This dualization of educational attainment between self-employed man-
agers who are mainly proprietors or employers in the small capitalist
sector and the managerial salariats in large firms can be substantia-
ted by the finding of Chee Peng Lim's survey of manufacturing firms.
He found that the proportion of chief executives of manufacturing firms
he surveyed who had upper secondary education and above was 9.0%,
22.7% and 53.2%, respectively, for firms with less than five full-
time employees, between 5 and 50, and above 50 (Chee Peng Lim (1974):
Table VII-5). The corresponding proportions for university degree
qualification were 0.9%, 1.3% and 17.2%.)
8 - These figures can be compared with the average fixed capital asset
size of sale proprietorships in the transport and entertainment
sectors:
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taxi transport 20,900
road haulage 39,760
tourist and travel agency 4,230
shipping agent 19,440
bus companies 359,750
real estate (partnership) 8,220
housing developers 15,880
cinema 22,300
insurance (sole and partner-
ship) 50,430
finance 46,840
Source: Calculated from 1973 Census of selected industries
9 - See Huang Tze Lian (1973) and Tan Tat Wai (1977) for more detailed
discussion of this point.
10 - In a sample survey of Chinese fruit vendors in Penang, Gardner (1975)
found that while entry requirements in terms of training, education
and specialized skills are minimal, there was nevertheless an average
set-up cost of cart-purchase, license fee and initial fruit purchase,
all of which came up to about $1,000. Moreover, a whole family unit of
workers were usually required to provide the labor in fruit purchase,
preparation and taking turns in stall-watching.
11 - Even then, a large number of hawkers in fact inherit the hawking trade
from their parents. In the survey of fruit vendors by Gardner (1975),
one-third of the vendors inherited their trade, while in the 1973 sur-
vey of hawkers in Kuala Lumpur, Petaling Joya and Malacca, the propor-
tion of hawkers who followed family tradition was 13%, 14%, and 18%,
respectively (Lam Thim Fook (1977): Table 7).
12 - A different tabulation from the study has been given by A.B. Wilson
(1977) for youths in the age-15 cohort in 1972; it shows that not
only do children from families with heads of households who are less
skilled have higher drop-out rates, but that they tend to drop out
earlier.
13 - In fact, this proxy greatly overestimates the probability of getting
a "white collar" job, since the credential degradation effect is
concentrated on the younger age-cohorts.
14 - Mazumdar (1977) has also noted this credential degradation effect using
unpublished data from the 1970 Population Census, the 1973 World Bank
School Leaver Survey and the 1973 World Bank Survey of Kuala Lumpur
labor market. He found that 41% of males with LCE in 1970 had white-
collar jobs, whereas only 29.4% of males under age 25 had such jobs.
Among the school leavers surveyed in 1973, only 16.6% had such jobs.
The corresponding figures for those with MCE were 81.7%, 71.2% and
40.4%.
15 - These figures are calculated from MSB (v.i.) and TMP.
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16 - The high demand for local university education in the last few years
is reflected in the following statistics:
1973/4 1977/8
number of applicants for
university places 10,000 26,000
number admitted 4,800 5,953
% admitted 44% 23%
(Source: Min. of Education)
There is no accurate estimate of the number of students overseas;
however, an official estimate of 14,600 was cited for 1967 (Sunday
Mail 29/9/68), which increased to over 30,000 by the mid-1970s
(Malaysia Bulletin (April 1978): 22). Meerman's (1977) survey found
that 1.4% of all households had at least one student overseas; however,
three-quarters of these overseas students were from households in the
highest two income quintiles, i.e., most of the students overseas were
from relatively rich backgrounds. Only 19% of these overseas students
were on full government scholarships (Meerman (1977): 4.53).
17 - The concept of labor market segmentation was originally developed for
the Western industrialized countries. See Kerr (1954) for an early
account. For more recent attempts to revive the concept, see e.g.,
Edwards, Reich and Gordon (ed.)(1975)(and bibliography cited therein),
Cain (1976), Montagna (1977) and Piore (1972).
18 - There is by now an immense body of literature on the formal-informal
dualization theory of urban labor market in LDCs. See Hart (1973),
ILO (1972) and McGee (1971) for the earlier formulations. A whole
series of studies of LDC metropolitan centers using this approach
has been sponsored by ILO (see, e.g., Sethuraman (1976) on Djakarta).
For some recent critical review, see Bromley (ed.)(1978) and Breman
(1975).
19 - See Mazumdar (1975) for a fuller discussion of this factor (which he
has called the "wage-efficiency" relationship).
20 - The concept of a blue-collar "labor aristocracy" was originally applied
to some African LDCs (Arrighi (1970) and Franz Fanon). See Waterman
(1975) for a useful review of the debates in the literature, and
Sandbrook and Cohen (ed.)(1975) and Sandbrook and Arn (1977) for more
recent contributions.
21 - See Todaro (1976) for a summary of the literature adopting this frame-
work.
22 - The term is Hart's (1973). Other writers have used different terms
to denote more or less the same concept (some more precise, some less
so): e.g., McGee (1971) used the term "proto-proletariat", A. G. Frank
used the term "lumpenproletariat", and Quijano used the term "marginals".
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23 - Only 9.6% of all manufacturing firms enumerated in the 1973 Manufac-
turing Census had 50 or more full-time paid employees, and only 5%
had over 100 employees (see Table 5.11 in Chapter 5).
24 - The road haulage firms surveyed averaged 15.2 employees per firm,
while the bus companies surveyed averaged 99.1 employees per company
(calculated from Ministry of Labor AR).
25 - Contract-labor formed 18.2%, 20.6%, 9.8% and 1.9% of the employed
manufacturing labor force in sole proprietorships, private limited
companies and public limited companies respectively in 1972 (Table
5.15).
26 - The Min. of Labor AR does provide information on labor turnover, but
the industries so covered were confined to the plantation, mining
and transport sectors only.
27 - The three industries of electronic assembly textiles and rubber pro-
ducts together accounted for almost one-fifth of total manufacturing
employment in 1973.(calculated from 1973 Manufacturing Census). The
proportion is likely to have increased since then.
28 - Retrenchment of workers was particularly widespread in 1974, especi-
ally for the electronic assembly industry. "Workers turning up at the
factory gate were told that they had been made redundant by the reces-
sion in world trade" (David Lim (1976): 72). 6,300 industrial workers
were reported to have been retrenched in the first quarter of 1975
(New Straits Times: 2/4/76), and another 3,000 in the first 7 months
of 1976 (Economic Report: 1966/7: 103). Being reported figures, these
are definitely underestimates. The first figure was about 2% of
total manufacturing employment in 1975.
29 - See various promotional brochures by FIDA (Federal Industrial Develop-
ment Authority).
30 - This estimate is derived as follows: from Chapter 3 and Chapter 5,
the total employment in Government sector and plantation sector in
1976 are estimated to be 410,000 and 260,000 respectively. Subtrac-
ting these -from the estimated total wage-labor force estimate for
1976 in Table 6.25 provides the base population for estimating the
share of organized labor in other sectors.
31 - Edwards (1975: Appendix 4) has argued that this fragmentation of
unions was due to Government actions against the trade unions in
the last 30 years. See also K. S. Jomo (1977): 325-7 for a review
of the legislative developments that constrained trade union growth.
32 - Although there is no specific legislation prohibiting unionization
in the pioneer industries, some of the major pioneer industries
(e.g., electronic assembly) have remained to date un-unionized.
In the case of electronics assembly workers, the Min. of Labor had
refused the Electrical Industry Workers Union (EIWU) to unionize them
on the grounds that the EIWU catered to a different category of
workers, even though the ILO agrees to the grouping of electrical
and electronics workers in the same union (K.S. Jomo (1977): fn 29, p. 444).
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33 - However, a rising trend of strikes since the mid-1970s appears
to have occurred. Whether this would lead to a new "peak" that
matches earlier ones (see Figure 6.3) remains to be seen. A sig-
nificant development is that since the mid-1970s the manufacturing
sector has taken over from the plantation sector as the sector where
the largest number of strikes occurs. (See Min. of Labor AR and
Econ. Report (v.y.) for information on distribution of strikes by
industries).
34 - Result is not significant at the 0.9 confidence level, but visual
inspection does suggest some correlation.
35 - See previous footnote.
36 - This is not to say that unionization per se can have little effect
in helping workers to bargain for better wages and working conditions.
The argument here is that so far it has not been very effective, not
that it never can be.
37 - In the discussion so far, government-employed blue-collar workers
have been excluded. Appendix Table 60 presents some information
on the wage-scale of manual workers in the public sector. Given
the wide spread of wage-scale by seniority in the public sector,
it is not clear how the average earnings in the public-sector would
compare with those in the private sector. Not much differential
appears to exist between the starting wage-scale in the public sector
and the averages of the private sector, however.
38 - Data from survey of hawkers in Kuala Lumpur, Malacca (as reported in
McGee and Young (1977: Table 17)) and in Penang (as reported in
Hora (1975)), support the contention that hawkers work long hours.
The proportion of hawker units that operated more than 9 hours a day
was 40%, 54% and 74% respectively in these surveys; the corresponding
figures for hawking units operating more than 11 hours a day were
27%, 34% and 45%. The survey from Penang found an average of 10.6
hours per day of stall operation, and an average of 28.2 days/month -
i.e., two days of rest a month on average. Moreover, since these
figures refer only.to stall operation and exclude time spent outside
stall (e.g., preparation at home), they are definitely underestimates.
This writer's personal knowledge of hawking in Ipoh suggests that
many hawker units operate every day of the year, and that work at
the stall is only a small part of the total work.
39 - Tan Tat Wai (1977) has derived estimates of the average net annual
turnover of retail traders in Peninsular Malaysia based on the 1966
Census of retail trades. Converted to monthly earnings, the figures
are:
fruits and vegetables stores $138
fish stores $141
provision stores $253
These figures appear low in comparison with those given in Table 6.34,
even after adjusting for inflation between the two periods. Presum-
ably, some of the smaller retail traders were in fact "hawkers".
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40 - See L. Peattie (1975) for description of this in the case of street
vendors in downtown Bogota.
41 - A recent survey of factory workers in Shah Alam (a new industrial
town being developed within the metropolitan Klang Valley area)
found the following:
- 64% of workers not satisfied with current levels of income
- 81% of workers do not perceive their prospects for improvement
in current employment as being good
- 57% of workers were looking for a change of job with the
hope of getting higher income; 16% had indicated at least
two changes of jobs in the past
(Source: Mhd Nor Ghani (1978))
These findings do not suggest the picture of a contented "labor
aristocracy".
42 - Thus, the fact that many professionals in the country today were
trained in British (or the Commonwealth) institutions has resulted
in an admission system in many professional fields today that is
still biased in favor of graduates from these institutions and that
bans other "equivalent" credentials.
43 - Jacob Meerman (1977), in a study of the cost of education to families
of different income status in a World Bank survey of households in
Peninsular Malaysia in 1974, concluded thus:
"A most impressive, even stirring fact emerging from the analysis
is the extent of the sacrifice by the poor to keep their children
in school... 79% of the [lowest income quintile households] spent
an average of 18% of their income for this purpose.. .Perhaps more
than any other variable the magnitude of educational sacrifice ex-
presses the aspiration of Malaysia's poor for a better life if not
for themselves, then for their children..." (Meerman (1977): 4-44))
44 - Narayanan (1975) has found that recent in-migrants to metropolitan
Selangor were more educated than locally-born residents after con-
trolling for sex, age and ethnic group.
45 - One dimension of this dualization historically ran along English-
educated white-collars vs. white-collars educated in vernacular
languages (Chinese, Malay, Tamil). It is common knowledge that
graduates from Chinese-medium schools or universities (e.g., Nantah,
Taiwan) generally get lower salaries than English-medium graduates
at equivalent level of education, although no comprehensive study
of the topic is available. Anand (1978), in his estimation of earning
functions of wage-employees in Peninsular Malaysia using the 1970
PES data, has found that the return to Chinese and other vernacular
education was less than that to English education at equivalent level.
A similar conclusion was arrived at by Mazumdar (1977). For a discussion
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of the differential in occupational mobility between the English-
educated and Chinese-educated in Singapore, see MacDougall and Chew
Sock Foon (1976). The same differentials in white-collar income and
occupational mobility between Malays who were educated in Malay-medium
or religious schools and those who were educated in English-medium
schools can be observed. Indeed, to the extent that one can concep-
tualize some of the Islamic religious teachers as "white-collar 'sal-
ariats" of the government, the disadvantaged mobility positions of
this group of salariats versus the more secular, Western-educated
government "bureaucrats" who are in more privileged positions of
governmental power may be a relevant factor for understanding intra-
Malay politics.
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CHAPTER 7 Ethnic differential in urban employment: the desegmentation
process
Like most other LDCs which had inherited the colonial legacy of a
multi-ethnic labor force, the employment structure of Peninsular Malaysia
at the eve of independence was characterized by a high degree of segmen-
tation along ethnic lines. In the previous two chapters, an attempt
has been made to analyze the pattern of change in the employment structure
during the post-colonial period and to identify the basic dynamics of
access stratification/segmentation in that structure. With these as
background, we are now in a position to examine the question of how this
colonial pattern of employment segmentation by ethnic groups has changed
over the post-colonial period.
The issue of ethnic imbalance in the employment structure is of
course one of a larger set of issues pertaining to the problem of ethnic
inequality in the political economy of the country today. Closely related,
and not easily disentangled in practice, are the issues of ethnic inequality
in wealth ownership, in income distribution, in access to public-controlled
resources and services, and perhaps also in the political system itself.
Taken at its most general level, the issue of ethnic inequality in the
economic structure is thus a very complex one, and it is not within the
scope of this dissertation to attempt to sort out the full complexities
involved. Rather, our focus here will be a more narrow and modest one,
and involves essentially an attempt to address the following questions:
(1) How has the pattern of ethnic distribution in the urban employment
structure changed over the post-colonial period? In view of the
increasing urbanization of Malays and movement of Malays from agricul-
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tural to non-agricultural activities, has there been a process of
"de-segmentation" of the ethnic groups vertically along the occupa-
tional hierarchy as well as horizontally across production organi-
zation sectors?
(2) What were the determinants of this process of change? In particular,
what were the impacts of government policies aimed at "re-structuring"
"ethnic imbalance" as formulated under the New Economic Policy?
The main argument against the perpetuation of an ethnic differential
in employment is that in so far as different employment positions provide
different earnings levels and social status, differential access to
employment positions by the different ethnic groups would be partly, if
not entirely, responsible for creating inequality in income and social
status between members of different ethnic groups. Moreover, the cumulative
effect of this differential, if uncorrected, is to further accentuate
inter-ethnic inequality inter-generationally.
The uneven distribution of the different ethnic groups in the employ-
ment structure is said to have two other undesirable consequences: firstly,
by perpetuating the segregation of ethnic groups at work, it limits the
extent of inter-ethnic interaction, thereby making a true integration of
the different ethnic groups and their cultural values at the "grass-roots"
level difficult. Secondly, in so far as certain employment positions
in the employment structure involve potentially conflicting relationships
with each other, an uneven allocation of ethnic groups within the employ-
ment structure may lead to a congealing of these potentially conflicting
relationships along ethnic lines. Thus, to the extent that the relation-
ship between peasant producers and middlemen is a potentially conflicting
one, the predominance of Malays among the former and Chinese among the
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latter results in a congealing of this conflict along a Malay-Chinese one.
To the extent that middlemen are identified as being exploitative, the per-
ception might develop that all Chinese are exploitative. In the absence
of knowledge of other economic roles occupied by other Chinese, the
development of such perception among the Malay peasant producers is rational.
Similarly, if employment in the manufacturing sector is segmented in such
a way that non-Malays occupy the managerial/supervisory positions while
Malays predominate as job-shop workers, the conflict between the manage-
ment and workers over wages, work conditions, etc. may be congealed into
an inter-ethnic conflict.
The 'thrust of the argument of this chapter is that a substantial
de-segmentation of ethnic groups in the urban structure vertically along
the occupational hierarchy has occurred, but that this has been achieved
through a rather uneven pace of change horizontally across production
organization sectors. In particular, the expansion of urban Malay employ-
ment has been mainly concentrated in the large corporate and public sectors.
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7.1 The colonial historical context
The causes and extent of employment segmentation along ethnic lines
during the colonial period have been studied by many writers (see,e.g.,
C.Rirschman(1975), B.N.Cham(1976) and Snodgrass(forthcoming)). To summarize
the argument from the perspective of our conceptual framework, industries
were little developed during the colonial period, and the urban economy
consisted largely of commercial, public administrative and infrastructural
service activities. Export-import trades were mainly dominated by large
British agency houses at the apex, while the lower rungs of the trading and
distributive hierarchy were mainly operated by Chinese merchants, middlemen
and retailers. The corporate sector can thus be described as dominated
by foreign firms, while the small capitalist sector was overwhelmingly non-
Malay controlled. The colonial government's direct participation in commer-
cial activities was minimal, but it was responsible for the production of
much of the infrastructural services (railways, hydroelectricity, port faci-
litiesetc.) which involved a significant number of manual laborers.
In the context of such an urban production organization structure, the
pattern of ethnic distribution within the employment structure generated can
be characterized as follows :
In the foreign-dominated corporate sector, absorption into white-collar
and middle managerial positions was based on English educational attain-
ment. To the extent that non-Malays had better access to English educa-
tion than Malays( due to concentration of English schools in the cities),
they tended to dominate access to these occupations.
A similar situation also applies to white-collar occupations in the
public-sector. However, due to explicit colonial policy to integrate
the traditional Malay aristocratic elites within the system of colonial
rule, a special system of selection of Malays from aristocratic backgrounds
for admission into the colonial administrative bureaucracy was instituted.
This had therefore resulted in a sizable presence of Malays in public
administrative occupations also.
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. On the other hand, absorption into the small capitalist sector is
based strongly on ethnic and even subethnic preferential selection
criteria. The reason for this has to do with the mode of employ-
ment of the small capitalist enterprises. Huang Tze Lian (1972),
among others, has described the widespread use of "apprenticeship"3
system of employment in the smaller Chinese enterprises, and noted
the "semi-feudal" nature of the informal "labor bondage" relat-
ionship involved. The apprenticeship system of recruiting and
retaining control over labor was historically necessary during the
early colonial days when a "universalized" free-wage labor system
has yet developed, and much of the labor was drawn directly from
fresh immigrants imported from China. Selection based on clanship
and even kinship network was therefore important in such a system.
The majority of these small employers and proprietors were either
uneducated or mainly educated in tteir own vernacular languages;
the big push of spreading a common national language (Malay or
Bahasa Malaysia) through the school system since the 1960's may
affect the younger generation, but had little effect on those
already out of school. The need to employ workers who can speak th
the same language or dialect is thus crucial for these proprieter-
employers.
. Because of the predominance of Chinese in terms of ownership and
control over enterprises in the small capitalist sector, wage-
employment in these enterprises tend also to be predominantly Chin-
ese. Unskilled or manual workers of Malay or Indian origins there-
fore tended to be excluded from such employment, and this had
partly contributed to their relative concentration in the protective
se r,-ices or their tendency to become general laborers in the public
services (public workes, railways, public utilities, etc.).
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_._2 Post-colonial transformation : changes in labor supply characteristics
and ownership of productive assets
How has this colonial pattern of ethnic segmentation in the employment
structure changed over the post-colonial period ? In-Chapter 1.3.3, it
was pointed out that a change in the employment segmentation pattern can
be induced by either a change in the ethnic differentials in terms of labor
supply attributes or a change in the conditions of access. The latter in
turn depend on the structure of ownership and control over productive assets
among the ethnic groups. Before turning to examine the available evidence
on the actual changes in the employment segmentation pattern, we shall there-
fore ,first examine the pattern of change in labor supply characteristics
and productive asset ownership in the urban economy among the ethnic groups.
The argument that we advance can be summarized in the following propo-
sitions :
(1) There has been a narrowing of the differential between Malays and non-
Malays in terms of their :
a) spatial access to urban wage-employment labor markets and self-employ-
ment locations
b) educational attainment
c). employment preference and expectation
(2) A substantial expansion of capital ownership and control by Malays has
occurred especially after the implementation of the NEP (New Economic
Policy) in 1970, mainly through the expansion of the public corporate
sector. Expansion of Malay ownership in the small capitalist sector
has also been of some significance, though not as much as the pace of
change in the corporate sector
In what follows, an attempt will be made to briefly review the empirical
evidence for both of these propositions.
..2.1. Narrowing of Ethnic Differentials in Labor Supply Attributes
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a) Decline of ethnic differentials in spatial access to urban employ-
ment opportunities
While post-colonial rural development has not led to massive rural-
urban transfer of Malays at least up to the late 60's (see Chapter 4),
the proportion of Malays in urban areas had nevertheless registered
appreciable increase between 1957 and 1970 (Table 7.1). 28% of the
population residing in urban areas of over 10,000 persons in 1970 were
Malay compared to 21% in 1957. Although the proportion in the largest
metropolitan towns (100,000 persons and over) was still less than that
in the smaller-size urban areas, it is in these large towns that the
Malay population was increasing fastest. This trend of increasing
Malay share in the urban population has definitely accelerated in the
post-70's period.
In addition, the attempt at "agropolitan" development, i.e. the
plan to develop new towns in large regional agri-complexes (Pahang
Tenggara, etc.) as well as to group FELDA schemes into increasingly
large settlements(see Chapter 3.2) would give rise to several large Malay-
dominated towns in the near future. To the extent that these towns are
viable, a significant amount of non-agricultural employment may be created
for rural Malays resettled there. These agri-complex developments in
the east coast states of Peninsular Malaysia will in turn stimulate the
growth of the existing towns there (e.g. Kuantan, Kota Baru).
b) Narrowing of ethnic differentials in educational attainment
Table 7.2 shows the ratio of mean years of educational attainment
of the different ethnic groups to the national average for different age-
cohorts in 1957 and 1970. It is seen that a substantial decline in the
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Table 7.1 Ethnic Distribution of Population By Urban Size, 1957 & 1970
Size of Urban Malay Chinese Indian
Area 1957 1970 1957 1970 1957 1970
a) Ethnic
distribution
10-20 000 37.9 43.9 50.5 47.2 9.6 8.1
20-50 000 15.7 20.0 72.1 68.0 10.3 11.7
50-100 000 29.4 33.3 56.6 55.2 10.4 10.2
100 000+ 15.4 22.6 65.4 60.0 14.9 15.7
All 10 000+ 21.0 27.6 62.6 58.4 12.8 12.7
b) Average annual
growth rate
10-20 000 2.93 1.28 0.38
20-50 000 4.20 1.85 3.29
50-100 000 4.38 3.24 3.31
100 000+ 5.42 1.87 2.88
Source: Narayanan(1974)
gap between Malays and non-Malays had occurred especially among
the younger age-cohorts 20-29. As this observed decline pertains to
those who were already out of school in 1970, Table 7.3 further examines
the pattern of ethnic distribution among those still enrolled in
school in 1970 and 1975. It is seen that the Malay share of total
enrollment had increased between 1970 and 1975 at every educational
level. Moreover, in 1975, Malay share at the upper secondary and
tertiary level was actually higher than at the primary and lower
secondary level, thus suggesting that the expansion of Malay educational
attainment was not just confined to the lower education levels.
Although non-Malays dominanted enrollment in higher education in the
past, by 1975 the Malay share of enrollment was higher than their
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Table 7.2
Age-about
20-29
30-39
40-49
50-59
60+
Index of Mean Year of Educational Attainment of Population
by Ethnic Groups (a11=100), 1957 & 1970
1957 1970
M C I M C I
82 110 122 90 110 108
76 118 126 83 116 121
72 113 118 79 120 137
65 115 133 77 120 125
55 127 173 73 116 154
All 20+ 77 110 127 85 113 118
Source: 1970 Population Census Vol.I: Table 4.19
Note: M = Malay
C = Chinese
I = Indian
Table 7.3 Enrollment
Primary
Lower
secondary
Upper
secondary
Past
secondary
All secondary
1970
1975
by Level of Education & Ethnic Group, 1970-75
Enrollment Distribution(%)
Malay Chinese Indian
53.4 36.0 10.0
55.2 34.7 9.6
1970
1975
1970
1975
1970
1975
1970
1975
51.0
54.4
48.8
60.7
43.4
54.0
50.4
55.8
38.8
35.4
43.4
32.4
49.6
40.5
39.9
34.8
9.6
9.7
7.0
6.2
6.0
4.9
9.0
8.8
Source: TMP
All tertiary 1970 49.7 42.7 5.1
1975 65.1 31.1 3.3
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share of total population. This trend is confirmed by a World Bank
survey in 1974, which found Malay enrollment rate higher than Chinese
and Indian at the secondary and post-secondary level (Table 7.5).
The pace of expansion of Malay share in local university enrollment
has been the most dramatic: while it was only 19.3% in 1959, and
still only 28.8% in 1966, by 1970 it had shot up to 49.7% and by
1975, the proportion (65%) exceeded their share of the population (55%).
The proportion has apparently gone up further in 1976 and 1977; over
79% of all new entrants in the latter yearwere Malay.
The conclusion can thus be drawn that the differentials in
educational attainment between Malays and non-4alays as a whole had
been large wiped out by the mid-70's, if not actually turning in
favor of Malays. This removal of inter-ethnic differential in
educational attainment should of course in no way be construed as an
equalization of educational access for all, since intra-ethnic
group differentials still persist. As Table 7.4 shows, the strong
influence of parents' socio-economic status on children's educational
attainment (which we have previously documented in Chapter 6) holds
true within each ethnic group. Moreover, from Table 7.4, it appears
that the stratification effect was more pronounced for Malays than
for Indians and Chinese, in that order. It is also of significance
to note that, in the urban areas, Malays had higher enrollment rates
than Chinese for all social backgrounds, whereas in the rural areas,
only Malays from "high" social backgrounds had a higher enrollment
rate.
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Table 7.4 Proportion of youth aged 15 currently enrolled in school in
1972 by socio-economic status of father (
Socio-economic status
Malay Chinese Indian Total
88.0 59.0 77.0
54.0 39.0 47.0
27.0 22.0 21.0
63.0
503
67. 0
43.0
22.0
42.0 42.0 47.0
1294 140 1937
Malay Chinese Indian Total
67.0 53.0 54.0 63.0
28.0 30.0 28.0 28.0
14.0 18.0 16.0 15.0
28.0 31.0 22.0 28.0
1776 544 235 2555
Source: Dropout Repott (1973) p. 21
ble 7.5 Enrollment rate in public/assisted educational institutions_
by ethnic group, 1974, (L)7
jala
Primary
Secondary
Post-secondary
89
41
3.9
Chinese
97
38
2.4
Indian
87
36
n.a.
Source: Meerman (1977): Table 4.3
High
Urban Rural
Medium
Low
Total
(n- )
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c) Narrowing of ethnic differentials in occupational aspiration
One argument that had much currency in the past was that Malays
had less desire or motivation for education. Hirschman(1972) has
shown this to be false even in the colonial period where mean years
of education among the Malays lagged behind the non-Malays. The rate
of retention in both primary and secondary schools among Malays was
higher than for non-Malays even then; the lower mean schooling for
Malays was caused instead by problems of access (Hirschman (1972):500).
In the post-colonial period, such an argument would be even less
tenable, in view of the higher enrollment rate for Malays.
The traditional argument that Malay youths have less strong
motivation for white-collar occupations and prefer to remain as
farmers and fishermen are also untenable. Indeed, all available
evidence shows that Malay students have a higher level of occupational
aspiration than their non-Malay peers at the same educational level
(Takei et. al. (1973), A. B. Wilson (1977), and Mazumdar (1977)).
It has also been found that youths in the least-developed Malay-
dominated states (Trengganu, Kelantan) had the highest job expectations
while those in the most urbanized states (Selangor, Penang) had the
8
lowest (A. B. Wilson (1977)). It thus appears that, while in the past,
lack of exposure to the occupational possibilities accruing to a
good education may have been a deterrent factor for youths from rural
backgrounds, the situation has now been reversed - it is youths in
the rural areas who have the most unrealistic white-collar job
expectations, while youths in the more urbanized areas have perhaps
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learnt to adjust their expectations downwards somewhat in the face
of the declining prospects for actually landing the desired jobs.
In summary, it can be concluded that ethnic differentials
in spatial location with respect to job markets has declined,
educational attainment has been equalized among the younger generations
of the different ethnic groups, and that rural Malays do not lag
behind urban non-Malays in terms of aspirations for white-collar
jobs (in fact, they showed higher aspirations).
7.2.2 Expansion of Malay Ownership of Urban Production Assets
Probably the single most important factor that accounted for the
domination of Chinese in the small capitalist sector and to some extent
the corporate sector at the eve of Independence was the head start they
had in the urban commercial trades as compared to other ethnic groups,
and the subsequent process of internal capital accumulation (transferred
intergenerationally through family inheritance) over the years. The
coming of Independence saw not only a further expansion of Chinese-
owned enterprises in the small capitalist sector, but more significantly,
many of the larger Chinese enterprises had moved up into the large
corporate sector. According to some writers, this continuation of
of Chinese dominance of urban production into the mid-60's had resulted
in the frustration of Malay businessmen attempting to expand production
and of Malay white-collar salariats who were attempting to move into
business operation or managerial occupations. In the wake of this
rising frustration of Malays and as a result of the racial riot in
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Ownership of share capital in limited companies, 1970-75
1970
Malay and Malay interests
- Malay individuals
- Malay interests
Other Malaysians
Foreign
Total Private Sector
Total value ($ million)
Total GDP (1970 prices)
2.4
(1.6)
(0.8)
34.3
63.3
100.0
5329.2
1975
7.8
(2.3)
(5.5)
37.3
54.9
100.0
9890.1
9038.0 12914.0
Average annual
growth rate (%)
43.6
(21.9)
(67.4)
15.1
10.0
13.2
7.4
Source: TMP: Table 4-16.
Table 7.7 Malay share of equity capital for FIDA-approved industrial
projects 1971-77
% share of call-up capital
Malays
16.0
41.8
1971-77 cumul. 32.3
Non-Malays
66.9
30.7
36.1
Foreign
17.1
27.5
31.6
% of projects approved
with Malay majority
ownership
n.a.
17.6
13.7
Source: FIDA AR (v.y.); ARB (31/7/78): 8(2), Part 1, 468.
Table 7.6
Year
1971
1975
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1969, a dramatic change in the role of the public sector towards an a
active "interventionist" program to "restructure" ethnic distribution
of ownership of urban productive assets has occurred. This new public
policy, codified as one of two major prongs of the NEP pronounced in
1970, takes several forms in terms of its implementation:
(1) Development of Public Corporations, i.e. the expansion of direct
participation of the Government in organizing production on a commercial
to
basis. The share capital of these enterprises is in many cases
supposedly held "in trust" for eventual allocation to Malays indi-
viduals. It is not clear when and how this "eventual" allocation will
be done, but in the man time, these corporations can for all intents
and purposes be classified as Malay-owned and controlled. The massive
pace of expansion of the public corporation sector after 1970 in every
sector of the urban economy has already been documented in chapter 5.
Table 7.6 shows the rapid pace of increase in Malay share capital
ownership in the corporate sector between 1970-75. Although the
extent of Malay ownership in 1975 remains small, compared with non-
Malays, this is partly misleading, since the importance of the public
corporations lies in their strategic control (though pyramiding, joint-
ventures, etc) and hence is not adequately reflected in share capital
values alone. Table 7.7 shows further the expansion of Malay share-
capital ownership in the manufacturing sector.
(2) Expansion of Credit Availability to Malay Businessmen
In addition to the development of government-owned enterprises and
reservation of share capital in limited companies for Malay ownership,
expansion of credit availability for Malay businessmen has also been
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a major public policy which is implemented through government regulation
of the private financial market (by e.g. requiring a certain share of
bank lending to be channelled to Malays) or direct government-subsidized
lending to Malays. The pace of this expansion of credit availability
to Malays was extremely rapid after 1970 (Snodgrass, forthcoming). For
example, loans to Malays totalled only $70 million in the 20 years
between 1951-70, but in the next 5 years, it shot up to $163 million.
Similarly, the share of MIDF loan value to Malay industrialists went
up from 0.2% in 1969 to 17% between 1971-75. Finally, credit out-
standing to Malay as a proportion of total bank lending to the private
sector went up from 3.4% in 1970 to 12.2% in 1975. Along with this sub-
stantial expansion of capital availability is the imposition of admin-
istrative measures favoring Malay participaiton in business. These
measures include price preferences for Malay suppliers of goods and
services to the government, reservation of work contracted out by the
Public Works Dept. (PWD) to Malay, specific quotas on award of transport
licences, and reservation of a certain share of trading areas and permits
to Malay wholesalers and retailers. While there has been no available
study on who among the Malay have benefited from this subsidized
capital access preferential treatment, it appears unlikely that the
poorer Malays benefited- much from it. Instead, the majority who derived
benefits from this tend to be those who were already a bit well-off or
had political connection.
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(b) Expansion of Malay Ownership & Control of Production Units in the
Small Capitalist Sector
Unlike the case of the corporate sector where ownership of equity
share capital by ethnic groups can be obtained, there is a dearth of
information on the ethnic distribution of ownership of unincorporated
enterprises. In what follows, a variety of diverse sources will be utilized
to piece together a picture of the extent of Malay ownership and control
of unincorporated enterprises and how it has changed over time.
The first and most comprehensive source fo information is the Registry
of Businesses. Table 7. 8 summarizes the trend data on the number of
registered unincorporated enterprises by ethnic ownership between 1954 and
1976. Three points emerge from examining Table 7. 8
(1) The number of Malay-owned enterprises has increased much faster than
non-Malay owned ones; between 1957 and 1976, the share of Malay-owned
enterprises rose from less than 10% to 24%, while that of Chinese
dropped from 74% to 66%, and Indian 16% to 10%.
(2) The pace of increase in Malay share of partnerships (which are gen-
erally larger in size than sole proprietorships) was even faster
(2.3% to 26.4%), i.e. Malay share of the larger enterprises increased
more rapidly than for all enterprises.
(3) The pace of increase has accelerated since 1970 for Malay-owned
enterprises; that of Chinese-owned enterprises has also picked up a
little. bit, but that of Indians has declined.
Taken together, these observations point to a significant penetration of
Malay-owned production units in the unincorporated sector, especially
after 1970. Although it is likely that the average size of Malay-owned
enterprises may be smaller than that of Chinese-owned ones (no infor-
mation on size of enterprise is available from the Registry of Business),
it remains true that the extent of growth of Malay-operated unincorporated
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Table 7.8 Growth in registered unincorporated enterprises (sole prprietor-
ships and partnerships) in Peninsular Malaysia by ethnic g p
of proprietors, 1954-1975
1) No. of enterprises Malay
(a)
7855
8731
11367
12741
13867
17856
21763
28991
55160
(b)
n. a.
267
n.a.
1007
n. a.
2797
n. a.
6557
15030
(a)
57096
66074
78143
86963
02634
99557
109983
120603
154230
(a) (b) (a) (b)
2) % of enterprises
9.8
10.8
13.1
16.9
2.3
5.4
10.4
17.7
23.7 26.4
74.3
73.9
73.1
70.4
82.9
81.8
77.8
72.0
66.4 66.4
15.5
14.9
13.3
12.2
14.1
12.2
11.1
9.7
0.4
0.4
0.5
0.4
0.8
0.6
0.7
0.6
9.7 7.0 0.2 0.1
3) Avg. annual rate of
growth (%)
1957-68
1968-76
6.7 23.8
15.1 23.4
3.8
5.6
Sources: 1954: Register of Business, cited in Goh
1957-1972: Dept. of Inland Revenue AR
1976: ARB 7(6)(Part 1): 389.
7.3 2.5 5.6
7.6 2.7 3.7
Jom Hai (1962).
(a) - sole proprietorships and partnerships
(b) - partnerships only
Chinese
1954
1957
1960
1963
1965
1968
1970
1972
1976
Indian Other
(b)
n. a.
9610
n.a.
15329
n.a.
20937
n.a.
26656
37748
12644
13790
16126
17583
17019
18187
20351
20854
22547
n.a.
1632
n. a.
2283
n.a.
2985
n. a.
3594
4007
310
332
380
462
550
671
766
747
497
n.a.
87
n. a.
117
n. a.
183
n. a.
206
84
1957
1963
1968
1972
1976
Notes:
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enterprises is more significant than is generally assumed in popular dis-
cussion. The small capitalist sector is no longer the confine of non-
Malays in the 1970's.
The shortcoming of the above information from the Registry of Business
is that no breakdown by sectors of activities is available. Table 7. 9
represents an attempt to provide such a breakdown by summarising infor-
mation on Malay ownership from many .diverse sources. It can be seen that
the proportion of Malay proprietorship in the distributive trades and
lodging and catering services in 1970 were almost one-third, while the
share of Malay in urban services (laundry services, barbers, etc.), rubber
dealers and hawkers were about one-fifth. These quantitative estimates
are generally higher than the impression one gets from popular discussion,
and confirm the previous estimates from the Registry of Business. It -
remains true, however, that the share of Malay-owned enterprises tend to
be more significant inthe smaller towns and rural areas; for example, in
1970, more than half of all proprietors in distributive trades and lodging/
catering services in the rural area were Malay, whereas the proportion in
metropolitan centers was less than 105. The same holds true for hawkers
also (almost half in rural areas and less than 5% in metropolitan centers).
Bearing in mind that the proportion of Malay population in the metropolitan
towns is smaller compared with other areas, however, this differential is
less extreme than it might first appear.
Table 7. 9 also included some information on other activities besides
distributive trades and services. Malay ownership was apparently still
small among small-scale manufacturing enterprises as a whole, although it
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Table 7.9 Malay ownership of enterprises in various sectors of activities
(a) Retail establishments in 48 urban areas, 1970
% Malay owned establishments 20%
(b) Selected urban service establishments in 48 urban areas, 1971
(laundry, barber and beauty shops, hotel and lodging places, photographic
studios, catering)
% Malay-owned estalishments 19.7%
(c) % Malay among working proprietors in
- wholesale and retail trade (1970)
- catering and lodging (1970)
(d) % Malay among hawkers (1970)
Towns
Metro. 10,000-
All towns 75,000
31.9 7.1
31.3 8.4
19.6 4.8
25.4
28.6
17.0
(e) Rubber dealers
1957
17.1% Malay
1970
22.6
(f) Small-scale manufacturing 1973
Paid full-time employment size
% of firms with Malay chief execu-
tives
1-4
8.0
5-49
5.4
50+
10.9
All
7.0
(g) Manufacturing firms with over 20 employees (1974):
In 22 industrial activities where information on the ethnic composition
of proprietors is available, 13 activities had no Malay proprietors,
4 had less than 10% of proprietors being Malay and 5 had over 10% of
proprietors being Malay. These 5 activities were:
food manufacturing (12%); tobacco (14%); chemical (15%); textiles (17%);
and electrical machinery (33%)
(h) Sawmills
% Malay-owned
% Joint-venture
1967
10
1977
11
2- 11
Towns
1,000-
10,000
Rural
<1,000
17.1
22.5
15.1
56.5
57.6
48.1
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Table 7.9 (Cont.)
(i) Road transport
% Malay-owned license 1957 1968 1970 1975
taxi 43.1 52.5 about 60
bus 13.0 21.9 n.a. n.a.
truck 5.2 9.1 10.0 54.0
(j) Tourist agencies (1977)
% Malay-owned 25.0
% Joint-venture 20.4
Sources: (a) - Cited in Von Vorys (1976).
(b) - Calculated from Census of selected urban services 1971 and
Directory of Malay establishments
(c), (d) - Calculated from 1970 Pop. Census, Vol. II
(e) - 1957 Pop. Census, 1970 RSH and Directory of Malay estab-
lishments
(f) - Chee Peng Lim (1974)
(g) - Hoffman and Tan (1977): Appendix.
(h) - Konggeres Ekon. Buniputra (1971) and ACCCM (1978).
(i) - 1957, 1968 - Suffian bin Hashim (1972); 1970-75 - TMP: 195.
The figures for trucks in 1970-75 pertain to "Class A"
license only.
(j) - ACCCM (1978).
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has apparently increased in some activities like sawmill (mainly through
joint-venture), food and textiles. The proportion of road transport
operation licences owned by Malays has however registered significant
increase, due mainly to government licencing quota policies. Similarly,
the proportion of Malay-operated tourist agencies has also increased
/3
substantially.
In summary, the impression one gains from the available evidence is
that Malay participation in the small capitalist sector has increased in
significance, and it is no longer correct to assume that the class of
Malay small proprietors and employers is negligible in terms of economic
/4-
or political significance. Indeed, scattered journalistic accounts had
pointed to a likely trend of growing friction between some of these small
Malay businessmen and the large government enterprises. For example,
PERNAS, UDA and the SEDC's have all been accused of driving small inde-
pendent Malay enterprises out of business.
Nevertheless, it remains true that the expansion of Malay ownership and
control of production has been more important in the corporate and public
sectors than in the small capitalist sector.
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7.3 Change in Employment Segmentation Pattern Over the Post-Colonial
Period
Given the substantial reduction in inter-ethnic differentials in
terms of labor supply attributes and ownership & control over productive
assets, it can be expected that a reduction in inter-ethnic differential
vertically along the occupational structure would occur. What is the
available evidence?
(a) Increasing participation of Malay in urban employment
Table 7.10 documents the pattern of increasing participation of
Malay in each of the major occupations between 195? and 1970. It can be
seen that Malay share registered an increase at all levels.
The trend of increase in Malay share at all levels of occupation
has apparently accelerated between 1970 and 1975 according to official
estimates pertain only to aggregate occupational categories. These
estimates suggest that Malay share of professional/technical occupation
had changed from 47.2 to 48.5, administrative/managerial from 22.4 to
32.4, clerical from 33.4 to 38.7, sales from 23.9 to 25.0, production
from 31.3 to 37.0, and "service and others" from 42.9 to 48.3 (T1P: Table
4.15). More direct information on the manufacturing industry beyond 1970
is available; as Table 7.11 shows, the proportion of Malay has increased
at every occupational level, (except "general" workers), but the pace of
increase was fastest in the managerial, technical/supervisary and
clerical categories.
Table 7.10
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Ethnic Composition of Employment by Occupation, 1957 & 1970
1957 1970
M
Managerial & Administrative:
a
Govt. admin. & executive
Managerialb
Professional & Technical:
Teachers
59.3
6.6
41.0
49.2
C
18.9
73.7
38.1
36.0
I M C I
5.9
14.0
11.0
8.9
65.6
14.0
45.8
53.5
19.5
74.5
39.0
34.4
11.4
7.6
12.8
10.5
Clerical
Sales:
Managers, wholesale &
retail trades
Proprietors, wholesale
& retail trades
Salesmen & Shop-assistants
Hawkers
Service:
Managers, catering &
lodging services
Proprietors, catering &
lodging services
Protective
d
Armed Services
Other
e
:Production & Related:
Supervisors
Transport
General Laborers
Agriculture - manager/supervisor:
27.1 46.2 19.8 34.1 49.7 14.9
15.9 66.0 16.8 22.8 66.4 10.5
24.4 59.8 14.1
7.3 71.5
7.4 66.0
20.3
15.5
16.5 61.2 21.6
79.0
88.6
17.4
26.2
24.6
42.0.
28.2
7.9
8.4
7.2
61.7
53.9
45.6
41.7
43.4
40.6
9.2
4.3
19.7
18.9
22.8
15.5
27.7
31.7'
7.3
31.9
16.1
20.2
77.2
58.1
74.5
64.7
13.8
9.7
8.9
14.9
8.6 76.9 13.1
31.3
78.4
89.1
28.7
34.0
28.4
42.9
47.4
28.0
55.3
9.3
6.0
55.3
54.9
50.9
42.9
33.8
36.6
13.1
11.5
4.9
16.9
10.9
18.8
13.8
18.6
33.4
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Table 7.10 (continued)
Source: 1957 & 1970 Population Census
Note: Figures do not add to 100f because of the presence of others
a - The 1970 Population Census includes government executive officials
- in clerical. We have separated okt.the government executive
officials from the clerical and put them in "government adminis-
trative and executive" to ensure compatibility with the 1957
classification.
b - excludes managers in distribution trades, catering and lodging
services, and agriculture
c - The 1970 Population Census figure on hawkers is too small because
it apparently left many who are hawkers in the unclassifiable
category. Interpretation of the ethnic distribution figures
would therefore have to be cautious.
d - Since the presence of "others" was significant in the armed forces
in both years, the ethnic composition figures calculated here
exclude the category "others" from the total
e - In the 1957 Population Census, miners., transportation and construc-
tion workers were classified separately from the "Production &
related" workers. We have included these categories in "Production
and related" workers also to ensure compatibility with the 1970
classification.
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Table 7.11Share of Malays in Pioneer Firm Employment By Occupation, 1968-75
Malay share (%)
1968 1971 1973 1975
Managerial 5 9.4 10.4 15.4
Technical & supervisory 9 15.8 20.9 26.0
Clerical 13 15.4 19.9 26.0
Sales, services & general 50 51.1 40.7 45.4
Skilled 37 41.1 49.0 51.1
Unskilled 57 57.3 65.6 63.3
TOTAL 42 44.6 50.7 50.4
Sources: Lindenberg (1973) and FIDA AR (v.y.)
Note: Total includes non-Malaysian citizens
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(b) Narrowing of differentials in occupational structure between Malays
and non-Malays
The decline in ethnic differentials vertically along the occupational
hierarchy can be seen in another way: by looking at how the differentials
between the occupational distribution patterns of each ethnic group have
changed over time. Table 7.12 shows the trend in occupational structure
for each ethnic group between 1957 and 1975. From this, we can calculate
the ethnic differentials pair-wise at different time periods to compare
changes over time. This is done in Table 7.13 for the year 1957 and 1975.
It can be seen that, between Malay and Chinese, differentials in occupa-
tional structure had narrowed at every occupational level except the clerical
occupations. Malay-Indian occupational differentials had also narrowed
except for the clerical and professional/technical occupations.
One shortcoming in the above comparison is that the data pertain to
the labor force as a whole and not to those in the urban areas alone.
Unfortunately, trend data on such a breakdown by urban size are not
available, but data for one point in time - 1970 - can be obtained from
the 1970 Population Census (Table 7.14). A significant observation emerges
from this more disaggregated breakdown: the proportion of Chinese in
"professional/technical" and "clerical" occupations was lower than for
Malay or Indian at every urban size with the exception of the rural areas.
Thus, the higher Chinese proportion in clerical and professional/technical
occupations than Malay for the labor force as a whole (see Table 7.9) is
caused by the disproportionate concentration of Malays in the rural areas,
where the share of professional/technical and clerical occupations was
very low. The differentials shown in Table 7.13 are therefore misleading
in one way - they hid ethe true extent of white-collar occupations among
Occupational structure of each ethnic group in Peninsular Malaysia over time, 1957-75 (%)
prof. & tech.
admin. & manag.
clerical
sub-total
sales
service
production
agricultural
Malay
1957 1967/8 1970 1975
2.7 4.7 4.3 4.8
0.4 0.7 0.4 0.6
1.7 2.5 3.3 4.0
4.8 7.9 8.0 9.4
2.9 4.9 5.2 4.6
7.3 5.5
21.6 28.8
10.7 16.7
74.4 65.0 65.3 57.3
Chinese
1957 1967/8 1970 1975
3.3 5.0 4.7 5.3
2.0 2.8 1.4 1.5
3.8 5.7 6.9 7.2
9.1 13.5 13.0 14.0
15.9 16.7 19.8 17.2
8.1 9.3
39.8 44.1
28.4 30.4
38.5 30.1 27.4 24.6
Indian
1957 1967/8 1970 1975
2.6 5.7 5.5 6.2
1.0 1.2 0.6 1.0
4.0 5.1 6.7 6.4
7.6 12.0 12.8 13.6
10.0 6.9 11.7 9.0
7.6 8.1
31.2 32.4
24.7 25.9
50.3 47.0 44.2 45.1
100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
sources : 1957 Population Census; 1967/8 SESS; TMP : Table 4.15
note t the 1970 figures given in TMP differ slightly from the 1970 Population Census
General Report tabulation; the 1975 figures given in TMP are EPU estimates
prof. & tech. = professional & technical
admin. & manag. = administrative & managerial
all
0
Table 7.12
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Table 7.13 Change in ethnic differentials in occupational structure, 1957-75
Malay-Chinese Malay-Indian Indian-Chinese
1957 1975 1957 1975 1957 1975
White-collar -4.3 -4.6 -2.8 -4.2 -1.5 -0.4
Sales -13.0 -12.6 -7.1 -4.4 -5.9 -8.2
Service -0.8 -0.3 -0.5
-15.1 -3.6 -11.7
Production -17.7 -14.0 -3.7
Agriculture +35.9 +32.7 +24.1 +12.2 -11.8 -20.5
Among white-collar
Professional & -0.6 -0.5 +0.1 -1.4 -0-7 -0-9
technical
Administrative -1.6 -0.9 -0.6 -0.4 -1.0 -0.5
Clerical -2.1 -3.2 -2.3 -2.4 +0.2 -0.8
Source: Table 7.12
MaJays in the urban areas. In the largest metropolitan towns, as much as
28% of Malay employment was in white-collar occupations, as compared to
20.6e for Chinese and 26.7/6 for Indian. In towns between 10,000 and
75,000, the corresponding figures are 22.1%, 14.3% and 21.3%, while in
towns between 1,000-10,000, they are 16.9%, 6.2% and 13.5%. If anything,
these figures suggest that Malays were disproportionately represented in
the white-collar occupations in the urban areas.
In summary, an increasing rate of participation of Malay at every
occupational level has occurred in the urban employment structure, and
that the differential in occupational structure between Malay and non-
Malays has narrowed.
Lction 10.0 24.9 14.4 19.9 23.2 23.0 25.9 36.5 28.9 29.8 36.9 30.0
73.6 50.2 67.2 36.7 44.2 27.2 20.1 12.2 8.5 2.9 2.5 3.8
re
s 5.2 4.9 4.8 4.1 4.3 5.3 3.9 4.2 4.2 3.8 3.5 -3.9
100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
Source: Calculated from 1970 Population Census Vol. II
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While there has thus been a desegmentation of the ethnic groups
vertically along the occupational hierarchy by the early 1970's, this
has been achieved through a rather uneven pace of absorption of Malays
into the different production organization sectors. As Table 7.15 shows
a substantial segmentation of the ethnic groups by the type of employer
still persists in the urban areas of Peninsular Malaysia in the early 1970's.
For example, in Kuala Lumpur, 87% of the employed labor force in Malay
owned firms were Malay, and 92% of the employed labor force in Chinese
owned firms were Chinese.
Table 7.16 shows further the differential pattern of absorption of
the ethnic groups by production organization sectors. As much as 43%
of Malay non-agricultural employment in 1967/8 was concentrated in the
public sector, compared with less than 10o for the Chinese. Only 3% of
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Table 7.15 Ethnic composition of employment by type of employer()
a) Kuala Lumpur Indians
(1973) Malay Chinese & others All
Malay private firms 87 9 4 100
Chinese private
firms 6 92 2 100
Foreign firms 44 45 10 100
Government & 64 17 19 100
public enterprises
All 34 55 11 100
b) Kota Baru &
Kuantan(1973)
Malay private firms 99 1 - 100
Chinese private 34 65 1 100
firms
Foreign firms 45 55 - 100
Government & 80 9 11 100
Public enterprises
All 67 28 5 100
Source: 'Flazumdar(1977); Table 3.1
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Table 7.16 Distribution of employment by production organization
sectors for each ethnic group, 1967/68
Malay- Chinese Indian
Estate worker 7.1 10.0 47.4
Smallholding 54.4 17-3 2.8
agriculture
Other agriculture 3.5 2.8 0.5
All agriculture 65-0 30.1 50.7
Government department 15.2(43.4) 6.7(9.6) 21.5(43.6)
& statutory bodies
Private company,
individual proprietor-
ship & partnership
- proprietors & 16.8(48.0) 51.8(74.1) 22-?(46.0)
employees
- unpaid family 1.0(2.9) 7.0(10.0) 1.8(3.7)
workers
Domestic & other 1.9(5.4) 4.0(5-7) 3.0(6.1)
personal services
Others 0.1(0.3) 0.4(0.6) 0.3 (0.6)
All non-agricultural 35.0(100) 69.9(100) 49.3(100)
Source : estimated from 1967/68 SESS
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Table 7.17 Employment mode distribution by ethnic
1970 (%)
group and urban size,
('000) Employer
Own-account
workers
Unpaid
family workers
Metropolitan
M
C
I
Urban
(10-75,000)
M
C
I
Small Urban
(1,000-9,999)
M
C
I
Rural
(<1,000)
M
C
I
All
M
I
Source: Calculated from 1970 Population Census, Vol.
Wage-
employees
5.2
2.2
6.8
2.7
9.0
8.2
10.3
3.7
4.7
3.3
5.2
4.8
5.4
4.2
6.2
4.9
4.7
4.1
4.9
4.9
14.1
6.0
16.6
14.9
22.0
27.8
19.9
16.4
26.3
29.4
26.4
16.9
462.0
91.5
297.0
66.9
289.2
91.1
169.6
26.8
335.9
84.7
221.7
26.7
1649.3
1167.7
301.8
165.7
76.0
88.5
71.4
77.7
63.6
59.8
63.7
74.6
52.9
56.3
49.0
71.9
16.1
10.2
19.7
5.6
3.6
3.2
4.8
4.6
34.1
40.4
24.5
21.7
25.3
16.7
5.27.2
2870.9
1502.1
1034.9
40.5
31.2
54.0
83.0
3.9
3.1
4.9
4.4308.1
27.2
35.1
20.8
10.0
16.1
20.8
12.7
48.1
36.4
57.2
74.34.2
II.
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Malays in non-agricultural employment worked as unpaid family workers,
whereas 10% of Chinese were so engaged. This differential distribution
by employment modes among the ethnic groups is further substantiated
by data from the 1970 Population Census (Table 7.17). In the
metropolitan areas, 89/1 of Malays were wage workers, as opposed to
71% for Chinese and 78% for Indian. The above evidence suggests that
Malay urban employment has mainly taken the form of wage-employment
concentrated in the public sector and in large corporate firms. To
confirm this impression, we shall now examine more closely the available
evidence on ethnic composition by the public-sector and by the private
sector disaggregated by firm size.
(c) Ethnic Composition of Public-Sector Employment
Table 7.18 summarizes information on ethnic composition of public
sector employment over the post-colonial period. It can be seen that
the proportion of Malay in total (civilian) government employment has
increased steadily from 46/ to over 61% between 1957 and 1973. In
both of these years, the share of Malay in total public employment was
much higher than their corresponding share in total non-agricultural
employment. Moreover, this trend of increase in Malay share of public
sector employment was not confined to the lower occupations only; Table
7.18 shows that Malay share has registered a significant increase in
all Division One posts (the top stratum of government civil servants)
as well as Malayan Civil Setrvice (MCS) posts (the top administrative
posts within the government); in the latter case, Malays were overwhel-
mingly represented. Furthermore, from Table 7.10 earlier, the proportion
of Malays in "government administrative and executive" occupations,
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Table 7.18 Ethnic composition of public-sector employment (%)
(1) Government services, community services and public utilities, 1957-70
1957
1970
1973
M C I
45.6 26.4 22.1
60.0 21.8 15.5
61.3 27.5 10.1
Other
5.9
2.7
1.1
All
100
100
100
(2) "Higher'civil service"
All Division I posts
No. of posts
2761
2902
1968(Jan. 1) 4308
Malay Chinese Indian Other Expatriate
14.1
29.3
36.3
13.2
34.0
36.1
7.0
15.9
21.5
4.6
6.7
5.3
Malayan Civil Service (MCS) only
360
277
597
35.5
79.0
85.1
85.8
2.5
6.1
0.8
5.4
61.1
9.4
7.4 6.4 0.2
14.2
Sources: (1) Computed from 1957 and 1970 Pop. Census.; 1973 Manpower Survey.
(2) 1957-68 - Gibbons and Zakaria Hj. Ahmad (1971).
1976 - compiled from Senarai Pegawai, PersekutuanMalaysia
(Jan. 1, 1976).
Pertains to "superscale" posts only.
Year
1957
1962
1957
1962
1968
1976
61.0
14.1
0.9
Note: (a) -
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which can be taken to include most of the upper and middle white-
collar salariat posts (Division I to Division III), has also increased
over time (from 59% in 1957 to 66% in 1970). Since the disproportio-
nate concentration of Malays in the protective service (mainly police)
and military occupations (both of which can be considered "blue-collar*
employment in the government sector) has already been previously noted,
the above evidence thus suggests that the disproportionate expansion of
Malay share in public-sector employment has occurred at every occu-
pational level.
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(d) Do large firms employ more Malays?
An attempt will now be made to examine the hypothesis that large
firms in general and the corporate sector in particular employ a larger
proportion of Malays than smaller firms and firms in the small capitalist
sector.
() The Manufacturing Sector
As a first cut, Table 7.19 compares the share of Malays in total manu-
facturing employment, in enterprises registered by the Ministry of Labor only,
and in pioneer firms. Since the latter two generally consists of enter-
prises larger than average for the whole manufacturing sector, a diffe-
rential in ethnic share would be indicative of differentiation by enterprise
size. Such a differential is confirmed while only 33% of total manufactu-
ring employment in 1975 was Malay, it was 40% in enterprises registered with
the Ministry of Labor, and 50% for pioneer firms. It also appears that
the differential between all manufacturing firms and pioneer firms had
not narrowed over time.
Further evidence can be obtained from the Department of Statistics'
surveys/censuses of Manufacturing. The published reports on these
surveys/censuses do not provide information on ethnic composition of
employment, but two special tabulations had been made available for all
maufacturing firms surveyed in 1969 and all pioneer firms in 1968; these
are reproduced in Table 7.20. The correlation of Malay share with size
of firm (as measured by the number of paid full-time employees) is
confirmed in both cases; moreover, pioneer firms appear to have higher Malay
share than all manufacturing firms surveyed at every employment size level.
The survey of small manufacturing firms in 1973 by Chee Peng Lim (1974)
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Table 7.19 Ethnic Composition in Manufacturing Sector, 1957 to 1975
a) All Manufacturing Employment
M C I Other
1957 20 72 7 1
1962 27 67 5 1
1970 29 65 5 1
1975 33 60 7 -
b) Ministry of Labor Registered Manufacturing Firms Only
M C I Other
1974 40 50 10 -
c) Pioneer Firms Only
M C I Other
1968 42 47 5 6
1970 45 45 7 3
1975 50 n.e. n.a. n.a.
sources: (a) 1957 Pop. Census, 1962 EUS, TMP
(b Ministry of Labor AR 1974
(c) Lindenberg (1973) & FIDA
provides yet another source of evidence (Table 7.21 ). This reveals that,
while firms with fifty or more full-time paid employees clearly had larger
share of Malays than those of smaller sizes, the differentiation of firms
among the latter is less obvious. A closer examination of the detail survey
data shows that the relatively large share of Malays in the 0-4 employ-
ment size-category is partly due to the presence of small batik firms which
are operated mainly by Malay. proprietors. This suggests that, for the
small unincorporated firms the ethnic origin of the proprietor is an
important factor in affecting the ethnic composition of the workforce.
To examine the differentiation of Malay share by enterprise size in
a different way, a plot is made of relationship between the (value-added/
worker) ratio of a manufacturing activity and the Malay share of employ-
ment in that activity (Figure 7.1). Information on (value-added/worker)
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Table 7.20 Ethnic composition of manufacturing employment by firm size,
1968 & 1969
Size of firm (no.
of paid full-
time employees)
(a)
All manufacturing firms
surveyed, 1969
(b)
Pioneer Industry
firms -only, 1968
Malay Chinese Indian
7
14
16
14
19
23
28
38
34
87
79
76
78
72
66
60
48
50
4
4
5
5
6
7
7
9
9
Other Non-
Malaysian Malaysian
1
1
1
27 62 7
Source : (a)- unpublished 1969 Survey of Manufacturing industries data,
as reported in Snodgrass (forthcoming), Figures refer
to firms covered by the survey only. The "All" figures in
include firms with no full-time employees
(b)- unpublished 1968 Census of Manufacturing industries data,
as reported in Lindenberg(1973)
1-4
5-9
10-19
20-29
30-49
50-99
100-199
200-499
500+
Malay
/0
n.a
13
26
35
29
37
43
46
40
2
3
3
2
3
4
4
4
8
All
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Table 7.21 Ethnic composition of manufacturing employment by firm size
(1973 Small Scale Manufacturing Survey)
% distribution
Paid full-time employment
size group Malay Chinese Indian Others
0 -4
5 -9
10 - 19
20 - 29
30 - 49
50 +
21.1
17.0
15.5
21.0
16.7
.. 28.6
24.3All
Source : Chee Peng Lim(1974) :8
77.0
78.8
82.9
76.4
76.7
63.5
69.5
1.7
4.0
1.4
2.3
6.3
7.6
6.0
0.2 100
0.5 100
0.2 100
0.3
0.3
100
100
0.3 100
0.2 100
Table
Table 7.22 Ethnic composition in Pioneer Firms
in 1968 Manufacturing Census
and all manufacturing firms
(a) Pioneer firms only
M C I Others
Managerial 10 83
Technical & Supervisory 20 73
Clerical 14 80
General
Skilled Production
Unskilled Production
5
5
4
52 29 15
38 58 4
38
2
2
2
3
(b) All enumerated firms
M C I Others
12 80 5
15 76 7
10 76 5
34 47 17
69 7
54 7
23
3837 5
3
2
2
2
1
1
Source: Lindenberg (1973)
note: figures refer to percentage share among Malaysian citizen workers
only.
All
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by broad industrial subgroups can be calculated using the 1968 Manufac-
turing Census, but since no breakdown of employment into its ethnic
composition is available from the Census, the Malay share in the corres-
ponding industrial subgroups as given in the 1967/8 SESS is used as
a proxy. Two points are highlighted by Figure 7.1:
(1) Except for three industrial subgroups, a rather significant correlation
between the (value-added/worker) - ratio and Malay share of employment is
observed.
(2) The three. exceptional industrial subgroups turn out to be: food
manufacturing, sawwood and related wood products, and textiles (mainly-
batik) manufacturing. All these activities are dominated by small-scale
enterprises and utilize significant amount of handicraft skills specialized
among Malays.
Assuming that firms with higher value-added per worker are generally
larger in size, the above observations thus neatly confirm earlier findings
as well as the qualification introduced by Chee Peng Lim (1974)'s data.
In the comparison across firm size made so far, we have focused only
on the differentials of Malay share in aggregate employment; differentials
by specific occupations were ignored. Table 7.22 remedies this by providing
a comparison of the ethnic composition by occupation of all pioneer firms
in 1968 versus all enumerated firms in the 1968 Manufacturing Census; since
pioneer firms are generally much larger in size, they can be used as a proxy
for large firms. It can be seen that pioneer firms had higher share
of Malay in all occupational levels except managerial. Since the fact
that Malay share of managerial occupations in pioneer firms had expanded
rapidly since 1970 (see Table 7.11 ), it can be expected to be higher than
in all manufacturing firms in later years. In conclusion. then, we can
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say that larger firms in the manufacturing sector on the whole employ
proportionally more Malays than smaller firms at every occupational level.
(ii) other sectors and overall
Malay share of employment in the construction sector also appears
to be higher in the larger firms, as shown by the fact that 35% of
employment in the construction firms registered by the Ministry of Labor
in 1974 was Malay, whereas the proportion for the industry as a whole was
only 22% in 1970 and 29% in 1975. Information for other sectors are
unfortunately not available at a disaggregated enough level for a meaning-
ful comparison across firm size to be made. However, a survey of manage-
ment staff in corporations by Hunt and Conway (1972) does provide an
interesting comparison of the share of Malays in corporate management
staff by firm size. As shown in Table 7.23 , not only does the proportion
of firms with Malay managers increase with the size of the corporations,
but so does the share of Malay among total management staff. Moreover,
foreign firms (especially the multinational firms) had higher share of
Malay managers than local firms.
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Table 7.23 Proportion of Malay in the management staff of large
corporate firms, 1971.
Corporation by
size groups.
(annual sales)
No. of
firms
sampled
No. of
managers
enumerated
% of firms % of Malay Malay as % of
with Malay among new recruitmemt
managers management of managers,
(1971) staff 1969-1971
(1971)
$ 1-5 million
5-20 hillion
20-50 million
50+ million
All
32
16
21
45
146
136
740
29 1993
98 3015
Corporation by
control
Local 757
Foreign
(of which
"International")
53 2258
(12) (742)
Source: Hunt & Conway (1972)
13
19
62
72
39
4
9
13
11
6
17
20
18
22 8 15
51
(83)
12
(17)
20
(26)
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(e) Summary and Interpretation
In summary, we have shown that a substantial decline in vertical
occupational segmentation between ethnic groups has occurred for the urban
economy as a whole, but that this has been achieved through an uneven pace
of absorption of Malay across different production organization sectors.
The expansion of Malay employment at all occupational levels - managerial,
white collar salariats and "blue-collar" wage-workers - were found to have
been relatively concentrated within the public sector or in large enter-
prises. This suggests that .there has been a simultaneous expansion of
Malay employment at all levels of occupations and functional roles
within the same enterprises or organizations, i.e. a situation of one
ethnic group predominating the white collar or management staff positions
in an organization while members of another ethnic group being concentrated
in the "blue-collar" occupations in the same plant has NOT occurred.
This further suggests that inter-occupational conflicts within organizations
will be increasingly of an intra-ethnic nature,instead of an inter-ethnic
one.
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Footnotes
Chapter 7
1. It is important to note that this phenomenon of an "immigrant"
business community playing an "intermediary" role between the
external colonial power and the local consumption/raw material-
extraction economy was not unique to Peninsular Malaysia, but was
characteristic of many other LDCs as well (e.g. "Asians" in Kenya,
Uganda and Tanzania, Indians in Burma, and Chinese in Thailand).
See Simoniya (1961) and Yu (1971) for studies of Chinese immigrant
business communities in other parts of Southeast Asia.
2. According to J. C. Jackson (1975), "Cantonese are closely associated
with such skilled occupations as carpenter, sonemason, watchmaker,
goldsmith and mechanic; Hainanese and Hokkien predominate in coffee
shops and restaurant businesses; pawnshops, traditional medicine
shops and textile retailing are frequently conducted by Hakka."
For more detailed information concerning employment segmentation by
subethnic groups within each of the ethnic groups, see e.g. Yong
Chin Fatt's (1968) description of occupational specialization by
dialect groups in Singapore, and Gardner (1975) for occupational
segmentation by dialect groups in Penang. For similar analyses in
the case of Indians, see Rajeswera (1972).
3. See Gardner (1975) for description of the apprenticeship system in
goldsmith shops, carpentry work, photographic work and barber shops
in Penang in the early 1970's.
4. An examination of the breakdown of secondary school enrollment rates
by states also shows substantial decline in differentials between the
Malay-dominated, less developed states and the more developed West
Coast states. Thus, both Perlis and Kelantan states have the same
excellent rate (57%) as that of Selangor and Penang in 1974.
5. The figures cited are compiled from Suffian (1972: Table 0), TMP,
and Ci Y v-? ,, ,. 7 - ( iO )
In terms of absolute numbers, Malay graduates from domestic tertiary
institutions increased from 916 in 1970/71 to 3107 in 1974/5, whereas
for non-Malays the increase was from 1984 to 1541 within the same
period (TMP: 32)
6. A second source of information on educational stratification by
ethnic groups (Takei, et. al. (1973)) shows a similar trend of bias
in favor of children from "high" social background among each ethnic
group; however, the source seems to indicate that the stratification
effect was highest for Indians and least pronounced for Malays:
"Malays from lower social class backgrounds seem to have a better
chance of reaching the secondary school (and university) level than
their non-Malay peers with comparable social class origins". (Takei,
et. al. (Takei, et. al. (1973)). One possible factor for this is
that of differential scholarships provision by the government making
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it possible for at least some of the poorer Malays to have access to
higher education. Thus an official report on students in Universiti
Malaya in 1971 found 90.7% of Malay students to be on some form of
scholarship/bursaries sponsorship (both public (88.6%) and private
2.1%); the corresponding proportions for non-Malays were 26.4%
Chinese) and 25.3% (Indians) (figures compiled from Report of the
Committee appointed by the NOC to study campus life of students of
the University of Malaya (KL, 1971): 62-63)
7. The study by A. B. Wilson (1977) found, for example, that the propor-
tion of male youths aged 15 in 1972 who had expectations of professional,
technical or managerial occupations were 49% for Malay, 42% for Chinese
and 53% for Indian among those who were currently enrolled; among
those no longer enrolled, the proportions were 20%, 11% and 14%.
The differentials among females were even greater. That Chinese
had in fact the lowest expectation of white collar and managerial
occupations is also confirmed by Takei, et. al. (1973)).
8. Takei, et. al. (1973) have argued that this higher job aspiration of
Malays was the result of active government "promotional propaganda"
(or "sponsorship") to modernize the rural Malays.
9. See Milne (1976), K. S. Jomo (1978), Chandra Muzaffar (1977) among
others for interpretation of the New Econ3mic Policy. For the
official statement of objectives of the NEP see SM?, SM? mid-term
review and TM?.
10. For comparative studies of the development of public enterprises as
a means to promote the growth of an "indigenous" industrial-commercial
elite, see e.g., Swanison (1977) on Kenya. Kalecki (1967) has
identified those countries where an initially economically weak
social grouping attempted to develop its economic base through the
use of state power as "intermediate regimes".
11. For a rather indicting account of this bias in Malay access to equity
shares ownership in favor of the rich and politically well-connected,
see Sacerdoti and Wilson (Far Eastern Economic Review 6/10/78:
72-74). According to them, "Major public issues of shares are
being used as vehicles for offering financial advantages to influen-
tial Malays and helping to grease the wheels of the dominant political
party.... ..... "
12. The number of Malay construction contractors has also increased
rapidly since 1970, although no precise estimate of the change in
proportional share is possible. The TM? stated that the number of
Malay contractors registered with the PWD more than doubled between
1972 and 1975 alone (TM?: 194)
13. It is likely the share of Malay-owned retail units has increased
significantly after 1970, given the rapid expansion of hinterland
production (padi, fish, rubber, etc.). Indeed, one source stated
that the number of Malay-owned retail outlets for padi had increased
from 1502 in 1971 to 6457 in 1977 (May) (Asean Review June 1977) .
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14. Little direct evidence on the nature of this small Malay businessman
class is available. A survey by UDA in 1973 of 530 Malay enterprises
found 80/ of them to be sole proprietorships, 10% partnerships, 21
cooperatives and 6% limited companies. 66% of the enterprises employed
less than 5 employees, 191 between 5 and 10 employees, and only 7'
had over 15 employees each. In terms of activities engaged in, 63%
were in commerce (mainly retail), 15% in services (mainly catering),
11% in manufacturing, 5 % in transport, and 4% in construction.
15. According to M. C. Puthucheary (1976: 442-3; 1977: 13-16), PERNAS
Edar (a subsidiary of PERNAS) has been accused of monopolizing the
distributive trades at the expense of other smaller public enterprises.
Similarly, UDA was under severe attack by no less than the National
Malay Chamber of Commerce (Utusan Malaysia: 7/7/1975), while several
public enterprises engaged in provision of business premises for
bumipurtras were criticised for catering to already wealthy Malay
businessmen rather than to the small-scale Malay entrepreneurs
(New Straits Times: 23/4/1976). Similar complaints had also been
made against the practice of large public holding companies setting
up their own travel agencies (as subsidiaries) to cut out the small
Malay "independents" (Malaysian Business: September 1975)
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Chapter 8 Conclusion
"The existence of a more complex reality imposes the need for
definitional clarity, firstly so that the reality does not get
obscured or distorted by crude and false categorization; secondly,
the exercise of definition usually involves a process of abstrac-
tion which implies a number of theoretical assumptions.. .However,
a concern with definition can lead to a construction of sterile
typologies, in which the original problem that had to be explained
is lost from sight."
- A. Scott (1975)
"... When doctrines command widespread agreement, the time has
usually come for a re-examination; when men who otherwise disagree
on fundamental political values agree on an issue of importance,
they are probably using crucial terms in widely different senses;
when radical rhetoric becomes fashionable, it may well require
non-radical implications."
- David Lehmann (1974): 13
"Details of the system are remarkably adaptable. The essence of
the system is wholly unadaptable."
- Charles Elliot (1975): 14
This dissertation has attempted to contribute to the study of
employment structure and labor absorption process in LDCs in two ways.
First, at the conceptual level, this dissertation argued that it is
theoretically necessary to incorporate considerations of the effect of
production organization structure on the structure of employment in
studying the dynamics of the labor absorption process. A modest attempt
at developing the relevant concepts in such a framework of approach was
made. Second, in terms of substantive analysis, this dissertation
attempted an empirical case study of how changes in the structure of
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production organization affect the structure of employment and thereby
the dynamics of labor absorption in one country, Peninsular Malaysia,
in the course of its post-colonial economic development. In carrying
out this case study, a major effort was devoted to deriving empirical
estimates from existing data sources to operationalize the concepts
introduced by the framework of approach adopted.
How useful has this approach been, and what substantive conclusions
can be drawn from the case study? In what follows, we shall first
try to briefly summarize some of the major empirical findings of
this study. The theoretical implications of these findings will be
discussed after that.
(a) Main Empirical Findings
The public land settlement sector was the major source of
expansion of agricultural land in the post-colonial period; the indi-
vidual smallholding sector has expanded relatively little, while the
plantation sector has actually declined. Future development trend
suggests further stagnation of land under individual smallholdings;
however, a shift towards the development of public-sector organized
(or joint-ventured) plantations is occurring.
Technological innovations have induced the spread of wage-labor
operations in the padi farming and fishing sector. Hired-labor
operations in rubber smallholdings has continued to be significant.
Significant displancement of owner0operating and tenant labor in fishing
has occurred as a result of the penetration of commercially-oriented
trawlers. The expanision of the public sector into direct organization
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of fishing operation appears to have hastened this process. Displace-
ment of tenant labor in padi farming has also begun as a result of the
"Green Revolution".
. The process of displacement of the land-based owner-operating
peasantry is more complex, and involves a gradual increase in landless-
ness and land poverty due to demographic pressure on fixed or de-
cumulating land resources over time. By the early 1970's, however,
significant extent of landlessness and land poverty has developed
and appears to be worsening.
. A range of responses to this gradual displacement process appears
to have been resorted to by the affected peasant labor. Pure tenancy
(and partial tenancy by small farmers) was steadily increasing in padi
farming up to the late 60's as a response, but this option is likely
to become increasingly unavailable with the spread of commercial farming
based on mechanization and wage-labor. Absorption as pure wage-labor is
an alternative in the short-run, but the trend of increasing capital-
labor substitution appears to undermine the viability of this alter-
native in the long run also.
. Transfer of peasant labor into off-farm work appears to be signi-
ficant. Indeed, the magnitude of the out-transfer has been such as to
prevent the land-labor ratio in the smallholding sector from appreciable
decline. However, rural-urban migration was not (at least up to 1970)
the most important component of this out-transfer of peasant labor.
Rural-rural movement has been more important. Public land settlement
schemes were an important source for re-absorbing these out-migrating
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labor, but other sources - plantations and the military and police
services - were of about the same order of magnitude combined. More-
over, rural land squatting also appears to be significant as a means
for absorbing rural peasant labor, although no precise estimate
is available.
. Partly the result of estate subdivision and partly the result
of declining land-labor ratio, the plantation sector actually suffered
a significant net decline in employment from the early 1960's to the
mid-1970's. The net absorption of Malay labor into the plantation
sector was therefore at the expense of a greater rate of displacement
of non-Malay (especially Indian) labor from plantation employment.
A significant number of the displaced Indian labor appears to have been
repatriated to India. Others were likely to have migrated to the
cities, contributing to high unemployment rates of Indians in the
urban areas. Many of the displaced Chinese laborers from the planta-
tion sector as well as many of the land-poor Chinese laborers in many
"New Villages" appear to be engaged in transient, migratory contract-
labor work both in the rural areas (land clearing for FELDA, logging,
etc.) and urban areas (construction work, etc.) including Singapore.
Most laborers who were absorbed into FELDA schemes had experienced
upward mobility in terms of income and the prospect of eventual land-
ownership. However, this was largely achieved by increasing the size of
land allotment per settler, which thereby reduced the number of laborers
who could be so absorbed. Moreover, the increasing needs of FELDA as
a commercially-oriented agri-complex to control production organization
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may have restricted the independence of the settlers as producers.
Whether this is leading to the emergence of a class of rich yeomen
peasants or to a form of disguised wage-labor is not clear as yet.
In any case, the trend has been towards the development of public
plantations in large-scale regional agri-complexes, which suggests that
wage-labor utilization will be of increasing significance in the
public land development sector in the future.
. The urban production organization structure of Peninsular Malaysia
in the post-colonial period is characterized by significant concentration
of production control alongside the proliferation of many small enter-
prises. There was also a significant presence of the public sector
as an employment sector.
. The degree of production control concentration in large enterprises
appears to have increased over time. The public sector has also expanded
relatively. A "polarized" growth pattern appears to have resulted,
with employment in the large corporate and public sector expanding
relatively at one end and the petty sector at the other, while the small
capitalist sector is "squeezed" in between. High and increasing rates
of turnover of small enterprises are observerd, suggesting a high degree
of insecurity in their existence.
. Large enterprises and the public sector employed proportionately
more white-collar and managerial salariats than small enterprises;
consequently, expansion of the corporate and public sector has led
to a relative increase in the share of these occupations in the urban
occupational structure. Moreover, these occupations tended to be
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spatially more concentrated in large metropolitan centers. There was
also a rapid increase in the share of wage workers in the "secondary"
sectors. Moreover, these workers were increasingly being employed
in large enterprises.
. Managerial and white collar salariats earned significantly higher
incomes than the blue collar workers, and access to these former
occupations is significantly affected by educational attainment. Earnings
of the self-employed showed a wide spread, and access to these occupa-
tions depended greatly on ownership of family assets. The capital
asset requirements of the average proprietors of retail and urban
service businesses were generally beyond the means of most blue collar
wage workers. The two occupational access stratification mechanisms
were not independent, however, as the levels of educational attainment
of workers were found to be strongly influenced by their socio-
economic origins.
Some differentials in wage earnings exist between blue-collar
production workers employed in large firms and those employed in small
firms. Evidence on the differential in terms of job security appears
to be weaker. However, the alleged presence of protectionby government
labor legislation or of strong union bargaining pushing up wages in large
firms appears not to exist. Hence whatever differentials there were
could not be accounted for very much by such protection or union
bargaining. "Wage productivity" considerations appear to be more
important factors.
Blue-collar production wage-workers in the "secondary" sectors
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also did not appear to be better off as a whole than blue-collar workers
in the "tertiary" sectors. In particular, the self-employed in the
lower sales and service occupations had a wide dispersion of earnings,
so that, while many did earn less than the production wage-workers in
large firms, a significant number also earned more.
. The material basis for the alleged emergence of a "blue-collar
labor aristocracy" is thus weak. Blue-collar workers do not automa-
tically aspire to move into factory wage-occupations; instead, upward
mobility from the petty sector to become proprietors and employers in the
small capitalist sector is the aspiration of many self-employed and
wage-workers in small enterprises.
. The material basis does appear to exist for a "white-collar
aristocracy" in urban Peninsular Malaysia. The rapid expansion of
educated labor has led to a significant raising of the screening thresh-
hold for entering white-collar salariat jobs, and hence "credential
degradation" has occurred to a significant extent. This in turn has
led to a high incidence of unemployment among the educated, who either
could afford the wait or were under significant pressure to do so, their
parents having made great sacrifices to equip them with the educational
qualifications. The differential in earnings and job security between
large and small firms was also much more significant for white-collars
than for the blue-collars. Institutional protection factors also appeared
to be more significant for many white-collar occupations than for
corresponding blue-collar ones.
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(b) Theoretical implications
The single most important point to emerge from this empirical
case study is the need to have a correct characterization of the structure
of production organization and the interrelationships between different
parts of this structure. False or crude characterization leads to
a distortion and an obscuring of the reality. This, we argue, is the
crux of the problem with many existing theoretical approaches to the
study of "employment" problems in LDCs. By failing to recognize that
different modes of employment access and labor utilization strategies
are inherent in different modes of production organization, and
instead taking an undifferentiated view of employment in terms of
aggregate numbers and productivity only, a false understanding of the
dynamics of change in employment structure often results.
Thus, for example, our analysis of the impact of technological
introduction in the peasant sectors casts.doubts on the simplistic
argument that rural poverty is due to low-productivity employment,
and that the introduction of productivity-raising technological
innovations would solve the problem. Such an argument follows from
an undifferentiated view of the rural peasantry, and is misleading
in a fundamental sense. Raising productivity can raise the income
of the poor, but whether it does so depends on the structure of
production organization. The latter determines the distribution of
income generated into labor income and return to owners of the non-
labor capital inputs, who may or may not be the laborers themselves.
More importantly, the introduction of productivity-raising technology
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induces a transformation of the production organization structure
itself, which may result in the displacement of the poorer producers
from production altogether, i.e., the benefits of the higher produc-
tivity may, over time, be monopolized by the larger producers, with
the poorer producers actually made worse off than before by being
excluded from production, i.e. technological development may create
umemployment problems rather than solve them. This, as we have seen,
has happened in the fishing sector (following the large-scale intro-
duction of trawling and mechanization) and also in padi farming
(following the introduction of the "Green Revolution"). Moreover,
the conversion of owner-operating or tenant labor to wage-labor also
involves changes in the income status and employment security of
the labor in a manner that mere reference to the number of people
employed (which may remain the same) and the productivity (which
may even be higher) would not be able to capture. By excluding from
consideration the effect of production organization structure, one
runs the risk of obscuring many dimensions of change in the reality,
and hence comes to a false view of the distributional benefits of
the technogical innovations introduced.
This is not, of course, an argument against the introduction
of productivity-raising technologies, nor even one against the
adverse distributional effects their economy of scale and "lumpiness"
characteristics introduce. Their distributional effects are adverse
only within a system of private production organization where access
to the technology is dependent on asset ownership and where the motiva-
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tion for the use of the technology is a commercially-oriented one.
It is not the technology that inherently has "egalitarian" or
"non-egalitarian" distribution characteristics; it is the nature of
production organization utilizing the technology that determines that
distribution.
Similarly, an undifferentiated view of what is being lumped as
the urban informal sector leads to a false view of the urban labor
absorption dynamics. It is our conclusion from Chapter 6 that the
alleged formal-informal dualization is simply too crude a charac-
terization of the urban production organization structure. By failing
to recognize the existence of an "intermediate stratum" - the small
capitalist sector - and the heterogeneity of the petty sector itself,
the framework leads one to postulate a significant differential among
the blue collar workers that in fact does not exist. This is not to
deny that "blue-collar labor aristocracy" may exist in some LDCs as
a result of strong protection by unions, etc., but this is a question
to be decided by concrete empirical analysis, and not assumed as
generally characteristic of LDCs, as many in the popular literatures
have done. To the extent that the assumed "urban tertiarization"
dynamics of Todaro et. al. that is now being popularized in the
development literature today follows directly from the above crude
conceptualization, it comes as no surprise that it is found
wanting in empirical support.
To what extent the perpetuation of these false conceptualizations
of the "employment" problems is the result of genuine false under-
standing or ideological biases can only be conjectured. The
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importance of the second element, whether intentional or unintentional,
cannot be easily ignored, however. Thus according to J. Weeks (1971):
"......once it is conceded that the problem is income,
or the inadequacy of income, we are granted that we
are dealing with what has been called in the US the
'working poor'. Of what use is it to call those who
toil (for inadequate incomes) 'unemployed'? I
suggest that the reason for this is political....
If the problem is 'unemployment' then the solution is
'employment'. And if by employment we mean 'wage-
employment', then the solution is clear - faster
growth of the foreign-owned 'modern' (i.e. imported
from the West) sector. This is not the solution. It
is the problem itself."
Similarly, the argument that strong union protection is respon-
sible for pushing up wages in the formal sector "artificially",
thereby causing capital-labor substitution and reducing job creation,
and thereby causing high rural-urban migration and high urban
unemployment, is convenient for those who want to keep wages down.
As the quotation from J. Lehmann at the beginning of this chapter
reminds us, the "problem of employment" means different things to
different people, and solving the "problem of employment" also means
different things to different people.
The findings of this study also casts serious doubts on the
"benign-relationships" view of economic development (see discussion
in Chapter 1). Instead, it highlights the importance of control
relationships between production units and sectors, and the signifi-
cance of unequal competitive relationships, either for resources or
markets. This point has increasingly gained recognition in recent
years. Thus, H. W. Singer, one of the most influential of the writers
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in the early post-war period who advocated industrialization as an
escape from dependent primary export production, has recently revised
his position and argued that the really important issues are not
primary production versus manufacturing, but the control of produc-
tion and technology (and access to information in general) (Singer
(1975), "The distribution of gains from trade and investment -
revisited", J. Dev. Stud., July). The same point has been made by
Thoburn (1977a) more forcefully:
"The relative failure of industrialization as an
easy solution to the development problem has led
to the realization of the importance of issues
which previously were either ignored or assumed to
be essentially part of the distinction between
primary commodities and manufacturing production.
Most important of thesd issues, and closely inter-
related, are the control and ownership of produc-
tion and the control and appropriateness of tech-
nology. Thus gains from exporting can be lost just
as easily by a developing country exporting electronic
components, as by one exporting tea, if production is
controlled by a foreign firm; and a multinational
company can choose to buy equipment from an overseas
subsidiary rather than local suppliers whatever its
final products. Similarly, mineral exports, for e.g.,
do not have a monopoly of inappropriate, excessively
capital intensive technology." (Thoburn, J. (1977a):x)
In regard to this focus on ownership and control relationships,
the question of the role of public policy has to be addressed. It
has been our observation throughout the case study that many of the
government policies appear to result in an increasing concentration
of control either in the hands of the large corporate sector or in
the hands of the commercially-oriented component of the public sector.
It was pointed out in Chapter 2 that the direct penetration into
production organization by the public sector in fishing has
535
accelerated the process of displacement of peasant fishermen. In
Chapter 3, the increasing shift towards public plantations was
documented, while in Chapter 5, the rapid expansion of public
corporations in all industrial, commercial and financial fields
was noted. The motivation behind these policy decisions appears
to be more an attempt to foster the development of a modern indus-
trial, commercial Malay elite-group than an attempt to solve
employment or poverty problems, although efforts in the latter
direction are not entirely absent.
In the short run, a redistribution of ownership and control
power from the non-Malay elites (and perhaps from certain segments
of the foreign capitals also) to the newly emerging Malay elites
would undoubtedly occur. In the longer run, however, the trend
towards greater concentration of ownership and control over
production organization will continue unabated (as the quotation
from C. Elliot (1975) at the beginning of the chapter reminds us).
536
Selected Bibliography
Abraham, C.E.R.(ed.)
n.d. "Southeast Johor Project : Sociological Field Studies Vol.2 -
FELDA Settlement Schemes" (mimeo.)
Abu Hassan bin Mhd Isa
1979 The performance of padi production credit scheme in the Muda
area, Mala4ia unpublished M.Sc. thesis, Cornell Univ.
Abu-Lughod,J. & Hay,R.(ed.)
1977 Third World Urbanization Chicago: Maaroufa Press
Afifuddin bin Hj. Omar
1973 "Some aspects of the socio-economic value system of the Muda
rice farmers in developmental perspectives", MADA publication
no. 24
1974 "So-cial implications of farm mechanization in the Muda Scheme",
in Southworth & Barnett(ed.)(1974)
AlatasS.H.
1968 "The grading of occupational prestige amongst the Malays in
Malaysia", JMBRAS XLI,Pt.l(July): 146-56
Ali Raza,M.
1969 "Legislature and public policy development in Malaysia's
industrial relations", J. of Developing Areas 3(April):355-72
Alladin Hashim
1971 "Land development and the settler : some social aspects of land
development", in MCDS(1971), Report on the 6th International
Seminar on Development (KL)
AMPO
1977 Free Trade Zones and industrialization of Asia Tokyo
Pacific-Asia Resource Center
AnandS.
1978 Inequality and poverty in Malaysia : measurement and decompo-
sition (World Bank draft, April)
1977 "Aspects of poverty in Malaysia", Review of Income & Wealth
23(l)(Mar.): 1-16
Anderson,E.N..,Jr. & Anderson,M.
1978 Fishing in troubled waters : Research on the Chinese fishing
industry in West Malaysia Taipei : Orient Cultural Service
AriffK.A.M.
1970 "The effect of price instability on employment, wages and
profits in the natural rubber industry of West Malaysia",
Kajian Ekonomi Malaysia VII(l): 19-27
Ariffin,Wan Azmi
1977 "Village profile study in District of Sik - Sik/Baling region,
Kedah", UNCRD Colloquim on Rural-Urban relations draft,June
Arles,J.P.
1971 "Ethnic and socio-economic patterns in Malaysia", Intern. Labor
Review 104(6): 527-53
Arrighi ,G.
1970 "International Corporations, labor aristocracies and economic
development in Tropical Africa", J. of Modern African Studies
6: 141-69
557
Arudsothy,P.
1977 "Poverty in the wage sector and the problem of formulating
minimum wage policy", in Mokzani & Khoo S.M.(ed.)(1977)
Asian Development Bank
1977 Asian Agricultural Survey 1976 : Rural Asia. challenge and oppor-
tunity Manila
AyaduraiD.
1978 "The law on strikes in Malaysia", Kajian Ekonomi Malaysia XII(2):
61-89
Aziz,U.
1967 "Government and industrial relations in Malaysia", in Japanese
Institute of Labor(1967), Labor relations in the Asian countries
1963 Subdivision of Estates in Malaya. 1951-60, Vol. 1 KL: Univ. of
Malaya
Barakbah,S .M.
1971 "The problem of illegal settlers in urban areas of Kedah state,
Malaysia", J. of Admins. Overseas X(3)(July)
Barclay,W.,Kumar,K. & Simms,R.P.(ed.)
1976 Racial conflict, discrimination and power : historical and con-
temporary studies NY: AMS Press
Barlow,C.
1978 The natural rubber industry : its development, technology and
economy in Malaysia KL: Oxford Univ. Press
Barlow,C. & Chan Chee Keong
1968 "Toward an optimum size of rubber holding", Natural Rubber Con-
ference, KL (Preprint)
Barnum,H.N. & SabotR.H.
1976 Migration, education and urban surplus labor : the case of
Tanzania Paris : OECD Development Center
Barnum,H.N. & SquireL.
1978 "Technology and relative efficiency", Oxford Economic Papers(New
Series) 30(2): 181-98
Bartsch,W.H.
1977 Employment and technology choice in Asian agriculture NY:Praeger
Bauer,P.T.
1948 The rubber industry : a study in competition and monopoly
Cambridge : Harvard Univ. Press
Beaglehole,J.H.
1969 "Malay participation in commerce and industry : the role of RIDA
and MARA", J. of Commonwealth Pol. Studies VII(3): 216-45
Beckford,G.L.
1972 Persistent poverty : underdevelopment in plantation economies of
the Third World NY: Oxford U. Press
Benn,D.M.
1974 "The theory of plantation economy and society : a methodological
critique", J. of Commonwealth & Comparative Pol. XII(3):.249-60
Bell,C. & Hazell,P.
1977 "A second report on the agricultural model for the Muda region",
World Bank:draftJuly
BevanJ.W.L.
1962 "A study of yields, labor inputs and incomes on rubber smallhold-
ings in the coastal area of Selangor", KL: Univ. of Malaya
Bienefeld,M.
1975 "The informal sector and peripheral capitalism : the case of
Tanzania", Bul. of the Ins. of Dev. Studies 6(3): 53-73
538
Blair, J.M.
1972 Economic concentration: structure, behaviour and public
policy NY: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich
Blau,P. & Duncan,O.D.
1967 The American Occupational Structure NY: Wiley
Blaug,M.
1973 Education and the employment problem in developing nations
Geneva : ILO
Braverman,H.
1974 Labor and monopoly capital : the degradation of work in the
Tientieth century NY: MR Press
Breman, J.
1976 "A dualistic labor system ? A critique of the informal sector
concept", Pol. & Econ. Weekly XI(48,49,50)
Brigg,P.
1973 "Some economic interpretations of case studies of urban migra-
tion in developing countries", World Bank Staff WP no.151
Bromley,R.(ed.)
1978 The urban informal sector : critical perspectives
entire issue of World Development 6(9/10)
Bodora,P.
1974 Analysis of some factors influencing the composition of higher
education in Malaysia unpublished Ph.D. thesis,Univ. of Pitts-
burg
Bowles,S. & Gintis,H.
1975 Schooling in capitalist America NY
Bowles,S.
1978 "Capitalist development and educational structure", World Deve-
lopment 6(6): 783-96
Cain,G.
1976 "The challenge of segmented labor market theories to orthodox
theory", J. of Econ. Literature (Dec.)
Calvert,P.
1977 "Discontent in Malaysia's barbed-wire villages", London : The
Guardian 26/1/77
Carchedi,G.
1977 On the economic identification of social classes London :
Routledge & Kegan Paul
ChamB.N.
1977 "Colonialism and communalism in Malaysia", JCA 7(2): 178-99
Chandra Muzaffar
1977 "Some political perspectives on the New Economic Policy", paper
presented at the 4th Convention of the M'sian Econ. Asso.,KL
Chee Peng Lim
1974 "Small scale industries in Peninsular Malaysia", draft,Sept.,
subsequently published as Ph.D. thesis, Univ. of Malaya
1978 "A study of the pattern of employment and wages in small scale
industry in Malaysia", Developing Economies XVI(l): 34-53
Chenery,H.B. et. al.
1974 Redistribution with growth Oxford Univ. Press
Che5 7 0iok 4Btate labor, management and ownership in Malaya,1960", Kajian
Ekon. Malaysia 7(1)
Chopra,P.
1977 "The dynamic world of PERNAS", Asian Finance (April/May)
539
Clignet,R.
1976 The Africanization of the labor market : educational and
occupational segmentation in the Cameroun Berkeley :
Univ. of Calif. Press
Cohen,M., English,J. & Brookfield,H.
1977 "Functional diversity at the base of the urban system in
Peninsular Malaysia", J. of Tropical Geography 45: 12-25
Colletta,N.J. & Wong Ah Sung
1974 "The education of Chinese workers' children on Malaysia's
plantation frontier : myths and realities", Asian Survey (Nov.):
827-44
Colletta,N.J.
1975 "Malaysia's forgotten people : education, cultural identity
and socio-economic mobility among South Indian plantation
workers", in J.A.Nagata(ed.)(1975) : 87-112
1977 "Class and cultural manifestations of Malay education in a
plantation context", in Lent(ed.)(1977)
Connell,J. & Lipton,M.
1977 Assessing village labor situations in developing countries
Delhi : Oxford Univ. Press
Connell,J. et. al.
1976 Migration from rural areas : the evidence from village studies
Delhi : Oxford Univ. Press
Courtenay,P.P.
1972 A geography of trade and development in Malaya London: G.Bell
1977 "Preliminary review of the location of smallholder rubber
modernization efforts in Peninsular Malaysia", Kabar Seberang 1
Cox,K.R.(ed.)
1978 Urbanization and conflict in market societies Chicago :
Maaroufa Press
Crissman,L.
1967 "The segmentary structure of urban overseas Chinese communities",
Man 2(2)(June): 185-204
DahlanH.M.
1976 "Some problems of communication in peasant fishing communities
in Malaysia", Kajian Ekon. Malaysia XIII(1-2): 51-71
DasguptaB.
1977 Village society and labor use Delhi: Oxford Univ. Press
de Kadt,E. & Williams,G.(ed.)
1974 Sociology and Development London
Del Tufo,M.V.
1949 Report on the 1947 Census of Population, Malaya London: Millbank
Dept. of Inland Revenue,Malaysia
v.y. Annual Report
Dept. of Statistics, Malaysia
v.y. Rubber Statistics Handbook
v.y. Oil Palm, coconut and tea statistics
v.. Monthly Stastical Bulletin
1957 Population Census of the Federation of Malaya (Report no.14)
Report on employment, unemployment and underemployment in the
Federation of Malaya 1962
540
Dept, of Statistics, Malaysia
1967- Socioeconomic Sample Survey of Households - Malaysia 1967-68:
68 Vol.1 - Employment & Unemployment, W. Malaysia
Vol.2 - Employment & Unemployment, Zones & Strata
1967- Socioeconomic Sample Survey of Households - Malaysia, 1967-68:
68 Households Amenities & Conveniences, W.Malaysia
1970 General Report of 1970 Population Census, Malaysia, Vol. I & II
1959
1963 Census of Manufacturing Industries, 1959, 1963 & 1968
1968
v.y. Survey of Manufacturing Industries, Peninsular Malaysia
1966 Census of Distributive Trades 1966
1970 Census of Wholesale & Retail Trades in the Urban Areas of Penin-
sular Malaysia, 1970
1972 Census of selected urban service trades in the urban areas of
Peninsular Malaysia 1972
v.y. Survey of Constructive Industries
v.y. Census of Mining Industries
1973 Census of selected industries, 1973, Vol. 1 & 2
1971 Occupational Wage Surveys, W.Malaysia 1971
Directory of Malay-owned establishments Vol. I-IV
Despres, Leo A.(ed.)
1975 Ethnicity & resource competition in plural societies
Development Admins. Unit(1968)
Land Administration - a study on some critical areas,
K.L: Prime Minister's Dept.
Dixon, J.A.
1977 Some economic aspects of rural to rural migration & land settle-
in East Asia, Unpublished PhD. thesis, Harvard Univ.(Dept. of Econ.)
Doering III, O.C.
1973 Malaysian rice policy & the Muda River Irrigation Project
Unpublished PhD. thesis, Cornell Univ.
Doeringer, P. & Piore, M.
1971 Internal Labor Markets & Manpower Analysis
Lexington, Mass. D.C.Health.
541
Dore, Ronald
1976 The diploma disese: education, qualification & development
Bekerley: Univ. of California Press
du Toit, B.M.& Sofa, H.I.(ed.)
1975 Migration & urbanization: models & adaptive strategies
The Hague: Mouton
Duclas, Ronnie
1977 Information Malaysia 1976/77, K.L. : Berita Publishing
Dugdale, A.E. & Siew Tin Chen
1977 " Factors influencing school achievement of children from low
socio-econ. groups in Malaysia " Int. J. of Psychology 12(1): 39-50
Dunlop, J.
1972 " The task of contemporary wage theory " in R. Marshall & R Perlman
(ed) (1972) An Anthology of. Labor Economics (Wiley)
Edwards, C.B.
1975 Protection, profits & policy: an analysis of industrialization
in Malaysia Unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Univ. of East Anglia(in
two volumes)
Edwards, C.T.
197 0 Public finance in Malaya and Singapore
Canberra : Australian National Univ. Press
Edwards, E.O. (ed)
1974 Employment in Developing Nations: Report on a Ford Foundation
Study NY: Columbia Univ. Press
Edwards, R., Reich, M. & Gordon, D. (ed.)
1975 Labor iarket Segmentation Lexington, Mass.: Health
Elliot, C.
1975 Pattern of Poverty in the Third World: A Study of Social & Econ-
omic Stratification NY: Praeger
Elliston, G.R.
1977 "Some factors which may explain the failure of some Government
Aid Schemes for fishermen" in Fredericks, L.J. (ed.) (1976)
Elliston, G.R.
1967 "The role of middlemen in the fishing industry of W.Malaysia"
Review of Agri. Econ. l(2)(Dec.): 16-33
Esman, M.J.
1972 Administration & Development in Malaysia Ithaca: Cornell Univ. Press
Evers, H.D.
1975 "Urbanization & Urban Conflicts in South East Asia" Asian Survey
XV(5): 775-785
542
Feder, Ernest
1976 "Six plausible theses about the peasants" perspective in the
the developing world", Dev. & Change
Federal Industrial Development Authority
v.y. Annual Report
Federal Land Development Authority Homewood, Ill.:
v.y. Annual Report
Fei, J.C.H & Ranis, G.(1964)
Development of the labor surplus economy: theory & policy
Homewood, Ill.: Irwin
Firth, Raymond
1966 Malay fisherman: their peasant economy(2nd Ed.) NY: W.W.Norton
Fisheries Division
1971 "An economic survey of the fishing Communities on the east
coast of Malaysia" (July) KL
Fisk, E.K.
1961 "Productivity & income from rubber in an established Malay
Reservation" Malayan Econ. Review 6(1) (April): 13-21
FAO/World Bank
The Muda Study: a first study Vol.1 : text
Vol.2 : Statistical tables
Rome : draft.
Fredericks,L.J.(ed.)
1978 Proceedings of the Seminar on the development of the fisheries
sector in Malaysia. as Kajian Ekonomi Malaysia XIII
(June/Dec.) (1976)
Federicks, L.J. & Wells, R.J.G.
1978 "Some aspects of tenancy reform measures in Southeast Asia"
Asian Survey XVIII(6) (June): 644-658
Fredericks,L.J., Wells,R.J.G. & Dissanayake, B.W.
1977 "Patterns of Labor utilization & income distribution in Rice
double-cropping systems: policy implications" CAMS Discussion
Paper Series no. 7?-12
Freedman,M
1960 "The growth of a plural society in Malaya" Pacific Affairs 33(2):
158-168
Friedmann, John
1978 The crisis of transition: a critique of strategies for crisis
management School of Architecture & Urban Planning, UCLA
543
FriedmannJ. & Alonso, W.(ed.)
1975 Regional Policy Cambridge: M.I.T. Press
Friedmann, J. & DouglassM.
1975 "Agnopolitan development: towards a new strategy for regional
planning in Asia", in UNCRD (1976)
Friedmann,J. & Sullivan,F. (1974) "The absorption of labor in the urban
economy: the case of developing countries" Econ. Dev. &
Cultural Change 22(3) (April): 385-413
Fryer,D.W. & Jackson,J.C.
1966 " Peasant producers or urban planters the Chinese rubber sma. 1
holders of Ulu Selangor" Pacific Viewpoint (Sept.)
Fryer, D.W
1964
Fujimoto,
1976
"The Plantation Industries-the estates" in Wang Gungvu(ed.)
1964, Chap.16
Akimi
"An economic analysis of peasant rice farming Kelantan, Malaysia
South East Asian Studies 14 (2) (Sept.): 159-176
Gamba, C.
1962- The origins of trade unionism in Malaya: a study in colonial
labor unrest Singapore: Eastern Univ. Press
Gamba, C.
1962 The National Union of Plantation Workers Singapore: Donald Moore
Gan Wee Beng
1978 "The relationship between market concentration & profitability
in Malaysian Manufacturing industries" Malaysian Econ. Review
XXIII (1): 1-13
Gardner,S. (ed.)
1975 Malaysian ethnic relations I Penang: USM
Gardner, S.
1975
Geertz, C.
19 6 3a
Geertz, C.
1963b
Ghosh, B.N.
1977
Ethnicity & work: Occupational distribution in an urban multi-
ethnic setting - Georgetown, Penang, West Malaysia
Unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Univ. of Berkeley
Peddlers & princes: Social Dev. & Econ. Change in Two Indones-
ian towns Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press
Agricultural involution Univ. of Californis Press
Disguised nemployment in underdeveloped countries, with special
reference to India New Delhi: Heritage
544
Gibbons,D.S.
1976 "Public policy towards fisheries development in Peninsular
Malaysia: a critical review emphasizing Penang & Kedah"
Kajian Ekonomi Malaysia XIII (1-2): 89-121
Gibbons, D.S. & Zakaria Hj. Ahmad
1971 "Politics & the selection for the Higher Civil Service in new
states: the Malaysian example" J. Comparative Asmins 3 (3)
330-48
30
Goh Cheng Teik
1977 "Disputes over fishing rights in Penang & Perak" The Econ.
Bulletin (Feb./Mar. 1977)
Goldman, R.H. & Squire, L. (1978)
1978 "Technical change, labor use & income distribution in the Muda
Irrigation Project" HIID Development Discussion Paper # 35
(Jan. '78)
Goldman, Richard
1975 "Staple food self-sufficiency & the distributive impact of
Malaysian rice policy" Food Research Institute Studies XIV(Sept.)
Goldthorpe, J.H. et al
1968, The Affluent Worker (in three volumes ) Cambridge U. Press
1969
Gordon, David
1972 Theories of poverty & underdevelopedment Lexington: D.C.
Health &.Co.
Gordon, S.
1970
Gordon, S.
n.d.
Grace, B.
1976
Greenwood,
1964
"The conditions of our plantation workers - the fathers & mothers
of the children" Intisari 3(4)
"Contradictions in the Malay economic- structure" Intisari
.1 (2): 30-40
"The politics of income distribution in Malaysia', American
Unlv. Field Staff Report, V 24(9) Southeast Asian Series
J.M.F.
"Rubber smallholdings in the Federation
ical Geograp (August)
Malaya" J. of Trop-
Griffin, Keith
1977 "Increasing poverty and changing ideas about development
strategies" Development and Change 8 (4) (Oct): 491-508
1976 Land concentration and rural poverty NY: Holmes and Meier
1974a The political economy of agrarian change Cambridge, Mass:
Harvard University Press
545
1974b "Rural development: the policy options" in E. 0. Edwards
(ed.) : 181-200
Gullick, J. M.
1958 Indigenous political systems of Western Malaya University of
London: Athlone Press
Gutkind, P.C.W. & Waterman, P. (ed.)
1977 African Social Studies New York: Monthly Review Press
Guyot, D.
1971 "The politics of land: comparative development in two states
of Malaysia" Pacific Affairs 44(3) : 368-389
Guyot, J. F.
1969 "Creeping urbanism and political development in Malaysia",
in R. T. Daland (ed.) (1969) Comparative Urban Research (Sage)
Hara, Fu jio
1975
Hart, K.
1973
Hawkers in Penang: their relations to the labor market Tokyo:
Institute of Developing Economies
"Informal income opportunities and the structure of urban
employment in Ghana" J. of Modern African Studies 11 (1): 61-89
Hassan Hj. Ali
1973 "Masaalah petani diKampong Kawah", Jernal Antropoloji &
Sosioloji 2
Hauser, P.M.
1977 "The measurement of labor utilization:more empirical results",
Malaysian Econ. Rev. XXII (1): 10-25
Hill, R.D.
1967
Hirashima,
1977
Hirschman,
1976
"Agricultural land tenure in West Malaysia" Malayan Econ.
Review 12 (1): 99-116
S. (ed.)
Hired labor in rural Asia Tokyo: Institute of Development
Economics
C.
"Recent urbanization trends in Peninsular Malaysia" Demography
13 (4): 445-461
1975 Ethnic and social stratification in Peninsular Malaysia
Washington D.C.: Arnold and Catherine Rose Monography,
American Sociological Asso.
1974a "Economic progress in Malaysia: how widely has it been shared?"
UMBC Econ. Review 10 (2): 1-10
546
1974b "Net external migration from Peninsular Malaysia, 1957 to 1970"
Malayan Economic Review XIX (2): 38-54
1972 "Educational patterns in colonial Malaya" Comparative Ed.
Review 16 (3) (Oct): 486-502
1971 "Ownership and control in the manufacturing sector of West
Malaysia" UMBC Econ. Review VII (1): 21-30
C. and Harbans Singh
"Urbanization and net migration to urban and rural areas,
Peninsular Malaysia 1957-1970" (draft, May 1975)
Hirschman,
1975
Ho, Robert
1970 "Land ownership and economic prospects of Malayan peasants"
Modern Asian Studies 4 (1): 83-92
1969 "Rice production in Malaya: a review of problems and prospects"
J. of Tropical Geography 29
1967a Farmers of Central Malaya Canberra: Australian National Univ.
1967b "Labor inputs of rubber producing smallholders in Malaya",
Mal. Econ. Rev. XII (1) (April, '67) 79-89
1962 "Mixed farming and multiple-cropping in Malaya", J. Trop.
Geog. 16 (Oct.): 1-17
Hoerr, O.D.
1973 "Education, income and equity in Malaysia"
and Cultural Change 21 (2) (Jan.)
Econ. Development
Hoffman, L. and Tan Siew Ee
1978 Industrial growth, trade and structural interdependence in
a small developing economy - the case of West Malaysia
(draft of forthcoming book)
Holland, S.
1976 Capital versus the regions London: Macmillan
Holmstrom, M. (ed. )
n.d. South East Johor Project: Sociological field studies Vol. 1
- Kampongs and estates (mimeo)
Horii, K.
1972) "The land tenure system of Malay padi farmers: a case
study of Kampong Sungei Bujor in the State of Kedah", The
Developing Economies 10 (1): 45-73
Horton, Brenton B.
1972 Foreign investment in Malaysian manufacturing: a cost-benefit
analysis unpublished Ph.D. thesis, MIT
House, W.J. and Rempel, H.
1976 "The impact of unionization on negotiated wages in the
manufacturing sector of Kenya" Oxford Bul. of Econ. & Stat.
38 (May): 111-123
547
Huang, Yukor
1975 "Tenancy patterns, productivity, & rentals in Malaysia"
Econ. Dev. & Cultural Change 23 (4) (July): 703-718
Huang, Y.
1972
Hunt, N.C.
1972
Husin Ali,S
1978
Husin Ali,
"Some reflections on padi double-cropping in W.Malaysia"
Mal. Econ. Rev. (April)
& Conway, B.M.
Survey of management development needs in W.Malaysia
Edinburgh: Mimeo.
.S
U.
Kemiskinan dan Kelaparan tanah diKelantan P.J., Selangor:
Korangkrof Sdn. Bhd.
S.
1976a "Political functionaries in rural Malaysia: leaders or middle-
men ?" in D.J.Banks (ed.) (1976) Changing identities in South-
east Asia (The Hague;Mouton)
1976b Apa erti pembangunan KL: Dewan Bahasa and Pustaka
1975 Malay peasant society and leadership KL: Oxford Univ. Press
1964 Social Stratification in Kampong Bagan: a study of class,
status, conflict and mobility in a rural Malay community
Singapore: Monograph of the Malaysian Branch of the Royal
Asiatic Society
1972a "Land concentration and poverty among rural Malays"
Nusantara 1
1972b "Some aspects of change, mobility and conflict in post-
Merdeka Malaysia" Manusia dan Masharakat 1 : 51-60
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development
1955 Economic Development of Malaya Baltimore: John Hopkins Univ.
Press
ILO
1977 Poverty and landlessness in Rural Asia Geneva: ILO
1973 Mechanization and employment in Agriculture: case studies from
four continents Geneva: ILO
International Rice Research Institute
1975 Changes in Rice Farming in selected areas of Asia Los Boros,
Philippines
ILO
1970 Towards full employment: a programme for Colombia. Geneva: ILO
1962 The Trade Union situation in the Federation of Malaya
Geneva: ILO
1972 Employment, income and equality: a strategy for increasing
productive employment in Kenya Geneva: ILO
Ishak bin Tadin
1972 "The Jengka Timber Complex - a case study on a government-
sponsored integrated commercial and industrial project" in
MCDS (1972)
548
Ishak Shari
1976 "Urban poverty and urban life in Kuala Lumpur - a case study",
paper presented at the Third Convention of Malaysian Economic
Association (Benang, August)
Jackson, J. C.
1974 "The Structure and functions of small Malaysian towns"
Institute of British Geographers Transactions 61_ 65-80
1964 "Smallholding cultivation of cash crops" in Wang Gungwu
(ed.) 1964
Jackson, N. R.
1963 "Changing pattern of employment in Malayan tin-mining" J. of
Southeast Asian History IV (2): 105-116
Jackson, R.N.
1970 "Notes on trade unionism among Government employees in the
Federation of Malaya 1948-57" JMBRAS 43 (Pt. 1): 129-142
1961 Immigrant labor and the development of Malaya 1786-1920
KL: Gover nment Printers
Jain, Ravindra K.
1970 South Indians on the Plantation Frontier in Malaya New Haven:
Yale University Press
Jamaludin Lamin
1976 "Rural land settlement and housing schemes in Malaysia with
particular reference to FELDA", paper presented at the
Conference on Human Settlements for the Rakyat in the Lower
Income Group ( KL: May)
Jegatheesan, S.
1977 The Green Revolution and the Muda Irrigation Scheme: An analysis
of its impact on the size, structure and distribution of rice
incomes MADA Monograph series no. 30
1974 "The economics of mechanization in rice double-cropping in
the Muda Irrigation Scheme" in Southworth, H. and Barnett, M.
(ed.) (1974)
Jellinck, L.
1977 "The life of a Jakarta Street trader" in Abu-Lughod and Hay
(ed.) (1977): 244-256
Jolly, R., et. al. (ed.)
1973 Third- World Employment: Problems and Strategy Penguin
Jomo, K. S.
1978 "Restructuring society: the NEP revisited" paper presented
at the Fifth Malaysian Economic Convention (Penang: May, 1978)
1977 Class formation in Malaya: capital, the state and uneven
development unpublished PhD thesis, Harvard University
549
Kalecki, M.
1967
Kamal Salih
1976
"Observations on social and economic aspects of 'Intermediate
Regimes"' Coexistence IV (1) : 1-5 (reprinted in Kalecki, M.
(1976) Essays on Developing Economies)
"Unbalanced growth and persistent poverty: the consequences
of unequal access in urban and rural development" (mimeo)
Penang: USM
Karunaratne, N. D. & Abdullah, M. B.
1978 "Incentive schemes and foreign investment in the industriali-
zation of Malaysia" Anian Survey XVIII (3) (Mrch): 261-274
Kasper, W.
1974 Malaysia: a study in successful economic development Washington
D. C.: American Enterprise Inst. for Public Policy Research
Kassalow, I. M.
1978 "Aspects of labor relations in multinational companies: an
overview of 3 Asian countries" ILR 117 (3) (May-June): 273-288
Kedah Department of Agriculture
1955 Census of padi planters in Kedah 1955 Alor Star
Kerr, C.
1954 "The balkanization of labor markets", in E.W. Bakke, et. al.
(ed.) (1954) Labor mobility and economic opportunities (NY)
Kessler, Clive S.
1978 Islam and Politics in a Malay state: Kelantan 1838-1969
Ithaca: Cornell Univ. Press
Khoo, S.I H. and Voon, P. K.
1975 "Rural urban migration in Peninsular Malaysia: a case study
of Sungei Ruan New Village, Pahang" Ikistics 235: 405-408
Khoo Teik Huat and Kwok Kwan Kit
1976 "The pattern of labor utilization in Peninsular Malaysia"
Quezon City, Philippines: CANS Discussion Paper Series No. 76-10
Ekonomi Bumiputra
Kertas Kerja
Kertas Kerja
Malaysia
KL: Government Printers
KL: Government Printers
Krishna, Raj
1976 "Rural unemployment - a survey of concepts and estimates fcr
India" IBRD Staff Working Paper #234
Krzyzaniak, M. and Uzir Malik
1975 "Market power, incidence of Government policies and poverty:
the case of fishermen in Northwestern Malaysia" Rice University
Studies Vol. 61 (4) (Fall '75) : 127-139
Kongress
1971
1965
550
Kuchiba, M.
1967
Kusuda, K.
1971
and Tsubauchi, Y.
"Padi farming and social structure in a Malay village",
The Developing Economies 5 (3): 463-485
"Surplus population and mobility of labor" The Developing
Economies IX (2): 154-173
Lai Kok Chew and Ari Arope
1971 "Towards optimal size of rice farms" MARDI Agri. Econ.
Bulletin 1 (2) (April)
Lall, S.
1978 "Transnationals, domestic enterprises, and industrial
structure in host LDCs: a survey" Oxford Econ. Papers
(New Series) 30 (2) (July): 217-248
Lall, S. and Streeter, P.
1977 Foreign investment, Transnationals and Developing Uountries
Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press
Lall, S.
1975 "Is 'dependence' a useful concept in analyzing underdevelopment?"
World Development 3 (11/12): 799-810
Lam Thim Fook
1977 "Urban poverty: the case of hawkers and vendors" in
Mokzani et. al. (1977) (ed.): 71-88
Lawson, R. M.
1975 Interim Report on socio-economic aspects of the development
of artisanal fisheries on the East Coast of Malaysia
South China Sea Fisheries Development and Coordination Programme,
Manila Working Paper SCS/75/WP/15
Lee Boon Thong
1977 "Malay urbanization and the ethnic profile of urban centers in
Peninsular Malaysia" J. of Southeast Asian Studies VIII (2)
(September 77): 2242-34
Lee, Eddy L. H.
1972 Educational planning in West Malaysia KL: Oxford Uni..Press
1975 Income distribution in a developing economy: a case study of
West Malaysia unpublished PhD thesis, Oxford University
1977 "Rural poverty in West Malaysia 1957-70" in ILO (1977)
Poverty and Landlessness in Rural Asia Chap. 9 pp. 185-204
Lee, George
1973 "Commodity production and reproduction amongst the Malayan
peasantry", JCA 3 (4): 441-455
551
Lee Hock Lock
1974 Public policies and measures towards economic diversification
- a critical study of the experience of West Malaysia 1957-70
unpublished PhD thesis, Univ. of Malaya
Lee, P. C. and Panton, W. P.
1971 Land capability classification report, West Malaysia
KL:Government Printers
Lee Sheng-yi
1973 "Bankigg and financial development of Singapore and Malaysia
since 1958" Southeast Asian J. of Social Sc. I (1): 1-16
Lehmann, David (ed.)
1974 Peasants, landlords and Governments: Agrarian reform in the
Third World NY: Holmes and Meier
Lent, John A. (ed.)
1976 Cultural pluralism in Malaysia: polity, military, mass media,
education, religion and social class Dekalb, Illinois:
Northern Illinois Univ. Center for Southeast Asian Studies
Special Report #14
Li Dun Jen
1955 British Malaya: an economic analysis NY: American Press
Lim Chong Yah
1967 Economic development of Modern Malaya KL: Oxford Univ. Press
Lim, David
1977 "Do foreign companies pay higher wages than their local
counterparts:.in Malaysian manufacturing?"' J-. of "Development
Economics 4(1): 55-66
1976 "Hours worked, methods of wage payment and wage rates in
West Malaysian manufacturing: a note" Malayan Econ. Review
XXI (1): 68-77
1975 "INdustrialization and unemployment in West Malaysia" in
David Lim (ed. ) (1975) 213-224
1973 Economic Growth and development in West Malaysia 1947-70
K. L. : Oxford Univ. Press
Lim David (ed.)
1975 Readings in Malaysian economic development KL: Oxford Univ. Press
Lim, Linda
1978a Multinational firms and manufacturing for export in less-
develope dcountries: the case of the electronics industry in
Malaysia and Singapore uhpublished PhD thesis, Univ. of Michigan
1978b "Women workers in MNCs in developing countries: the case of the
electronic industry in Malaysia and Singapore" Occasional
Paper no. 9, Univ. of Michigan Women's Studies Program (Oct.)
552
Lim Mah Hui
1978 Ownership & control in a dependent economy :The -case of Malaysia's
one hundred largest corporations Unpublished Ph.D. thesis,
Univ. of Pittsburgh
Lim Sow Ching
1975 "Marketing of rubber by smallholders in Peninsular Malaysia"
UN Econ. Bulletin for Asia & the Pacific XXVI(2-3):58-7l
Lim Sow Ching
1972 Land development schemes in: a study of benefits & costs
Unpublished Ph.D. thesis, ANU
Lim Sow Ching & Chong Kow Ming
1974 "Merits of estate participation & incentive Wage system in
public sector land development", Kajian Ekonomi Malaysia
XI(l)(June): 53-67
Lim Teck Ghee
1977 Peasants and their agricultural economy in colonial Malaya
1874-1941 K.L.: Oxford Univ. Press.
Lim Teck Ghee, et al
1974 Land Tenure Survey: Farm Locality D-II Muda Irrigation Scheme,
Final RepQrt MADA & USM (Center for Policy Research)
Linde. berg,
1975
Lindenberg,
173
Lipton, M.
1977
Lubeck, P.M
1977
MacAndrews,
1976
M.
"Multinational corporates & reinvestment rates: the case of
the Pioneer Industry Program in Malaysia", International
Political Studies Quarterly,19(l)(March)
M.
Foreign & domestic investment in the pioneer industry program,
Malaysia: 1965-70, Political, economic & social impacts
Unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Univ. of Southern Calif.
Why poor people stay poor: a study of urban bias in World Deve-
lopment Harvard Univ. Press
"Contrasts & continuity in a dependent city: Kano, Nigeria"
Chap.22 in Abu-Lughod & Hay (ed.)(1977)
C.
Migration, mobility & modernization: a study of the Federal Land
Development Authority & its role in modernizing the rural Malay
unpublished Ph.D. thesis, M.I.T.
MacAndrews, C. & Yamamoto, K.
1976 "Induced & voluntary migration in Malaysia: the FELDA's role in
migration since 1957" Southeast Asian J.of Social Science(Feb.)
553
MacDougall, J. A. and Chew Sock Foon
1976 "English Language competence and occupational mobility in
Singapore" Pacific Affairs 49 (2): 294-312
MacEwen, A. M.
1974 "Differentiation among the urban poor: an Argentine study"
in de Kadt and Williams (ed.) (1974)
Mak Lau-fong
1977 The emergence and persistence of Chinese secret societies
in Singapore and Malaysia unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Univ. of
Waterloo (Canada)
Malaya, Federation of
1958 Report of the Land Adminstration Commission
1957 Report of the Industrial Development Working Party
1958 Report of the Education Committee 1956 (The 'Razak Report')
1960 Report of the Educational Review Committee 1960 (The'Rahman
Talib Report')
1951 Report on Malay education in the Federation of Malaya
(The 'Barnes Report')
1951 Report on Chinese education (The 'Fenn-Wu Report')
Malaysia
1976
1973
1971
Third Malaysia Plan 1976-80
Mid-term review of the Second Malaysia Plan 1971-75
Second Malaysia Plan 1971-1975
MCDS
1974 "Public enterprises in Malaysia - a general survel " Development
Forum IV (2): 1-20
Malaysian Trade Union Congress
1976 General Council Report 1974-76 Petaling Jaya
Mann, L.
1977
Mazumdar,
1977
Mazumdar,
1975
McGee, T.
"Some effects of foreign investment: the case of Malaysia"
Bull, of Concerned Asian Scholars 9(4) (Oct. Dec.): 2-14
D.
Education and employment in urban Malaysia Washington, D.C.:
World Bank Dev. Econ. Dept. (mimeo)
D.
"The urban informal sector", World Bank Staff Working Paper #211
G.
1976 "Hawkers and hookers: making out in the Third World city: some
Southeast Asian examples" Manpower and Unemployment Research
9 (1) (April)
1975 "Malay migration to K. L. city: individual adaptation to the
city" in Du Toi and Sofa (ed.) (1975) pp 143-178
554
1974 "The persistence of the proto-proletariat: occupational
structures and planning of the future of Third World cities"
Chapter 20 in Abu-Lughod and Hay (ed.) (1977)
1972 "Rural-urban migration in a plural society: a case study of
Malays in West Malaysia" in Dwyer (ed.) (1972)
1971a The urbanization process in the Third World London G. Bell
1971b "Malays in K. L. city: an investigation of one aspect of the
process of urbanization 0- occupational mobility" in McGee,
T. G. (1971)
1967 Southeast Asian cities London G. Bell
1963 "The cultural roles of cities : a case study of Kuala Lumpur",
J. of Trop. Geog. 17:178-96
McGee,T.G. & Yeung,Y.M.
1977 Hawkers in Southeast Asian cities : planning for the bazaar
economy
Means,G.P.
1976
1972
Meerman, J.
1977
Mehmet,0.
1972
MilneR.S.
1976
Mills,C.P.
1971
Malaysian politics (2nd ed.) London: Hodder & Stoughton
"Special rights as a strategy of development", Comparative
Politics V: 29-62
The redistribution of public expenditure in Penin.sular
Malaysia Washington D.C. : World Bank (mimeo.)
"Manpower planning and labor markets in developing countries :
a case study of West Malaysia", J. of Development Studies
8(2) (Feb.)
"The politics of Malaysia's New Economic Policy", Pacific
Affairs 49(2): 235-262
Industrial Disputes Law in Malaysia
Law Journal Ltd
Singapore: Malayan
stry of Agriculture
1976 Agriculture in Peninsular Malaysia (draft,Dec.)
1960 Census.-of Agriculture (in 16 volumes)
v.y. Statistical Digest, Peninsular Malaysia
1967 Farm economic survey of the Muda River Project 1966
Ministry
1973
of Education
Dropout Study Educational Planning & Research Division
Ministry of Labor
v.y. Annual Report
Mini
555
Ministry of National Unity
1973 A socioeconomic survey of New Villages in Perak & Melaka
Mitchell,R.E.
1972 Levels of emotional strain in Southeast Asian cities: a study
individual responses to the stresses of urbanization and
7ndustrialization Vol. I & II Taipei: Orient Cultural Service
Mizuno,K.
1977 "Comparative analysis of rural development - rice growing
villages in Thailand and Malaysia", Southeast Asian Studies 15(3)
Mohd. Noor
1974
Mohd. Noor
1968
bin Mohamed
"Masaalah pemilikan tanah di Mukim Gunong", J. Antropoloji &
Sosioloji III : 41-47
bin Wahab & Arun,K.C.
"Rubber smallholdings in West Malaysia", K.L.: Natural Rubber
Conference (preprint)
Mohd. Nor Ghani
1978 "Preliminary socio-economic report of the Shah Alam industrial
workers", K.L. (mimeo. draft)
Mohd. Yob bin Busu
1974 A survey of the land administration in the state of Johore
MCDS occasional paper no.3
Mokhzani,B.A.R.
1965 "The study of social stratification and social mobility in
Malaya", East Asian Cultural Studies IV(Mar.)
M1oktar bin Tamin & N.Hashim Mustapha
1975 'elantan, West Malaysia", in IRRI(1975): 201-23
Montagna,P.D.
1977 Occupations and Society : toward a sociology of the labor market
NY : Wiley
Moore,B.J.
1975
Morawetz,D.
1974
"Restructuring wealth ownership", USM-CPR discussion paper no.2
"Employment implications of industrialization in developing
countries : a survey", World Bank Staff Working Paper no.1?0
Moser, C.
1978 "Informal sector or petty commodity production: dualism or
dependence in urban development ?", in Bromley(ed.)(1978)
1977 "The dual economy and marginality debate and the contribution of
micro analysis : market sellers in Bogota", Development & Change
8(4):465-89
Mouly ,J.
1977 "Employment: a concept in need of innovation", Int. Labor Review 116(1)
556
Mulat, T.
1976
Munro, G.
1977
Nagata, J
(July-Aug.): 1-9
"The working of urban labor markets in developing areas"
Labor and Society 1(1): 63-78
and Chee Kim Loy
The economics of fishing in the developing world: a Malaysian
case study Penang: USM Press
A.
1974 "Urban interlude: some aspects of internal Malay migration
in West Malaysia" International Migration Review VIII (2):
301-24
Nagata, J. (ed.)
1975 Pluralism in Malaysia: myth and reality Leider: Brill
Narayanan, S.
1975 Urban in-migration and urban labor absorption: a study of
metropolitan Selangor K.L.: unpublished M. Econ. thesis,
Univ. of Malaya Faculty of Econ. & Admin.
Narkswasdi, V. and Selvadurai, S.
1968 Economic survey of padi production in West Malaysia K.L:
Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives
Nash, Manning
1974 Peasant citizens: politics, religion and modernization in
Kelantan, Malaysia Athens, Ohio: Ohio Univ., Paper in
International Studies Southeast Asian series no. 31
Ness, G. D.
1967 Bureaucracy and rural development in Malaysia
Berkeley: univ. of Calif. Press
Neville, R. J. W.
1962 "An urban study of Pontian Kechil, South-West Malaya"
J. of Trop. Geog. 16 (Oct.): 32-56
Newell, W.
1962
Nijhar, K.
1976
Nordin Sel
1976
Nozawa, M.
1974
Nyce, Ray
1973
O'Connor,
1973
H.
Treacherous River: a study of rural Chinese in North Malaya
K.L.: Univ. of Malaya Press
S.
Wage Structure: a case study in Malaysia KL: Academic
Publishers Sdn. Bhd.
at
Kelas Menengah Pentadbir Melayu: Satu Kalian Perkembganap
Gaya Hidup KL: Utusan Melayu (M) Berhad
and Kawaguchi, K.
"Capital accumulation and changes in the structure of the
laboring classes in Japan since 1960" Kyoto Univ. Econ
Review XLIV (1-2): 19-58
Chinese New Villages in Malaya: a community study
Singapore: Malaysian Sociological Research Inst.
James
The fiscal crisis of the state NY: St. Martin's Press
MITLibraries
Document Services
Room 14-0551
77 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02139
Ph: 617.253.2800
Email: docs@mit.edu
http:/libraries.mit.edu/docs
DISCLAIMER
Page-bas been ommitted due to a pagination error
by the author.
560
O'Mara, G. T.
1975 An econometric analysis of small scale industry in Malaysia
Northwestern Univ. (mimeo., May 1975)
Ooi Jin Bee
1976 Peninsular Malaysia NY: Longman
1975 "Urbanization and the urban population in Peninsular Malaysia"
J.of Tropical Geography 37: 53-67
1963 Land, People and Economy in Malaya London: Longman
Pahang Tenggara Masterplanning Study
1972 Sociology and Migration in Pahang Tenggara
Parmer, J. N.
1960 Colonial labor policy and administration: a history of labor
in the rubber plantation industry in Malaya 1910-41
NY: J. J.~Augustin
Patnaik, U.
1976 "Class differentiation within the peasantry: an approach to
analysis of Indian Agriculture" Econ. & Pol. Weekly XI
(39): A82-AlOl
Peace, A. J.
1974 "Lagos factory workers and urban belief-systems: overview
of a paradox" (mimeo draft)
Pearse, A.
1977 "Technology and peasant production: reflections on a Global
Study" Dev. and Change 8(2) (April):125-160
Peattie, Lisa
1975 "'Tertiarization' and urban poverty in Latin America"
in Cornelius and Trueblood (ed.) (1975)
Peiris, D.
1975 "The emerging rural revolution", Far Eastern Econ. Review
Jan. 10, 1975
Popense, 0.
1969 "A study of Malay entrepreneurs" in David Lim (ed.) (1975)
KL: Oxford U. Press
Pryor, R. J.
1978 "Internal migrants in Penin. Malaysia" J. Tropical Geography
46 (June): 61-75
1977 "The migrant to the city in Southeast Asia - can, and should
we generalize?" Asian Profile 5(1) (Feb.): 63-89
Purcal, John T.
1972 Rice economy: emploment and income in Malaysia
Honolulu: Univ. Press of Hawaii
Puthucheary, J. J.
1960 Ownership and control in the Malavan economy Singapore:
Eastern Univ. Press
561
Puthucheary, M. C.
1977 "Public enterprise and the creation of a Bumiputra entre-
preneurial community", paper presented at Fourth Malaysian
Economic Convention, May 177, K. L.
1976 "Coordination of public enterprises: country study for
Malaysia" in A. S. H. K. Sadique (ed.) (1976): 417-446
Quah Chin Eng
1975 "Differentiation within the Chinese community in Penang"
in S. Gardner (ed.) (1975) pp 1-41
Quijano, A.
1974 "The marginal pole of the economy and the marginalized
labor force" Economy and Society 3 (4): 393-428
Rabenau, K. V.
1976 "Trade policies and industrialization ina developing
country: the case of West Malaysia" Malayan Econ. Review
XXI (1): 23-46
Radzi bin Manan
1975 "Tinjauan tentang kegiatan mengusaha dan mendudoki tanah
secara haram diNegri Perak" Geographica Vol. 10: 42-46
Raja Mohd. Affandi bin Raja Halim
1976 "Coordination of public enterprises: country study for
Malaysia" in A.S.H.K.Sadique (ed.) (1976): 363-415
Rajeswari, A.
1972 "Class, caste and ethnicism among urban Indians in Malaya,
1920-41" Nusantara 2 (July)
Roberts, K., et. al.
1977 The fragmentary class structure London: Humanities Press
Rogers, M. L.
1968 Political involvement in a rural Malay community
unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Univ. of Calif., Berkeley
Rosenberg, Nathan
1976 Perspectives on Technology Cambridge Univ. Press
RISDA
1976 RISDA in brief
1974 Annual Report 1973
Rudner, Martin
1977 "Education, development and change in Malaysia" Southeast
Asian Studies DV (1) (June): 23-62
1973 "Malayan labor in transition - labor policy and trade unionism,
1955-1963" Modern Asian Studies 7 (1): 21-45
Rudra, Ashok
1978 "Class relations in IndianAgriculture" Part I, II, & III
Econ. and Political Weekly June 7, 10, 17, 1978
Ruttan, V. W.
1977 "The Green Revolution: Seven Generalizations" IDR XIX (4):
19-23
562
Sacerdoti, G. and Wilson, P.
1978 "Stockmarket spoils for sons of the soil" Far Eastern
Economic Review (Oct. 6): 72-74
Sadique, Abu Sharof H. K. (ed.)
1976 Public Enterprise in Asia: Studies on Coordination and
Control K.L. : Asian Center fro Development Administration
Sandbrook, Richard
1975 Proletarians and African capitalism: the Kenvan case, 1960-
1972 Cambridge Univ. Press
Sandbrook, R. and Arn, J.
1977 The laboring poor and urban class formation: the case of
Greater Accra McGill Univ: Center for Developing Area Studies
Sandbrook, R. and Cohen, R. (ed.)
1975 The development of an African working class: studies in
class formation and action Toronto: Univ. of Toronto
Sandhu Singh, K.
1964 "Emergency resettlement in Malaya" J. of Tropical Geography
18: 157-183
Santos, Milton
1977 "Spatial dialectics: the 2 circuits of the urban economy in
underdeveloped countries" Antipode 9(3) (Dec/): 49-59
Sarjit Singh, Jasbir
1974 "Social stratification in Petaling Jaya, Malaysia"
Southeast Asian J. of Social Sc. I (1-2): 75-92
Saw Swee Hock
1972
Scott, A. M.
1976
Seers, Dudley
1976
Selvadurai, S
"Pattern of urbanization in West Malaysia, 1911-1970"
MalaVan Econ. Review 17(2): 114-20
"Who are the self-employed?" Univ. of Essex (mimeo. draft,
June 1, 1976)
"The political economy of national accounting" in Cairncross,
A. and Puri, M. (ed.) Employment, Income Distribution and
Development Strategy: Problems of the Developing Countries
NY: Holmes and Meier (1976): pp 193-209
1972a Padi farming in West Malaysia K.L.: Ministry of Agriculture
and fisheries
1972b Padi Survey: Sungai Manik and Changkat Jong Irrigation Areas,
Perak K.L. : Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries
1972c Socio-economic survey of rubber smallholdings in West
Johore K.L.: Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries
Selvadurai, et. al.
1969a Socio-economic study of padi farms in Province Wellesley
1968 K.L.: Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives
563
1969b Socio-economic studies of padi farms in the Kemubu area of
Kelantan 1968 K.L.: Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives
Selvadurai, S. and Narkswasdi, U.
1968 Economic survey of padi production in West Malaysia
(Selangor, Collective Padi Cultivation in Bachang, and
Malacca) K.L.: Ministry of Agriculture and Cooperatives
Selvaratnam,
1976
Sen, A. K.
1975
V. and Dissanayake, B.W.
"Migration, regional development and employment in Penin-
sular Malaysia: the case of Negri Sembilan Timor"
Developing Economies XIV (2) (June)
Employment, technology, and development Oxford: Clarendon
Press
Shamsul Bahrin, T.
1971 "Some aspects of land reform in Malaysia", in MCDS (1972)
Report on the 6th International Seminar on Development
(K.L. August, 1971)
1968 "Land development in post-independence Malaysia: some lessons"
Geographica 4: 67-83
Shanin, T. (ed.)
1971 Peasants and peasant societies Penguin
Sieh Mei Ling
1977 "Size distribution of shareholders in manufacturing
companies of Malaysia 1974-75" paper presented in the
Fourth Malaysian Economic Convention (KL, May 1977)
1974 The Structure of retail trade in West Malaysia Univ. of
Malaya: Faculty of Econ. and Admin. Occas. Papers on
Malaysian Socioeconomic Affairs #2
Siew Nim CheE
1961
Silcock, T. H
1965
"Labor and tin-mining in Malaya" in Silcock (ed.) (1961):
404-439
1.
"The effects of industrialization on race relations in
Malaya" in M. M. Tumin (ed.) (1969) Comparative perspectives
on race relations (Boston: Little, Brown & Co.): 140-160
Silcock, T. H. (ed.)
1961 Readings in Malayan economics Singapore: Eastern Univ. Press
Silcock, T.H. and Fisk, E.K. (ed.)
1963 The political economy of independent Nalaya CAnberra:
Australian National Univ. Press
Simoniya, N.
1961
A.
Overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia Ithaca: Cornell Univ.
Siti Zahariah Sulaiman
1975 MARA Junior Science College unpublished Ph.D. thesis,
Cornell Univ. (Education)
564
Smith, E.D. and Goethals, P.R.
1965 Tenancy among padi cultivators in Malaysia Ford Foundation
Snodgrass, D. R.
1974 "The growth and utilization of Malaysian labor supply"
HIID Development Discussion Paper #1
Economic inequality and development in Malaysia (forthcoming)
Soon Lee Ying
1975a An economic analysis of internal migration in West Malaysia
unpublished M. Econ. thesis, Univ. of Malaya Faculty of
Econ. and Admin.
197.5b "Trends and patterns of internal migration in Peninsular
Malaysia" Kalian Ekonomi Malaysia XII (2): 40-60
Southworth, H. and Barnett, M. (ed.)
1974 Experience in farm mechanization in South East Asia
Singapore: Agricultural Development Council
Stenson, M.
1970 Industrial conflict in Malaya KL: Oxford Univ. Press
Stewart, Francis
1977 Technology and Underdevelopment Boulder, Colorado: Westview
Press
Stewart, F. and Weeks, J.
1975 "The employment effect of wage changes in poor countries"
J. of Dev. Studies 11(2): -93-107
Stinchcombe, A.L.
1968 Constructing Social theories NY: Harcourt, Brace and World
Stockwell, A. J.
1976 "The historiography of Malaysia: recent writing in English
on the history of the area since 1874" J. of Imperial and
Commonwealth History V (1): 82-110
Straefland, P.
1977 "The absorptive capacity of the urban tertiary sector in
Third World countries" Development and Change 8(3) (July):
293-306
Strange, Heather
1978 "Education and employment patterns of rural Malay women
1965-1975" J. Asian and African Studies XIII (1-2): 50-64
Strauch, Judith
1975 Sanchun, Malaysia: Local level politics in a rural Chinese
town unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Stanford University
Suffian bin Hashim, Tan Sri Mhd.
1972 An Introduction to the Constitution of Malaysia KL
Sumitro, Djojohadikusomo
1968 Trade and aid in Southeast Asia Vol. 1 : Malaysia and
Singapore Melbourne: Cheshire
565
Sutcliffe, R. B.
1971 Industry and underdevelopment Addison-Wesley
Swift, M. G.
1967 "Economic concentration and Malay Peasant society"
in M. Freedman (ed.) (1967) Social Organization (Chicago:
Aldine)
1965 Malay peasant society in Jelebu Univ. of London: Athlone
Press
Szentes, T.
1971 Political economy of underdevelopment Budapest: Akademiai
Kiado
Takei, Y., Bock, J. C. and Saunders, B.
1973 Educational sponsorhip by ethnicity: a preliminary analysis
of the West Malaysian experience Athens, Ohio: Ohio Univ.,
Center for International Studies, Southeast Asian series #28
Tan Tat Wai
1977 Income distribution and determination in West Malaysia
unpublished Ph.D. thesis, Harvard Univ. (Department of
Economics)
Tham Seong Chee
1973 "Ideology, politics and economic modernization: the case of
the Malays in Malaysia" Southeast Asian J. of Social Sc.
I (1): 41-60
Thillainathan, R.
1976a An analysis of the effects of policies for the redistri-
bution of income and wealth in West Malaysia unpublished
Ph.D. thesis, London School of Econ.
1976b "Public enterprises in Malaysia - problems and prospects"
UMBC Econ. Rev. XII (2): 37-45
Thoburn, J.T.
1977a Primary Commodity exports and economic development:
Theory, evidence and a case study of Malaysia London: Wiley
1977b "Commodity prices and appropriate technology - some lessons
from tin-mining" J. of Development Studies 14(1) (Oct.):
35-52
Todaro, M.P.
1976
Tokman, V.
1978
Tsuda, M.
1972
Turnham, D.
1971
Internal migration in developing countries Geneva: ILO
"An exploration into the nature of informal-formal sector
relationships" in Bromley (ed.) (1978)
"Wage and salary structure in Asian Context, Pt. 2"
Hitotsubashi J. of Social Studies 6 (Nov.): 10-20
The employment problem in less developed countries Paris:
OECD Development Center
566
Waterman, Pet
1975
Webb, R.
1976
er
"The 'labor aristocracy in Africa: introduction to a
debate" Dev. and Change 6(3) (July): 57-74
"On the statistical mapping of urban poverty and employ-
ment", World Bank Staff Working Paper no. 227
Weeks, J.
1971a "Does employment matter?" Manpower and Unemployment Research
4 (1)
1971b "The political economy of labor transfer" Science and
Society 35 (4)
1971c "Wage policy and colonial legacy a comparative study"
J. of Modern African Studies (Oct.)
Wheelwright, E. L.
1965 Industrialization in Malaysia Melbourne: Melbourne Univ. Press
Wikkramatileke, R.
1972a "Federal Land Development in West Malaysia, 1957-71"
Pacific Viewpoint 13 (1)
1972b "Jengka Triangle, West Malaysia: A regional development
project" Geographical Review 62 (Oct.): 82-92
1964 "Variable ethnic attributes in Malayan rural land develop-
ment" Pacific Viewpoin 5 (1): 35-49
Williams, G.
1974 "Political consciousness among the Ibadan poor" in de Kadt
and Williams (ed.) (1974)
Wilson, A. B.
1977 "Education, mobility, and expectations of youths in Malaysia"
in J. A. Lent (ed.) (1977): 58-70
Wilson, P. J.
1967 A Malay village in Malaysia: social values and rural
development New Haven: HRAF Press
Wilson, T.B.
1958 Economics of Padi Production in North Malaya, Part 1:
Land tenure, rents, land use and fragmentation K. L.:
Dep artment of Agri. Bulletin #103, Fed. of Malaya
Winzeler, R. L.
1976 "Ethnic differences and economic change in a local Malaysian
setting" South East Asian Studies XIV (3): 309-334
Wohlmuth, K. (ed.)
1973 Employment creation in developing societies: the situation
of labor in dependent economies NY: Praeger
Yap Chan Ling
1973 "Over-expansion in the trawler industry with specific
reference to the Dindings district of West Malaysia"
Kajian Ekonomi Malaysia X(2) (Dec. 73): 79-101
567
UNCRD
1976 Growth pole strategy and regional development planning in
Asia Nagoya, Japan
UKM Jabatan Ilmu Alam
1974 "Perusahaan Perikanan diPahang: satu laporan awal" Ilmu
Alam 3
1972 "Perusahaan Perikanan diKemaman, Trengganu: satu laporan
permulaan" Ilmu Alam 1 (May)
Urban Development Authority
1973 "Report on survey of Malay businessmen, West Malaysia 1972"
(mimeo. draft, June 1973)
von der Mehden, F. R.
1978 "Communalism, bureaucracy and access to public services in
Afro-Asia: an overview" Rice Univ. Program of Dev. Studies
Paper #89
1976 Communalism, Wealth and income in Afro-Asia Rice Univ.
Program of Development Studies
1975 "Communalism, industrial policy and income distribution in
Malaysia" Asian Survey 15(3): 259-61
1973 "Industrialization in Malaysia: a Penang micro-study"
Rice Univ. Program of Dev. Studies Paper #45
von Vorys, Karl
1976 Democracy without consensus: communalism and political
stability in Malaysia Princeton: Princeton U. Press
Voon Phin-Keong
1977a "Rural land ownership and development in the Malay Reser-
vations of Peninsular Malaysia" Southeast Asian Studies
XIV (4): 496-512
1977b "The adoption of technological innovations in rubber
processing: the case of Malaysian smallholders" Malayan
Econ. Review XXII (2) (Oct.): 33-51
1972 "Size aspects of rubber smallholdings in West Malaysia: a
case study of Bentong, Pahang" J. Tropical Geography 34
(June): 65-76
Vreeland, N., et. al.
1977 Area Handbook for Malaysia (Third Edition) Washington, D. C:
The American Univ. Foreign Area Studies
Wofa, S. H.
1973 "Land development strategies in Malaysia: an empirical study,
Part II" Kajian Ekonomi Malaysia X(2): 1-50
1972 "Land development strategies in Malaysia: an empirical study,
Part I" Kajian Ekonomi Malaysia IX (2): 1-28
Watton, J. and Masotti, L. H. (ed.)
1976 The city in comparative perspective Sage
Wang Gung-wu (ed.)
1964 Malaysia: a survey NY: Praeger
568
Yap, Y. L.
1975
Yew, Y. K.
1976
"Internal migration in less developed societies: a survey
of the literatures" World Bank Staff Working Paper no. 215
"Education and the acculturation of the Malaysian Chinese:
a survey of Form IV pupils in Chinese and English schools
in West Malaysia" Philippines Sociological Review 24:93-126
Yip Yat Hoong
1969 The Development of the tin mining industry of Malaysia
K. L.: Univ. of Malaya Press
Young, M. L.
1977 "Migration and Development: a case study of a rural
settlement within a development scheme in Peninsular
Malaysia" paper presented to UNCRD Colloquim on Rural-
Urban Relations, Nagoya (Nov., 77)
Yu, C. H.
1971 "Capitalist development and the Overseas Chinese economy:
Thailand" Developing Economies IX(3): 246-267
& / "J *Da - e.
C /
*A ' j/4--,VV
d-
